COX II v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Edward C. Cox, II, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 3 felony. Cox claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion because the withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to “correct a manifest injustice.” Appellant's Brief at 13.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 5, 2022, Cox was caring for his three-year-old daughter, A.C., at his Vincennes apartment. At some point, Cox fell asleep and when he awoke, he realized that he forgot to place a baby gate in front of his cat's litter box. As a consequence, A.C. “had gotten into the cat litter box and made a mess of the kitty litter and the feces inside of it,” while Cox was sleeping. Transcript at 46. Although Cox spanked A.C., “she didn't cry or seem to have any kind of reaction,” so he “smacked her in the face.” Id.

[4] Shortly thereafter, Cox called his mother and told her that he hit A.C. “out of anger and injured her.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 18. Cox's mother went to the apartment and observed that A.C. “had a black eye, bruising on both sides of her face, and a swollen lip.” Id. Cox's mother called police, and officers were dispatched to Cox's residence. When the officers entered the apartment, they observed “severe swelling on the left side of [A.C.’s] face, a black eye, a swollen lip, and bruising throughout [A.C.’s] face which resembled a handprint.” Id. at 19. Cox admitted to the responding officers that he had inflicted the injuries to A.C. and that he had “taken it too far.” Transcript at 47.

[5] On June 6, 2022, the State charged Cox with domestic battery with serious bodily injury to a person under 14 years of age, a Level 3 felony.¹ During the course of the pretrial proceedings, Cox claimed that A.C.’s injuries were not “serious” and that he “had proof” to dispute that element of the charge. Id. at 20. Cox further asserted that his counsel believed that the “charge was not fair,” and that he was only willing to plead guilty to battery as a Level 5 felony, i.e., domestic battery on a child under the age of 14. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 92.

[6] Notwithstanding Cox's claim, he decided to plead guilty—five days before his jury trial was to commence—to the charged offense. At the beginning of the plea hearing on February 15, 2024, the trial court informed Cox that he “should speak with his counsel at any time” if there was any misunderstanding. Transcript at 5. After advising Cox of his constitutional rights, the trial court read the text of the Level 3 felony charge to Cox, along with the sentencing range for the offense. Cox acknowledged that the State “would have to prove each part of the statutory definition [of the charged offense] beyond a reasonable doubt” if he proceeded to trial. Id. at 9. A factual basis was presented, at which time Cox admitted that the State would be able to prove that he inflicted serious bodily injuries on A.C. The trial court then found that Cox had voluntarily waived his rights and that a factual basis existed for Cox's guilty plea.

[7] Approximately two weeks prior to the sentencing hearing, Cox sent the following letter to his counsel, which was also filed with the trial court:

I no longer wish to take a guilty plea to a Lv3 charge. I've had time to consider this decision. You said in our last meeting at the jail that a Lv3 was not a fair charge to my case. I've decided to take my chances to a jury trail [sic] where I can file a motion to appeal to a higher court if I'm wrong sentenced [sic] to a Lv3 crime. You didn't tell me I could get maxed out to 16 yrs on a [sic] open Lv3 plea which was wrong on your end. I had the impression of getting under 9 yrs split to work release and probation. The original charge was a Lv6 and due to the statement ․ [A.C.] “released with NO extensive injury” should prove I'm not guilty of a Lv3 crime. So unless I'm given a Lv5 plea split to work release and probation I will take this to a jury trail [sic]. You said yourself, you thought and agreed a Lv3 charge was not right[.] I hope your [sic] willing and prepared to argue these facts.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 81.

[8] Thereafter, Cox obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on October 10, 2024, alleging that there was a “[l]ack of factual basis” for the charged offense and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “explain the ramifications of an open plea of guilty; namely, that Defendant could receive a maximum sentence.” Id. at 114–16.

[9] At a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Cox maintained that he did not believe he caused serious bodily injury to A.C. and felt “pushed” by his previous counsel to plead guilty to the charge as a Level 3 felony. Transcript at 22. Cox claimed that he researched the statutory definition of serious bodily injury in February 2023—a year before the guilty plea hearing. When Cox was asked on direct examination why he did not believe that he caused serious bodily injury to A.C., he responded:

I am going to say the reason why I plead guilty to the Level 3 at the time was because [trial counsel] told me that when he went to [the deputy prosecutor] and said hey, he's trying to get a Level 5 plea, according to [counsel], he completed [sic] freaked out. And in his words, said that he was frothing at the mouth and that he wasn't going to be convinced otherwise that I was not guilty of—or that I was guilty of a Level 3․ And at that time, that's when I—I—I—got scared and panicked, and I thought that was the best thing for me to do.

Id. at 21.

[10] When questioned by the trial court, Cox confirmed that he acknowledged at the guilty plea hearing that the State had sufficient evidence to prove the serious bodily injury element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Cox then remarked that he “made a mistake with that answer.” Id. at 29-30. At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied Cox's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and commented:

I have considered the testimony of the witness as well as argument of Counsel. I have also taken judicial notice ․ of the previous change of plea hearing wherein the Defendant did change his plea. Having considered the statute regarding withdrawal of pleas as well, I am going to determine that the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be denied. I don't believe that there has been a manifest injustice during that change of plea hearing. At all points, Mr. Cox indicated that he understood what he was doing. He was put under oath. He was questioned with regards to the establishment of a factual basis. He indicated yes to the question was there serious bodily injury. He was advised of the statute. He was advised of the possible penalty provisions. I believe that Mr. Cox was aware of what he was pleading guilty to. He may have had regrets later, but regrets about a plea that you have entered does not equal manifest injustice.

Id. at 36.

[11] The trial court subsequently sentenced Cox to twelve years of incarceration with four years suspended to probation. Cox now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] After a guilty plea is entered, but before the sentence is imposed, the Indiana Code provides two potential avenues for withdrawal of a guilty plea. The trial court “shall” allow the withdrawal of the plea upon proof that it is “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Jefferson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(c). Absent that showing, the trial court “may allow” the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.” I.C. § 35-35-1-4(b). “Manifest injustice” and “substantial prejudice” are necessarily imprecise standards, and an appellant seeking to overturn a trial court's decision faces a high hurdle. Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995).

[13] The defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence, and a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001); I.C. § 35-35-1-4(e). We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion and in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered “freely and knowigly.” Coomer, 652 N.E.2d at 62; see also Akins v. State, 245 N.E.3d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[14] In this case, Cox contends that the withdrawal of his plea was warranted to correct a manifest injustice because he is innocent of the charged offense and that he should have been more fully informed about the definition of serious bodily injury. As for the first contention, Cox could have chosen to proceed to trial if he truly believed that he was innocent of the charged offense. But Cox pled guilty for reasons other than his claimed innocence in light of his comments at the plea withdrawal hearing that he “got scared and panicked and ․ thought that was the best thing ․ to do.” Transcript at 21. To be sure, Cox clearly and unequivocally admitted at the guilty plea hearing that he committed the charged offense and understood the effect of his guilty plea. The trial court informed Cox of the possible sentencing range, and Cox acknowledged that he had reviewed the guilty plea with counsel and stated that pleading guilty was his own decision and that he was entering the plea of his own free will. At no point during the hearing did Cox mention not understanding the nature of the charge against him or the possible sentence that could be imposed. For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Cox's alleged claim of innocence did not constitute a manifest injustice. See, e.g., Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the refusal to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea did not constitute manifest injustice when it was determined among other things that he understood the nature and effect of his plea agreement), trans. denied.

[15] We further note that to the extent that Cox contends that he should have been more thoroughly informed of the definition of serious bodily injury at the guilty plea hearing, he provides no authority for that proposition, nor have we found any. Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record indicating that Cox knew the definition of serious bodily injury. The letter Cox wrote to his counsel months before the plea stated that A.C. suffered “[n]o extensive injury” and that he “shouldnt [sic] be charged with a LV3 felony” even though “slapping [his] child and leaving a bruise was 100% wrong.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 68.

[16] Finally, although Cox contends that the motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the possible sentencing range for the offense, the record contradicts that claim. At the guilty plea hearing, Cox was specifically informed of the elements of the offense and the possible penalties that could be imposed. In light of these advisements, it is apparent that Cox was fully aware of the possible sentence that could be imposed. The trial court was well within its discretion in determining that no fair and just reason supported withdrawal of Cox's guilty plea.

[17] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cox was also charged with neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, but the State subsequently dismissed that charge.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.