Mackshane Philip Budd, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Mackshane Philip Budd appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, claiming that reversal is warranted because the police officers’ purported inventory search of his vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Budd argues that the search failed to comport with any stated police policy regarding warrantless inventory searches and that the search was only a pretext to discover evidence of a crime.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 22, 2021, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Stacey Knight was driving westbound on East State Road 54 toward Bloomfield after leaving work. Budd was driving eastbound when his vehicle completely crossed the center line and struck Knight's vehicle, sending his car airborne. Knight's vehicle spun and stopped on the road near the shoulder, while Budd's car landed in the westbound lane of the roadway and was inoperable.

[4] Two Greene County Sheriff's Department (the Department) deputies—Jordan Allor and Cayden Walker (collectively, the Deputies)—were traveling on the same road en route to another call when they happened upon the wreckage. Once stopped, Deputy Allor helped Knight out of her car. Deputy Walker approached Budd's vehicle and noticed that Budd was in and out of consciousness and was suffering from a significant open wound to his abdomen. In addition to summoning medical personnel, the Deputies called for tow trucks and an accident reconstructionist. Both vehicles needed to be towed because they were in the road blocking traffic.

[5] At some point, the fire department arrived on the scene and used the jaws of life to remove Budd from his vehicle. Budd was then loaded into an ambulance and transported to IU Bloomington Hospital (the Hospital). While the Deputies waited for another ambulance to arrive and transport Knight to the Hospital for her injuries, Deputy Walker began to inventory Budd's vehicle in accordance with the Department's policy that required the officers to inventory impounded vehicles. Pursuant to that policy, Deputy Walker photographed the outside and inside of the vehicle to account for Budd's personal items and other items of value that were in the car. At some point during the inventory, Deputy Walker observed a half-full bottle of vodka on the floorboard of the front passenger seat, along with other personal items including the vehicle title and registration.

[6] The Deputies proceeded to the Hospital to obtain portable breath tests and/or chemical tests from Budd and Knight. Knight was administered a portable breath test ¹ and was treated for a broken ankle that required six months of physical therapy. The Deputies learned that Budd had already been airlifted to an Indianapolis hospital before their arrival, but the emergency room treating physician had taken a blood draw from Budd for in-house testing before he was transported to Indianapolis. The Deputies obtained a warrant for that draw and submitted the blood sample to the Indiana Department of Toxicology for testing. The results of that report established that Budd was intoxicated with a blood alcohol content of 0.094 g/100 ml at the time of the accident.

[7] On January 31, 2023, the State charged Budd with operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor, and operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of between 0.08 and 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 ml of the person's blood, a Class C misdemeanor. The State subsequently amended the charging information and dismissed all counts but the Level 5 felony.

[8] While Budd did not file a pretrial motion to suppress, he objected to the admission of evidence at his jury trial that commenced on October 1, 2024, regarding the search of his vehicle and the admission of the toxicology reports and photos of the vehicle title under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Over Budd's objection, the trial court admitted the photographs of the items found in Budd's vehicle during the inventory search. Budd also objected to the admission of the photographs of the registration and title to his vehicle, claiming that those items were seized during the alleged improper inventory search. The trial court admitted those photos over Budd's objection. Budd then objected to the Deputies’ retrieval of his blood sample pursuant to the search warrant, arguing that the warrant was obtained by using facts gathered during the alleged improper search. That objection was overruled, along with objections that Budd made to the admission of the blood test results and toxicology report. The jury found Budd guilty as charged, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to three and one-half years of incarceration with two years suspended to probation.

[9] Budd now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Where, as here, a motion to suppress is not filed prior to trial, the issue becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial. Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The standard of review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pretrial motion to suppress or by objection at trial. Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). That is, the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Those rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and ordinarily reversed when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. When, however, a challenge to such a ruling is “predicated on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.” Id.

[11] In this case, Budd claims that the admission of the evidence seized during the warrantless search—as well as the blood test results and the toxicology report—violated his rights under both the federal and state constitutions.² The Fourth Amendment—incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 991 (Ind. 2021). Because the Fourth Amendment “generally requires warrants for searches and seizures, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.” Combs, 168 N.E.3d at 991 (internal quotations and citations omitted). And when police seize and then search a vehicle, “both measures must be reasonable—that is, executed under a valid warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.

[12] An inventory search is one such exception to the warrant requirement “since it serves an administrative, not investigatory, purpose—because when police lawfully impound a vehicle, they must also perform an administrative inventory search to document the vehicle's contents to preserve them for the owner and protect themselves against claims of lost or stolen property.” Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016). Police are permitted to conduct a warrantless search of a lawfully impounded vehicle if the search is designed to produce an inventory of the vehicle's contents. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993). The underlying rationale for the inventory exception is three-fold: (1) protection of private property in police custody; (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of police from possible danger. Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (Ind. 2006).

[13] As in all Fourth Amendment cases, “the test of constitutionality in inventory cases is reasonableness.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431. In determining whether an inventory search is reasonable, we examine all the facts and circumstances, including the propriety of the impoundment giving rise to the search and the scope of the inventory search itself.³ Id. The search must be conducted pursuant to, and in conformity with, standard police procedures. Faust v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Evidence of established local policy and procedure is required “to ensure that the inventory is not a pretext for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[14] Where, as here, a written policy has not been admitted into evidence, the existence and relevant provisions of the policy can be established by a police officer's testimony. Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 376-78. Although inventory searches performed in conformity with police procedure are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the State must present more than the conclusory testimony of a police officer that the search was conducted as a routine inventory. Edwards, 762 N.E.2d at 133. That is, an evidentiary basis must exist for evaluating whether an inventory search was performed in conformity with standard police procedures, and the circumstances surrounding the search must indicate that the search was conducted pursuant to those procedures. See id.

[15] In this case, Deputy Allor testified that the Department's vehicle tow policy includes an inventory search of the vehicle. Deputy Allor explained that the policy ensures that things of value are documented, and the deputies therefore “take photographs of the vehicle and ․ look for anything of value ․ to protect the owner of the vehicle from whenever the vehicle leaves the scene ․ [s]o, we will note anything of value inside the vehicle and then we will [have] it towed.” Transcript Vol. II at 60-61. And Deputy Walker confirmed that it was Department policy to either “photograph or document on a piece of paper the inventory of the vehicle.” Transcript Vol. III at 57. He further explained that the Department's inventorying process includes “documenting or photographing the interior and exterior of the vehicle along with anything we believed to be of value to the person․” Id. at 58.

[16] In light of this testimony, it is apparent that the inventory search was limited and conducted in conformity with standard and established departmental procedures and policy. See e.g., Vehorn, 717 N.E.2d at 875 (finding that an inventory search was proper where the officer testified that he conducted it in accordance with standard policies, completed inventory sheets, and took photos to make a record of the vehicle's contents); see also Peete v. State, 678 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (finding an inventory search valid based on the officer's testimony that the purpose of the inventory was, in part, to log valuable property or contraband), trans. denied.

[17] Budd maintains that our Supreme Court's opinion in Fair must control the outcome here; however, the circumstances in Fair are distinguishable from those in this case. In Fair, police officers recovered a sawed-off shotgun in the trunk of the defendant's rented vehicle during the course of a purported inventory search. 627 N.E.2d at 430. Our Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for dealing in a sawed-off shotgun because the State failed to demonstrate that sufficient police department regulations existed for inventory searches or that the search was conducted in accordance with those regulations. Id. at 436. Indeed, the police officers provided only limited testimony at trial as to what they were permitted to search pursuant to police department policy. See id. The Fair Court determined that the State failed to carry its burden of establishing that the search of the defendant's vehicle was reasonable and not a mere pretext, noting:

The fatal defect in this search is that the provisions of the Indianapolis Police Department's inventory policy are not established in sufficient detail by the record. Officer Wager testified only that “we conduct an inventory search of the car to see what kind of items are in it. If there's anything valuable that might need to be placed in the property room or otherwise noted as being in the car.” R. at 112. There was no testimony whatsoever that provided the particulars of the policy and, therefore, it is not possible for this Court to determine whether the seemingly suspicious circumstances which attended the search were in fact irregular. Without more, then, we cannot conclude that the police department's inventory search was reasonable.

Id. Givan, J., (dissenting); see also Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 383 (reversing defendant's conviction because the police department's inventory search policy described by the police officer as only “to inventory for valuables,” without further explanation of standardized criteria used in conducting inventory searches, provided the officer with “unconstitutionally broad discretion”).

[18] Unlike the circumstances in Fair where it was suggested that the search was merely pretextual, i.e., that it was performed solely for the purpose of finding incriminating evidence, there is no suggestion here that the Deputies were looking for evidence of a crime or were on a “fishing expedition” and simply rummaging through the vehicle when they searched Budd's vehicle. To be sure, Deputy Walker testified that he only searched to inventory the vehicle's contents because it had to be towed and removed from the blocked roadway. The record includes sufficient particulars of the Department's policy through the Deputies’ testimony, in that they were required to photograph or prepare a written log of items of value before the vehicle could be towed from the scene, and that they needed to photograph the inside and outside of the vehicle.

[19] The Deputies chose to use photographs to catalogue the contents of Budd's vehicle, including personal effects that were strewn throughout the car, and the vehicle title and registration that were laying on the floorboard. Officer Walker testified that he took photos of Budd's personal items that were inside the vehicle for the purpose of documenting and accounting for them. And of the nine photos that were taken, one focused on the opened vodka bottle and two others included the remaining personal effects near the bottle.

[20] Also unlike Fair, the Deputies’ testimony in this case provided adequate details about the Department's policy to ensure that officer discretion was adequately regulated. Moreover, merely because Deputy Walker's suspicions were raised when he noticed the half-full vodka bottle on the floor during the inventory search, the bottle's discovery did not render the search unreasonable. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (the fact that an officer's suspicion arose “during the inventory search already properly initiated and in progress does not render the search pretextual”), trans. denied.

Finally, we reject Budd's reliance on Sams, where a panel of this court held that the claimed inventory search of the defendant's truck following a stop for an infraction was pretextual and was not sufficiently regulated by standardized police procedure. 71 N.E.3d at 374. In Sams, it was not necessary to reach the question of the constitutionality of the police department's inventory search policy because the evidence established that the police officers did not follow department policy in searching a discarded fast-food paper bag in the defendant's vehicle. Id. at 375. The Sams court determined that the search of the bag that contained methamphetamine failed to fulfill any administrative purpose of an inventory search, thus creating an inference of pretext. Id. at 382. It was further noted that two of the three photographs taken at the scene were of the methamphetamine, while the other photo showed personal items only “incompletely at the edges of the frame.” Id.

[21] Here, the inventory search of Budd's vehicle did not focus on suspected contraband. Rather, the photos depicted all the vehicle's contents including a USB charger, a pill bottle, a bottle of Bloody Mary mix, loose change, and an article of clothing. In short, the factors that led the Sams Court to label that search pretextual in nature are not present here. The Deputies sufficiently articulated the Department's policy at trial to photograph the inside and outside of an impounded vehicle and identify and photograph items of value inside the vehicle prior to towing.

[22] In sum, both the scope of the inventory search and the Department's policy were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the evidence was properly admitted at trial.

[23] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not reveal the results of the test.

2.   Although Budd refers to Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution in his appellate brief, he fails to present a state constitutional analysis of his claim separate from that of the Fourth Amendment. Budd has therefore waived his claim based upon the Indiana Constitution, and we consider only the federal claim. See Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 275 n.1 (Ind. 2008).

3.   While we acknowledge that the threshold question in determining the propriety of an inventory search is whether the impoundment of the vehicle was proper, Vehorn v. State, 717 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. 1999), Budd does not challenge the propriety of the impoundment, as his inoperable vehicle was in a public road at night blocking the lanes of traffic. Budd's concession on this point is well taken. See, e.g., Sams v. State, 71 N.E.3d 372, 377 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding impoundment of the defendant's truck “as it stood in a public road at night in a snowstorm without a licensed driver available to move it”).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.