III v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2022, Ernest Chase III engaged in a day-long spree of abusing his now-ex-wife (Wife). Chase was arrested a few days later and charged with four counts, including Count I: Criminal Confinement While Armed with a Deadly Weapon, a Level 3 felony, and Count II: Domestic Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon, a Level 5 felony. After his trial was delayed for over two years, a jury ultimately found him guilty on multiple counts, including the two listed above. Chase appeals and makes two arguments: (1) the delay in bringing him to trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States (U.S.) and Indiana Constitutions; and (2) his convictions for Counts I and II violate substantive double jeopardy. Finding Chase waived his speedy trial claim and his convictions violate substantive double jeopardy, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the morning of April 22, 2022, Chase began physically abusing Wife. This violence continued throughout the day. That afternoon, Wife was driving the couple to their daughter's home when Chase began punching her. She turned the car around and drove them back home. When they got out of the car at home, Chase pulled Wife's hair, “dragged [her] down to the floor,” and kicked her. Transcript at 114. Inside, Chase continued beating her about her head and ribs and then kicked her in the ribs, legs, and arms after he got her to the floor. He put his hand over her mouth to prevent her from screaming, told her he was going to kill her, and held her nose so she could not breathe. See Tr. at 115. Chase then “put a knife up to [her] neck, [telling her] he was going to slit [her] throat.” Id. He threatened to kill her if she tried to leave and said he would break her phone if she called the police. He subsequently broke her phone using a bottle of alcohol.

[3] Chase stopped when a neighbor knocked on the door to ask for a ride somewhere. After dropping off their neighbor and returning home, Chase told Wife to “get in the house.” Id. at 116. Instead, Wife “took off running.” Id. Chase fell while running after her, and she was able to get away. Wife met up with her brother, who gave her money to get a motel room. Two days later, Wife went to the police department and reported the domestic violence. A police detective took photos of her bruises and cuts. See Exhibits 1-10.

[4] On April 25, 2022, Chase was arrested and charged with: Count I: Criminal Confinement while Armed with a Deadly Weapon, a Level 3 felony;¹ Count II: Domestic Battery by Means of Deadly Weapon, a Level 5 felony;² Count III: Strangulation, a Level 6 felony;³ and Count IV: Interference with the Reporting of a Crime, a Class A misdemeanor.⁴ His jury trial was originally set for August 9, 2022, but it was delayed five times—twice on motions to continue by the defense and three times due to court congestion. A span of 884 days passed between Chase's arrest and his trial. Ultimately, his trial took place on September 24, 2024. Wife and the detective that documented her injuries testified, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Counts I, II, and IV.

[5] On Count I, the trial court sentenced Chase to nine years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), with six years executed in the DOC and the remaining three years served on work release. For Count II, he was sentenced to five years in the DOC with a direct commitment to work release. The sentences for Counts I and II were to be served consecutively. For Count IV, he was sentenced to 180 days in the Knox County Jail, to be served concurrently with the sentences for Counts I and II. He received credit for 911 actual days of confinement in Knox County Jail awaiting trial and sentencing and 304 days in good time credit.

[6] Chase now appeals, asserting that: (1) his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution was violated; and (2) his convictions for Counts I and II violate substantive double jeopardy.

Discussion and Decision

1. Speedy Trial

[7] Chase argues on appeal that the 884-day delay in bringing him to trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions, but we find he has waived his claim. Chase never sought to enforce this speedy trial right at the trial court level, nor did he timely object to the trial court's proceedings with respect to those rights. “Arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even ones based upon constitutional claims, are waived for appeal.” State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Therefore, Chase has failed to preserve his speedy trial claim for our review.  ⁵ See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1147-48 (Ind. 2011) (finding that defendant forfeited his constitutional speedy-trial claims by failing to raise them before the trial court).

[8] Chase argues that, despite waiver, his claim should still be reviewed pursuant to the doctrine of fundamental error. However, our Supreme Court has made clear that “the deprivation of an accused's speedy trial right does not constitute fundamental error.” Locke v. State, 461 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ind. 1984), reh'g denied. Thus, because Chase has waived his speedy trial claim and it does not constitute fundamental error, it is unsuited for appellate review. Id.; see Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1147-48.

2. Double Jeopardy

[9] Chase next argues that his convictions for Level 3 felony criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon and Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon violate substantive double jeopardy. The prohibition on substantive double jeopardy protects defendants from “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1066 (Ind. 2024). In analyzing substantive double jeopardy claims, we apply the three-step test established in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020) and clarified in A.W. As a question of law, we review this issue de novo. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1064.

A. Step One: Statutory Analysis

[10] We begin by considering the statutory language of the offenses and whether they permit multiple punishment. “If the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court's inquiry comes to an end and there is no violation of double jeopardy.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. Both parties agree that neither statute at issue here permits multiple punishment.⁶ Thus, we continue to step two.

B. Step Two: Inherently or Factually Included

[11] When the statutory language does not clearly permit multiple punishment, we turn to Indiana's included offense statute. Our legislature has defined an “included offense” as an offense that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168. “ ‘If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or [factually]), there is no violation of double jeopardy’ and the analysis ends—full stop.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). If one offense is included in the other, inherently or factually, we continue to step three. Id.

[12] Inherently included offenses are those that fall into any of the subsections above, and our analysis requires us to look at the offense statutes at issue and consider their elements. Id. Criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon requires proof that “a person [ ] knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent ․ while armed with a deadly weapon.” I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(A). Domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon requires proof that “a person [ ] knowingly or intentionally touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner ․ with a deadly weapon[.]” I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(2). These offenses are not inherently included; each has elements the other does not, neither offense is an attempt to commit the other, and they differ by more than just their risks of harm or culpability.⁷

[13] “Factually included”⁸ offenses are those that, when looking at “only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument[,]” “punish the same conduct as charged[.]” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067, 1072. In determining factual inclusion, we assess whether the charging instrument shows that the “ ‘means used’ to commit the alleged greater offense ‘include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’ ” Bradshaw v. State, 239 N.E.3d 864, 867-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067). If the charging instrument is ambiguous as to whether one of the offenses is included in the other, we construe that ambiguity in favor of Chase and proceed to step three presuming a double jeopardy violation. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069. In A.W., our Supreme Court clarified that ambiguity exists when “it is conceivable that” some fact not included in the charging instrument could have happened. Id. at 1070; see Bradshaw, 239 N.E.3d. at 870 (Felix, J., dissenting). More specifically, “[i]f any conceivable facts from one charge include all the elements of the other charge, then the charging information is ambiguous and we must presume a double jeopardy violation.” Bradshaw, 239 N.E.3d at 871 (Felix, J., dissenting).

[14] We find the charging instrument in this case to be ambiguous. The two offenses at issue were charged as follows:

Count I: On or about April 24, 2022, in Knox County, State of Indiana, Ernest L. Chase III did knowingly or intentionally confine [Wife] without the consent of Victim 1, said Ernest L. Chase III being armed with a deadly weapon․

Count II: On or about April 24, 2022, in Knox County, State of Indiana, Ernest L. Chase III did knowingly or intentionally touch [Wife], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner said touching being committed with a deadly weapon.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 61. Both counts simply track the statutory language and lack any specific facts, particularly as to the means used or what deadly weapon was involved in either offense. The lack of specific facts makes it entirely conceivable that the means Chase used to confine Wife while armed with a deadly weapon included all the elements of the domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon offense. The instrument provides no indication of the timing of the offenses, how they were committed, what deadly weapons were involved, or whether the weapons in each offense were the same or different. Hypothetically, without specific facts, it is conceivable that Chase pinned down Wife, a family member, while holding a handgun to her head. Those facts would satisfy the elements of both offenses. Thus, because there are conceivable facts that could show the means used to commit the confinement include all the elements of the domestic battery, we find the charging instrument ambiguous. Construing that ambiguity in Chase's favor, we proceed to step three with the presumption that there is a double jeopardy violation. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069.

C. Step Three: Factual Analysis

[15] Step three provides the State an opportunity to “rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation by using the facts presented at trial to demonstrate a ‘distinction between what would otherwise be two of the “same” offenses.’ ” Bradshaw, 239 N.E.3d at 868 (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071). However, the convictions will be found to violate substantive double jeopardy if the two offenses were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).

[16] We conclude the two offenses here were so compressed as to constitute a single transaction. Wife gave the following testimony about the encounter:

Q: So he was beating you and kicking you?

A: Yes.

Q: Did he get you on the floor?

A: Yes.

Q: So at some point did he put his hand over your mouth?

A: Yes.

Q: Could you describe that for the jury please?

A: He would put his hand over my mouth so I wouldn't scream. He told me he was going to kill me and holding my nose so I couldn't breathe. He put a knife up to my neck, told me he was going to slit my throat.

Q: Did he tell you what would happen if you would try to leave?

A: He would kill me. And if I called the cops—he broke my phone so I wouldn't call the cops.

Tr. at 115-16.

[17] While the State continuously referenced Chase's day-long domestic violence spree against Wife in its opening statements and closing arguments, none of the earlier violence involved a deadly weapon. The only conduct that satisfied the elements of domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon was Chase's touching the knife to Wife's throat. The record further shows that it was also in that moment, with no evidence of a change of position, location, or passage of significant time, that Chase threatened to kill her if she tried to leave. In discussing the confinement in closing arguments, the prosecution said to the jury, “[d]o you think having a knife to somebody's throat, which is clearly a deadly weapon, and saying if you try to leave, I will kill you. Do you suppose that substantially interferes with someone's liberty? Of course it does.” Tr. at 149. In summary, Chase's threat proved his intent to confine Wife, the fact that he was holding a knife to her throat proved he was armed with a deadly weapon, and him holding the knife to Wife's throat is also the only fact that proved the domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon. Therefore, the domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon offense is included in the confinement while armed with a deadly weapon offense.

[18] The State contends that these offenses were separate and not so compressed as to constitute a single transaction because there was insufficient continuity of action: specifically, the fact that the abuse took place throughout the day at other times and in different locations. We disagree. As previously discussed, the abuse that took place earlier in the day was not sufficient to support the domestic battery charge because none of it occurred by means of a deadly weapon.

[19] The State also argues there was no singleness of purpose as the confinement was an “interjection of new conduct for a different purpose,” namely, “scar[ing] Wife from exercising her own independence to hold him accountable” for his abuse. Appellee's Br. at 20. Again, we disagree. While we agree that confinement, as a general matter, can have a different purpose than domestic battery, we are unconvinced of such separate purposes under these facts. Holding a knife to someone's throat while threatening to kill them if they leave—in the same room, to the same person, presumably within the same time span—appears quite united in purpose. Consistent with the prosecution's closing argument, holding a knife to someone's throat lends significant credence to a threat to kill them. We cannot envision a clearer case of conduct that was “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).

[20] Based on the facts presented at trial, we find that the domestic battery by means of deadly weapon is a lesser-included offense in the confinement while armed with a deadly weapon offense. Thus, the State has failed to rebut the presumption that there was a double jeopardy violation, and we hold that Chase's convictions for Count 1: Criminal Confinement While Armed with a Deadly Weapon, a Level 3 felony and Count II: Domestic Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon, a Level 5 felony, violate substantive double jeopardy.

[21] “Where a defendant is found guilty of both the greater offense and the lesser-included offense, the proper procedure is to vacate the conviction for the lesser-included offense and enter a judgment of conviction and sentence only upon the greater offense.” Demby v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1035, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Therefore, we affirm Chase's conviction for Count I and remand this matter back to the trial court to vacate Chase's conviction and sentence for Count II and amend the Abstract of Judgment and sentencing order in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Conclusion

[22] For failure to preserve the issue of a violation of his speedy trial right at the trial court level, Chase has waived his speedy trial claim, and we affirm. However, we find that his convictions for Count I and Count II violate substantive double jeopardy, and we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the conviction and sentence entered on Count II.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(A).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

4.   I.C. § 35-45-2-5(1).

5.   Between his arrest and jury trial, Chase wrote three pro se letters to the trial court in which he cited his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment or complained about the timing of proceedings. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 49, 67, 72. The trial court was not permitted to respond to pro se, ex parte letters from a represented defendant. See Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 2.9. Importantly, Chase never formally objected to the trial court's new dates, and he did not raise the issue with the court before his trial began, which did not provide the court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of the issue. Thus, we find Chase's failure to file any motions or raise any objections constitutes waiver of the issue for appellate review. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1147-48 (Ind. 2011).

6.   See I.C. § 35-42-3-3; see also I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3.

7.   Chase argues that the domestic battery charge is inherently included in the confinement charge “because it creates ‘a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest’ ” than the confinement. Appellant's Br. at 16. However, this argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, we agree with the State that “touching” is not a less serious form of harm than “restraint of liberty,” but rather a different type of harm. See, e.g., Moyers v. State, 249 N.E.3d 667, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (finding that Level 4 felony confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury and Level 3 felony confinement committed while armed with a deadly weapon contemplate “distinct” harms). Second, the lesser form or risk of harm or level of culpability must be the only difference between the offenses under subsection (3) of the included offense statute. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(3). The offenses at issue here differ in more than just the level of harm involved, as confinement requires proof of a restriction of liberty without consent and domestic battery requires an angry, rude, or insolent touching of a family member. Thus, the offenses at issue here are not inherently included under any of the subsections of our included offense statute.

8.   In Wadle, our Supreme Court required courts to determine whether the offenses were included “as charged,” rather than factually included. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. However, the Court clarified in A.W. that “[t]hese two concepts—as charged and factually included—should be treated as synonymous under Wadle: ‘the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’ ” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30).

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.