Susan Mills, Appellant-Plaintiff v. State of Indiana and Jamise Perkins, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Susan Mills filed a complaint alleging various claims against the State and Lake Superior Court Judge pro tempore Jamise Perkins after Judge Perkins terminated Mills's employment as a Chief Bailiff in the Lake Superior Court. The State and Judge Perkins moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Mills now appeals and raises nine issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the designated evidence demonstrates that Mills's claims against Judge Perkins in her personal capacity must fail.

2. Whether the designated evidence demonstrates that Mills's claims against the State and Judge Perkins in her official capacity must fail.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mills has worked for the Lake Superior Court and its judges since 1999. In 2014, she became the Chief Bailiff for Judge Clarence Murray. Pursuant to the policies of the Lake Superior Court, Mills was an “at will” employee as a Chief Bailiff, and, thus, her employment was subject to being “terminated by either the judge or the employee with or without cause” at any time. Appellees’ App. Vol. 4, p. 15. In early 2020, Judge Murray became seriously ill and informed the Indiana Supreme Court of his intent to retire at the end of 2020. Our Supreme Court, in turn, appointed Judge Perkins as Judge pro tempore in Judge Murray's courtroom until further order of the Court.

[4] In the fall of 2020, Judge Perkins presided over a murder trial with Mills as the Chief Bailiff in the courtroom. During the jury's deliberations, Mills, inadvertently by all appearances, took inadmissible evidence into the jury room, which resulted in Judge Perkins having to declare a mistrial. A few days later, Judge Perkins fired Mills.

[5] The Governor eventually named Judge Murray's replacement, and Judge Perkins's service as Judge pro tempore came to an end. Meanwhile, Lake Superior Court Judge Calvin Hawkins hired Mills as his Chief Bailiff.

[6] In October 2021, Mills filed an amended complaint against the State and Judge Perkins in her official and personal capacities. In her complaint, Mills alleged that Judge Perkins's termination of Mills's employment resulted in the following causes of action: a violation of Mills's constitutional due process rights; breach of an implied contract; wrongful termination; tortious interference with a business relationship; defamation; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mills claimed lost wages and benefits related to each of her claims.¹ The State and Judge Perkins moved for summary judgment as to all claims, which the trial court granted.²

[7] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[8] Mills appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the State and Judge Perkins. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ․ the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to “demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (omission and some alterations original to Hughley). Further, we are not bound by the trial court's explanation for its summary judgment ruling, and “we will affirm the trial court's ruling” on summary judgment “based on any theory supported by record evidence.” Markey v. Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Ind. 2015).

1. Mills has no viable claims against Judge Perkins in her personal capacity.

[9] We first address Mills's claims against Judge Perkins in her personal capacity, and we begin with Mills's claim that the manner in which Judge Perkins terminated Mills's employment violated Mills's federal due process rights. According to Mills, she has brought suit against Judge Perkins to enforce her federal due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[10] The doctrine of qualified immunity immunizes Judge Perkins from damages under § 1983 if, in relevant part, Judge Perkins did not violate a clearly established constitutional right held by Mills. Perry v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 196 N.E.3d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)), trans. denied; see also Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“When a Section 1983 claim is asserted against a state official in his or her individual capacity, he or she may assert privileges of absolute or qualified immunity.”), trans. denied. Our Supreme Court has cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with approval for the proposition that a government official who fires an employee is “entitled to qualified immunity from suit as long as [the official's] actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights [the official is] alleged to have violated.” Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 496 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 352 (7th Cir. 2005)).

[11] Mills argues that she was entitled to a certain measure of due process before Judge Perkins could fire her. But Judge Perkins's designated evidence made clear that Mills, as a Chief Bailiff, was an “at will” employee whose employment could be terminated at any time and for any reason, and we are not persuaded by Mills's arguments to the contrary. Appellees’ App. Vol. 4, p. 15. And Judge Perkins's termination of Mills's employment without some antecedent procedure was entirely consistent with the evidence that Mills was an at-will employee. As Judge Perkins's actions were “reasonably ․ consistent” with the rights of an at-will employee, Judge Perkins is entitled to qualified immunity from Mills's federal constitutional claim against her in her personal capacity. See Cantrell, 849 N.E.2d at 496.

[12] Mills's remaining claims for liability against Judge Perkins in her personal capacity are state-law claims, namely, for an alleged violation of Mills's state-law process rights, defamation, wrongful termination, tortious interference with a business relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (the “ITCA”), Judge Perkins is personally immune from liability for her acts so long as her acts were within the scope of her employment. See Ind. Code 34-13-3-3 (2020). To be within the scope of employment, the conduct at issue must be “of the same general nature as that authorized” or “incidental to the conduct authorized” by her employment relationship. Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) Agency § 229 (1958)).

[13] The designated evidence makes clear that Judge Perkins's act of terminating Mills's employment, and the manner in which Judge Perkins terminated that employment, were within the scope of her employment as a trial judge. Indiana's trial judges are authorized to manage their own staffs, and the Lake Superior Court's own policies make clear that a judge's chief bailiff is an at-will employee of that judge. Similarly, Mills's defamation claim is premised on statements made by Judge Perkins from the bench in making a record as to the entry of a mistrial in the fall 2020 murder trial. Those statements were also within the scope of Judge Perkins's employment. Accordingly, Judge Perkins cannot be held personally liable to Mills on any of Mills's state-law claims.

[14] Still, Mills argues that Judge Perkins's termination of Mills's employment and the manner in which Judge Perkins terminated her employment were so egregious as to necessarily be outside the scope of Judge Perkins's employment as a trial judge. We are not persuaded by Mills's bald assertions, and we conclude that she has not demonstrated any genuine issue of material fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment for Judge Perkins in her personal capacity.

2. Mills also has no viable claims against the State or Judge Perkins in her official capacity.

[15] We next turn to Mills's claims against the State and Judge Perkins in her official capacity for the alleged violation of Mills's federal due process rights. Again, Mills's claim here is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, she cannot sue the State under that statute. See Melton, 156 N.E.3d at 649 (noting that the State is “not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court”). Relatedly, Mills's claim against Judge Perkins in her official capacity under § 1983 must be premised on prospective relief (i.e., reinstatement) and not on money damages. Id. at 650-52. However, as noted above, Mills has already been reemployed as a Chief Bailiff in the Lake Superior Court, and her § 1983 claim against Judge Perkins in her official capacity now seeks only money damages. Accordingly, Mills's § 1983 claims against the State and Judge Perkins in her official capacity are contrary to law.

[16] We next address Mills's state-law claim that Judge Perkins, in her official capacity, breached an implied contract with Mills. Of course, the existence of a contract is a requirement for any breach-of-contract claim. Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 231 (Ind. 2021). And whether a contract exists is a question of law. Barrand v. Martin, 120 N.E.3d 565, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[17] Mills's contract theory is that Judge Murray had promised her continued employment through the term of any judge pro tempore. But Mills has brought suit against Judge Perkins, and no representation between Judge Murray and Mills demonstrates a contract between Judge Perkins and Mills. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Judge Perkins in her official capacity on Mills's breach-of-contract claim, and the entry of judgment for Judge Perkins here likewise precludes Mills's respondeat-superior claim against the State.

[18] We next turn to Mills's claims against Judge Perkins in her official capacity for wrongful termination, tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of Mills's state constitutional process rights.³ As our Supreme Court has explained, the ITCA “immunizes both the governmental entity and its officers acting ‘within the scope of’ their employment from liability in a number of areas.” Cantrell, 849 N.E.2d at 495; see I.C. § 34-13-3-3. One basis for immunity under the ITCA is for an officer's “performance of a discretionary function.” I.C. § 34-13-3-3(7). And our Supreme Court has expressly held that “claims for wrongful discharge” of public employees, whether based on a “constitutional right” or “tort law,” are “subject to the ‘discretionary act’ immunity of the ITCA.” Cantrell, 849 N.E.2d at 496-98.

[19] Each of Mills's non-defamation state-law claims has the same allegedly tortious factual premise: Judge Perkins's termination of Mills's employment. See Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 7-8, 10-11, 13-14. But, as our Supreme Court held in Cantrell, a fired public employee may not maintain a civil claim against the officer who fired her for the discretionary act of terminating that employment. 849 N.E.2d at 496-98. Thus, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment for Judge Perkins in her official capacity, and thus the State, as to Mills's state-law claims relating to the termination of Mills's employment.

[20] Mills's final claim is against Judge Perkins in her official capacity for defamation, which, again, is premised on statements Judge Perkins made from the bench in declaring the mistrial. There is no question that those statements were within the scope of Judge Perkins's employment as a judge, and, thus, the ITCA again applies. See Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453-54. And Indiana's case law makes clear that public statements made by public officials explaining acts those officials took within the scope of their employment are immune from defamation claims under ITCA's discretionary-function immunity. See, e.g., E.L.C. Elec., Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Labor, 825 N.E.2d 16, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Thus, we agree with the State that statements made by a judge from the bench in the course of a trial are not statements that can form the basis for a civil lawsuit against that judge or the State.

[21] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the State and Judge Perkins in her official capacity.

Conclusion

[22] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the State and Judge Perkins, in both her official and personal capacities, on all claims.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mills also sought reinstatement of her employment. We agree with the State that that request for relief is now moot.

2.   Mills subsequently moved for relief under Trial Rule 59, which the trial court summarily denied. Mills argues on appeal that the summary denial of her T.R. 59 motion violated her constitutional rights. We conclude that that argument is not supported by cogent reasoning, and we do not consider it. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

3.   We assume for the sake of the state constitutional arguments that Mills has a private cause of action to enforce those rights.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges May and Bradford concur. May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.