Demorus Bonds, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Demorus Bonds (“Bonds”) was convicted after a jury trial of twelve separate felony counts of child molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, and criminal deviant conduct related to the abuse of two minor children. The trial court sentenced Bonds to an aggregate sentence of thirty years with twenty-five years executed in the Indiana Department of Corrections (“the DOC”) and five years suspended to Marion County Community Corrections (“MCCC”) home detention. Bonds appeals and raises the following restated issues:

I. Whether the prosecution of the offense alleged in Count XI, Class B felony criminal deviant conduct, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations;

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions for Counts I through X 1; and

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to reopen the case after the jury had already begun deliberating.

[2] Concluding that the prosecution of the allegations in Count XI were barred by the statute of limitations, we reverse that conviction and remand with instructions to vacate the conviction and modify the sentencing order and abstract of judgment accordingly. We otherwise affirm his convictions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 17, 2022, Bonds was charged with Count I and Count II: Class A felony child molesting ² ; Count III and Count IV: Class C felony child molesting ³ ; Count V and Count VI: Level 1 felony child molesting ⁴ ; Count VII and Count VIII: Level 4 felony child molesting ⁵ ; Count IX and Count X: Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor ⁶ ; Count XI: Class B felony criminal deviate conduct ⁷ ; and Count XII: Class B felony child molesting.⁸ These charges were initiated after A.B., who was nineteen years old at the time, disclosed to law enforcement on March 2, 2022, that he was being sexually abused by his uncle, Bonds. During the investigation, another family member, K.W., came forward and also disclosed sexual abuse by Bonds. K.W. and A.B. (collectively, “the victims”) reported the abuse by Bonds began on or about October 15, 1998, and continued through October 30, 2018. This matter eventually proceeded to a jury trial, which was held on May 28 and 29, 2024.

[4] Bonds and K.W. were cousins. Bonds began sexually abusing K.W. in 1998, when she was approximately seven years old ⁹ and Bonds was sixteen years old.¹⁰ Bonds continued to abuse K.W. until she was about eleven years old. See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 92. K.W. recalled seven specific occurrences of sexual abuse, beginning around October 15, 1998, and ending around June 2002. See id.

[5] K.W. recalled that the first instance of abuse began during a family gathering at an apartment in Marion County, Indiana. K.W. explained that she was playing with all the other kids, and when her aunt left the room, Bonds came in and asked her “if [she] wanted to play the video game[,]” which was located in Bond's room. Id. at 87. K.W. followed Bonds into his room, then Bonds shut the door behind them and began to tell K.W. a story about “a girl that lived across the apartment from [Bonds]” who used to show her breasts out the window. Id. Next, Bonds played a pornographic video (“the video”) and told K.W. to “do what they did” in the video, which depicted oral sex. Id. Bonds then “pulled his penis out[ ]” and “[g]rabbed [K.W.’s] head and put it to his penis.” Id. at 89. K.W. explained that Bonds made her “giv[e] him head.” Id. K.W. described Bonds's penis as “erect” and stated that she could hear “moans” from the video. Id.

[6] The second instance of abuse occurred in much of the same fashion as the prior incident. K.W. was in Bond's room and Bonds again played a pornographic video. Bonds made K.W. “do exactly what they were doing” in the video, which was “nothing but oral sex.” Id. at 90. Bonds again forced K.W. to engage in oral sex by grabbing her head and forcing her towards his penis.

[7] The last time K.W. recalled Bonds sexually abusing her was in June 2002 and occurred after her father suffered a health emergency. Bonds stayed with K.W. and her brother while her father was in the hospital, and in the middle of the night, Bonds “came and got [K.W.] up.” Id. at 91. Bonds led K.W. downstairs, again showed K.W. a pornographic video and “told [K.W.] to do it exactly again.” Id. Bonds once again forced K.W. to perform oral sex on him. See id. at 92.

[8] K.W. first disclosed Bonds's abuse when she was either eleven or twelve years old. K.W. was at Bonds's residence and one of her family members was doing her hair when Bonds “came in very angry from the living room.” Id. at 93. Bonds slapped K.W. because “something was going around the family[,] and [he] was very angry[.]” Id. K.W. began to cry and said, “I don't know why he just slapped me when he’[s] been molesting me since I was seven years old.” Id. K.W.’s cousins heard what K.W. had said about Bonds, and then one of her cousins called Bonds back to the room, and K.W. repeated the allegation. Bonds stated that “it was a lie.” Id. at 114. K.W.’s allegation was not reported to law enforcement at that time.

[9] A.B. is Bonds's nephew and was born in October of 2002. A.B. testified that his relationship with Bonds was “fun at first[ ]” but “things started getting chaotic later on down the road.” Id. at 155. A.B.’s father worked as a truck driver, often requiring A.B. to stay at times with his grandmother, who was Bonds's mother. Bonds frequently took A.B. to school when other family members were unable to do so. A.B. was around eleven or twelve years old during this time. See id. at 143, 146.

[10] A.B. generally characterized the sexual abuse endured from Bonds as “[s]uck[ing] [his] private area ․ [,] rubbing on [his] upper chest, torso[, and] ․ grabbing [his] hands, kissing on [him]. Want[ing] him to rub [Bonds], wanted [him] to rub on [Bonds]. Had [him] do anal with [Bonds].” Id. at 156. A.B. further explained that his private area meant “[his] dick.” Id. A.B. explained that the oral sex and stroking happened through middle school graduation and occurred “maybe 25, 30 times[,]” but over the entire course of the sexual abuse from Bonds, which happened until A.B. was seventeen, the oral sex and stroking happened “more than 50 times.” Id. at 158, 161.

[11] A.B.’s father noticed that A.B. started to act out in school and began “getting in trouble in school” and was just “not himself.” Id. at 143. A.B.’s father testified that on one occasion, he went to Bonds's home because A.B. was staying with his grandmother at Bonds's residence. He walked inside unannounced and saw Bonds “run in the bathroom, and [his] son was in another room[,]” without his shirt on. Id. at 146–47.

[12] A.B. explained he was thirteen and was sleeping in the living room on the floor when Bonds woke A.B. up by touching him in the torso area, private area, over his clothing and under his clothing. Id. at 156–57. A.B. described the touching in his private area as “[s]troking [his] dick, grabbing [his] balls.” Id. at 157. This made A.B. feel “uncomfortable and confused.” Id. Bonds walked around the home to make sure everyone was still asleep and then, while A.B. was still sleeping, “pulled [A.B.’s] private part out” and “started sucking [his] dick.” Id. at 156. Then, Bonds again checked to make sure everyone was asleep and “[d]id it again and then made [A.B.] get ready for school.” Id. A.B. stated that, “everything just escalated from there.” Id. at 157. If A.B. was in a room by himself, Bonds would “scope out the scenery. He was putting cameras around the house” to “make everything easier for him.” Id. at 158. A.B. further testified that after Bonds would get him alone in the room he would “[t]ouch on [him], grope [his] private area. Hug all on [him]. Rub on [his] back, rub on [his] torso.” Id. at 158.

[13] Bonds also showed A.B. pornographic videos. One day when A.B. was alone in the car with Bonds, Bonds “pulled over on the side of the road, show[ed A.B.] porn[ ], suck[ed his] private area.” Id. at 159. Bonds also showed A.B. pornography at his house and his grandmother's house. Id. A.B. testified about an instance where they were riding in a truck, and again Bonds pulled over, showed A.B. a pornographic video, and then performed oral sex on A.B. Id. at 159–160.

[14] When A.B. was a freshman in high school and approximately fourteen or fifteen years old, the abuse continued, and Bonds initiated anal sex with A.B. The first incident began with Bonds “sucking on [A.B.’s] private area[,]” and then Bonds “ended up pulling down his pants and that's when the anal happened.” Id. at 160. A.B. explained that he penetrated Bonds, but that Bonds never penetrated him. Id. at 160, 180. A.B. stated that anal sex occurred “[p]robably 10, 15 times” and at different locations, including Bonds's home, in one of his vehicles, and in A.B.’s grandmother's garage, all of which were located in Marion County, Indiana. Id. at 161, 163.

[15] A.B. also recalled being sexually abused by Bonds at a Holiday Inn in Indianapolis when he was 13 or 14 years old. The family had gathered at the hotel for a cousin's birthday party. Id. at 162. Bonds came to A.B.’s room, they walked downstairs towards the main office, and they ended up going into a bathroom where Bonds locked the door. Id. Bonds then “pull[ed] [A.B.’s] pants down and start[ed] sucking [his] private area.” Id. at 162.

[16] A.B.’s father testified that in March of 2022, A.B. called him and said he needed to speak with him. A.B.’s father recalled that he “could tell that something was going on, that [A.B.] was hurting, that he really needed to talk to [him].” Id. at 144. A.B. then disclosed Bonds's sexual abuse to his father who promptly reported the abuse to law enforcement.

[17] During trial, Bonds testified and denied the allegations. See Tr. Vol. 4 p. 37. Bonds stated that he “never put [his] hands on K.W.” Id. Bonds stated that, prior to the charges being filed, he suspected A.B. was doing drugs and sneaking out of the house and had a conversation with A.B. about these behaviors. See id. at 38. Bonds claimed he discussed these concerns with A.B.’s mother and father. Id.

[18] Bonds had installed video cameras on his property and explained that he installed them for “security” because previously “someone [had] shot up [his] mom[’s] house.” Id. at 43. Bonds submitted two exhibits that consisted of pictures and videos from his video cameras. The first exhibit contained eight screenshot pictures taken from video footage and depicted Bonds lying on a couch. The second exhibit was a video that showed A.B. taking pictures standing up behind a couch. See Defense Exhibit B. When Defense Exhibit B was played for the jury, the video contained no audio. Despite assistance from the State, defense counsel was unable to get the audio to play and proceeded without requesting a recess or continuance to allow the defense time to attempt to remedy the audio issue.

[19] During the trial and after the State rested its case, Bonds moved for judgment on the evidence ¹¹ as to Counts XI and XII, arguing, among other things, that the two charges were “past the statute of limitations of five years.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 227. The trial court heard arguments from both parties and, after taking the matter under advisement, denied Bonds's motion and issued a written order, in part explaining that it did “not find the filing to be untimely, in violation of the Statute of Limitations according to the provisions of Indiana Code [section] 35-41-4-2(b), (e), and (p).” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 78.

[20] Almost three hours after the jury began their deliberations, Bonds's defense counsel discovered that he was now able to play the audio on his video exhibit. The trial court was notified and conducted a hearing on the matter outside the presence of the jury. Bonds requested that the jury be offered an opportunity to view the video exhibit with the audio by providing an instruction to the jury “that the video actually does have sound and if they would like to watch or listen to the video that they can.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 103. Defense counsel described the audio as being difficult to hear, largely consisting of static, and stated, “I really can't hear anything. I mean, you can hear (static noise made) and you – you really can't. I can't make out the words.” Id. at 105. The trial court concluded that it could not permit the jury to review the audio with the video “because that wouldn't be them reviewing the evidence. That would be new different evidence, even if it's not ․ you're saying it's not a big deal and it's just crackling. That's not what they saw.” Id. at 107. The trial court further stated, “if they ask to review things again, it has to be the exhibits that were introduced at trial.” Id. Defense counsel expressed a desire to offer a copy of the exhibit with audio as an offer to prove, but the trial court explained “[y]ou can talk about it, but I am not going to take the recording. I'm not adding the recording because I'm not going to cause confusion with the record.” Id. at 108. The trial court denied defense counsel's request, stating that the “[e]vidence is closed at this point.” Id. at 103.

[21] Just over an hour later, the jury concluded its deliberations and returned guilty verdicts against Bonds on all twelve counts. The trial court sentenced Bonds to an aggregate sentence of thirty years with twenty-five years executed in the DOC and five years suspended to MCCC home detention. In sentencing Bonds, the trial court ordered Bonds to serve twenty years executed in the DOC for Counts I through Count X, which were ordered to be served concurrently, and ten years for Counts XI and XII, which were to be served as five years executed to the DOC and five years executed to MCCC home detention, all of which were to be served concurrently. Counts I through Count X were ordered to be served consecutively to Counts XI and XII. Bonds now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Statute of Limitations

[22] Bonds argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied both Bonds's motion to dismiss and his Trial Rule 50(A) motion regarding Count XI. “It is well established that a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.” Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 950 (Ind. 2015)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Johnson v. State, 194 N.E.3d 98, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans denied. “[W]e review a matter of statutory interpretation de novo because it presents a question of law.” Study, 24 N.E.3d at 950 (quoting Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ind. 2011)). Indiana Trial Rule 50(A) provides that:

Where all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury or an advisory jury are not supported by sufficient evidence or a verdict thereon is clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence because the evidence is insufficient to support it, the court shall withdraw such issues from the jury and enter judgment thereon or shall enter judgment thereon notwithstanding a verdict. A party may move for such judgment on the evidence.

Ind. Trial Rule 50(A).

[23] On May 17, 2022, the State brought its charges against Bonds, including Count XI (criminal deviate conduct as a Class B felony) and alleged the crime occurred “[b]etween October 15, 1998[,] and June 19, 2002[.]” Appellant's App. Vol II pp. 68, 70. Both parties acknowledge that the charges in Count XI were commenced more than ten years after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and are time barred.¹² Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(m) (providing a ten-year statute of limitations) applies. Bonds's prosecution did not commence until 2022, well beyond the ten-year statute of limitations, therefore, his prosecution as to Count XI was untimely as a matter of law. Further, the State concedes that the statute was not tolled by an act of concealment by Bonds and that none of the exceptions to the ten-year statute of limitations identified by the trial court were applicable.¹³ We agree, and therefore reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Bonds's conviction for Count XI and modify the sentence order and abstract of judgment accordingly.¹⁴

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[24] Bonds argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for the crimes against A.B. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). “A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). “[T]he testimony of a sole child witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for molestation.” Griffith v. State, 259 N.E.3d 1025, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012), reh'g denied); see also Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans denied.

[25] During the pertinent timeframe, our legislature amended the child molesting statutes. Prior to July 1, 2014, Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3 provided as follows:

A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct commits child molesting, a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if: (1) it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]

․

A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Class C felony[.]

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1), (b) (2007).

[26] After July 1, 2014, the statute provided:

A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) commits child molesting, a Level 3 felony. However, the offense is a Level 1 felony if: (1) it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]

․

A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Level 4 felony.

I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1),(b) (2014, 2015).¹⁵

[27] The statute for sexual misconduct with a minor provides in relevant part:

A person at least eighteen (18) years of age who, with a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age, performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) commits sexual misconduct with a minor, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is:

(1) a Level 4 felony if it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]

I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a)(1) (2014, 2018).16

Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-221.5 defines “Other sexual conduct” as an act involving “(1) a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5. “Sexual intercourse” is defined as “an act that includes any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-302.

A. Counts I–IV

[28] Bonds argues that there was insufficient evidence presented of specific acts of child molesting against A.B. for the time periods encompassed by Counts I–IV. Those counts consisted of two counts of child molesting involving deviate sexual conduct (Counts I and II) and two counts of child molesting involving fondling or touching (Counts III and IV). All four counts were alleged to have occurred between October 31, 2013, and June 30, 2014, when A.B. was between twelve and thirteen years old. The evidence most favorable to the verdict established that Bonds began taking A.B. to school when he “was between the age [of] 11 to 12.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 146. During that time frame, or shortly thereafter, A.B. was on a car ride with Bonds, and Bonds “pulled over on the side of the road, show[ed A.B.] porno[graphy], suck[ed] [his] private area.” Id. at 159. On another occasion, A.B. recalled riding in a truck with Bonds where he detailed further sexual abuse. He stated that Bonds was “grabbing on [him], rubbing on [him] and stuff.” Id. at 160. At one point, A.B. explained that Bonds stroked A.B.’s private area over and under his clothing and then performed oral sex on him. See id. at 156–57. A.B. testified that the oral sex and stroking happened through middle school graduation “[m]aybe about 25, 30 times.” Id. at 161.

[29] During the same time when Bonds was taking A.B. to school, A.B.’s father explained that A.B. began acting out in school, “between the ages [of] 10 and 15[ ]” and “getting in trouble in school, you know, fights and just was not himself[.]” Id. at 143. Ultimately, A.B.’s father concluded that “he just dramatically, he just changed.” Id. In addition to describing the change in A.B.’s behavior, his father explained that he went to Bonds's home one day and saw Bonds “run in the bathroom, and [his] son was in another room” with his shirt off. Id. at 146–47.

[30] Despite A.B. not providing specific times or dates for the events, A.B.’s father's testimony and the testimony about other events or time periods was sufficient to support the allegations of child molesting set forth in Counts I–IV which occurred on or between the time periods charged. Based on the testimony from A.B. and corroborating testimony from A.B.’s Father, we conclude that the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that Bonds committed Counts I–IV, child molesting as Class A and Level C felonies.

B. Counts V–VIII

[31] Bonds argues that there was insufficient evidence presented of specific acts of child molesting against A.B. for the time periods encompassed by Counts V–VIII.¹⁷ Those counts consisted of two counts of child molesting involving other sexual conduct (Counts V and VI) and two counts of child molesting involving fondling or touching (Counts VII and VIII). All four counts are alleged to have occurred on or between July 1, 2014, and October 30, 2016, when A.B. was between thirteen and sixteen years old. However, the conduct alleged in Counts V through VIII requires A.B. to be under fourteen years of age, meaning the acts must have occurred when A.B. was thirteen years old. The State presented sufficient evidence to prove, through A.B.’s testimony, that Bonds committed child molesting as alleged in Counts V–VIII.

[32] A.B. was thirteen years old from the end of October 2015 through the end of October 2016. A.B. explained that when he was thirteen, and while everyone else in the home was asleep, Bonds came out into the living room where A.B. was sleeping and touched his private area and performed oral sex on him. Id. at 156, 157. After making sure everyone was asleep, Bonds again stroked A.B.’s private area and performed oral sex on him. See id. Then Bonds “made [AB.] get ready for school.” Id. at 156. A.B. stated that Bonds woke him up by touching him in the torso area, private area, over and under his clothing. Id. at 156, 157. Specifically, A.B. described Bonds touching his private area as “[s]troking [his] dick and grabbing [his] balls.” Id. at 157. This type of abuse was not an isolated incident, as A.B. testified that oral sex and stroking continued through middle school graduation, a time period when A.B. would have been thirteen to fourteen years old, and occurred “[m]aybe about 25, 30 times.” Id. at 161. A.B. also recalled that Bonds would get him alone in a room and would “[t]ouch on [him], grope [his] private area. Hug all on [him]. Rub on [his] back, rub on [his] torso.” Id. at 158. A.B. further explained this abuse was not limited to his grandmother's home, rather, he was sexually abused at Bonds's home, in one of his vehicles, and in his grandmother's garage. See id. at 163.

[33] Additionally, A.B. testified that another instance of sexual abuse occurred at a Holiday Inn in Indianapolis. This abuse occurred when A.B. was roughly 13 or 14 years old. A.B. explained his family had gathered for his cousin's birthday party and during this instance of sexual abuse, Bonds came back to his room, and they walked downstairs toward the main office together. Id. at 162. Instead of going into the main office, they ended up going into the bathroom where Bonds locked the door and then “pull[ed] [A.B's] pants down and start[ed] sucking [his] private area.” Id.

[34] Based on A.B.’s testimony, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Bonds committed Count V and Count VI: Level 1 felony child molesting and Count VII and Count VIII: Level 4 felony child molesting.

C. Counts IX–X

[35] Counts IX and X consist of two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor. These counts are alleged to have occurred on or between October 31, 2016, and October 30, 2018, when A.B. was between fourteen and sixteen years old. The State presented sufficient evidence to prove, through A.B.’s testimony, that Bonds committed felony sexual misconduct with a minor as alleged in Counts IX and X.

[36] A.B. explained that Bonds continued to perform oral sex on him through his sophomore year and junior year of high school, when A.B. was sixteen or seventeen years old. Id. at 158. In total, A.B. estimated the sexual abuse occurred “more than 50 times.” Id. When A.B. was a freshman in high school, roughly fourteen or fifteen years old, he testified that he had anal sex with Bonds for the first time and in total, A.B. estimated that anal sex occurred “[p]robably 10, 15 times.” Id. at 161. A.B stated that anal sex occurred at different places, including Bonds's home, in one of his vehicles, and in his grandmother's garage, all of which were located in Marion County, Indiana.

[37] Based on A.B.’s testimony, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Bonds committed Count IX and Count X: Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor.

[38] All in all, we conclude that although A.B. did not testify to the occurrences of abuse occurring on specific dates, the State presented sufficient evidence of the material elements of each of the Counts I through X such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found Bonds guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. Reopening Case to the Jury

[39] Finally, Bonds argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to reopen his case to make the audio portion of the video evidence available to the jury after jury deliberations had already begun. Specifically, Bonds argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling because he was unable to rebut the State's inference during closing arguments that Bonds had not been truthful when he testified that the video contained audio. See Appellant's Br. p. 21. “Whether to grant a party's motion to reopen his case after having rested is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The decision will be set aside only when it appears that this discretion has been abused.” Flynn v. State, 497 N.E.2d 912, 914 (Ind. 1986). In making this determination, a trial court must consider the following factors: “whether there is any prejudice to the opposing party, whether the party seeking to reopen appears to have rested inadvertently or purposely, the stage of the proceedings at which the request is made, and whether any real confusion or inconvenience would result from granting the request.” Id. “We will set aside a trial court's ruling made in the exercise of discretion if the decision was unreasonable in light of all of the circumstances and prejudiced the defendant's rights.” White v. State, 726 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[40] Bonds called three individuals to testify on his behalf, before ultimately taking the stand himself. While Bonds was testifying, the defense admitted the video (Defense Exhibit B) into evidence. The jury witnessed defense counsel's efforts to remedy the audio issue during the trial. The trial court commented that “it sometimes will take computers time to get going.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 51. Ultimately, Bonds's counsel elected to play the video to the jury without the accompanying audio. During his testimony about the video, Bonds maintained there was audio, noting that “the camera's so ․ old and rigid, it really doesn't—you can't hear the sound.” Id. Shortly thereafter, the defense rested its case, and the parties made closing arguments. During closing arguments, defense counsel commented on A.B.’s credibility, specifically noting that A.B. failed to provide accompanying video to certain digital images he provided to the State. See id. at 85. During closing, the State subsequently argued that the audio on Bonds's video “magically disappeared[,]” using the same phrasing previously used by defense counsel. Id. at 85, 94. Thereafter, the jury began its deliberations.

[41] Almost three hours into deliberations, the trial court was made aware that defense counsel wanted to play the audio for the jury. The trial court concluded that it could not permit the jury to review the audio with the video “because that wouldn't be them reviewing the evidence. That would be new different evidence, even if it's not ․ you're saying it's not a big deal and it's just crackling. That's not what they saw.” Id. at 107. The trial court further stated, “if they ask to review things again, it has to be the exhibits that were introduced at trial.” Id. Defense counsel requested that the video containing the audio be included in the record of the proceedings as an offer to prove, but the trial court denied the request. The trial court reasoned that it did not want to cause confusion within the record and provided defense counsel the opportunity to describe the audio as his offer to prove. See id. at 108. Ultimately, the trial court denied defense counsel's request to offer the video containing audio to the jury, stating that the “[e]vidence is closed at this point.” Id. at 103.

[42] All in all, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Bonds's request to reopen the case. Reopening the case would have caused undue emphasis to be placed on the video exhibit and been confusing for the jury. Additionally, Bonds would have had to be recalled as a witness to provide a foundation for the new exhibit. Moreover, Bonds did not rest his case inadvertently. Bonds rested his case after calling three witnesses in addition to testifying in his own defense. While there was no evidence that Bonds sabotaged the audio or otherwise purposely prevented the audio from playing with the video, he did not request additional time or a continuance to remedy the issue. Reopening the case for the jury to hear audio static—roughly three hours into deliberations—would have sown confusion into the jury's deliberative process and unduly emphasized a specific exhibit.

[43] Moreover, we cannot say the lack of audio presented with his exhibit affected Bonds's credibility in the eyes of the jury. The jury could have just as easily reasoned that the audio was unavailable due to the age of the camera, based on Bonds's own testimony, that “the camera's so, I guess, old and rigid, it really doesn't – you can't hear the sound.” Id. at 51. Playing the video with accompanying audio consisting of static noise was largely consistent with Bonds's testimony regarding the quality of the camera's sound.

[44] Even if the trial court abused its discretion in denying Bonds's request to reopen the case, its decision did not affect Bonds's substantial rights and was harmless. “[R]eversal is warranted only if the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1246 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We review “whether this non-constitutional error was harmless such that its probable impact in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 488 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)), cert. denied. “[W]hen conducting that review, we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. Ultimately, “the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[45] Here, the trial court's decision to deny Bonds's request to reopen the case to have the opportunity to play the accompanying sound—audio static—with the exhibit is sufficiently minor considering the entirety of the record. Bonds's intent to introduce this audio static was to bolster his credibility to the jury because the State argued that the audio had “magically disappeared.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 85, 94. Although Bonds raises concern regarding his credibility, we conclude the jury could have easily reasoned that the audio was unavailable due to the age of the camera, based on Bonds's own testimony explaining the camera's age and condition, and the fact that the audio consisted of indecipherable static.

[46] Any potential prejudice to Bonds must be considered in light of the testimony from the victims of their years-long sexual abuse at the hands of Bonds. Both K.W. and A.B. provided extensive testimony regarding their years of continual sexual abuse by Bonds. In addition to their testimony, K.W.’s cousins testified to being present when Bonds came into the room and slapped her, corroborating K.W.’s testimony. A.B.’s Father also explained how A.B.’s behavior began to change, that A.B. lived with his grandmother while he worked, and that he witnessed Bonds run from A.B.’s room. The trial court's decision not to reopen the case for Bonds to present the accompanying sound with the video exhibit, which amounted to only audio static, did not affect Bonds's substantial rights in light of the evidence presented.

[47] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bonds's request to reopen his case to make the audio evidence available to the jury.

Conclusion

[48] The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Bonds's motion to dismiss Count XI, which was prosecuted outside the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the conviction and modify the sentencing order and abstract of judgment accordingly. We otherwise affirm, concluding the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Bonds committed Count I through Count X against A.B. and that Bonds failed to identify reversible error with regard to his request to reopen the case hours into deliberations.

[49] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Bonds failed to raise an argument in regard to Count XII, and therefore, has waived such argument.

2.   Ind. Code. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b) (2007).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2014); I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2015).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b) (2014); I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b) (2015).

6.   I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a)(1) (2014); I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a)(1)(2018).

7.   I.C. § 35-42-4-2(a)(1) (1998).

8.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a) (1998).

9.   K.W. was born in June 1991. See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 86.

10.   Bonds was born on October 15, 1982. See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 199.

11.   A day prior to trial, on May 27, 2024, Bonds filed a motion to dismiss Counts XI and XII on the basis that those charges were for conduct outside the statute of limitations. See Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 5. On the first day of the jury trial, the trial court heard argument on Bonds's motion and denied the motion. See Tr. Vol. 2 p. 175.

12.   Bonds argues that the applicable statute of limitations is five years, whereas the State argues that the applicable statute of limitations is ten years. The State is correct that under Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(m) the applicable statute of limitations is ten years.

13.   The trial court found that Count XI did not violate the statute of limitations pursuant to Indiana Code sections 35-41-4-2(b), (e), and (p). See Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 78.

14.   Our decision does not affect Bonds's aggregate sentence because Count XI was ordered to be served concurrent to Count XII.

15.   The amendment to the 2015 version of the Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a)(1), (b) did not affect portions of the statute appliable to the underlying criminal offense in this matter.

16.   The amendment to the 2018 version of Indiana Code section 35-42-4-9(a)(1) did not affect portions of the statute applicable to the underlying criminal offense in this matter.

17.   In his brief, Bonds concedes that there was evidence to prove three of the ten counts involving A.B., but it is unclear which three counts are conceded. Therefore, we will review those counts without regard to any concession by Bonds.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur