Leland P. Hairston, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Divoryan Warren-Hill was murdered by his half-brother, Leland Hairston. Hairston beat Divoryan over the head, slashed his throat, and shot him five times in the back. Hairston then wrapped Divoryan in a comforter and hid him in a closet. Hairston was charged with and convicted of murder and using a firearm during the commission of the offense, and the trial court sentenced him to 75 years of incarceration. Hairston now appeals, raising two issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hairston's murder conviction; and

2. Whether Hairston's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2024, Hairston was temporarily staying at the home of Divoryan's stepfather, Franklin Baker Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Divoryan's two younger half-brothers also lived at Baker's house. On the morning of February 20, Baker went to work, and Divoryan's half-brothers went to school. As of 11:52 a.m., Hairston and Divoryan were alone in Baker's house. Just 12 minutes later at 12:04 p.m., Hairston called his mother, asking her to pick him up at 12:30 p.m. Surveillance footage captured nearby showed Hairston coming in and out of Baker's house moving bags into his mother's vehicle at 12:36 p.m.; they departed at 12:56 p.m.

[4] At trial, the State alleged that between 11:52 a.m. and 12:56 p.m., Hairston killed Divoryan in the basement of the home. The medical examiner determined that Divoryan sustained multiple fatal injuries: blunt force trauma to both temples and the top of his head, stab wounds to the left side of his neck that severed his jugular vein, and five gunshot wounds to the back. After killing Divoryan, Hairston wrapped Divoryan's body in a comforter and pushed it into a closet underneath the basement stairs; he piled clothes on top and placed a chair in front of the body.

[5] At approximately 2:20 p.m. the same day, Hairston initiated a video call with a friend. During this call, Hairston shared his screen so that his friend could see what Hairston was typing on his phone. Hairston then typed in a Notes app the following: “I did it,” Tr. Vol. II at 242, and “I hid him where you have to look hard to find him,” Tr. Vol. III at 9.

[6] Between February 20 and February 26, 2024, Hairston consistently lied about Divoryan's whereabouts to multiple people who were looking for him. Hairston told Divoryan's mom that Divoryan was “sad and depressed and needed time away,” Tr. Vol. II at 148, then claimed Divoryan was at the Baldwin Creek Apartments with a girl. Hairston told his father different stories regarding Divoryan's disappearance, including that Divoryan might be in jail or at the Baldwin Creek Apartments with a girl. Hairston told yet another person that Divoryan was at the Baldwin Creek Apartments trying to “run back up” some money. Tr. Vol. III at 134.

[7] In addition to lying about Divoryan's whereabouts, Hairston also began conducting internet searches related to escaping liability for committing a crime. On February 24, four days after the murder, Hairston conducted a web search. The search query was: “if the police search your house without a warrant and found the murder weapon you used, can the court still charge you? How does the law work in this case?” Tr. Vol. III at 135.

[8] Two days later, one of Divoryan's younger half-brothers told Baker that there was a bad smell in the basement. Baker investigated and discovered Divoryan's body in the closet underneath the basement stairs. An investigation revealed that the condition of Divoryan's body was consistent with his death occurring “more or less” on February 20, 2024. Tr. Vol. III at 39.

[9] Investigators found an orange kitchen knife on the basement pool table that had a partial fingerprint on the blade that had characteristics matching Hairston's, had very strong DNA evidence linking him to the handle, and was consistent with Divoryan's stab wounds. The blade of the knife contained DNA of Divoryan. Tr. Vol. III at 195. Investigators also found a spent bullet on the basement floor and a spent shell casing by the pool table leg. When law enforcement searched Hairston's belongings at his mother's home, they found a partially loaded magazine for a Glock pistol in his backpack. Hairston was known to carry a Glock handgun. The bullet and shell casing found near the pool table were the same make and caliber as those found in Hairston's magazine and the same brand as some of them. Additionally, Baker later found a cushion that contained four “really flat” bullets and a bullet fragment that were believed to have been fired from the same firearm. Tr. Vol. III at 108-109. Crime Scene Technician James Chambers testified that the bullets were likely “flat” because Divoryan “was shot in the back, so it appeared that he was laying [sic] face down on the pillow and shot in the back․ so the concrete from the basement stopped the bullet rapidly.” Tr. Vol. III at 108–09.

[10] The State charged Hairston with murder ¹ and alleged he used a firearm in committing that offense ² . A jury found Hairston guilty of murder and found he used a firearm in committing that murder. The trial court sentenced Hairston to 75 years of incarceration. Hairston now appeals.³

Discussion and Decision

1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Hairston's Murder Conviction

[11] Hairston argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his murder conviction. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[12] To convict Hairston of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Divoryan. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Notably, “it is well-settled that ‘circumstantial evidence alone’ can sustain a murder conviction.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244–45 (quoting Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016)). Hairston argues that his conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove he is the person who murdered Divoryan. In support, Hairston argues that (1) the State did not prove what his motive was for killing Divoryan, (2) the window of time in which the State alleged the murder was committed was too narrow for him to have done it, (3) the firearm used to shoot Divoryan was never recovered, and (4) law enforcement failed to investigate other unknown individuals who Hairston claims could have murdered Divoryan. First, motive is not an element of murder, see I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1); Ivory v. State, 141 N.E.3d 1273 (Ind. Ct. App.) (“[M]otive is not a necessary element of the offense of murder ․”), trans. denied, 153 N.E.3d 1101 (Ind. 2020), so Hairston's sufficiency challenge on this basis fails.

[13] Second, regarding Hairston's window of opportunity argument, he more specifically suggests that he could not have killed Divoryan and cleaned up the scene prior to his mother picking him up. The evidence most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences therefrom demonstrate that on the day of the murder, everyone was out of the house by 11:52 a.m. except for Hairston and Divoryan. Hairston called his mother at 12:04 p.m. and asked to be picked up at 12:30 p.m. Hairston argues that the crime and clean-up could not have occurred in 12 minutes. However, without evidence proving there was insufficient time to commit the crime and clean up the scene, Hairston is merely asking us to speculate, which we will not do. Additionally, Hairston did not leave the scene with his mother until 12:56 p.m., which means there was much more time than Hairston now argues to commit the crime and clean it up. The jury could have reasonably concluded that 11:52 a.m. to 12:56 p.m. was a sufficient period of time for Hairston to kill Divoryan; we will not second guess the jury's judgment, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1091 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[14] Third, although the firearm used to shoot Divoryan was never recovered, the State presented evidence that Hairston possessed ammunition matching the ammunition used in the shooting. Additionally, the orange kitchen knife used to stab Divoryan had Hairston's fingerprint on the blade, directly linking him to it. The presence of unknown DNA and third-party fingerprints does not negate the substantial evidence linking Hairston to Divoryan's murder. The jury could have reasonably concluded this evidence was consistent with normal household contact.

[15] Fourth, concerning Hairston's challenge to the “quality of the investigation,” Appellant's Br. at 19, the evidence most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences therefrom show that law enforcement did not find any evidence consistent with a burglary or with an unknown individual entering through the unlocked sunroom. Additionally, Hairston was connected to both the gun and the knife used to kill Divoryan—Hairston possessed the same caliber and brand of bullets used to shoot Divoryan, and Hairston's fingerprint and DNA were found on the kitchen knife used to stab Divoryan.

[16] Moreover, Hairston's own behavior and admissions after the murder further support his conviction. Hairston admitted his involvement to a friend while on a video call, he conducted suspicious web searches on his phone about a warrantless search and seizure of a murder weapon, and he repeatedly lied to people about Divoryan's whereabouts. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Hairston's murder conviction.

2. Hairston's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate Under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[17] Hairston argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[18] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence's appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[19] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing “ ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should recieve considerable deference,’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail “unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character ․” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[20] In reviewing the defendant's sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count,” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Similarly, a defendant “need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts” so long as “one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of revising the defendant's sentence. Id. at 126–27 (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[21] When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Here, Hairston was convicted of murder and the use of a firearm in commission of the offense that resulted in death. “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (emphasis added). For his murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Hairston to 60 years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). In addition, a person who knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense may be sentenced to an additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g). For the firearm enhancement, the trial court sentenced Hairston to 15 years executed at the DOC. In total, the trial court sentenced Hairston to 75 years executed at the DOC.

[22] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[23] Here, Hairston was residing with Divoryan's family, which consisted of Divoryan's stepfather and two juvenile half-brothers. Hairston's attack on Divoryan was extremely brutal and violent. He inflicted multiple cuts and four stab wounds on Divoryan's neck that severed his jugular vein, fired five gunshot wounds into his back, and struck him multiple times on his head. Even Hairston acknowledges that the crime was “brutal, senseless and reprehensible.” Appellant's Br. at 23.

[24] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[25] Hairston's conduct following the murder demonstrates a callous disregard for Divoryan's family and the truth. When Divoryan's family inquired about his whereabouts, Hairston repeatedly lied, claiming that Divoryan was at Baldwin Creek apartments and had even been arrested. Hairston also made the decision to leave Divoryan's decomposing body in a basement closet that was accessible to any family member, including the two minors living in the home. Divoryan's stepfather ultimately discovered the body. These actions reveal a defendant who not only committed a brutal murder but continued to cause harm through deception and callous indifference to Divoryan's family's suffering.

[26] Hairston was 19 years old when he committed the murder. Although he did not have any prior adult convictions, his juvenile record demonstrates a clear pattern of escalating violence and noncompliance with court orders prior to the murder. Notably, his record from April 2020 to September 2022 includes two battery charges, battery causing injury and intimidation with a deadly weapon, and possessing a firearm on school property, along with multiple violations for truancy and running away from home. Despite court-ordered interventions including electronic monitoring, counseling, and family services, he continued violating court orders and was twice designated as a violent offender before wardship was ultimately awarded to the DOC. Released from DOC wardship in August 2023, Hairston committed the present offense just six months later.

[27] Based on the violent nature of Hairston's offense, his callousness in the aftermath, and his history of criminal behavior, we cannot say that Hairston has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1248–49; Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119; Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56. Consequently, Hairston has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

Conclusion

[28] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hairston's murder conviction, and his 75-year sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm Hairston's conviction and sentence.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-11.

3.   Hairston fails to support with citations to the record numerous statements of fact in his Statement of Facts and Argument, as required by Indiana Appellate Rules 46(A)(6)(a) and 46(A)(8)(a), respectively. We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Foley concur. Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.