Michael Barlow, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Michael Barlow (“Barlow”) was convicted after a jury trial of criminal confinement ¹ as a Level 5 felony and strangulation ² as a Level 6 felony and was adjudicated to be a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Barlow to an aggregate sentence of ten years executed. Barlow appeals his convictions and sentence, raising the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions for Level 5 felony criminal confinement and Level 6 felony strangulation; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the morning of June 1, 2024, Barlow's wife, Maggie Tanner (“Maggie”), awoke, and Barlow immediately began arguing with her, calling her names, and accusing her of promiscuity. Maggie ran outside into a neighbor's yard, but Barlow followed her outside. She screamed and called for help and was afraid “it would start again” if she went back inside. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 146.

[4] A neighbor who lived in the apartment complex across the street was awoken by “a loud commotion” that sounded “like a guy[,] and then a lady in distress.” Id. at 127. The neighbor looked out her window and observed a man and a woman, whom she recognized as her neighbors, fighting. The woman, who was later determined to be Maggie, was trying to get away from the man, who was later identified as Barlow, but the man grabbed hold of her. The neighbor saw Maggie “half up and half down ․ trying to crawl, walk away from [Barlow],” who had “grabbed a hold of her.” Id. at 131. Barlow got “her in a head lock and started dragging her back” towards the garage. Id. at 130. Maggie was trying to get his arm off of her, but Barlow continued to pull her back towards the garage. The neighbor then called 911. In the 911 call, the neighbor stated that she “just saw a man strangling a woman and dragged her back into the house. And she's screamin’, asking for help.” State's Ex. 1 at 0:15–0:20. The neighbor also told the 911 dispatcher, “He pulled her in through the back in the alleyway. She was trying to run away.” Id. at 1:18–1:22. Further, the neighbor reported that Maggie “was telling him she couldn't breathe ․ and then when I saw him grab her, he was grabbing her by the throat and dragging her back into the house.” Id. at 3:25–3:34.

[5] During the altercation, Maggie was so afraid of Barlow that she urinated on herself. Therefore, after she and Barlow got back inside the house, Maggie went into the bathroom to clean herself up and change. Barlow followed her into the bathroom and told her to be quiet. Barlow then put his hand over her mouth and applied pressure making it hard to breathe. Barlow also began smacking Maggie on both sides of her head.

[6] The police arrived several minutes after the neighbor's call, around 8:00 a.m. Officers went to the front door and knocked, announcing themselves. One of the officers heard faint noises inside the house that then went silent. While in the bathroom, Maggie heard the police asking Barlow to come outside. Maggie wanted to go outside with him, but she was not able to because Barlow stood in front of her, blocking her path. After receiving no answer when they knocked on the door, the officers went around to an open window that had been broken and did a “loud hail,” which is a call to the occupants in the house through the PA system on a patrol car, asking them to come outside. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 162–63. The police received no response.

[7] After receiving no answer from the house, the officers reached out to Maggie's mother (“Mother”) to see if she could help make contact with Barlow and Maggie. Mother told the officers that Maggie and Barlow had been having “ongoing issues” and that she was “very concerned” for Maggie's safety since she had been unable to reach her. Id. at 164. Mother arrived at the home around 9:30 a.m. When Mother arrived, she knocked on the front door and then went around the house to a back window that was broken in an attempt to make contact with Maggie. The broken window was covered with a blanket, and Mother pulled the blanket aside to speak with Barlow and Maggie. Looking inside through the broken window, Mother saw Barlow standing behind Maggie with his hands around her neck, holding her. Mother told Barlow to let Maggie go, but he did not release her. After several minutes of negotiating and pleading, Maggie was finally able to leave the house. When Maggie exited the house, she “looked ․ really broke[n] down a lot [sic] and her face was all red.” Id. at 139. She had dried blood on her face and around her mouth and nose. She told the police that Barlow had instructed her to falsely say she got into a fight with a girl the previous night.

[8] The police then attempted to get Barlow to exit the house. The officers first did another “loud hail” to tell Barlow that “he's under arrest and that he needs to exit the house now.” Id. at 193. They received no response. The police then threw a flash-bang grenade into the house, but they still received no response. Officers then tried to induce Barlow to exit by shooting “CS gas” cartridges into the house, which also did not work. Id. at 196. Finally, the officers decided to enter the house and search for Barlow. Once inside the house, the officers eventually found Barlow hiding under a pile of clothes in an upstairs closet. Barlow was then taken into custody.

[9] On June 3, 2024, the State charged Barlow with Level 5 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. On October 8, 2024, the State filed notice of its intent to seek a habitual offender enhancement. A jury trial was held on November 12 and 13, 2024, and at the conclusion of the trial, Barlow was found guilty of all counts, including the habitual offender enhancement.

[10] On December 2, 2024, the sentencing hearing was held. At the time of sentencing, Barlow was twenty-nine years old. Barlow's contacts with the criminal justice system included five adjudications for juvenile delinquency that, if committed by an adult, would be Class D felony theft in 2009, Class D felony possession of a legend drug in 2009, Class D felony receiving stolen property in 2011, Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief in 2011, and Class C felony robbery in 2012. He violated the terms of his probation for the 2009 theft adjudication several times, which resulted in multiple placements. As an adult, Barlow had convictions for Class B felony burglary, Class D felony receiving stolen property, and Class B misdemeanor false informing in 2014; Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in 2019; Level 6 felony escape in 2020; and Level 6 resisting law enforcement using a vehicle in 2023. Barlow violated the terms of a re-entry program in February 2019 and absconded, which resulted in the Level 6 felony escape charge. Barlow's substance abuse history included the use of alcohol and marijuana at age sixteen; morphine at age seventeen; cocaine, methamphetamine, and spice at age twenty-three; and fentanyl at age twenty-seven.

[11] At sentencing, the trial court noted, as to mitigating factors: “I did not find any mitigators. None were proposed. You didn't plead guilty. Didn't accept responsibility. You have said nothing at your allocution statement.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 11. As to aggravating factors, the trial court found Barlow's criminal history and the fact that prior attempts at rehabilitation had failed. In sentencing Barlow, the trial court vacated his conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of ten years on the remaining counts, with five years for Level 5 felony criminal confinement, to be served concurrent with two years for Level 6 felony strangulation, and five years for the habitual offender enhancement. Barlow now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] Barlow argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions for criminal confinement and strangulation. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.” Id. Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

A. Criminal Confinement

[13] Barlow first contends that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction for criminal confinement. To convict Barlow of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally confined Maggie without her consent and the offense resulted in bodily injury to Maggie. Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(1)(C). To “confine” means to “substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.” I.C. § 35-42-3-1. Barlow asserts that the evidence at trial did not prove that he substantially interfered with Maggie's liberty because he claims the evidence only established that he stood in front of her. We disagree.

[14] The evidence most favorable to the verdict revealed that Barlow substantially interfered with Maggie's liberty by dragging her back into the house as she was running away screaming and by then preventing her from leaving the house by blocking her way and hitting her head. Specifically, testimony was presented that Maggie ran outside and screamed for help, but Barlow grabbed her in a headlock and dragged her back inside, which caused Maggie to be so afraid that she urinated on herself. Once back inside the house, Maggie went to the bathroom, and Barlow followed her and blocked her path, preventing her from leaving. While blocking her path, Barlow hit her on both sides of her head. Barlow still persisted in his refusal to allow Maggie to leave even after the police and Mother arrived and asked him to let Maggie go. This was sufficient evidence to prove that Barlow substantially interfered with Maggie's liberty, and we conclude that his conviction for criminal confinement was supported by sufficient evidence.

B. Strangulation

[15] Barlow next argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction for strangulation. To convict Barlow of strangulation as a Level 6 felony, the State was required to prove that he, in a rude, angry, or insolent manner, knowingly or intentionally applied pressure to Maggie's throat or neck or obstructed Maggie's nose or mouth in a manner that impeded her normal breathing or blood circulation. I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c). He asserts that there was no evidence to prove that he impeded Maggie's normal breathing.

[16] Contrary to Barlow's assertion, the evidence most favorable to the verdict established that he impeded Maggie's normal breathing, both when he put her in a headlock outside the house and when he covered her mouth with his hand in the bathroom. After Maggie ran out of the house, Barlow “grabb[ed] her by the throat and dragg[ed] her back into the house” and Maggie “was telling him she couldn't breathe.” State's Ex. 1 at 3:25–3:34. Once inside the house, Barlow followed Maggie into the bathroom, told her to be quiet, and covered her mouth with his hand “where [she] couldn't breathe.” State's Ex. 22 at 1:20–1:30. This was sufficient evidence to prove that Barlow impeded Maggie's normal breathing.

[17] Barlow directs us to Maggie's trial testimony, arguing that portions of her trial testimony contradicted her prior statements at the time of the offense and the statements of the neighbor. Yet, our role is to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, and it is well-established that “[w]hen a witness's trial testimony contradicts a statement she made before trial, it is the jury's province to decide which statement to believe.” Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Therefore, it was within the purview of the jury to give more weight to the statements made by the neighbor, an independent eyewitness, in the 911 call and to the statements made by Maggie to the police directly after the offenses when the events were fresh in her mind than Maggie's testimony at trial after time had passed since the offenses. Barlow's request for us to give more weight to Maggie's trial testimony over other evidence presented at trial is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210. We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Barlow's conviction for strangulation.

II. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[18] Barlow contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[19] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[20] Barlow was convicted of Level 5 felony criminal confinement and Level 6 felony strangulation and was adjudicated to be a habitual offender. A person who commits a Level 5 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). A person who commits a Level 6 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six months and two and a half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). A person found to be a habitual offender shall be sentenced to an additional fixed term between three years and six years if the person is convicted of a Level 5 or Level 6 felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(2). Here, the trial court sentenced Barlow to five years for his Level 5 felony conviction and two years for his Level 6 felony conviction served concurrently and five years for the habitual offender enhancement for a total sentence of ten years executed.

[21] Barlow cites Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 2007), in his challenge that his sentence is inappropriate, suggesting the case controls our analysis. There, our Supreme Court concluded that, because the victims were not home and no weapons were used when the eighteen-year-old defendant burglarized the home and because the defendant's criminal history consisted of mainly non-violent juvenile offenses, the forty-year aggregate sentence was inappropriate. Id. at 465. However, our 7(B) authority is reserved for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied, and whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on “myriad ․ factors that come to light in a given case,” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224, which causes appellate courts to give “substantial deference to the trial court's sentence” and “independently examine” the defendant's offenses and character, Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). We, therefore, do not find Hollin controlling and proceed to independently examine whether Barlow's sentence is inappropriate.

[22] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Barlow asserts that the nature of the offenses for which he was convicted did not warrant a sentence that was “just shy of the maximum for [both] a Level 5 felony” and the habitual offender enhancement. Appellant's Br. p. 19. Looking to the nature of the offenses, the facts demonstrated that Barlow was angrily arguing with Maggie when she went outside to get away from him. He then grabbed her by the throat, put her in a headlock, and dragged her back inside, causing her to scream for help and say that she could not breathe. Maggie was so scared that she urinated on herself. Once back inside, she went into the bathroom, and Barlow followed her, blocking her exit from the bathroom. Barlow then put his hand over her mouth and applied pressure making it so “she couldn't breathe.” State's Ex. 22 at 1:20–1:30. Barlow also smacked Maggie on both sides of her head, and although Maggie wanted to go outside when the police arrived, she was not able to because Barlow stood in front of her, blocking her path. Further, after the police arrived and announced their presence, Barlow did not allow Maggie to leave, forcing Maggie to endure additionally by being held captive for over an hour. Once Maggie was able to leave the residence, Barlow remained in the residence, forcing the police to use flash-bang grenades and CS gas cartridges before entering the house to take him into custody, ultimately finding Barlow hiding in a closet under clothing. Barlow's assertions on appeal have not shown compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offenses in a positive light, accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[23] The character of the offender is found in what we learn from the offender's life and conduct. Merriweather, 151 N.E.3d at 1286. “A defendant's criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing character, the significance of which varies based on the ‘gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’ ” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Barlow asserts that, although he does have a criminal history, most of his prior convictions are for theft or drug-related offenses, and therefore, his criminal history is not significant enough to warrant the sentence imposed, especially in light of “the difficult circumstances he faced as a child.” Appellant's Br. p. 20.

[24] As to Barlow's character, the evidence established that he was twenty-nine years old at the time of sentencing and had a substantial criminal history consisting of two misdemeanors and four felonies, including two instances of resisting law enforcement, one count of Class B felony burglary of a dwelling, receiving stolen property, and false informing. After serving his sentence for burglary, he was terminated from a re-entry program for violating the terms of the program and absconding, which resulted in a charge and conviction for Level 6 felony escape. Additionally, Barlow had numerous contacts with the criminal justice system as a juvenile that resulted in at least five adjudications for offenses that would have been four felonies and one misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Barlow also had an untreated substance abuse history that consisted of the use of alcohol and marijuana beginning at age sixteen; morphine beginning at age seventeen; cocaine, methamphetamine, and spice beginning at age twenty-three; and fentanyl beginning at age twenty-seven. Both his criminal history and unremedied substance abuse history do not reflect well on Barlow's character. Further, although he cites to difficult circumstances that he faced in childhood, he did not raise such circumstances as mitigators at sentencing, and his presentence investigation report merely stated that he reported having “a poor childhood due to ‘not having any guidance’ ” and that he “suffered from verbal abuse ‘here and there’ throughout his childhood by various adults.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 115. Barlow has not demonstrated substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character to portray his character in a positive light that sentence revision is necessary. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[25] Based on the facts in the record, Barlow has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Conclusion

[26] We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Barlow's convictions for Level 5 felony criminal confinement and Level 6 felony strangulation. Further, Barlow's sentence is not inappropriate.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(1)(C).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

Foley, Judge.

Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur. Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J. concur.