D.P., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] D.P., a juvenile delinquent with a history of violent outbursts, repeatedly violated the terms of his probation by committing new offenses and testing positive for illegal substances. After the juvenile court's attempts to place D.P. in less restrictive placements failed to yield better behavior from D.P., it awarded wardship of D.P. to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). D.P. now appeals, raising a single issue for our review: Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering DOC placement.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This case begins not with the criminal conduct underlying D.P.’s delinquency adjudication but with his family's involvement with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). D.P. was born on May 2, 2007, and he was adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) both in Illinois and Indiana. The Illinois CHINS case resulted in termination of his biological parents’ parental rights. D.P. was then adopted in 2019 but abandoned by his adoptive parents in or around February 2021, resulting in a second CHINS adjudication and termination of the adoptive parents’ parental rights in May 2021. Between February 2021 and July 2022, D.P. had eight foster home placements and multiple contacts with law enforcement. This resulted in D.P.’s placement at Pierceton Woods Academy's SABER program.

[4] On September 7, 2022, after escaping from Pierceton Woods, D.P. set fire to and burned down a dwelling. He was adjudicated delinquent for committing arson on October 27 (the “Arson Cause”).¹ After D.P. returned to Pierceton Woods, he constructed a shank and used it on a staff member, resulting in his removal from the facility. Following a brief DOC placement, D.P. was released to kinship placement in April 2023; however, after he was charged with theft and resisting law enforcement, he was relocated to Indiana United Methodist Children's Home (“Children's Home”) on October 9. While at Children's Home, D.P. continued to possess contraband and test positive for THC. In November, D.P. struck a peer. In December, D.P. threatened staff members.

[5] In February 2024, D.P. was removed from Children's Home and detained in Boone County after he “sprayed two staff a[t] the [Children's Home] with a fire extinguisher, ․ assaulted staff with his fist, feet and spit[,] pulled out the hair of one staff member[, and] assault[ed] an Officer. One [Children's Home] resident had to be transported to the hospital due to the inhaling of the fumes.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 231. This incident resulted in a new delinquency petition being filed on February 15, alleging D.P. committed resisting law enforcement, three counts of battery by bodily waste, two counts of battery resulting in bodily injury, and criminal mischief. On September 12, D.P. admitted to resisting law enforcement, two counts of battery by bodily waste, and criminal mischief, (the “Resisting Cause”).² D.P. was adjudicated delinquent under the Resisting Cause, and the case was transferred to Hendricks County for disposition.

[6] While the Resisting Cause was pending, D.P. continued to engage in violence and consume illegal substances. In August 2024, D.P. was placed in kinship placement with Michele Morrical. While there, D.P. possessed and smoked marijuana, resulting in multiple failed drug screens and probation filing a modification report in the Arson Cause. D.P. also ordered knives and had them shipped to Morrical's home. Fortunately, Morrical prevented the knives from being delivered to D.P.

[7] On November 25, at the combined factfinding hearing on the probation modification reports in the Arson Cause and disposition hearing in the Resisting Cause, D.P. admitted to violating his probation in the Arson Cause, and the juvenile court immediately proceeded to a combined disposition under the Arson Cause and the Resisting Cause. D.P.’s kinship placement and the child advocate asked for D.P. to remain on home detention. The probation department recommended DOC placement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court awarded wardship of D.P. to DOC and ordered disposition for the Resisting Cause to fall under the companion Arson Cause. The juvenile court issued its dispositional order two days later. In the order, the juvenile court found in relevant part as follows:

25. D[.P.] needs behavioral and mental health counseling to better cope when he is overcome with anger so that he does not physically harm others.

26. D[.P.] needs substance abuse treatment as he has shown a long pattern of abusing substances.

27. A residential treatment facility is not appropriate for D[.P.] because of his aggressive behaviors and tendency to engage in violence. D[.P.] could harm staff, destruct property, or harm his residential peers and residential treatment facilities are not equipped to address these behaviors like the IDOC is. This is especially true given D[.P.]’s history of such behaviors while at residential treatment facilities and secure detention facilities.

28. It is in D[.P.]’s interest that he be committed to the Indiana Department of Corrections [sic] for a period of time deemed appropriate by the IDOC for D[.P.] to complete necessary rehabilitative programs.

29. It is essential D[.P.] receive these services now; he is on the eve of turning eighteen (18) and must receive and implement services to avoid his aggressive, harmful, and destructive behaviors in the future.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 246–47. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Wardship of D.P. to the DOC

[8] D.P. argues the juvenile court erred by ordering DOC placement. “Juvenile courts enjoy wide latitude and significant flexibility in their dealings with juveniles.” B.K. v. State, 235 N.E.3d 142, 145 (Ind. 2024) (citing In re M.T., 928 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). We review the juvenile court's disposition for abuse of discretion. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024) (citing K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “A court abuses its discretion by misinterpreting the law or ‘if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.’ ” Id. (quoting T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023)). “In determining whether a juvenile court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)), trans. not sought.

[9] “The disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to the juvenile court's discretion, subject to the statutory considerations of the child's welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition.” A.F., 247 N.E.3d at 843 (citing Q.H., 216 N.E.3d at 1200). When considering an appropriate disposition, if it can be consistent with safety of the community and the best interest of the child, juvenile courts must consider (1) the least restrictive setting that is close to the parents’ home, (2) attempting to minimally interfere with family autonomy, (3) attempting to not disrupt family life, (4) imposing the least restraint on the child, and (5) providing reasonable opportunities for participation of the child's family. Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. “Commitment to the DOC ‘should be treated as a last resort,’ ” G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), but “that option may be appropriate when ‘consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child,’ ” id. (quoting I.C. § 31-37-18-6).

[10] The juvenile court is required to “accompany [its] dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions,” I.C. § 31-37-18-9. Here, the juvenile court issued the required written findings indicating its reasons for ordering DOC placement and emphasizing the need for counseling and substance abuse treatment. Therefore, we will not “set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Ind. R. Trial P. 52(A). “[F]or a finding to be clearly erroneous, there must be no evidence to support it.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2016).

[11] D.P. challenges the juvenile court's finding that “[i]t is terribly unfortunate the multiple services provided in D[.P.]’s community have been insufficient to rehabilitate D[.P.] of his aggressive, violent behaviors, as well as substance abuse, but they have been.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 246. D.P. points to his lack of violence and aggression while living with Morrical for approximately four months in support of his claim that the above finding is not supported by the record. This is simply a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do. See A.F., 247 N.E.3d at 843 (citing Q.H., 216 N.E.3d at 1200). D.P. exhibited a continued inability to respond to less restrictive placements throughout the CHINS and delinquency cases, and he has routinely failed to sufficiently address his violent behavior. Despite this, D.P. claims it was inappropriate for the juvenile court to “delve ․ into behaviors D.P. exhibited while in placement [(Pierceton Woods and Children's Home)] prior to being within the community at the time of the modification hearing,” because “D.P.’s admission resulting in modification of his disposition was for having positive drug screens.” Appellant's Br. at 21. First, this ignores that the juvenile court's disposition was combined under the Arson and Resisting Causes. Second, even if they were not combined, a juvenile court would have difficulty creating an appropriate disposition for a juvenile by simply reviewing the current situation as if in a vacuum. Rather, “dispositional proceedings [are] analogous to sentencing hearings after an open plea agreement in adult court, where the trial court considers a broad range of information in evaluating aggravating and mitigating circumstances relevant to sentencing.” J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[12] D.P.’s remaining challenges of the juvenile court's findings are similarly requests to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility. For example, D.P. challenges the finding that he “is a threat to the safety of others and a threat to himself,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 246, because he was not violent during the short period he lived with Morrical. D.P. also challenges findings related to DOC placement being in his best interest. D.P. was removed from two residential treatment facilities for violence and DCS “exhausted 33 residential treatment programs,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 245. We also cannot ignore that, despite D.P.’s claims of nonviolence, he ordered knives delivered to his placement with Morrical. The juvenile court did not clearly err in entering its findings.

[13] Lastly, D.P. argues the juvenile court failed to “produce a finding[ ] that [ ]DOC would be the least restrictive” placement. Appellant's Br. at 22. We disagree. The juvenile court incorporated the probation department's modification report which details attempts to exhaust less restrictive placement options: “Relative care is not a valid option ․ Out-of-home placement in a residential setting is not an option for [D.P.] at this time.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 239. Probation concluded that “[p]lacement in the [DOC] will allow [D.P.] an opportunity for mental health services, education program, substance use treatment and participation in core cognitive-behavioral programs.” Id. For the same reason, we disagree with D.P.’s claim that there was a lack of evidence that DOC would be in his best interest. Based on the foregoing, the evidence supports the juvenile court's findings and its conclusion that DOC placement was consistent with the safety of the community and in D.P.’s best interest. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering D.P. to be placed with DOC.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cause No. 32D03-2210-JD-000166.

2.   Cause No. 32D03-2410-JD-98.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.