ABBAS v. WILLIAMS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Devonte Abbas appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error after a jury returned a verdict against Abbas on his claims of malicious prosecution against the City of Hobart and two of its law enforcement officers, Richard Mayer and Kenneth Williams.¹ Abbas raises four issues for our review, and Mayer and Williams raise one issue on cross-appeal. We consolidate the parties’ various issues and restate them as whether the parties have demonstrated reversible error.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 4, 2019, Officer Mayer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle being operated by Abbas for failing to signal a turn. Officer Mayer gave Abbas a verbal warning and, thus, concluded the purpose of the stop. However, instead of allowing Abbas to leave, Officer Mayer asked for permission to search Abbas's vehicle, which permission Abbas declined to give. Officer Mayer then informed Abbas that he would have to wait at the scene for a K-9 unit to search the outside of his vehicle.

[4] Officer Williams arrived some time thereafter, along with other officers. Officer Williams approached the driver's side window, which was partially down, and instructed Abbas to exit the vehicle. When Abbas did not immediately comply, Officer Williams reached through the open window and pulled Abbas out of the vehicle. Officer Williams then struck Abbas in the face and “slammed [him] on the ground.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 130.

[5] Officer Williams told Officer Mayer that Abbas had attempted to close the car window on Officer Williams's arm. Officer Mayer, in turn, repeated that allegation in a probable cause affidavit in support of criminal charges against Abbas. And, after the State had charged Abbas with Level 6 felony battery against a public safety official and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Officer Mayer again repeated the allegation at a deposition.

[6] Approximately two and one-half years after the State filed its charges, the State filed a motion to dismiss them. In its motion to dismiss, the State acknowledged that “there are clear suppressible issues as it pertains to the stop” of Abbas. Ex. Vol. 1, p. 41. The State further represented that a “video review of the incident and discussion with the trial deputy as to the deposition leaves the State unable to sustain its burden.” Id. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss.

[7] Thereafter, Abbas filed the instant complaint alleging malicious prosecution against Mayer and Williams. Mayer and Williams moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were immune from such claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied that motion.

[8] At Abbas's ensuing jury trial, defense counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam), for the proposition that that opinion “authorizes officers to remove motorists from their vehicle without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 159. Abbas's counsel did not object and, thus, did not explain to the court that Mimms is an opinion on officer safety during the course of a lawful stop, involved asking an occupant to exit a vehicle rather than “remov[ing]” him, and involved a not-yet-completed traffic stop. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.

[9] The trial court accepted the request to take notice of Mimms as described by defense counsel, and defense counsel then proceeded to ask Abbas if he was aware of that legal authority. Later in the trial, Officer Mayer testified, without objection, that it was his understanding that Mimms allowed police officers to “pull occupants out of” their vehicles. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 106.

[10] The next day of the trial, and after the lunch break that day, Abbas's counsel asked to “re-raise” the issue of Mimms. Id. At that point, Abbas's counsel noted that “[a]t no point in [Mimms] does it hold that officers may pull the occupant out of the car.” Id. at 107. Abbas's counsel thus asked the court to admonish the jury as to the holding in Mimms. Although the court recognized that defense counsel had not accurately portrayed Mimms, the court declined to admonish the jury, stating that “we can play with these decisions” and the attorneys could make their arguments on “how you want to interpret it in your closing.” Id. at 108-09. Abbas did not object to that stated procedure, and defense counsel continued to question officers on their mistaken understanding of Mimms.

[11] During the defense's case, defense counsel solicited testimony from Mayer, without objection, that Mayer has never had “a complaint of excess force filed” against him. Id. at 91. Defense counsel likewise solicited testimony from Williams that he has been “recognized for [his] work nationally” on multiple occasions. Id. at 112-13. Again, Abbas's counsel did not object to that line of questioning.

[12] Following the close of the defense's case, Abbas's counsel stated to the court that he did not think that a final instruction to the jury would be “appropriate to cover the prejudice” that the defense's misstatements on Mimms had caused. Id. at 152. Instead, Abbas's counsel requested a “curative oral instruction” to the jury that simply read the exact holding of Mimms from the opinion itself. Id. The court responded that it would issue a final instruction that quoted the holding of Mimms and that it would read that instruction to the jury; insofar as Abbas sought something beyond that remedy, however, the court overruled Abbas's request.

[13] Defense counsel asked the court for a final instruction that would have required the jury to find that Mayer and Williams acted with personal animosity toward Abbas to find them guilty of malicious prosecution. The court declined that proffered instruction. However, during defense counsel's closing argument, he stated, without objection, as follows: “No matter how you feel about ․ that night, if you can't find evidence of personal animosity, malicious behavior by these officers against the plaintiff, then you should find on behalf of the defendants.” Id. at 197.

[14] Defense counsel also referenced immunity from malicious prosecution during his closing argument, stating, again, without objection:

[a] charging affidavit goes to a deputy prosecutor who oftentimes can send the charges back. You heard the testimony. A lot of times they come back either for changes or anything else if he or she feels they need more information before the deputy prosecutor signs the charging information. The deputy prosecutor isn't involved in things like a battery or false arrest, but they have to be involved in a malicious prosecution because it is that prosecutor that has to sign the charging information, and then it goes to a judge. There[ are] all kinds of safeguards built in as to why this isn't a—why a malicious prosecution is so difficult to show; whereas, false arrest not so. They can bring that against one officer. You don't need a deputy involved. You don't need a judge involved. If there is a battery, that's brought strictly against the officer.

Id. at 186.

[15] The jury returned a verdict for Mayer and Williams. Thereafter, Abbas filed a lengthy pro se motion to correct error in which he asked the trial court to act as the thirteenth juror and overturn the jury's verdict. The trial court denied his request, and this appeal ensued.

The parties’ various arguments on appeal do not demonstrate reversible error.

[16] On appeal, Abbas first argues that the trial court abused its discretion “when it failed to declare a mistrial sua sponte” based on the misstatements about Mimms. Appellant's Br. at 12 (bold font removed). Abbas also asserts that a sua sponte mistrial was required based on “lies” by the testifying officers, in particular with respect to the determination of charges against Abbas. Id.

[17] But Abbas cites no authority for his proposition that these issues are properly before us. See, e.g., Stamper v. Hyundai Motor Co., 699 N.E.2d 678, 681-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the appellants failed to preserve their argument for a mistrial by not requesting one in the trial court), trans. denied. Abbas did not ask for a mistrial, and, therefore, he cannot now complain about not having been granted a mistrial. Id. Abbas's mistrial arguments fail.

[18] Abbas also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, following the close of defense's case, the court declined his request for a curative instruction to the jury on Mimms. But Abbas recognizes that the court essentially did just that when it gave the final instructions to the jury. See Appellant's Br. at 18-19. Abbas's argument here is not supported by cogent reasoning and therefore fails.

[19] Abbas next contends that six different components of his jury trial constituted fundamental error that required the trial court to interject itself despite there being no objection on any of the purported issues by Abbas's counsel. We flatly reject all six of these arguments. “We have applied the fundamental error doctrine only in limited situations in civil cases,” namely, in civil commitments and cases involving the termination of parental rights. Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Abbas has not demonstrated that his malicious prosecution case, which sought money damages, implicates such a fundamental interest. We therefore decline to consider his fundamental error arguments.

[20] Abbas's final argument is that the trial court erred when it did not grant his motion to correct error and overturn the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence. We are at least willing to agree with Abbas that the jury could have found in his favor at the conclusion of the jury trial. But that is a much different proposition from the proposition that a verdict for Abbas was the only verdict that the evidence would have supported. For example, Abbas's only evidence of damages related to his “[m]ental suffering” from the criminal proceedings, which proceedings never went past the charging phase. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 181. The jury was within the evidence to conclude that his alleged injuries did not merit a verdict in his favor, and, therefore, we cannot say that the trial court was obliged to overturn the jury's verdict.

[21] On cross-appeal, Mayer and Williams assert that the trial court erred when it denied their motion for summary judgment under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. As we affirm the trial court's denial of Abbas's motion to correct error, the cross-appeal issue is moot, and we do not consider it.

Conclusion

[22] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The City of Hobart does not participate in this appeal in a separate capacity, and so we simply refer to Mayer and Williams throughout this decision.

Mathias, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.