L.B., Appellant-Respondent v. K.R., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In September of 2022, K.R. petitioned for an order for protection against L.B. The trial court entered an ex parte order for protection (the “Ex Parte Order”) against L.B., which order was in effect through September 28, 2024. In August of 2024, K.R. petitioned to extend the Ex Parte Order, which petition the trial court granted the same day, extending the order through September 28, 2026. L.B. appeals from the trial court's order denying his objection to the extension of the Ex Parte Order, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the extension of the order and that the trial court erred in awarding K.R. attorney's fees. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] K.R. and L.B. were married and are the parents of a six-year-old daughter, E.B. On September 14, 2022, K.R. petitioned for an order for protection against L.B. On September 28, 2022, the trial court entered the Ex Parte Order against L.B., which order was in effect through September 28, 2024. The Ex Parte Order provided the following findings:

a. [K.R.] has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that stalking has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of this Order.

b. This order does protect an intimate partner or child.

c. [L.B.] represents a credible threat to the safety of [K.R.] or a member of [K.R.]’s household.

d. The following relief is necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence.

Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 11.

[3] The trial court enjoined L.B. “from threatening to commit or committing acts of domestic or family violence or stalking against [K.R.] and the following designated family or household members, if any: [J.P.]; [R.R.]” and prohibited L.B. from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with” K.R., except for “contact permitted only as specified in the provisional order under case no. 29D04-2206-DC-004715 [(“Cause No. 4715”)].”¹ Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 11. L.B. did not request a hearing on the Ex Parte Order. Tr. Vol. II p. 7.

[4] The parties’ marriage was dissolved in November of 2023. A final hearing on the issue of custody of E.B. was conducted on July 25, 2024. Prior to that hearing, L.B. had filed a petition for a rule to show cause in which he had alleged that K.R. had been untruthful.

[5] After the July 25, 2024 hearing, L.B. contacted the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department to request that they investigate K.R. for perjury. A sheriff's deputy contacted K.R. about L.B.’s accusations, and upon receiving the call, K.R. felt “frightened,” “upset and shaking[,]” and “scared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. K.R. contacted her attorney, and, after they spoke with and provided documents to the deputy, K.R. was not charged with perjury. K.R. testified that these events “led [her] to seek the [․] extension of the protective order[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 37.

[6] On August 22, 2024, K.R. petitioned to extend the Ex Parte Order, which petition the trial court granted the same day, extending the order through September 28, 2026. L.B., pro se at the time, filed various motions with the trial court. On August 23, 2024, K.R. sent a message to L.B. informing him that she, E.B., and other family members were going on a family vacation with K.R.’s mother while K.R.’s mother was still “able to travel” because they had been made aware that K.R.’s mother's “treatment will be discontinued as it is not being effective.” Ex. Vol. III p. 11. K.R. informed L.B. that while E.B. would be unavailable for L.B.’s midweek parenting time as a result of the trip, they could arrange makeup parenting time.

[7] K.R. sent another message on August 24, 2024, asking L.B. if she could pick up E.B. at 4 p.m. the next day. On August 25, 2024, L.B. messaged K.R. among other things, “Your proclivity for not being truthful makes me disinclined to acquiesce.” Ex. Vol. III p. 13. K.R. told L.B. that her mother had cancer and would be starting hospice care and asked him to “please reconsider allowing me to pick up [E.B.] so that she can spend time with her grandmother while she is still able[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 13. L.B.’s response included the following:

So, when do you tell the truth, [K.R.]? Not to me, not to the court, not to DCS, not to the Guardian. You've lied, you've kept [E.B.] from me, and now I'm supposed to believe you? And your mom lied to the Guardian, to prevent me from having parenting time with [E.B.]. 2 years I've been apart from my daughter because of you, your mom, your brother, and your ex. And now, you want me to believe you or concede what limited time I have with [E.B.]? After you've acted in every way to take everything else from me?

Ex. Vol. III p. 13. On August 27, 2024, during K.R.’s family vacation, L.B. sent K.R. a message on OFW that read, “Please see attached.” Ex. Vol. III p. 16. The attachment was titled “Notice of Defamation[,]” referred to Indiana Code section 34-15-3-1, and alleged that K.R. had made false and defamatory statements against L.B. Ex. Vol. III p. 17. L.B. indicated in the attachment, “I am serving this notice to you at least three (3) days before I intend to file a Complaint for Damages with the court. I have been harmed and I have suffered damages. I will seek compensation for these atrocities.” Ex. Vol. III p. 17.

[8] K.R. viewed the OFW message on the family vacation, felt “panicked[,]” and contacted her attorney. Tr. Vol. II p. 39. K.R. felt scared, frightened, intimidated, and harassed as a result of the “notice” that L.B. had sent. Tr. Vol. II p. 39. L.B. also mailed a copy of the notice to K.R. via U.S. Mail. L.B. was subsequently criminally charged with invasion of privacy in Hamilton County.

[9] On September 11, 2024, L.B. filed a complaint for damages against K.R. in Hamilton County. In the complaint, L.B. alleged that K.R. had committed defamation and requested general and special damages in the amount of $123,000.00, compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000.00, and punitive damages. On September 12, 2024, L.B. filed a fifteen-page document titled “Complaint-Affidavit Demonstrating Multiple Acts of Perjury and Contempt of Court” in the parties’ dissolution matter. Ex. Vol. III p. 41. On September 14, 2024, L.B. also filed a “Motion to Rule on Contempt of Court and Issue an Arrest Warrant for [K.R.] for Perjury” in the parties’ dissolution matter, in which L.B. specifically requested that the trial court issue an arrest warrant for K.R. Ex. Vol. III p. 58.

[10] On October 9, 2024, K.R.’s mother died. The next day, L.B. filed a complaint for damages against K.R.’s mother for defamation, which complaint was dismissed. L.B. has appealed two prior orders from the parties’ dissolution matter. In both, L.B. has requested that the Indiana Court of Appeals “immediately issue a warrant for the arrest” of K.R. Ex. Vol. III pp. 84, 136.

[11] On December 12, 2024, L.B., through counsel, filed a general denial/response to K.R.’s petition to extend the protective order and demand for a hearing. On February 6, 2025, the trial court held a hearing in this matter. At the hearing, K.R. testified that she still felt scared, frightened, intimidated, and harassed by L.B. K.R. also testified that she “feel[s] like [L.B.] won't stop[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. K.R. testified that the extension of the Ex Parte Order was necessary “in order to have some peace and feel somewhat safe with [L.B.]” and “if this is what happens when I have [a protective order] in place, I'm scared to know what happens if I don't.” Tr. Vol. II p. 40.

[12] K.R. also testified that she felt that L.B. “is using and abusing the court system to harass and intimidate” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 40. K.R. testified that she had incurred a “great deal of attorney's fees responding to [L.B.’s] different lawsuits and the appellate issues[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. At the hearing, K.R. admitted her attorney's “Affidavit of Billable Fees and Expenses” into evidence, showing that she had incurred $3325.50 in fees and expenses “relating to the extension of the protective order[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 144.

[13] On February 7, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying L.B.’s objection to the extension of the Ex Parte Order, ordering that the Ex Parte Order remain in effect through September 28, 2026, and ordering that L.B. pay K.R.’s attorney fees in the amount of $3325.50.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Initially, we note that L.B. proceeds pro se. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

[15] “[I]n granting a protective order the trial court must sua sponte make special findings of fact and conclusions thereon.” Hanauer v. Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We apply a two-tiered standard of review to these findings and conclusions:

[F]irst, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the [order]. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the [order] only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the [order]. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the ․ [order]. Those appealing the ․ [order] must establish that the findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them de novo.

Id. at 149 (bracketed and omitted material in Hanauer).

I. Challenged Findings

[16] The trial court made numerous findings in the February 7, 2025 order to support its conclusion that “[a]n extension of the protective order is necessary to bring about a cessation of the harassment.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 38. L.B. specifically challenges Finding Numbers 19, 20, 21, and 29.

A. Finding 19

[17] Finding 19 is that there was no need for L.B. to send the notice of intent to file to K.R. via U.S. Mail and OFW. For context, Finding Numbers 17, 18, and 19 provide the following:

17. On August 27, 2024, when [L.B.] knew that [K.R.] would be vacationing with her family, including her dying mother, [L.B.] sent a document to [K.R.] via OFW and via U.S. Mail. The document notified [K.R.] that he believed that [K.R.] had made false and defamatory statements about [him] and that he was giving her at least three days of notice pursuant to I.C. 34-15-3-2 before filing his Complaint for Damages with the court. [L.B.] stated that he had been harmed and had suffered damages and that he will “seek compensation for these atrocities.” (Ex. 5).

18. I.C. 34-15-3-2 applies only to radio and televisions stations and is not applicable. There was no need for [L.B.] to ‘notify’ [K.R.] of his intent to file a lawsuit against her for defamation.

19. There was also no need for [L.B.] to send it to [K.R.] via U.S. Mail and OFW.

Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 37 (underlining in original). In challenging Finding 19, L.B. contends that he “clearly believed he was taking the correct course of action to file a suit, by first giving [K.R.] notice.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. L.B. cites to Rule 5 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure to support his argument that “[s]ervice of the notice via Certified Mail was required.” Appellant's Br. p. 20.

[18] The record shows that when L.B. had sent the notice to K.R. that he believed K.R. had made “false and defamatory statements” about him, he purported to do so “[i]n accordance with” Indiana Code section 34-15-3-1 and 34-15-3-2. Ex. Vol. III p. 17. These sections of the code clearly apply only to lawsuits “brought for [․] a libel or slander by any radio or television station or company in Indiana.” Ind. Code § 34-15-3-1. L.B. does not contend that K.R. committed the alleged acts against him as a radio or television station or company in Indiana, and nothing in the record would support such a conclusion. Therefore, Finding 19 was not clearly erroneous.

B. Finding 20

[19] Finding 20 is that L.B.’s “OFW message to [K.R.] on August 27, 2024, was intended to threaten, harass, frighten, and intimidate [K.R.] while she was on vacation with their daughter, [K.R.]’s extended family, and [K.R.]’s dying mother.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 37. In challenging this finding, L.B. contends that he had “believed serving notice was appropriate” under Indiana Code section 34-15-3-2. Appellant's Br. p. 16. Again, Indiana Code section 34-15-3-2 applies only to lawsuits “brought for [․] a libel or slander by any radio or television station or company in Indiana.” Ind. Code § 34-15-3-1. Whether L.B. had truly believed that he was required to send the document to K.R. was for the trial court to decide, and, as it relates to L.B.’s testimony that he had believed that he was required to send the notice, the trial court, as the trier of fact, was not obligated to believe L.B.’s self-serving testimony. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). L.B.’s challenge to this finding amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d at 149.

[20] Moreover, the record supports the trial court's finding that L.B. had intended to threaten, harass, frighten, and intimidate K.R. while she was on the family vacation. L.B. sent K.R. a message that read, “Please see attached.” Ex. Vol. III p. 16. The attachment was titled “Notice of Defamation” and referenced Indiana Code section 34-15-3-1, alleging that K.R. had made false and defamatory statements against L.B. Ex. Vol. III p. 17. L.B. had indicated in the attachment, “I am serving this notice to you at least three (3) days before I intend to file a Complaint for Damages with the court. I have been harmed and I have suffered damages. I will seek compensation for these atrocities.” Ex. Vol. III p. 17. L.B. had known that K.R. was on a family vacation when he sent the message, and when K.R. had viewed the OFW message during the family vacation, she had felt “panicked[,]” scared, frightened, intimidated, and harassed as a result of the message, and contacted her attorney. Tr. Vol. II p. 39. We cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that L.B.’s message had been intended to threaten, harass, frighten, and intimidate K.R. while she was on her family vacation.

C. Finding 21

[21] Finding 21 reads “[L.B.]’s messages to [K.R.] on OFW on August 25 and 27, 2024 violated the Ex Parte Order of Protection that was in effect.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 37. L.B. disputes that any of his messages violated the Ex Parte Order in effect at the time. In the Ex Parte Order, the trial court prohibited L.B. from communicating with K.R., except for “contact permitted only as specified in the provisional order under [Cause No. 4715].”² Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 11. Again, the referenced order in Cause No. 4715 specified that

[a]ll communication between the parties shall be through OFW absent an emergency. Each party shall limit his/her messages to the reasonable number needed each week to communicate co-parenting time issues for the best interests of [E.B.]. The parties’ communication shall be limited to communication related only to [E.B.], the parties’ ongoing arbitration matter, and marital expenses.

Ex. Vol. III pp. 5–6 (emphasis added).

[22] On August 25, 2024, after K.R. had sent messages to L.B. informing him of her mother's illness and the upcoming family vacation, and asking if she could pick up E.B. at 4 p.m. instead of 6 p.m., L.B. had messaged K.R., among other things, “Your proclivity for not being truthful makes me disinclined to acquiesce.” Ex. Vol. III p. 13. K.R. asked L.B. to “please reconsider allowing me to pick up [E.B.] so that she can spend time with her grandmother while she is still able[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 13. L.B.’s response included the following:

So, when do you tell the truth, [K.R.]? Not to me, not to the court, not to DCS, not to the Guardian. You've lied, you've kept [E.B.] from me, and now I'm supposed to believe you? And your mom lied to the Guardian, to prevent me from having parenting time with [E.B.]. 2 years I've been apart from my daughter because of you, your mom, your brother, and your ex. And now, you want me to believe you or concede what limited time I have with [E.B.]? After you've acted in every way to take everything else from me?

Ex. Vol. III p. 13. L.B. subsequently acknowledged he had been calling K.R. a liar in this message. Furthermore, L.B.’s August 27, 2024 message on OFW, “Please see attached” with the included attachment alleging that K.R. had made false and defamatory statements against L.B. made no mention of the topics covered by the provisional order under Cause No. 4715. L.B.’s messages were not limited to co-parenting topics, nor did the messages relate to the parties’ ongoing arbitration matter or marital expenses, as the Ex Parte Order and provisional order under Cause No. 4715 required. We cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that L.B.’s messages violated the Ex Parte Order.

D. Finding 29

[23] Finding 29 provides that L.B. “has repeatedly attempted to use law enforcement and multiple court filings to defame and harass [K.R.], and that [L.B.] has a pending criminal charge for Invasion of Privacy.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 38. L.B. contends that the “facts do not support the findings.” Appellant's Br. p. 26.

[24] Harassment, in this context, is “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5(a). “Harassment” does not include “statutorily or constitutionally protected activity[.]” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5(b). To “defame” a person may be defined as “harm[ing] the reputation or good name of by uttering injurious charges.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 590 (Phillip Babcock Gove et al. eds., G.&C. Merriam Company 1964).

[25] The record supports Finding 29. Prior to the final hearing on L.B. and K.R.’s dissolution of marriage, L.B. had filed a petition for a rule to show cause in which he had alleged that K.R. had been untruthful. After the final hearing, L.B. had contacted the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department to request that they investigate K.R. for perjury. After a sheriff's deputy had contacted K.R. about L.B.’s accusations, K.R. had felt “frightened,” and was “upset and shaking.” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. After K.R. had petitioned to extend the Ex Parte Order, L.B. had filed various motions, including a petition for hearing for a rule to show cause as to “why [K.R.] should not be found to have perjured herself[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 16. Again, L.B. had sent K.R. a message on August 27, 2024, with an attachment of a “Notice of Defamation” indicating “I am serving this notice to you at least three (3) days before I intend to file a Complaint for Damages with the court. I have been harmed and I have suffered damages. I will seek compensation for these atrocities.” Ex. Vol. III p. 17. As a result of the message, K.R. had felt “panicked[,]” scared, frightened, intimidated, and harassed. Tr. Vol. II p. 39.

[26] Furthermore, on September 11, 2024, L.B. had filed a complaint for damages against K.R. in Hamilton County, alleging that K.R. had committed defamation against him and requesting general and special damages in the amount of $123,000.00, compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000.00, and punitive damages. On September 12, 2024, L.B. had filed a fifteen-page document titled “Complaint-Affidavit Demonstrating Multiple Acts of Perjury and Contempt of Court” in the parties’ dissolution matter. Ex. Vol. III p. 41. On September 14, 2024, L.B. had filed a “Motion to Rule on Contempt of Court and Issue an Arrest Warrant for [K.R.] for Perjury” in the parties’ dissolution matter. Ex. Vol. III p. 58.

[27] In addition, the day after K.R.’s mother died, L.B. had filed a complaint for damages against K.R.’s mother for defamation, which complaint was dismissed. L.B. has appealed two prior orders from the parties’ dissolution matter, and, in both appeals, had requested that the Indiana Court of Appeals “immediately issue a warrant for the arrest” of K.R.³ Ex. Vol. III pp. 84, 136. Finally, L.B. admitted that he had been criminally charged with invasion of privacy in Hamilton County.

[28] Suffice it to say that the record amply supports the trial court's conclusion that L.B. had “repeatedly attempted to use law enforcement and multiple court filings to defame and harass [K.R.], and that [L.B.] has a pending criminal charge for Invasion of Privacy.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 38. K.R. presented evidence demonstrating L.B.’s intentional course of conduct involving repeated filings and attempts to paint her as a “liar” or a criminal in the eyes of the law. Moreover, the record contains evidence that K.R. actually had felt emotional distress as a result of L.B.’s actions, and we have little trouble concluding that a reasonable person would feel intimidated or threatened by L.B.’s behavior.

[29] To the extent that L.B. contends that his multiple filings against K.R. are “constitutionally and statutorily protected activities,” Appellant's Br. p. 25, he does not point to anything in the record suggesting that he raised these assertions below, and he has therefore waived this argument. See State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even ones based upon constitutional claims, are waived for appeal.”), trans. denied.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[30] L.B. further contends that K.R. did not present evidence sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Ex Parte Order should be extended. In extending the Ex Parte Order, the trial court found

that [K.R.] has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [L.B.] has engaged in an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of [K.R.] that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes [K.R.] to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.

Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 38. The trial court concluded that “[a]n extension of the protective order is necessary to bring about a cessation of the harassment.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 38.

[31] Under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (“CPOA”), “[a] person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b). Harassment is “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5(a). “Harassment” does not include “statutorily or constitutionally protected activity[.]” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5(b).

[32] To justify the issuance of an order for protection, the harassment must objectively include a present and credible threat. S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020). A credible threat is “plausible or believable.” Id. The burden is on the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner or the petitioner's family.” Id.

[33] To avoid duplication of the same facts and evidence, we conclude that the evidence outlined above in support of Findings 19, 20, 21, and 29 amply supports the trial court's finding that K.R. had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that L.B. had engaged in an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of K.R. that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that had actually caused K.R. to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened. The trial court's extension of the protective order is further supported by the fact that L.B. had engaged in repeated acts of harassment both in the weeks leading up to K.R. filing the petition to extend the Ex Parte Order and after she sought the extension. At the hearing on this matter, K.R. testified that she still felt scared, frightened, intimidated, and harassed by L.B. and that she “feel[s] like [L.B.] won't stop[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. K.R. testified that the extension of the Ex Parte Order was necessary “in order to have some peace and feel somewhat safe with [L.B.]” and “if this is what happens when I have [a protective order] in place, I'm scared to know what happens if I don't.” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. K.R. also testified that she felt that L.B. “is using and abusing the court system to harass and intimidate” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 40.

[34] The evidence supports the findings in the trial court's order. Furthermore, it is clear that the record supports a conclusion that L.B. represents a credible threat to K.R. and that his behavior has caused K.R. to suffer emotional distress. L.B. has failed to establish that the findings are clearly erroneous, and we conclude that the trial court's findings support the conclusion that “[a]n extension of the protective order is necessary to bring about a cessation of the harassment.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 38. The issuance of the February 7, 2025 order was not in error. L.B.’s arguments to the contrary amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Hanauer, 981 N.E.2d at 149.

III. Attorney's Fees

[35] The trial court ordered L.B. to pay K.R.’s attorney's fees in the amount of $3325.50. L.B. contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to K.R. A trial court's decision to award attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020).

[36] Pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-26-5-9(d)(3)(A), a trial court “may [․] after notice and a hearing, [․] in an order for protection or in a modification of an order for protection” order the respondent to “pay attorney's fees[.]” In the instant matter, K.R. admitted as evidence her attorney's “Affidavit of Billable Fees and Expenses” which showed a total of $3325.50 in total fees and expenses “relating to the extension of the protective order[.]” Ex. Vol. III p. 144. Given the history between the parties and L.B.’s behavior, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding K.R. $3325.50, which was the exact amount she had incurred in extending the Ex Parte Order.

IV. L.B.’s Other Arguments

[37] We find no merit or cogent arguments in L.B.’s “Argument 9,” asserting, among other things, that K.R. has “committed acts of perjury,” Appellant's Br. p. 34, or “contempt of court[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 35. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” See Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives any issue raised on appeal where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”), trans. denied. Furthermore, to the extent that L.B. makes “requests” accompanied with no argument whatsoever in the final pages of his brief, these requests are waived. See id.

[38] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The provisional order entered in Cause No. 4715 included an order for L.B. and K.R. “to communicate exclusively via Our Family Wizard [(“OFW”)].” Ex. Vol. p. 5. The order specified that[a]ll communication between the parties shall be through OFW absent an emergency. Each party shall limit his/her messages to the reasonable number needed each week to communicate co-parenting time issues for the best interests of [E.B.]. The parties’ communication shall be limited to communication related only to [E.B.], the parties’ ongoing arbitration matter, and marital expenses.Ex. Vol. III pp. 5–6.

2.   While the divorce decree is not a part of the record in this case, neither party disputes that the communication order, which was originally contained in the court's Ex Parte Order, has been in effect throughout this case.

3.   We note that in the present appeal, L.B. has again made the baseless argument that we “issue an arrest warrant for” K.R. Appellant's Br. p. 35.

Bradford, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.