NICHOLS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Torri Nichols appeals her conviction for Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent.¹ Nichols argues there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 5:00 a.m. on July 30, 2022, Thorntown Police Department Deputy Derek Babcock was driving home from an off-duty assignment in Marion County. While headed westbound on I-865 in Boone County, he looked in his rearview mirror and saw a car “traveling at a very high rate of speed.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. The car quickly approached and nearly struck the officer's vehicle from behind. Deputy Babcock turned on his emergency lights to start a traffic stop, and the driver pulled over to the side of the interstate.

[3] Deputy Babcock approached the car from the passenger side. He did not “run any information” before approaching because his computer was turned off. Id. at 24. He estimated it took him “[f]ifteen/twenty seconds” from the time the car stopped for him to reach it. Id. On arriving, he saw Nichols in the front passenger seat holding a very young child, later identified as her six-month-old daughter. Deputy Babcock asked Nichols why she was holding the child instead of the child being in a car seat. Nichols told Deputy Babcock there was no car seat, even though the officer observed one in the back passenger area.

[4] Initially, the driver did not look intoxicated to Deputy Babcock. But when the driver exited the car, he was unsteady on his feet and leaned on the car for balance. Deputy Babcock saw the driver had watery eyes, his speech was slurred, and his breath smelled like alcohol. After administering field sobriety tests, Deputy Babcock arrested the driver on charges of reckless driving, criminal recklessness, and operating while intoxicated. On the way to the patrol car, the driver leaned on it “as if he needed assistance to stay upright.” Id. at 22.

[5] Deputy Babcock walked back to the car to speak to Nichols. When he asked her why the child was not in a car seat, Nichols responded there was an emergency and she was locked out of her house but had “no real explanation on why a child wasn't in a car seat especially going that fast.” Id. Deputy Babcock also saw Nichols was intoxicated, based on her slurred speech, the alcohol odor on her breath, and her admission she had been drinking earlier that night at her workplace.

[6] The State charged Nichols with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. Nichols waived her right to a jury trial. At the bench trial, Nichols testified to the morning's events. After finishing her shift around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m., Nichols went to a friend's house. The driver then picked up Nichols and drove her to her sister's house, where her sister was babysitting Nichols’ daughter while Nichols was at work. When Nichols picked up her daughter, Nichols put the baby in a car seat and buckled the seat into the back passenger seat, directly behind her. The driver then took them home, but when they reached Nichols’ apartment, she realized she had left her keys at work, so they got back in the car and headed toward the driver's house in Brownsburg. She estimated they were driving around for about one and one-half to two hours, during which time she did not see the driver drink alcohol. According to Nichols, after Deputy Babcock pulled them over, Nichols’ child was screaming and crying, so the driver helped her reach into the back to bring the car seat to the front. Nichols removed her daughter, and the driver put the car seat in the back before the officer approached. Nichols claimed her child was not out of the car seat for long.

[7] On cross-examination of Deputy Babcock, Nichols’ attorney asked whether the officer's initial report indicated he “observed the driver to be moving around and appeared to place a car seat in the backseat on the passenger side[.]” Id. at 28. The officer responded, “If I wrote it in there, I'm ․ sure it's in there,” and stated the events occurred about one and one-half years earlier. Id. But the officer also testified he did not recall the driver making significant movements “like shifting a child from ․ the back to the front.” Id.

[8] After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court found Nichols guilty as charged and sentenced her to one year in the Boone County Jail, all suspended to supervised probation.

There was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

[9] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[10] To convict Nichols of neglect of a dependent as charged, the State was required to prove Nichols, having the care of a dependent, knowingly placed the dependent in a situation that endangered the dependent's life or health. See I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1). Specifically, the State alleged Nichols endangered her daughter's life or health by “failing to restrain [the dependent] with an intoxicated driver.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11.² Nichols does not dispute the dependent was in her care. Rather, she argues there was insufficient evidence to prove the child was not restrained when the car was moving or she knew the driver was intoxicated.

[11] As to the failure to restrain, Nichols directs our attention to her testimony that her daughter was in a car seat until the driver stopped, at which time the driver helped her unbuckle and move the child to the front seat. Nichols also points to Deputy Babcock's acknowledgment that his report stated he saw the driver place a car seat in the back passenger seat. She argues the officer's testimony on this point supports her version of events and therefore the allegation her daughter was unrestrained while the vehicle was moving was “based solely on speculation in a situation where the officer acknowledged his memory of the facts was not good.” Appellant's Br. at 9.

[12] Nichols’ argument ignores the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's judgment. After Deputy Babcock pulled the car over, he approached the passenger side quickly—within fifteen or twenty seconds—and saw the infant in Nichols’ arms. Although the officer acknowledged he may have seen movement in the car at the time, it was “[n]othing like shifting a child from the ․ back to the front.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. Nichols was intoxicated and initially told Deputy Babcock there was no car seat in the car, even though the officer saw one in the backseat. After Deputy Babcock arrested the driver, he again spoke to Nichols. She said there was an emergency and she was locked out of her house; yet she did not explain why her daughter was not in the car seat, nor did she state the child had been in one. This was sufficient evidence to support a finding Nichols failed to restrain her dependent in the car. Nichols’ argument is a straightforward request to reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244.³

[13] Nichols next argues the State presented insufficient evidence she knew the driver was intoxicated. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, [s]he is aware of a high probability that [s]he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). The Indiana Supreme Court has further explained that “knowingly” within the context of the child neglect statute “is that level where the accused must have been subjectively aware of a high probability that [s]he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.” Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985). Because such a finding requires inferential reasoning to ascertain the defendant's mental state, we must look to all the surrounding circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty verdict is proper. Burden v. State, 92 N.E.3d 671, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[14] Through Deputy Babcock's testimony, the State presented evidence the driver was visibly intoxicated: the driver was unsteady on his feet, he needed support to stay upright, he “had a slight slur, [had] watery eyes, and had a strong odor of intoxicants on his breath.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 21. Nichols estimated she had been riding in the car with the driver for one and one-half to two hours, during which time she, too, could observe these signs. She rode with him both before and after picking up her daughter. From these facts and circumstances, a reasonable fact-finder could infer Nichols knew the driver was intoxicated, and by placing her dependent in the car without properly restraining the child in a car seat, Nichols was subjectively aware of a high probability she was placing her daughter in a dangerous situation. See Jordan, 244 N.E.3d at 454–56 (sustaining the defendant's felony neglect of a dependent conviction where the defendant was a passenger in a car driven by a visibly intoxicated driver during an accident in which the dependent was improperly restrained, partially ejected, and killed).

Conclusion

[15] Sufficient evidence supports Nichols’ neglect of a dependent conviction.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1) (2021).

2.   The charging information contains a typo, alleging failure “to restrain driver with an intoxicated driver.” Id. at 11. The trial court noted the problem during Nichols’ initial hearing, and although the record does not include an amended charging information, Nichols acknowledged understanding the charges against her and does not raise this issue on appeal.

3.   Nichols also argues the State failed to prove she committed the traffic infraction of failing to restrain her daughter. In Indiana, it is a Class D infraction to operate a motor vehicle in which there is a child less than eight years old who is not properly fastened and restrained by a child restraint system according to the system manufacturer's instructions. See I.C. § 9-19-11-2 (2018). As Nichols notes, the statute places the duty to restrain the child on the vehicle's operator. See Jordan v. State, 244 N.E.3d 445, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“At a minimum, the child restraint statute placed on [the defendant] the duty to ensure [a child] was properly restrained while [the defendant] drove the vehicle.”). Nichols observes she was not the driver; moreover, the State presented no evidence of the restraint system manufacturer's instructions. But Nichols was not charged with the infraction of failing to restrain her daughter; the State charged her with knowingly placing her daughter in a situation that endangered her daughter's life or health, specifically by failing to restrain the child in a car with an intoxicated driver. The State was not required to prove Nichols violated the restraint statute to support a neglect conviction.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.