WINFORD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Allen D. Winford, Jr., took a heavily intoxicated woman to his apartment and required her to submit to sexual conduct even though she lacked the ability to consent. He appeals his convictions and sentence for two counts of Level 3 felony rape, arguing the trial court should have granted his motion to continue the trial and erred in identifying sentencing factors. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Winford was a cashier at a liquor store in Goshen. On the evening of June 10, 2022, Winford and a co-worker were present when N.O. entered the store. She was an alcoholic, and at that point she had used alcohol heavily on a daily basis for several years. In addition, N.O. was homeless and carless. She was a daily customer at the liquor store where Winford worked because it was one of the few sources of alcohol she could access by walking.

[3] N.O. knew Winford by his first name, but she had not spent time with him outside of the liquor store prior to June 10. He had invited her to go to his place for cookouts, but she had declined. N.O. had given her mother's phone number to Winford after he had “pressured” her by asking “many times.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 26. Before June 10, they had texted each other a few times.

[4] On June 10, N.O. was fidgety and paced around the store. She asked Winford when he was getting off work and whether he would buy her some alcohol. It appeared to Winford's co-worker that she was under the influence of an unidentified substance. N.O. later said her judgment on that day was impaired due to her heavy drinking.

[5] Winford and N.O. left the store together at around 6:15 p.m. Security cameras at Winford's apartment building showed they arrived at 6:28 in the evening. N.O. appeared to be staggering as she walked through the halls and up the stairs to Winford's apartment.

[6] Next, security camera recordings showed N.O. leaving Winford's apartment building at 12:55 in the morning on June 11, wearing nothing but a t-shirt. The shirt had rips in the sides and back, providing little cover. Winford also left his apartment and appeared to be looking for her.

[7] At 1:00 a.m., Esther Wisser was awakened by the sound of a woman screaming outside of her home. Wisser looked out of a window and saw a woman, later identified as N.O., screaming for help as she tried to enter a gap in the fence around Wisser's home. N.O. was still naked from the waist down. Wisser also saw two men nearby, one of whom she later identified as Winford. She called 911.

[8] At 1:12 in the morning, Officer Michael Miller of the Goshen Police Department (“GPD”) was dispatched to investigate a call of a woman shouting for help. Upon arrival, he was directed to N.O., who was still wearing only the ripped t-shirt, leaning on a car. She had an odor of alcohol on her breath. Officer Miller could not understand N.O. at first due to her slurred speech, and he requested an ambulance. Paramedics took her to a hospital.

[9] At the hospital, GPD Officer Paige Hershberger spoke with N.O. She was groggy and highly disoriented. N.O.’s speech was slurred, and she became more emotional as they talked. It appeared to Officer Hershberger that N.O. was intoxicated and had experienced a traumatic event. N.O. told the officer that she had awakened in Winford's place, did not know where her clothes were, and he had had sex with her.

[10] Next, a trained sexual assault nurse examiner interviewed N.O. and performed a physical examination. The examiner determined she was still intoxicated. N.O., who was crying, said she had vaginal pain. She also said that she had accompanied a man from a liquor store to his apartment, where he had raped her vaginally and anally. The examiner took swabs of N.O.’s mouth, neck, vagina, and anus.

[11] GPD Detective Shayne Miller arrived at N.O.’s hospital room during the sexual assault examination. He noted N.O. was intoxicated. Her demeanor changed rapidly from happy to sad, including crying. N.O. told the detective she remembered doing shots of alcohol with Winford.

[12] On June 17, Detective Miller interviewed Winford in his apartment after Winford failed to appear for a prearranged interview at the police department. The detective advised Winford of his Miranda rights, and Winford agreed to speak with him. Detective Miller was wearing a body cam and also activated a digital audio recorder for the interview, which lasted thirty minutes. The video recording from the body camera was later deleted, and it was initially unclear what happened to the audio recording. The detective took notes and later generated a four-page written summary of the interview. During the interview, Winford denied having sex with N.O., denied knowing her name at the time of the encounter, and claimed that she had left his apartment fully clothed.

[13] The swabs that the sexual assault nurse examiner took from N.O. were submitted for DNA testing. A forensic scientist generated DNA profiles for the swabs taken from N.O.’s internal genitals, anus, and neck. Statistical analysis provided “very strong support” for the inclusion of Winford's DNA in each of the three profiles. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 18-19. It was “at least one trillion times more likely” that Winford's DNA was included in the profiles. Id. at 18-19.

[14] The State charged Winford with four counts of Level 3 felony rape. During discovery, the State gave Winford the detective's four-page summary of his interview of Winford. The jury trial was scheduled to begin on September 10, 2024. On the Thursday before that date, the State informed Winford that they had found the audio recording of the interview with Winford and gave him a copy. On the first day of trial, Winford requested a continuance in connection with the belated disclosure of the audio recording. The trial court denied Winford's motion. During trial, the audio recording was admitted into evidence.

[15] The jury determined Winford was guilty as charged, but the court entered a judgment of conviction as to only two of the Level 3 felony counts. The court sentenced Winford to fourteen years on each count, to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.

Discussion

I. Continuance on First Day of Trial

[16] Winford argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to continue the trial after the State belatedly disclosed the audio recording. In general, motions for continuance are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion and resultant prejudice. Wells v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1133, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), corrected on reh'g, 853 N.E.2d 143 (August 24, 2006), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs only if a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. “[A]n appellant must affirmatively show that there was error prejudicial to his or her substantial rights before reversal is warranted.” Id.

[17] Here, the State possessed the audio recording of the interview, but prosecutors were unaware of it and did not disclose it during discovery. Instead, the State turned over the detective's four-page summary of the interview, which Winford's counsel later conceded “does track” with the audio recording. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 8. The prosecutors became aware of the recording the Thursday before trial and promptly turned it over.

[18] Winford argues the belated disclosure prejudiced him because his counsel had been preparing for trial based on the detective and Winford's different memories of what was said during the interview. But Winford's counsel had several days to review the thirty-minute recording, and Winford, as one of the participants in the interview, cannot have been unfairly surprised by the recording's contents. Winford does not explain how being granted more time to prepare would have allowed counsel to improve his strategy. Without this explanation, we cannot conclude the denial of a continuance prejudiced his substantial rights. See Zanussi v. State, 2 N.E.3d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App 2013) (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying continuance on day before trial; counsel had time to review new evidence with client). The court did not err in denying Winford's motion for a continuance on the day of trial.

II. Sentencing

[19] Winford challenges the trial court's sentencing decisions, particularly its identification of aggravating sentencing factors and the grounds for ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)).

[20] When a trial court imposes a sentence for a felony conviction, the court must issue a statement of reasons unless imposing an advisory sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-1.3 (2014). In addition, Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1 (2019) provides a nonexclusive list of aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors that a trial court may consider. A trial court abuses its sentencing discretion if the sentencing statement “includes aggravating and mitigating [sentencing] factors that are unsupported by the record[.]” Kayser v. State, 131 N.E.3d 717, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[21] During the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing order, the trial court identified three aggravating factors: (1) Winford's criminal history; (2) a lack of success in modifying his criminal behavior through lesser sanctions; and (3) his failure to take advantage of programming or alternative sanctions in the past. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 109-111; Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 22. Winford does not challenge any of those factors. Instead, he claims the court identified two additional aggravating factors that are improper: (1) that he maintained his innocence; and (2) that the victim was intoxicated, which was an element of the offense.

[22] We disagree with Winford's reading of the sentencing transcript. After the trial court identified the three aggravating factors and rejected mitigating factors Winford had proposed, the court determined that the “aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 112. The court then stated, “here are my observations regarding the evidence that was tendered to the jury.” Id. At that point, the court noted that Winford had initially denied to the detective that any sexual activity occurred, but after the DNA testing results came back, Winford changed to arguing sex had occurred but was consensual. Next, the court stated that the evidence showed N.O. was so intoxicated that “common sense should have dictated” that she was unable to consent. Id. at 114. But the trial court prefaced her remarks by stating they were mere observations. We do not consider them to be additional aggravating sentencing factors.

[23] Next, Winford argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences without stating a specific reason. “A trial court may order consecutive sentences based on one valid aggravating factor.” Kayser, 131 N.E.3d at 723. And “that one valid aggravator may be used both to enhance a sentence and to justify consecutive sentences.” Id.

[24] When the trial court announced its sentences on each of the two convictions, including that Winford would serve the sentences consecutively, the court prefaced the announcement by referring to “all of those reasons.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 114. We read that statement as incorporating the three aggravating sentencing factors the court had identified earlier. Again, Winford does not challenge any of those factors. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. See Kayser, 131 N.E.3d at 723 (no error in imposing consecutive sentences; trial court referred to defendant's long criminal history as support).

Conclusion

[25] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[26] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.