M.D.G., Sr., Appellant-Respondent v. M.D., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.D.G., Sr. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order dispensing with the need for his consent to M.D.’s (“Stepfather's”) petitions for adoption of Father's three children with B.D. (“Mother”). Father raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it concluded that his consent to the adoption is not required.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother were married and have three children together: K.G., born in 2007; M.G., born in 2009; and B.G., born in October 2012. Mother also has an older daughter, K.Q., from a prior relationship. During the marriage, Mother “was the victim of several acts of domestic violence committed by Father ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 21. In 2014, while the children were asleep in the family home, Father “forced [Mother] to strip naked,” and he proceeded to hit her, cut her with a knife, “slit her throat,” and threaten to kill her. Id. Father also “choked her until she blacked out.” Id. After that incident, Mother separated from Father, and she filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. The dissolution decree awarded primary custody of the children to Mother, with Father exercising parenting time.

[4] Soon after the dissolution, Mother grew concerned about Father's drug abuse and “neglect of the children during his parenting time.” Id. When they were staying with Father, the children “were often late for school” and “complained that there was no food at Father's home.” Id. at 22. Then, in 2018, Mother's eldest daughter, K.Q., told Mother that Father had molested her when she was nine years old. Mother asked K.G. whether Father had ever molested her, and she said that he had. Accordingly, Mother contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to report the molestations. According to a DCS report, K.G. stated that,

when [K.G.] “was approximately 9 or 10 years old[,] ․ on several occasions[,] she was forced to undress and ․ her father was undressed as well.” [K.G.] ․ disclosed several instances of penetration between herself and Father. [K.G.] disclosed that he told her he would be in big trouble if she told anyone. [K.G.] also stated that she knew her Father had rugs in his home and described them as [“]two different shades of green.”

Id. In addition, K.Q. “disclosed that when she was younger she had been forced to undress and then [Father] ‘got on top of her.’ ” Id. After DCS substantiated the molestation claims, Mother obtained a protective order against Father, and his parenting time with the children was restricted.

[5] Mother met and married Stepfather, who filed petitions to adopt the children in 2020. Father timely filed an objection to the adoption petitions. During hearings on Father's objection, both K.G. and K.Q. testified regarding the molestations by Father. K.G. testified that she did not want a relationship with Father and wanted Stepfather to adopt her because Father was “mentally, physically[,] and sexually [abusive], and [he] was not a good father figure.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 8. K.G. explained that Father called her a “whore” and told her that she “turned him on” when she was wearing a bathing suit. Id. at 10. K.G. also described a time when Father locked the children in his basement while he was hanging out with friends in the living room, and Father ignored the children's cries and pleas to be let out of the basement.

[6] K.Q. testified that

she was sexually assaulted by Father on more than one occasion. When Mother worked on the weekends, [K.Q.] was often home with Father. [K.Q.] stated that Father would make her go to his bedroom, lock the door, make her take her clothes off, and instruct her to lay on the bed. [K.Q.] testified [that] Father penetrated her vagina on multiple occasions. [K.Q.] recalled that Father threatened to kill her family if she ever told anyone what happened. [K.Q.] told her grandmother what happened but substituted another person as the perpetrator because she was afraid Father would hurt her family.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 23.

[7] Following the hearings on Father's objection, the trial court made extensive findings and conclusions. The court found K.G. and K.Q. to be credible witnesses. The trial court also found that,

sometime in the summer of 2019, Father and his girlfriend, [R.B.] ․, traveled from Indiana to Colorado. Prior to leaving Indiana, Father purchased a handgun and fired it in her direction, threatened to cut off R.B[.]’s toes with a knife and threatened to sexually assault her daughter. The evidence further revealed that Father battered R.B[.] with a wooden baton causing bruising to her arm as well as a black eye. On direct appeal[ following a trial on criminal charges filed as a result of those offenses], Father was awarded a new trial on three of the four charges because the prior acts of domestic violence by Father admitted at trial were found to be unduly prejudicial. Menacing with a Handgun was upheld. Father subsequently entered into a plea agreement prior to a new trial and is currently incarcerated in the State of Colorado Department of Correction. His maximum possible release date is January 4, 2033. Father's earliest possible release date is July 4, 2025[,] at which time [K.G.] will be 18 years old, [M.G.] will be 16 years old in September[ ] 2025, and [B.G.] will be 13 years old in October 2025.

Id. at 24-25.

[8] The trial court concluded that Father was unfit to be a parent and that the best interests of the children would be served if the court dispensed with Father's consent to the adoption. The trial court made the order a final judgment under Trial Rule 54(B), and this appeal ensued.¹

Discussion and Decision

[9] Father contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that his consent to the adoption was not required. As our Supreme Court has stated:

In family law matters, we generally give considerable deference to the trial court's decision because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children. Accordingly, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.

The trial court's findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision.

J.W. v. D.F. (In re Adoption of E.B.F.), 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

[10] Indiana law generally requires natural parents to consent to adoptions. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, a natural parent's consent to an adoption is not required if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the parent is unfit to be a parent” and “the best interests of the child ․ would be served if the court dispensed with the parent's consent.” I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(11). As we have explained:

While the term “unfit” as used in Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11) is not statutorily defined, this court has defined “unfit” as “[u]nsuitable; not adapted or qualified for a particular use or service” or “[m]orally unqualified; incompetent.” We have also noted that statutes concerning the termination of parental rights and adoption “strike a similar balance between the parent's rights and the child's best interests” and thus termination cases provide useful guidance in determining whether a parent is unfit. Termination cases have considered factors such as a parent's substance abuse, mental health, willingness to follow recommended treatment, lack of insight, instability in housing and employment, and ability to care for a child's special needs. Also, this Court has consistently held in the termination context that it need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development are permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. It is well-settled that individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.

Mendez v. Weaver (In re Adoption of D.M.), 82 N.E.3d 354, 358-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citations omitted).

[11] In his brief on appeal, Father argues that he is not unfit to parent the children and that the trial court “erroneously granted the petition[s] for adoption by finding that [Father's] consent was unnecessary.” Appellant's Br. at 9 (capitalization omitted). First, the trial court has not yet granted the petitions, so Father's argument misses the mark. Second, to the extent Father argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that his consent is unnecessary under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(11), he argues that he is not unfit to parent the children, but he omits cogent argument regarding the best interests element of the consent statute. Given that critical omission, we could hold that Father has waived the consent issue for our review. But we exercise our discretion to address the merits of his argument that he is a fit parent and that his consent to the adoption is, therefore, necessary.

[12] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he molested K.G. and K.Q. But the court explicitly found both witnesses to be credible. Father also minimizes his criminal history and points out that he has engaged in therapy and educational classes while incarcerated. Accordingly, Father asks that he be given more time to repair the “strained” relationships with the children. Appellant's Br. at 8. In all, Father's arguments amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal.

[13] Stepfather presented ample evidence to support the court's conclusions that Father is unfit to parent the children and that the children's best interests are served if the court dispenses with Father's consent to the adoption. K.G. and K.Q. gave harrowing testimony regarding Father's molestations of them. Mother gave equally harrowing testimony regarding Father's violent abuse of her. And, at the time of the final hearings, Father was incarcerated in Colorado due to violent abuse of his girlfriend in 2019. Finally, the trial court found that

[t]he children will have lived separately from Father since 2018. It is undisputed that [Stepfather] has a strong bond with the minor children and has provided them with a stable and safe environment. All three children are in support of the adoption. It is also undisputed the minor children view [Stepfather] as their [f]ather.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 27.

[14] For all these reasons, the trial court did not err when it concluded that Father's consent to the adoption is not required, and we affirm the trial court's order.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father states that the trial court granted the adoption petitions, but that is incorrect. The final hearing on the adoption petitions has not yet been held.

Mathias, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.