DANGERFIELD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After Frank Dangerfield was convicted of dealing in a narcotic drug and found to be a habitual offender, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The Marion Superior Court denied Dangerfield's petition, and he appeals. Dangerfield argues that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2017, the Marion Superior Court sentenced Dangerfield to an aggregate term of twenty-six years after he was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and for being a habitual offender. Dangerfield appealed his conviction, which our court affirmed in a memorandum decision. Relevant to this appeal, the following facts were set forth in our decision:

Detective Scott Wolfe of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) was assigned to the Metro Drug Task Force and began an investigation into an individual who would eventually be identified as Dangerfield sometime in the spring of 2016. Between March 7 and March 9, 2016, police arranged a controlled purchase of heroin through a confidential informant (“CI”) with whom working had “led to the seizure of drugs in the past as well as the arrest and conviction of people for drug crimes.” After being “set up ․ with ․ recording equipment” and being provided with “pre-recorded IMPD buy money,” the CI traveled to a pre-determined location established with the individual later identified as Dangerfield and purchased what was later tested to be heroin. Following the purchase, the CI met with Detective Wolfe and gave him the heroin. Detective Wolfe reviewed video obtained by the CI and identified the person who sold the heroin as Dangerfield, someone who had grown up in the area that Detective Wolfe had originally patrolled and who had been arrested by him in the past.

In preparation for a second controlled purchase which was also conducted in March 2016, Detective Wolfe researched Dangerfield and discovered that he was on home detention and obtained the details of his home detention. Surveillance units monitored Dangerfield's residence. Once the second controlled purchase commenced, detectives reported to Detective Wolfe that they observed Dangerfield exit the residence, enter a vehicle, and head to meet the CI at the arranged location. Similar to the first controlled purchase, the CI was provided pre-recorded money. Audio and video surveillance was collected on the purchase which further “demonstrated that [it] was in fact [Dangerfield] that was conducting [the purchase].” Officers met with the CI after the purchase and recovered the suspected heroin, which later tested positive.

Detective Wolfe coordinated a third controlled purchase in April 2016, where the CI placed a telephone call to Dangerfield and the same procedure was followed with regards to the CI being provided purchase money. The purchase was also captured on audio and video recording and the CI brought the acquired substance to officers after meeting with Dangerfield, which also tested positive for heroin. During the third purchase, Dangerfield was driving a “sort of a greenish-grey Chrysler 300.”

On April 13, 2016, officers from the Metro Drug Task Force arrived at Dangerfield's residence, intending to “[m]ake an outright arrest.” As they arrived, they parked away from the residence. Dangerfield exited the house with his wife and walked to a green Chrysler 300 parked in the driveway.

Officers identified Dangerfield, drove “right up in the driveway,” exited their vehicles and moved towards the house as Dangerfield approached the Chrysler, identified themselves as police officers, and told Dangerfield “at that time” to place his hands in the air. Dangerfield responded by backing away toward the garage and moved to the front bumper of the Chrysler, which faced the garage. He then reached into the front part of his blue jeans, ducked down, and placed a “clear plastic baggie with a grayish substance” on the ground that was recognized by Detective Wolfe as “suspected heroin.” After starting to stand, Dangerfield reached again into his waistband, and removed and placed a “little over forty-seven hundred dollars” “made mainly of twenties” on the hood of the car. An officer placed Dangerfield in handcuffs, moved him into the front yard of the residence, patted him down, checked his pockets, and located an additional bag of heroin, two cellular phones, a lighter, and additional U.S. currency. At some point, Dangerfield attempted to step on the bag of heroin pulled from his pocket.

After Detective Wolfe was notified of the search of Dangerfield's person and the discovered contraband, he explained to Dangerfield why the officers were present at his residence, advised him of his rights, and obtained the signatures of Dangerfield and his wife on a standard IMPD consent to search form, allowing officers to search the residence. While officers entered the house using keys recovered from Dangerfield, Detective Wolfe interviewed Dangerfield. Officers found, among other items, “over three thousand dollars” “largely made up of ․ twenty dollar bills” in a pair of men's sweat pants in what was established as the residence's master bedroom; a digital scale, a hammer, a “Magic Bullet type blender grinder,” and a bottle of “cut,” or a “substance that you would mix with the heroin like ․ more of the product” to sell and “make more money”, on the counter to the right of the sink between the sink and the refrigerator in the kitchen; a box of plastic baggies in the drawer directly below the area where the digital scale and bottle of “cut” substance were located and “right next to the suspected narcotics”; and a hydraulic press at the back left corner of the garage and a bag “just left of the press” with a box of ammunition and “another small baggie of suspected narcotics” inside.

On April 15, 2016, Detective Wolfe completed an affidavit for probable cause. The same day, the State charged Dangerfield with three counts of dealing in a narcotic drug as level 2 felonies, one count of possession of a narcotic drug as a level 3 felony, two counts of possession of a narcotic drug as level 4 felonies, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a level 4 felony, and possession of cocaine as a level 5 felony. On May 5, 2017, the State filed a motion to dismiss, asking to dismiss two counts of dealing in a narcotic drug as level 2 felonies and the two counts of possession of a narcotic drug as level 4 felonies, which the court granted. The court also dismissed the single count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon upon motion by the State.

On August 29, 2017, the court held a jury trial. Prior to trial, the court addressed preliminary matters, and Dangerfield's counsel asked to suppress the evidence obtained on April 13, 2016, and argued that the detectives lacked probable cause to stop Dangerfield and his wife. In response, the State presented testimony of Detective Wolfe regarding the three foregoing controlled purchases. Detective Wolfe testified that the general procedure taken to prepare informants to conduct controlled purchases involved searching the vehicle and the informant before sending the informant down to conduct the purchase and sometimes placing a call “down to the target” which would be recorded.

He also testified that, at the point where he “ha[d] three buys on [Dangerfield],” he knew that Dangerfield had been sentenced, was on home detention for dealing, and that “[d]ealing in narcotics would be a violation of [Dangerfield's] community correction sentence.” After cross-examining Detective Wolfe, Dangerfield's defense counsel stated that, if it was his intention to arrest Dangerfield on April 13, 2016, Detective Wolfe should have sought an arrest warrant from a judicial officer because all three controlled purchases occurred prior to the arrest date. Counsel for the State responded in part, “[t]here's no requirement that they get a warrant unless he's holed up in a house somewhere. Here the arrest was made as [Dangerfield] was leaving his home.” The court, in finding that Detective Wolfe had probable cause to arrest Dangerfield for a felony, stated:

I think based on all of the circumstances that was known to Detective Wolfe, based on the three previous [purchases] I don't find that they were so remote in time as to perhaps lose their value in terms of—of—lose their probative value. All of the circumstances surrounding those [purchases] including knowledge of Detective Wolfe and including the audio and video recordings of that. I don't think there's anything in the law that I am aware of that would mandate that the—the behavior or the offense occurred at the time or directly before the time of arrest.

Detective Wolfe testified at trial that, when he interviewed him, Dangerfield admitted the quantity of the money recovered from the hood of the car was about forty-seven hundred dollars, that officers had recovered heroin on the ground in front of the car in the quantity of “over forty grams” and from his pocket, and that he had been currently selling heroin at about fifty dollars per gram. He also indicated that he recognized the contents of the bag that Dangerfield had placed on the ground as “suspected heroin” based on his training and experience as a narcotics detective. He testified that the garage was “an attached garage, which is part of the home,” when asked if Dangerfield and his wife consented to the search of the garage.

IMPD Detective Randall Dings testified, when asked what happened after Dangerfield exited the house, that “[a]s we pulled up, I made eye contact with [Dangerfield]. And he just kind of looked at us. Did a little head tilt to try to figure out who we—what we were doing.” In response to being asked, “as you all got out and headed up towards [Dangerfield], what happened next,” he stated:

Detective Wolfe and Detective Graber were giving him commands. Detective Graber made contact—and Wolfe made contact with [Dangerfield]. I observed—originally I observed [Dangerfield] kind of bend down a little bit but I couldn't see what he was doing. And he stood up as they got to him. And then I saw him set a large amount of cash on the hood of the car.

He also indicated that plastic baggies, while common to have in a normal kitchen, are typically used as a “a way to package the narcotics for sale.”

IMPD Detective Ryan Graber testified that he arrived at the scene on April 13, 2016, and was involved in the search of the garage of the residence. He also testified that hydraulic presses were commonly known to narcotics detectives through experience as items used to re-press narcotics.

The court admitted into evidence, over objection, the State's photographs of items discovered that day, as well as the Consent to Search form signed by Dangerfield and his wife as State's Exhibit 5 and photographs of the residence.

Dangerfield v. State, No. 49A05-1711-CR-2544, 2018 WL 3118402, at *1-3 (Ind. Ct. App. June 26, 2018).

[4] After Dangerfield's conviction was affirmed on appeal, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Dangerfield subsequently filed an amended petition by counsel. The petition raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel relating to counsel's investigation of the case, counsel's review of discovery, and counsel's failure to have Dangerfield evaluated to determine whether he suffered from a mental illness.

[5] The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 7, 2024, and trial counsel testified at the hearing. Trial counsel explained that Dangerfield's case was assigned to her approximately three months prior to trial and she initially believed the matter would be resolved by plea agreement. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. Trial counsel discussed her reasons for filing an emergency motion to continue Dangerfield's trial the day before his scheduled jury trial, which included late discovery from the State and her suspicion that Dangerfield suffered from mental health issues. Id. at 12. Trial counsel opined that the trial court's denial of her emergency motion “denied Mr. Dangerfield of a fair trial.” Id. at 13. Trial counsel stated that at trial, she “did the absolute best” that she could but believed that she “rendered some ineffective assistance. Not because [she] didn't do [her] job, but because that late discovery, [she] didn't get a chance to follow up.” Id.

[6] On November 22, the post-conviction court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied Dangerfield's petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court issued the following findings and conclusions relevant to the issues presented in this appeal:

5. At a pre-trial conference on June 7, 2017, [attorney] Childress-Jones orally requested a continuance of the trial date scheduled for June 13, 2017. The State did not object, and the motion was granted. The jury trial was re-set for August 29, 2017.

6. At the final pre-trial conference on August 23, 2017, Childress-Jones requested a continuance of the trial date, but it was denied. The State's position at that hearing is not reflected in the Case Chronology.

7. On August 28, 2017, Childress-Jones filed a “Verified Emergency Motion for Continuance.” Petitioner's Exhibit A. In that motion, counsel cited numerous reasons for her request, including the following: inability to adequately prepare for trial; late discovery from the State (photographs, jail calls received July 12, consent to search received July 21, recorded interview of Petitioner wherein he refuses to give a statement, received August 25); and new information concerning Defendant's mental health.

8. The State filed a written objection to her motion on August 28, 2017. In their objection the State noted that they did not intend to use Dangerfield's recorded statement, and that Dangerfield had no record of mental illness in his other cases that had been before the Court.

9. The Court denied the motion to continue.

***

22. Childress-Jones testified that she was ineffective, “not because I didn't do my job,” but because she received late discovery and was unable to follow up on the possible mental health issues of her client.

23. Regarding the late discovery of photographs, she testified that she did not initially receive the ones that were provided in discovery, and that she was disadvantaged because of this. To her recollection, the photographs were of items seized when Dangerfield was arrested, and of the drug material collected. When asked how this affected her defense, she could not articulate a specific reason she was disadvantaged.

24. Regarding the late discovery of an audio recording of Dangerfield refusing to give a statement, she testified that she may have been able to use it to her advantage if given more time. However, when asked specifically how she was disadvantaged by this late discovery, she said she did not know.

25. Childress-Jones also testified extensively about her concern for her client's mental health status. She testified that at a meeting on August 25, 2017, her client “disclosed something” that caused her to question his competence and his mental health. However, she could not specifically recall what it was that Dangerfield disclosed. She believes she was ineffective because she was not allowed more time to assess her client's competency, and that Dangerfield was unable to assist with his defense.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3, pp. 233-36.

[7] The court concluded that Dangerfield did not establish that Childress-Jones's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that, but for any claimed error of trial counsel, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. In support of this conclusion, the court issued the following conclusions of law:

40. This Court first examines the late discovery of the photographs. A review of the motion to continue filed by Childress-Jones filed on August 28, 2017, reveals that Childress-Jones acknowledged that the photographs were discovered by the State on July 12, 2017. However, she believed that they were likely sent to Dangerfield's prior attorney, and that there were “no such photos in the file when the undersigned counsel assumed representation of Mr. Dangerfield.” Petitioner's A, pg. 2. This Court has reviewed the trial transcript in this case. The State submitted 16 photographs through multiple witnesses. Transcript II of V, pg. 79-139. They depicted items collected when Dangerfield was arrested, and the items located inside the home. Id. It is unclear why an experienced attorney such as Childress-Jones would have been surprised by the existence of such photographs. Neither she nor Dangerfield have offered evidence as to why she was specifically ineffective in this regard, or how the result of the trial would have been different if she had been given additional time to prepare.

41. This Court turns next to the late discovery of jail calls. According to Childress-Jones’[s] own filing, the jail calls were given to her July 21, 2017, over one month prior to trial. Petitioner's Exhibit A, pg. 2. According to the State's response objecting to a continuance, filed August 28, 2017, a transcript of the relevant jail call was also provided to Childress-Jones. This Court finds that this was not late discovery. Neither Childress-Jones nor Dangerfield have offered evidence as to why counsel was specifically ineffective with this evidence, or how the results of the proceedings would have been different if she had been granted a continuance.

42. This Court next examines a consent to search that was, according to Childress-Jones, disclosed to counsel on July 21, 2017. Petitioner's Exhibit A, pg. 2. A review of the probable cause affidavit filed under 49D21-1604-F2-014201 shows that this document was directly referenced and discussed. For that reason, and because the actual document was disclosed at least one month prior to trial, this Court does not consider this to be late discovery. Neither Childress-Jones nor Dangerfield have offered evidence as to why counsel was specifically ineffective with this evidence.

43. The final item of late discovery to be addressed is an audio recording of Dangerfield by law enforcement, wherein he apparently refuses to give a recorded statement. Childress-Jones indicated that she received the recording on August 25, 2017, four days prior to trial. Petitioner's Exhibit A, pg. 2. This Court has reviewed the probable cause affidavit filed under 49D21-1604-F2-014201, which does note that “Mr. Dangerfield agreed to speak to law enforcement, but refused the [sic] have the discussion recorded.” The actual recording at issue was not presented as an exhibit in this cause. However, a review of the trial transcript indicates that it consists of law enforcement giving an advisement of rights, and Dangerfield then asking that his statement not be[ ] recorded. Id. [a]t 90-92. Neither Childress-Jones nor Dangerfield have offered articulable evidence as to why counsel was ineffective due to receiving this recording four days prior to trial, or how the results of the proceedings may have been different if given more time.

Id. at 239-40.

[8] Concerning trial counsel's failure to investigate whether Dangerfield suffered from mental health issues, the court noted that Dangerfield did not present any evidence during the trial proceedings or the post-conviction proceedings to establish that he has a mental health diagnosis. Id. at 242. Furthermore, the post-conviction court observed that Dangerfield testified and was subject to cross-examination during his trial and his “answers [we]re responsive to the questions asked. He d[id] not ramble on or sound confused.” Id. Finally, the court concluded that “Dangerfield cannot claim that he was unable to assist in his own defense when the record reflects that he did exactly that.” Id.

[9] Dangerfield now appeals the post-conviction court's order denying him post-conviction relief.

Standard of Review

[10] Our standard of review in post-conviction proceedings is well-settled.

“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind. 2014). “When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.” Id. at 274. In order to prevail on an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the post-conviction court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).

Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681-82 (Ind. 2017).

Discussion and Decision

[11] Dangerfield claims that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he was not subjected to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. “The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “A defendant claiming a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel must establish the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” Perez v. State, 748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind. 2001).

[12] “First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.” Id. The defendant must establish that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the errors were so serious that they resulted in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. “There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, and the burden falls on the defendant to overcome that presumption.” Peaver v. State, 937 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[13] “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Perez, 748 N.E.2d at 854. “To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “Although the two parts of the Strickland test are separate [inquiries], a claim may be disposed of on either prong.” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006). “Strickland declared that the ‘object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, ․ that course should be followed.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

[14] We can easily dispose of Dangerfield's ineffective assistance claim under the second Strickland prong. Dangerfield bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was prejudiced, i.e., a reasonable probability that the result of his proceeding would have been different. See Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 681. Dangerfield's trial counsel believed that her representation of Dangerfield was deficient, but she could not explain how her representation prejudiced Dangerfield. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 22, 25-27.

[15] Dangerfield has not established, and does not argue, how trial counsel's allegedly deficient representation prejudiced him. The argument section of his brief focuses on the first prong of the Strickland standard. Regarding the second prong, Dangerfield merely claims that the cumulative effect of counsel's deficient performance “undermine[s] confidence in the outcome of his trial.” Appellant's Br. at 22.

[16] Assuming for the sake of argument that counsel should have performed additional investigation concerning his case, Dangerfield also had to establish that an additional investigation would have yielded information or evidence that would have undermined the outcome of his trial. Dangerfield did not do so. And, concerning his mental health, there was no evidence presented either at trial or in these proceedings that Dangerfield suffers from mental health issues. Trial counsel believed that it was possible that Dangerfield had mental health issues, but the post-conviction court noted Dangerfield did not present any evidence establishing that he had suffered from a mental illness or that he was unable to assist in his own defense at trial.

[17] Although trial counsel claimed that her representation was ineffective, she could only speculate as to how those purported deficiencies prejudiced Dangerfield. The Strickland standard requires more than speculation. Because Dangerfield has not established that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance, we affirm the post-conviction court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief.

[18] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.