IN RE: the Civil Commitment of A.A. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.A. appeals the trial court's order of regular commitment, claiming the court reversibly erred by holding A.A.’s commitment hearing remotely and by admitting evidence about a violent incident that occurred around nine years before the hearing. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In early October 2024, Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health (the “Hospital”) filed an application for A.A.’s emergency detention and later sought his regular commitment, claiming A.A.’s “[p]aranoia, hallucinations, confusion, threats to harm others, [and] poor insight and judgment” rendered him dangerous to others and gravely disabled. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14. A.A. has diagnoses of schizophrenia and anti-social personality disorder and this was his seventh mental health case. The trial court granted the Hospital's emergency application and set A.A.’s commitment hearing for October 22 to occur “over video.” Id. at 21. Citing Interim Indiana Administrative Rule 14 (“Rule 14”), A.A. objected to a video hearing and requested his hearing be held in-person instead. The trial court acknowledged A.A.’s objection and noted it would begin his commitment hearing by addressing it.

[3] At the outset of A.A.’s commitment hearing, the trial court heard evidence on A.A.’s objection to proceeding remotely. A.A.’s attending psychiatrist—Dr. Shilpa Guggali—testified A.A.’s “strong history of aggression and violence” sparked her concern about holding A.A.’s hearing in person because she believed A.A. posed a “significant risk” of harm to himself and any others in attendance. Tr. Vol. 2 at 5–6. Based on Dr. Guggali's insight and each side's arguments, the trial court decided holding A.A.’s commitment hearing remotely was necessary to “ensure not just that [A.A.] is safe but that the courthouse is a safe environment for this proceeding.” Id. at 9. The hearing continued remotely.

[4] In support of its petition, the Hospital offered the testimonies of A.A.’s mother and Dr. Guggali. A.A.’s mother recalled first noticing signs of A.A.’s mental illness in 2003, sharing he has become “more violent” over time. Id. at 20. She described how A.A.’s anger and paranoia increase when he refuses to take his prescribed medication. Throughout her testimony, A.A.’s mother laid out several times where A.A. threatened or acted violently toward his family members. For example, A.A. once stabbed his brother in the head with a knife and on another occasion “beat up” his mother's husband “with a beer bottle.” Id. A.A. objected to his mother mentioning the bottle incident, claiming it was irrelevant because it happened in 2015. The trial court overruled his objection, explaining “[i]t is relevant, we're talking about regular commitment, this is an account of violence[.]” Id. at 21. Because of A.A.’s threatening behavior, A.A.’s mother explained he would not be able to stay at her home.

[5] Dr. Guggali testified A.A.’s most recent commitment was based on his “worsening ․ psychotic symptoms, agitation, and aggressive behavior” stemming from his schizophrenia diagnosis. Id. at 28. Dr. Guggali noted A.A. was not taking any of his prescribed medications. And in Dr. Guggali's opinion, A.A. was unable to function independently and commitment was necessary to guarantee A.A. resumed taking medication.

[6] After privately consulting with his attorney, A.A. testified. A.A. explained he stopped taking his prescribed medications because, among other things, they caused his hands to shake and head to hurt. A.A. also believed his mind was clearer and he was happier when not taking his medications.

[7] After each side presented evidence, the trial court took judicial notice of mental health cases involving A.A. in 2010, 2016 (two separate cases), 2019, 2021, and 2023; concluded there was “overwhelming evidence” A.A. suffers from a mental illness; and found A.A. was “gravely disabled” and “dangerous to others.” Id. at 46. The trial court ordered A.A.’s regular commitment, determining placement in the Hospital was the least restrictive environment suitable for A.A.’s treatment and stabilization.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding A.A.’s commitment hearing remotely.

[8] A.A. first contends the trial court erred in holding his commitment hearing remotely, thereby denying him the right to appear in person. In support, A.A. points to an Indiana statute guaranteeing a patient in an involuntary commitment proceeding the right to be present at his or her commitment hearing. See Ind. Code § 12-26-2-2(b)(3) (2007). The Hospital frames the issue differently, pointing instead to Rule 14, which “explains when and how trial courts may conduct remote proceedings using telephone or audiovisual telecommunication.” B.N. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360, 363 (Ind. 2022); Ind. Administrative Rule 14(C) (2023) (requiring all testimonial proceedings be conducted in person except “for good cause shown or by agreement of the parties”). Despite A.A.’s efforts to guide us toward Section 12-26-2-2(b)(3) and its due process protections, we think his claim is properly addressed under Rule 14.¹

[9] We first review what constitutes good cause under Rule 14 de novo and next review the trial court's good-cause determination for abuse of discretion. See B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 363. Findings of good cause under Rule 14 require “particularized and specific factual support.” Id. at 364.² So, to conduct remote proceedings over a party's objection, a trial court “must offer something more than a one-size-fits-all, boilerplate pronouncement[.]” Id. “[G]ood cause requires something specific to the moment, the case, the court, the parties, the subject matter, or other relevant considerations.” Id. at 364–65.

[10] That requirement was satisfied here. Dr. Guggali discussed A.A.’s verbal aggression, threatening behavior, paranoia, and lack of cooperation. In doing so, Dr. Guggali described how A.A.’s behavior caused her concern for A.A.’s safety—and that of others—if A.A.’s hearing was conducted in person. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 6 (Dr. Guggali classifying the risk to A.A. and others posed by an in-person hearing as “significant”). Based on Dr. Guggali's testimony, the trial court found good cause to hold A.A.’s hearing remotely. Because this finding was based on “particularized and specific” facts tied to A.A.’s current situation—not a cookie-cutter-type finding our Supreme Court has held to be inadequate—the trial court's decision to conduct A.A.’s hearing remotely over his objection was not an abuse of discretion. Cf. B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 364 (concluding a trial court's generic reference of “due to the COVID-19 pandemic” did not amount to a finding of good cause).

The trial court did not reversibly err by admitting the challenged evidence.

[11] A.A. also argues the trial court reversibly erred by admitting his mother's testimony about him “beat[ing] up” her husband “with a beer bottle” in 2015. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20. From A.A.’s perspective, this evidence was not relevant, and its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Yet even assuming the trial court erred by admitting this testimony, the error was harmless.

[12] A non-constitutional error is not “ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A); see Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023) (clarifying Rule 66(A)’s “probable impact test” is used by an appellate court to determine whether a non-constitutional error is harmless). “Under this test, the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. This encompasses “a review of what was presented to the trier of fact compared to what should have been presented[;]” it is “not a review for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence.” Id. An error's probable impact is “sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[13] Assuming the challenged evidence was improperly admitted, its probable impact was sufficiently minor. A.A.’s mother's testimony that A.A. attacked her husband was but one of the many violent incidents she detailed, including a few that occurred in the weeks just before A.A.’s most recent commitment. Dr. Guggali echoed similar concerns about A.A.’s dangerousness tied to his “worsening ․ psychotic symptoms, agitation, and aggressive behavior.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. Not to mention, the trial court narrowed its focus to evidence on A.A.’s current condition when deciding whether to order A.A.’s regular commitment. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2 at 46 (recounting testimony that relates to A.A.’s “current psychiatric condition”). And perhaps most importantly, the trial court also found A.A. “gravely disabled,” noting A.A.’s “lack of insight and a lack of ability to make decisions based on reality” due to his mental illness. Id. This was a statutory ground apart from “dangerousness” that supported the trial court's decision to commit A.A.³ In light of this evidence, the probable impact of the challenged testimony does not undermine our confidence in the outcome reached below. In other words, we are confident the trial court, based on all the evidence, would have ordered A.A.’s regular commitment even if the testimony had been excluded. Any error in admitting the testimony was therefore harmless and not a ground for reversal.

Conclusion

[14] The trial court did not reversibly err by conducting A.A.’s commitment hearing remotely or by admitting the challenged evidence.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under Indiana Code Section 12-26-2-2(b)(3), a trial court may waive an individual's presence at his or her commitment hearing if his or her presence would be injurious to the individual's mental health or well-being. A.A. argues he was improperly stripped of his right to be present at his hearing because the trial court failed to make such a finding at the outset of his hearing. But A.A. was “present” throughout his hearing, albeit remotely. See B.N., 199 N.E.3d at 365 (considering an individual “present throughout her commitment hearing” despite the hearing being held remotely); cf. A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 618 (Ind. 2018) (finding a violation of an individual's right to appear when he was completely excluded from his commitment hearing). A.A. also actively participated throughout his hearing by testifying on his own behalf and conferring with counsel separately in a virtual room on a few occasions.

2.   Although our Supreme Court in B.N. analyzed an earlier version of Rule 14, the Court explicitly noted the standard it set forth for finding good cause to proceed remotely over a party's objection would also apply to Interim Rule 14 once it became effective January 1, 2023. See id. (explaining findings of good cause under then “forthcoming Interim Rule 14” require “particularized and specific factual support”).

3.   To order A.A.’s regular commitment, the trial court had to find by clear and convincing evidence A.A. was either dangerous or “gravely disabled.” I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e) (2007); Civ. Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2015). In the civil commitment context, a person is “gravely disabled” if, as a result of mental illness, he is in danger of coming to harm because he (1) is unable to provide for his food, clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or (2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of his judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function independently. I.C. § 12-7-2-96 (1992). On appeal, A.A. does not challenge the trial court's finding that he is “gravely disabled.”

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Foley and Scheele concur. Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.