IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.F. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] J.F. (“Child”) is the biological child of P.F. (“Mother”)¹ . In March 2021, Child was removed from Mother's care and later adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) due to Mother's substance abuse and neglect. In late 2022, Mother identified S.M. (“Father”) as Child's father, and in early 2023, Father was added to the CHINS case. Despite receiving personal service of the CHINS case, Father failed to appear for any hearings until after the termination petition was filed in May 2024. Because Father did not engage in or request any services and had never met Child, his parental rights to Child were terminated. Father now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother were in a relationship when “[s]he got pregnant and she went her way.” Tr. Vol. II at 32. On October 12, 2019, Child was born. Despite knowing Mother was pregnant when she left him, Father did not know when Child was born or her name, did not sign Child's birth certificate, and never signed the putative father registry.

[4] On March 17, 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS due to Mother's substance abuse and the absence of a father “com[ing] forward to successfully demonstrate an ability and willingness to appropriately parent [Child].” Ex. Vol. I at 25. Child was removed from the home and Mother admitted Child was a CHINS. Because Father's identity was unknown at the time, the trial court's dispositional order only compelled services for Mother.

[5] In or around December 2022, Mother notified DCS that Father was Child's father, so on March 13, 2023, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition adding Father. On March 28, Father was personally served the amended CHINS petition, a copy of the summons, and a notice of rights for an April 6 initial hearing. Two days after being served, Father was arrested for violating the terms of his community corrections sentence,² and he was sentenced to one year of incarceration therefore. Father did not attend the April 6 hearing, nor any other hearing in the CHINS case. After Father failed to attend the August 23 factfinding hearing, Child was adjudicated a CHINS pursuant to the amended petition, and Father was ordered to contact the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) weekly. The trial court withheld services until Father “appear[ed] in court or [made] himself otherwise available to DCS.” Ex. Vol. I at 71 (capitalization removed).

[6] Sometime after his arrest, Father was accidentally released from custody for more than six months before returning to custody in January or February 2024. During the time he was released, Father did not contact DCS to inquire about Child.

[7] On May 15, 2024, after Father failed to contact DCS about Child or attend any hearings for over a year, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights. Father participated in the November 22 factfinding hearing after receiving notice of the hearing at the Department of Correction (“DOC”) where he was to be incarcerated until December 25, 2024. At the factfinding hearing, the FCM, the child advocate, and Child's therapist testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.

[8] In an order issued on January 13, 2025, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights over Child. In that order, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

At the time of the Disposition Hearing on August 26, 2021, the Father of [Child] was still unknown and no one claiming to be her Father had come forward to successfully ․ parent [Child].

* * *

A Fact Finding as to [Father] was held on August 3, 2023. He failed to appear to the fact finding. [The trial court] found that . .

e. Father [ ] was personally served notice of this case on March 28, 2023. Despite being served, he has not appeared in court.

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h. [Father] has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to parent [Child] or to ensure the safety and wellbeing of [Child] ․

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The Court finds that [Father] is either unwilling or unable to provide for [Child's] needs.

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The court finds that there is a reasonable probability that conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal will not be remedied, and that the reasons for continued placement of [Child] outside the home [ ] will not be remedied.

The Court finds that termination of [Father's] parental rights is in [Child's] best interests.

Further, DCS has a satisfactory plan of adoption for [Child].

* * *

․ [Father] has never visited with [Child] and presents no evidence that he had made attempts to visit prior to his incarceration. He was ordered no services by the Court until he appeared in court or made himself otherwise available to DCS, and he failed to do either. He is simply not committed to preserving the parent-child relationship. [Father] claims to have not known that he had a child although he testifies that he was aware of Mother's pregnancy when he was with her. [Father] agree[s] he did not sign the birth certificate, a paternity affidavit, or fulfill his duty to register with the Indiana Putative Father Registry. It is critical that despite knowing [Child's] mother to be pregnant and that he could be the father, [ ] he failed to do any of these things.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 17–29. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Father's Parental Rights to Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[9] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied. To terminate Father's parental rights under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that either (a) “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,” or (b) “there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of” Father's relationship with the Child “poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of [Child].” See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3), (d)(3)-(4) (effective March 11, 2024 to June 30, 2025); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[10] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which are not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[11] Father contends the trial court erred in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied.³ In reviewing the trial court's findings regarding whether Father has or will remedy the conditions resulting in Child's removal or the reasons Child was placed outside the home, we first “identify the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

J.S., 133 N.E.3d at 715 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[12] Child was removed and adjudicated a CHINS due, in part, to Father's failure to make himself known to Child despite knowing Mother was pregnant when she left him and receiving personal service of the amended CHINS petition on March 18, 2023. Father's argument is premised on two things: (1) that the trial court failed to make a specific finding regarding the reason for Child's removal and (2) that Father's “prior failure ․ to be in [Child's] life was the result of his nescience to her existence, not his indifference to her well-being.” Appellant's Br. at 15. Notably, Father does not challenge any of the trial court's findings supporting its conclusion that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for the Child's removal from his care, so we take all those findings as true, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687).

[13] To Father's first argument, we disagree. The trial court specifically found that Father “was aware of Mother's pregnancy ․ [but] did not sign the birth certificate, a paternity affidavit, or fulfill his duty to register with the Indiana Putative Father Registry․ [D]espite knowing [Child's] mother to be pregnant and that he could be the father, [ ] he failed to do any of these things.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 29. The trial court also found that Father “has never visited with [Child] and presents no evidence that he had made attempts to visit prior to his incarceration.” Id. In its order adjudicating Child a CHINS under the amended petition, the trial court found that Father “ha[d] not demonstrated the ability or willingness to parent his child or to ensure the safety and wellbeing of [Child] while in the care of [Mother].” Ex. Vol. I at 68. These are the conditions that led to Child's removal.

[14] With the removal reasons in mind, we turn to Father's second argument that his absence was due to ignorance of her existence rather than indifference. Father's arguments on this point are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For example, Father claims that once he “learned of [Child's] existence, [he] expressed strong interest in parenting her.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Father claims he only learned of Child's “existence [when] she became the subject of CHINS and termination proceedings.” Id. at 15. Father blames DCS for his alleged ignorance of Child's existence because it failed to send correspondence to DOC after the records showed he had “escaped,” and instead, sent correspondence to his home. Tr. Vol. II at 97. Father claims DCS withheld information about Child and now seeks to “fault [Father] for having never seen her.” Appellant's Br. at 15.

[15] Despite Father's claims of ignorance, the record shows that Father knew Mother was pregnant when she left him, and he failed to follow up with her to sign the birth certificate or sign the putative father registry. The record further shows that Father was personally served the amended CHINS petition on March 28, 2023. Even if his complete absence in Child's life could be excused before that point, Father took no action on the CHINS case after receiving notice until the termination petition was filed. Significantly, during his accidental six-month release, spanning summer 2023 through early 2024, Father made no attempt to contact DCS or make himself known to the trial court or Child. The trial court is permitted “to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” J.S., 133 N.E.3d at 715. Father's attendance at the termination hearing is vastly overshadowed by his complete absence in Child's life up until that point. Based on the unchallenged findings and considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for the Child's removal or placement outside of Father's care.⁴

Conclusion

[16] The evidence supports the trial court's findings, and those findings support the trial court's judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating Father's parental rights over Child, and we affirm the trial court's decision.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother relinquished and consented to termination of her parental rights to Child, so she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father was convicted of battery with bodily injury to a public safety officer as a Level 5 felony in December 2021 and given a split sentence with two years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction and three years at community corrections.

3.   Father does not challenge the trial court's conclusions as to Child's best interest or DCS's plan of care.

4.   Father also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (effective date March 11, 2024 to June 30, 2025). The trial court was required to find only that one prong of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) has been established. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. Because we agree with the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child's removal from Father's care would not be remedied, we need not address his argument directed at the “threat” prong of Section 4(d)(4). See id. For the same reason, we will not address Father's arguments under I.C. §§ 31-35-2-4(d)(2) and (6), which were not addressed in the trial court's order.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.