IN RE: A.H.P. (Minor Child) M.D. (Mother) and C.P. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.D. (Mother) had six children removed from her care due to her substance abuse. Thereafter, she used methamphetamine while pregnant with her seventh child, A.P. (Daughter). Daughter was later born with syphilis transmitted from Mother. Though both Mother and Daughter tested negative for illegal drugs at Daughter's birth, Mother did not submit drug screens for several months afterward. And shortly after Daughter's birth, Mother reported that Daughter's father, C.P. (Father), who has a history of domestic violence and child neglect, had become intoxicated and threatened Mother while Daughter was in the home.

[2] Following a fact-finding hearing, the trial court determined that Daughter was a child in need of services (CHINS). Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) now appeal, arguing that the court improperly relied on their extensive history with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) rather than focusing on Daughter's current circumstances. We affirm.

Facts

[3] In September 2024, Daughter was born with syphilis and remained hospitalized for that condition for ten days. As Daughter was still positive for the disease when she was discharged, she required continuing treatment and monitoring with the hospital's infectious disease department.

[4] DCS was notified of Daughter's condition at birth and began an investigation that revealed Mother's extensive DCS history. Mother previously had six children removed from her care due to her substance abuse and was under a CHINS dispositional order as to the sixth child, B.D. (Sibling), who was a ward of DCS and resided outside of Mother's home. Sibling had also been born with syphilis transmitted from Mother and the child took seven months to test negative for the disease. Though Mother and Daughter tested negative for drugs at birth, DCS learned that Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine twice during her pregnancy with Daughter—in January 2024 and June 2024. Mother did not test positive thereafter, but she stopped submitting to drug tests in August 2024.

[5] In October 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Daughter was a CHINS. At an initial hearing on the petition, the trial court determined that Daughter could continue to reside at home with Mother and Father, but the court also found that Daughter was at risk of out-of-home placement without supervision and services.

[6] Following the initial hearing, Parents exhibited minimal cooperation with DCS. Despite DCS arranging at-home drug screening to accommodate Mother, she never responded to the screening agency to schedule testing. She did not resume screening until after December 5, 2024—the original date of the fact-finding hearing. Mother also failed to sign releases that DCS needed to verify her claimed participation in therapy.

[7] Additionally, in late December, Mother reported an incident in which Father was drinking while Mother was trying to put Daughter to bed. Parents argued, and Mother heard Father threaten to pay somebody to beat up Mother. Mother then contacted her home-based case worker about Father's behavior and left with Daughter to stay in a hotel that night.

[8] At the fact-finding hearing in February 2025, DCS employees recounted these events and Mother's history with DCS. A provider of home-based services testified that Mother was providing Daughter with adequate care, but the Family Case Manager testified that Daughter's “safety and stability is a problem.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 23. The trial court ultimately determined that Daughter was a CHINS. It found that Mother had “a long history of illegal use of substances including testing positive for methamphetamine during her pregnancy,” that Father “has a history of domestic violence and substantiation for neglect,” and that “coercive intervention of the court is necessary.” App. Vol. II, p. 76.

[9] After a dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered Parents to submit to regular drug tests, meet all of Daughter's medical needs, and engage with Daughter in home-based counseling, among other things. The court also ordered Father to complete a domestic violence assessment. Daughter was permitted to remain at home with Parents, with supervision by DCS.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Mother and Father jointly appeal the trial court's CHINS determination. Because a CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child, “the acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). Therefore, a separate analysis as to each parent is generally not required. Id. at 106.

[11] Parents argue that the trial court erred by relying too heavily on their history with DCS when determining that Daughter was a CHINS. They frame this as both an error affecting the sufficiency of evidence supporting the determination and a due process violation. We address both issues and affirm.

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[12] When reviewing a CHINS adjudication for sufficient evidence, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's decision. Matter of E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 909 (Ind. 2025).

[13] Where, as here, the trial court supplements its determination with sua sponte findings and conclusions, “we consider whether the evidence supports the findings and whether those findings support the judgment.” Id. “But we review issues not covered by the findings under the general judgment standard, meaning we will affirm the court's decision if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. Parents challenge none of the trial court's findings of fact, only its conclusion that Daughter is a CHINS.

[14] The trial court found Daughter is a CHINS as defined in Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1. A CHINS adjudication under this section requires DCS to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision ․ and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Id.; Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (preponderance of evidence).

[15] In other words, there must have been sufficient evidence supporting three basic elements: (1) Parents’ actions or inactions seriously endangered Daughter; (2) Daughter's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). The third element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life because “[n]ot every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family.” Id. For this reason, courts “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (citation omitted).

[16] Parents argue that DCS failed to prove all three elements. Though they “concede that Mother has a drug abuse history, a history that the Department has detained her other children, and Father's history includes domestic violence,” Parents claim that Mother's prior neglect of her children was the sole support for the CHINS determination. Appellants’ Br., p. 15. We disagree.

[17] First, as Parents acknowledge, evidence regarding a parent's prior neglect of a child is expressly permitted in CHINS proceedings. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-5. Our Supreme Court has also explicitly recognized that “DCS must necessarily rely on the past actions of parents to give a trial court the full story of why a CHINS petition was filed in the first place.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1212 (Ind. 2019).¹

[18] Second, Mother's history of neglect with her other children was not the sole evidence supporting the CHINS determination, as Parents contend. Daughter was born with syphilis—a serious infection requiring immediate medical care, ongoing treatment, and continued monitoring. Considering this need for specialized care, Mother's drug use and inconsistent participation in drug screens was particularly problematic.

[19] Mother tested positive for methamphetamine twice during her pregnancy with Daughter, with one positive test as recently as June 2024. She then stopped drug testing shortly before giving birth to Daughter. After Daughter's birth in September 2024, DCS attempted to accommodate Mother's needs by referring her to a drug testing provider that made house visits, but Mother never responded to requests to schedule the testing. Mother only began drug testing in December 2024—on the day the fact-finding was originally scheduled. By the time of the fact-finding hearing in February, Mother had been providing negative screens for only a matter of weeks. While those negative screens are commendable, they covered a short period compared to her admittedly long history of substance abuse. They were therefore not sufficient to dispel concerns about Mother's ability to appropriately care for Daughter and ensure Daughter receives the medical care she requires.

[20] Mother also failed to provide the releases of information that DCS needed to confirm Mother's report that she had resumed therapy three weeks before the fact-finding hearing. And finally, Daughter was exposed to the December 2024 incident of Father's alcohol abuse and violent threats, presenting concerns about the safety and stability of Daughter's household. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644-45 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that young children are harmed by exposure to domestic violence). This evidence established that Daughter was endangered and had unmet needs.

[21] As to the third and final element—whether court coercion is necessary—DCS emphasized that Mother failed to consistently cooperate with services and often did so only at the last minute. For instance, Mother failed to engage in drug testing until the day the fact-finding hearing was originally scheduled. Additionally, Mother's prior history with DCS provided critical context demonstrating why coercion was needed to ensure Daughter receives proper care. See Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1210.

[22] DCS employees testified that all six of Mother's other children were previously removed from her care due to her ongoing substance abuse and neglect. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother was under a CHINS dispositional order for Sibling. Over the prior twenty months of Sibling's case, Mother “failed to make progress sufficient to even get to unsupervised parenting” time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 33. She only recently began to engage in services for Siblings’ case and only after the permanency plan was changed to adoption. This history of general non-compliance with reunification efforts suggests that voluntary services here would be insufficient. See In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[Courts] must consider [a] parent's habitual patterns of conduct as a means of determining the probability of future detrimental behavior.”).

[23] To support their argument to the contrary, Parents rely heavily on the Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, which warns that, while the use of a parent's prior acts is permitted, it can be “ripe for potential abuse.” Id. at 1211. But the concern identified in that case is not present here. In Eq.W., the trial court dismissed a CHINS petition, and the following day, DCS filed another CHINS petition containing “nearly identical allegations.” Id. at 1205. Finding the new CHINS petition “screams out as an obvious ‘second bite at the apple[,]’ ” our Supreme Court ruled that dismissal of the first CHINS petition precluded DCS from attempting to relitigate the same allegations in the second CHINS petition. Id. at 1211. Here, the CHINS petition did not merely contain the same allegations as a prior petition. It pertained to a different child—Daughter—and arose from her syphilis diagnosis and Parent's recent conduct regarding drug testing, violence in the home, and non-compliance with services.

[24] We also find unpersuasive Parents’ comparison to In re D.H., 859 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In that case, five siblings were adjudicated as CHINS based on the allegations of a stepparent's sexual abuse made by one of those children. The trial court refused to determine whether that allegation was true but still granted the CHINS petitions, finding that the allegations, “if true,” would endanger the children. Id. at 743. This Court reversed, finding that the trial court's failure to determine whether the harm occurred rendered the CHINS adjudications mere “speculation.” Id. at 744. Here, there is no question that Parents have a history with DCS, and the court had evidence of current, not just speculative, endangerment.

[25] Given the foregoing, the record demonstrates that the family's condition at the time of the fact-finding hearing had not improved since the CHINS petition was filed. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580. DCS is not required to “wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene.” K.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that, without court intervention, Daughter—born with a serious infection requiring ongoing medical treatment to a mother with a demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety across multiple cases—would not receive necessary care and supervision.

II. Due Process

[26] Parents also allege that, by using their history with the DCS to conclude that Daughter is a CHINs, the trial court effectively lowered DCS's burden of proof. They argue this made the CHINS determination “a foregone conclusion,” thereby violating their due process right to a “fair proceeding.” Appellant's Br., p. 21 (citing In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011)). Invoking Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), Parents claim the court improperly inferred that they would act in conformity with their past behavior. But this argument fundamentally misconstrues how past history functions in CHINS proceedings.

[27] CHINS adjudications are not criminal trials where prior bad acts are excluded to prevent prejudice toward a defendant. They are child protection proceedings where courts must make predictive judgments about child safety based on a “broad range of evidence.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1211. And a provision of the CHINS statutes, Indiana Code § 31-34-12-5, specifically permits the use of a parent's prior acts to demonstrate intent, guilty knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, identification, existence of a common scheme or plan, a likelihood that a parent is responsible for a child's injury or condition, or other similar purposes.

[28] In making CHINS determinations, courts are called to look to the past, present, and future. To prove the allegations of its CHINS petition, DCS was required to demonstrate that Daughter was seriously endangered, had unmet needs, and that those needs were unlikely to be met without court coercion. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. While the first two parts—endangerment and unmet needs—focus on current harm, the third part—court coercion—is an inherently predictive inquiry. Determining whether parents will voluntarily address endangerment and accept services can include the consideration of how parents have responded to services in the past.

[29] Here, the trial court did not use Parents’ history to circumvent the statutory standard. As previously discussed, it appropriately considered Parents’ history alongside current circumstances to understand the “full story” of the CHINS petition and determine whether court coercion was necessary. Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1212. Moreover, the court's decision to keep Daughter placed in Parents’ home while under DCS supervision—rather than order Daughter be removed as with Mother's other six children—dispels the notion that the CHINS determination was a “foregone conclusion from the inference that the Parents’ history would dictate their future.” Appellant's Br., p. 22. The decision instead reflects careful consideration of Daughter's needs in this particular case and the tailoring of a plan to meet those needs. We find no due process violation.

Conclusion

[30] DCS demonstrated that Daughter needs care and supervision that Parents have shown themselves unable or unwilling to consistently provide, given Mother's positive drug tests during pregnancy, Daughter's congenital syphilis diagnosis, Father's domestic violence, and Mother's only recent cooperation with drug testing, despite an extensive history of substance abuse. The evidence supports the trial court's determination that the necessary care for Daughter is unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the court. Therefore, the trial court's CHINS adjudication is not clearly erroneous and we find no due process violation. We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Parents argue the trial court improperly relied on evidence about the DCS's history with Mother's other children without taking judicial notice of the underlying DCS records from those prior cases. But DCS staff independently testified about that history at the fact-finding hearing, including Mother's six prior removals of children due to her substance abuse and her inconsistency with services in Sibling's case. The court did not consider any information about these prior cases beyond what was discussed at the hearing and what was contained in the DCS records of Daughter's case. Accordingly, there was no need to take judicial notice of the other DCS records.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.