HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND v. NELSON (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The Housing Authority of South Bend (HASB) appeals the small-claims court's grant of Annemary Nelson's motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(7). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] This is the second appeal in this matter. In our first opinion, we set forth the following facts:

Nelson became a tenant of HASB in 2003. In April 2017, she entered into a lease agreement with HASB to rent a two-bedroom unit on Edison Road. Nelson was the sole resident listed in the lease. Under the lease terms, Nelson agreed to submit to annual recertification regarding income, assets, and family composition. The lease contained the following relevant terms:

C. Transfer to Appropriate Size Dwelling Unit. The Resident agrees to transfer to an appropriate size dwelling unit based on family composition upon notice from HASB that such a dwelling unit is available. Failure to transfer to such dwelling unit is grounds for termination of this Lease by HASB ․

D. Notification. When HASB ․ determines that the Resident must transfer to another dwelling unit based on family composition, HASB shall notify the Resident that the Resident may request an explanation stating the specific grounds of the HASB determination, and that if the Resident does not agree with the determination, the Resident shall have the right to request a hearing under the HASB Grievance Procedure.

In April 2022, a HASB employee emailed Nelson to say her annual recertification inspection showed she was over-housed in a two-bedroom apartment and offered to show her a one-bedroom unit. In October, HASB mailed Nelson a letter offering her a one-bedroom unit at 501 Alonzo Watson and gave her until October 20 to accept or decline the transfer.

Nelson did not want to transfer, so she contacted the HASB office to request they add her adult son to her current lease as an additional adult. HASB met with Nelson soon after and provided her with a list of documentation her son would need to bring to the office. Because he was out of the country, HASB scheduled an appointment for November 21, at which time Nelson was to appear in person with her son and turn in the documents. HASB talked to her “several times” about adding the son. Her son did not appear on November 21 or thereafter.

In February 2023, HASB mailed Nelson a second offer of a one-bedroom unit at a different property, which she could accept or decline by March 15. The letter stated refusal of the offer without good cause would result in lease termination, and she must request a grievance hearing within five days if she intended to dispute the transfer. Nelson rejected the second offer. HASB then mailed Nelson a notice to vacate by April 30, listing the reason for lease termination as failure to transfer to an appropriate size dwelling.

On April 28, Nelson's adult daughter, Caroline, sent HASB an email summarizing a meeting between HASB, Caroline, and Nelson. In the email, Caroline states Nelson is a “senior citizen, disabled, and a wife of a veteran” and asserts they “asked for reasonable accommodations which you have denied us.”

On May 4, HASB sent Nelson a final notice to vacate, informing her HASB would terminate the lease on May 31 because she did not transfer to an appropriate size dwelling or vacate her current unit. HASB also filed an eviction action in the small claims court.

Nelson v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, No. 23A-EV-1835, 2024 WL 3594458 (Ind. Ct. App. July 31, 2024) (mem.) (citations omitted). The small-claims court granted the eviction but stayed the order pending an appeal by Nelson. In July 2024, we affirmed the eviction order. See id.

[3] Following our decision, the small-claims court granted HASB possession of the unit effective October 15. Before that date, however, Nelson moved to have the judgment set aside under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(7), which authorizes relief from a judgment when “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]” Her motion noted that HASB had approved a live-in aide for her in December 2023, while her appeal was pending, and that the aide was living with her in the two-bedroom unit. Nelson argued:

It is no longer equitable to evict Ms. Nelson and terminate her public housing benefit for being over-housed. When [HASB] filed this case, Ms. Nelson was a household of one living in a two-bedroom unit. [HASB] sought to evict her because, under their occupancy standards, a household of one should live in [a] one bedroom apartment. Now, because of [HASB's] unilateral actions, two people are authorized to live in her 2-bedroom apartment. It is inequitable to evict Ms. Nelson for circumstances that no longer exist.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 176.

[4] After hearing arguments from counsel, the small-claims court granted Nelson's motion, explaining:

[A]t this present time Miss Nelson, according to the standards of the [federal regulations], the standards of the Housing Authority, is currently properly housed as far as I can tell for the -- for the size of the unit and the size of her live-in members.

․

I'm going to find that pursuant to Trial Rule [60(B)(7)] that it would not at this point be equitable to enforce the judgment, the Court's prior judgment, relating to possession against Miss Nelson, at this time.

Tr. pp. 26-28.

[5] HASB now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] HASB makes four arguments on appeal: (1) small-claims courts cannot set aside judgments under Trial Rule 60(B)(7); (2) the judgment at issue here does not have prospective application and so cannot be set aside under Trial Rule 60(B)(7); (3) Nelson had an adequate remedy at law and so could not be granted equitable relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7); and (4) the facts of the case do not support a grant of relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7). As Nelson notes, HASB didn't make the first three arguments in the small-claims court. Therefore, HASB waived those arguments for purposes of appeal. See Wilkes v. Celadon Grp., Inc., 177 N.E.3d 786, 794 (Ind. 2021) (explaining that an argument raised for the first time on appeal is waived).¹ That leaves HASB's argument that relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7) isn't appropriate under the facts of the case. Where, as here, a trial court decides a Trial Rule 60(B) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. In re Adoption of C.B.M., 992 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 2013).

[7] Again, Trial Rule 60(B)(7) allows a court to grant relief from a judgment when “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]” In arguing that the small-claims court erred by setting aside the eviction order under this provision, HASB doesn't dispute the court's conclusion that Nelson is currently properly housed in a two-bedroom unit, since a live-in aide has moved in with her. But it contends that it approved the live-in aide not because it changed its position about Nelson staying in the two-bedroom unit but because “denial of the accommodation” while Nelson's appeal was pending “would have violated federal law[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 18. In other words, HASB asserts that the approval was merely a temporary measure until Nelson's appeal was resolved. Once this Court affirmed the eviction order, HASB renewed its position that Nelson should be evicted because of her earlier breach of the lease agreement.

[8] While HASB cites no authority in support of its claim that it was required to approve a live-in aide for Nelson while her appeal was pending, we understand the difficult position it was in at that time. Ultimately, though, we agree with the small-claims court that it would no longer be equitable to enforce the eviction order. The bottom line is that because of HASB's approval of the live-in aide, the circumstance that led to the eviction order—Nelson living by herself in a two-bedroom unit—no longer existed by the time the case returned to the small-claims court. Therefore, we cannot say that the court erred by finding that setting aside its original order would be appropriate.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In its reply brief, HASB argues that whether small-claims courts can use Trial Rule 60(B)(7) is an issue of “jurisdiction” and that challenges to a court's jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. Appellant's Reply Br. pp. 5-6. HASB doesn't specify a type of jurisdiction, but Indiana recognizes two: subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. In re K.S., 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006). The only type that can be challenged for the first time on appeal is subject-matter jurisdiction. See Joyner v. Citifinancial Mortg. Co., 800 N.E.3d 979, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and determine cases of a general class to which the proceeding then before the court belongs. Id. We fail to see, and HASB doesn't explain, how the availability or unavailability of Trial Rule 60(B)(7) in small-claims courts is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. In any event, we have made clear that Trial Rule 60(B) applies in small-claims courts. See Summit Acct. & Comput. Serv. v. Hogge, 608 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.