LAFATA v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joseph Lafata (“Lafata”) received an aggregate sentence of two years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) upon his convictions of Level 6 felony domestic battery, Class A misdemeanor theft, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Lafata appeals his sentence, arguing the trial court abused its discretion with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2024, the State filed six counts against Lafata, where L.G.—Lafata's then-girlfriend (“Girlfriend”)—was the alleged victim: Count I – Level 6 felony domestic battery; Count II – Level 6 felony criminal confinement; Count III – Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury; Count IV – Class A misdemeanor intimidation; Count V – Class A misdemeanor theft; and Count VI – Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. While the instant case was pending, the State filed separate criminal charges against Lafata alleging he contacted Girlfriend in violation of a no-contact order and committed one count of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice and multiple counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. As to the instant matter, Lafata requested a bench trial, which the trial court held on November 13, 2024.

[3] The charges related to events around Valentine's Day 2024, at which point Lafata was on probation in a prior criminal cause. Lafata lived with Girlfriend and their daughter (“Child”), who was about one year old. Girlfriend testified about the evening of February 13, 2024, when she said Lafata confined her to their bedroom. Girlfriend testified that Lafata pushed his weight against the bedroom door to block her exit, then “[f]ound the means to stop [her] from going through the window.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 77. Girlfriend also said that Lafata eventually sat on top of her on their bed and placed his hands on her face, making it difficult for her to breathe. Girlfriend said she eventually fell asleep.

[4] The next morning, Girlfriend was using her phone to record a video. At the time, Child was in her highchair in the kitchen. Lafata got upset that Girlfriend was recording a video. As Girlfriend walked into the kitchen, Lafata “[e]ither ․ pushed [her] from behind or picked [her] up from behind” such that “all [her] body weight [was] off of the floor[.]” Id. at 79. Girlfriend tumbled to the floor. While Girlfriend was face down on the floor, she stuffed her phone “down the front end of [her] pants because [she] was trying to keep it away from [Lafata].” Id. Lafata got on top of Girlfriend and pried the phone away from her. When Lafata did so, Child was awake in her highchair. Lafata's forceful actions caused pain to Girlfriend's arm and one of her legs. Thereafter, Lafata and Girlfriend argued. Girlfriend recalled Lafata saying: “[Y]ou thought I'd beat you before. Well, I'm really going to do it now.” Id. at 80. Girlfriend moved toward the front door “because [she] was worried [she] was going to be confined again” and did not have her phone. Id. Lafata asked if she would help feed Child. Girlfriend agreed to feed Child if Lafata “would leave the room[.]” Id. Lafata began walking out of the kitchen, away from Girlfriend, as Girlfriend began to walk toward Child. Lafata “lunged at [Girlfriend] and tried grabbing [her].” Id. Girlfriend then “ran out the front door.” Id. Shortly thereafter, Girlfriend snuck back into the residence to get Child. She also tried to set off the house alarm using a panic button, hoping law enforcement would respond. Girlfriend tried to set off the alarm four times, but Lafata kept turning off the alarm. Eventually, Lafata left, and Girlfriend set off the house alarm.

[5] Officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department responded to the house alarm and encountered Girlfriend standing on the porch of the residence, holding Child. Girlfriend was “frantic” and “crying.” Id. at 92. One of the officers took photographs of Girlfriend, capturing redness and bruising on her body, including bruising on her lower legs, redness across her knees, and a patch of redness on her upper left arm “from ․ being grabbed[.]” Id. at 87.

[6] At trial, the State presented testimony from Girlfriend and two investigating officers. Lafata also testified in his defense, giving a different version of events. Lafata claimed Girlfriend got “angry very quickly” and he would “separate [himself] from an argument” until things “cool[ed] down.” Id. at 99. Lafata denied confining Girlfriend on the evening of February 13, claiming they had an argument and he locked himself in their bedroom and “put [his] back up against the door,” with Girlfriend repeatedly “trying to get into the room.” Id.

[7] As for the morning of February 14, Lafata claimed he made breakfast and left for work when he and Girlfriend began arguing on the phone. According to Lafata, he returned to the residence, “sat on the couch next to [Girlfriend,] and asked her what's been going on and what was the problem, and why have [they] been arguing constantly, especially on Valentine's Day.” Id. at 102. Lafata said Girlfriend “progressively kept getting angry,” “insults [were] thrown back and forth,” and they “got loud enough to wake up [Child] in the back of the house.” Id. at 102–03. Lafata said he got up to get Child, “mumbled underneath [his] breath saying something offensive,” and Girlfriend followed him through the kitchen and struck his head with a large frying pan. Id. Lafata denied stealing Girlfriend's phone, asserting that Girlfriend had been using a cellphone of his because “[s]he hates using an older device,” and he told Girlfriend “[he] was leaving” and “asked her for [his] phone back.” Id. at 104. Lafata suggested that the redness on Girlfriend's body was attributable to rosacea. As for the bruising, Lafata said Girlfriend “bruises pretty easily,” noting that she often played with their dogs and became bruised. Id. at 107. Lafata claimed he left the residence and promptly contacted the probation department.

[8] The trial court determined the State did not meet its burden on Count II – Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Count IV – Class A misdemeanor intimidation. The trial court otherwise found Lafata guilty of Counts I, III, V, and VI. A sentencing hearing was held on December 4, 2024, where the trial court also addressed (1) Lafata's intent to plead guilty in the new case to one count of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice and two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy; and (2) allegations that, in a prior case, Lafata violated the conditions of probation by committing the instant offenses.

[9] At sentencing, Lafata asked the trial court to consider an exhibit that consisted of several letters of support. The State acknowledged Lafata had support from the community, noting: “The [c]ourt should hold some weight to that and I believe he does have relatives here present in the courtroom for support, so the [c]ourt should take some weight as to that.” Id. at 143. However, the State maintained that “the statutory aggravators outweigh[ed] any statutory or non-statutory mitigators in th[e] case.” Id. The State ultimately argued as follows:

The statutory aggravators the State sees here [are] that ․ Lafata has a mild history of criminal and delinquent behavior. That is seen in his prior convictions and more specifically, the PSI noted that he was first arrested at the age of 18. His first conviction was at the age of 18. He's had a couple of misdemeanor convictions and a couple of felony convictions, so the Court should hold some weight as to his prior criminal history.

The next statutory aggravator the State sees is that ․ Lafata committed this crime of violence and did so knowing that his one-year-old daughter was awake in her high[ ]chair in the kitchen, which was one of the rooms in which this incident occurred. And she was not a victim in this case.

The third aggravator seen is [Lafata] violated conditions of probation when he was on probation ․ by picking up this case and whether that's, you know, the arrest, the conviction now, and everything in between that the [c]ourt can hold some weight to that. [The State would] like to remind the [c]ourt of the evidence [presented] during the trial and [Girlfriend's] testimony and the injuries that she incurred[.]

Id. at 143–44. As to the instant criminal case, the State sought an aggregate sentence that would involve two years executed in the DOC with suspension of the remaining time. The State noted that, by “picking up case after case after case,” Lafata had displayed “a disdain for the [c]ourt's order and [an] inability to control himself.” Id. at 145. The State added that Lafata's probation violation constituted “his fourth violation in that probation matter.” Id.

[10] Lafata asked the trial court to impose one year of probation for Count I – Level 6 felony domestic battery, and asked that Count II be “merged with [Count I]” as a lesser-included offense. Id. at 147. Lafata also sought concurrent sentences for the misdemeanor offenses. Lafata referred to the letters of support from members of the community, asserting: “Based on the character and attitudes described by the loved ones and his professional acquaintances[,] ․ Lafata is unlikely to commit another crime.” Id. at 146. Lafata also referred to the time between criminal convictions, asserting that “there [was] a significant amount of time where he was able to stay out of trouble.” Id. Lafata argued that he ultimately remained a good candidate for probation because, in the past, he had successfully completed a sentence on home detention. Lafata also pointed out that he and Girlfriend broke up and “it's unlikely that they would reestablish a relationship at this point.” Id. at 146–47. Lafata further indicated that he was willing to participate in “whatever classes ․ the [c]ourt would order,” while asserting that he “wouldn't be able to complete those in prison.” Id. at 147.

[11] Later, Lafata had the opportunity to speak in allocution. Lafata asked the court for the ability to contact Child. Lafata also mentioned that he and his family supported one another, asserting: “They need me, I need them. Me going to prison is going to be more of a punishment to them than it would be for me. I do [u]nderstand a punishment is deserved.” Id. at 149. Lafata added: “All I can really ask is if you would allow me to go home, I will not fail․ I promise and I guarantee that my support system is huge and I will not fail them.” Id.

[12] In sentencing Lafata, the trial court began by noting that “certain aggravators and mitigators ․ go towards what kind of sentence [it] should pronounce.” Id. at 150. The trial court then turned to “statutory aggravators,” finding that one “statutory aggravator” was Lafata's criminal history. Id. (“It's a slight history, but it is still a criminal history nevertheless. So I do find that as a statutory aggravator.”). The trial court found that another “statutory aggravator” was that Lafata was “serving a probation sentence when [he was] arrested” in connection with the instant case. Id. The trial court also found “as a statutory aggravator specifically [for] the [instant] cause ․ that [Child] was an infant, [a] child under the age of 18,” “wasn't a victim of this offense,” and “was present ․ when this offense occurred.” Id. at 151. The trial court ultimately identified a single mitigator in the instant cause, which was that Lafata's “incarceration would be a hardship on ․ Lafata's family.” Id. The trial court determined that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, which warranted imposing an aggravated sentence. The trial court added that, because Lafata violated conditions of probation on multiple occasions, it did not think that “anything less than ․ the [DOC] [was] appropriate.” Id. at 152.

[13] In the end, the trial court vacated Count III, which it determined was a lesser-included offense of Count I. For Count I – Level 6 felony domestic battery, the court imposed a somewhat aggravated sentence, ordering Lafata to serve two years in the DOC. Cf. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (setting forth a sentencing range of six months to two and one-half years with an advisory sentence of one year). As for Counts V and VI—which were both Class A misdemeanors—the trial court imposed concurrent 365-day sentences with 364 days executed and one day suspended. All sentences were to run concurrently, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of two years executed in the DOC. Lafata now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Lafata argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him by failing to find that his support network constituted a significant mitigating circumstance and in identifying Child's presence as one of three aggravating circumstances.

[15] We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. As our Supreme Court explained in Anglemyer, a trial court can abuse its sentencing discretion in several ways, including by failing to enter a sentencing statement, entering a statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that lack support in the record, entering a statement that omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, and entering a statement with reasons for the sentence that are ultimately improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490–91.

[16] Lafata argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find that his support network was a significant mitigating factor. Lafata argues the record contained evidence of his strong support network, including letters from relatives and professional acquaintances. Tr. Vol 2 pp. 146–49. Lafata also asserts that, at sentencing, the State acknowledged that “the [c]ourt should hold some weight” to Lafata's support in the community and the presence of family members “in the courtroom for support[.]” Id. at 143. We note, however, that under Anglemyer, the trial court is only required to identify “all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances[.]” 868 N.E.2d at 490 (emphasis added). Furthermore, our Supreme Court explained in Anglemyer that “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Id. at 491.

[17] In this case, the trial court explicitly found that “incarceration would be a hardship on ․ Lafata's family,” identifying this as the sole significant mitigating factor. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 151. Although the trial court did not separately identify Lafata's family and community support as a significant mitigating factor, the court had no obligation to explain why it found that the proffered mitigating factor was not a significant mitigator under the circumstances. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. Moreover, Lafata has not identified caselaw—nor are we aware of any—that the presence of a strong support network automatically entitles a defendant to sentence mitigation, particularly where, as here, the defendant already repeatedly violated the conditions of a prior sentence while having that support network available to him. In this case, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Lafata's support network had limited mitigating value given his pattern of violating conditions of probation. Thus, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in determining this factor lacked significance such that it did not warrant explicit identification as a mitigator.

[18] Next, Lafata argues that the trial court erred in identifying as a significant aggravating circumstance that Lafata committed the offenses in the presence of his young child. We begin by observing that Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a) contains a list of potential aggravating circumstances. That list includes circumstances when a person knowingly committed a “crime of violence” in the presence of a minor who was not the victim of the offense. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(4). Lafata points out that our legislature gave the phrase “crime of violence” a specific meaning set forth in Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, which does not encompass the crimes for which he was convicted in this criminal case. Lafata argues that, because he did not commit a crime of violence as defined under the applicable statute, the trial court erred by referring to its aggravator as a “statutory” aggravator. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 151. We note, however, that a trial court is not limited to the aggravators enumerated in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a). Indeed, our legislature specifically explained that the list is non-exhaustive such that the enumerated factors “do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence.” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(c).

[19] In any case, putting aside the specific terminology used, Lafata also argues it was improper to identify Child's presence as an aggravating circumstance because the domestic battery conviction was already elevated to a Level 6 felony based on Child's presence. Based on the trial court's identification of other valid aggravators, however, we need not definitively resolve this issue.

[20] That is, even if we concluded it was improper to identify Child's presence as an aggravating circumstance in this case, it is well-settled that a single aggravating circumstance is adequate to support the imposition of an aggravated sentence. E.g., Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. 1999). Furthermore, the use of an improper aggravator warrants reversal only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it considered the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Ind. 2001). Here, the trial court identified two additional, valid aggravating circumstances, which Lafata does not challenge on appeal: (1) Lafata's criminal history and (2) his violation of probation. At sentencing, the trial court agreed with the State that a somewhat aggravated sentence was warranted because the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Moreover, in sentencing Lafata, the court was adamant that a suspended sentence was improper due to the multiple violations of probation. All in all, we are confident from the record that, based on two other valid aggravators and the identification of only a single significant mitigator, the trial court would have imposed the same aggravated sentence. Thus, even if we were to conclude that the court erred with reference to Child's presence, any error in that regard did not amount to reversible error under the circumstances.

[21] In summary, Lafata has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that his support network was not a significant mitigating factor. Nor has Lafata established that the identification of Child's presence as an aggravating factor constituted reversible error given the other valid aggravators and single mitigator. We, therefore, affirm the sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.