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Byron A. BARNES, Appellant-Defendant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] After a jury trial, Byron Barnes was convicted of murder for gunning down a man he suspected killed his friend. Barnes now appeals his conviction, challenging the exclusion of evidence that his two companions were also arrested for the murder. The jury, however, learned of his companions’ arrests through other evidence, rendering the exclusion harmless. Barnes also challenges the admission of evidence seized after his arrest, which he claims was unconstitutional. But a security video of the shooting and other evidence provided ample probable cause for Barnes's arrest, making the evidence's seizure lawful and its admission not improper. Finding neither of Barnes's claims meritorious, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In November 2021, Barnes's friend Tobijah Goines, also known as “Toby4,” was shot and killed during what police described as narcotics activity at the home of Tyrae Hayes. Tr. Vol. III, p. 77. Though Hayes was initially a suspect, no charges were ever filed.
[3] Eight months after Goines's death, Barnes and a companion, Jimmijion Bailey, crossed paths with Hayes at a gas station. According to gas station security footage, Barnes was dressed in light-colored pants featuring an orangish pattern, a black knitted hat, white sneakers with large dark trim around the sides, and a black hoodie that featured a large photo of Goines with the words “GONE BUT NEVER FORGOTTEN” and “TOBY4.” Exhs., p. 16. Bailey was dressed in a white tank top, long red athletic shorts, and what appeared to be a gun at his waist. Their clothing is shown here in the security footage:
[4] After completing their shopping, Barnes and Bailey returned to a Hyundai vehicle, from which they could see Hayes arriving at the gas station on the back of a motor scooter. Barnes and Bailey then left the gas station and drove into a nearby alley.
[5] Two minutes later, security video showed two individuals walking to the gas station from the same alley. One wore a black hood, white graphic t-shirt, jeans, and sneakers—clothing dissimilar to that worn by Bailey a few minutes earlier in the gas station. The other wore a mask and a black hoodie—turned inside out—and pants and shoes similar to the distinctive clothing that Barnes had just been wearing, as depicted in these excerpts from the security video:
[6] The two men, each armed with a gun, entered the store and shot Hayes nine times before fleeing. Hayes died from multiple gunshot wounds to the forehead and face, although he also was shot in the lungs, stomach, kidneys, and colon.
[7] About an hour after the shooting, police responded to a report of an armed man at the Marquette Park Aquatorium. There, officers located Barnes, Bailey, and a third person, Michael Alexander. Bailey was wearing the same red athletic shorts and white tank top in which he appeared in the initial security video. He was still carrying a firearm at his waist. Barnes had on the black memorial hoodie with a basketball jersey over it but with black pants. Alexander was wearing a black graphic t-shirt—not the white graphic t-shirt that the hooded shooter wore. The clothing of the hooded shooter, as well as the clothing of the three men when they were at the park is shown here:
[8] Officers told Bailey that firearms were prohibited at the park, but Bailey attempted to walk away. When officers caught up with Bailey, he smelled of marijuana and admitted possessing the drug. Barnes and Alexander were unarmed, but when asked for their names and birth dates, they provided information that matched no one in the police database.
[9] Meanwhile, the officers looking for the murder suspects headed to the park after learning on a police radio about the group stopped there. In a parking lot adjacent to the park, the officers found the Hyundai in which Barnes and Bailey had been seen at the gas station. One of the original officers who stopped the three men at the park intended to arrest Bailey for his marijuana possession and Barnes and Alexander for false informing. However, this officer was instructed by a homicide detective to “transport them to Lake County [Jail] and PC (probable cause) them for the homicide.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 152.
[10] Barnes, Bailey, and Alexander were taken to the Lake County Jail, where their clothing, including Barnes's hoodie, was collected. All three men were swabbed for DNA samples. Later that day, Barnes made a jail phone call to Goines's cousin during which he told her, “[J]ust know I put the smile on [Goines's] face today.” Exh. 23(a).
[11] The State charged all three men with murdering Hayes under the theory that Barnes and Alexander were the shooters and Bailey was the getaway driver. As to Barnes, the State also alleged a sentencing enhancement based on Barnes's use of a firearm in the killing. But subsequent forensic testing showed that the gun confiscated from Bailey at the park was not used in Hayes's murder. The State ultimately dismissed the murder charges against Bailey and Alexander due to inadequate proof. The State proceeded with its prosecution of Barnes for the murder.
[12] The State filed a pretrial motion in limine seeking to bar admission of any evidence that Bailey and Alexander had been charged with Hayes's murder and that the charges had been dismissed. The trial court granted the motion in limine on that issue after finding the disposition of the charges against Bailey and Alexander was not relevant.
[13] During Barnes's jury trial, his defense counsel sought to cross-examine a detective about the arrests of Bailey and Alexander. On the State's objection, the trial court excluded the testimony. Defense counsel then made an offer of proof, stating his belief that if allowed to answer, the detective “would testify that Michael Alexander and Jimmijion Bailey, were also arrested for the homicide at issue in this case.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 61.
[14] When the State later introduced Barnes's hoodie as evidence, defense counsel objected, arguing that police lacked probable cause to arrest Barnes and, thus, the State had obtained the hoodie illegally. The trial court found probable cause for Barnes's arrest, stating “[Police] have the Defendant that they've seen on the video, and they were taking [him] in for that” and “there's enough there to hold” Barnes while the investigation continued. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 21-22.
[15] Defense counsel argues in closing that Alexander and Bailey, rather than Barnes, may have been involved in the shooting. And defense counsel specifically argued that all three men were DNA swabbed but that the State failed to test their confiscated clothing and shoes for DNA. The jury found Barnes guilty of murder. Barnes waived his right to jury trial on the sentencing enhancement allegation, and the trial court ultimately found the enhancement applied. The trial court sentenced Barnes to 65 years imprisonment. Barnes appeals only his conviction, raising two evidentiary issues.
Discussion and Decision
[16] Barnes claims the trial court erred in excluding testimony that Bailey and Alexander were also arrested for Hayes's murder. He also complains about the admission of evidence obtained from him on the day of his arrest, arguing that police lacked probable cause to arrest him and thus obtained the evidence illegally.
[17] “A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence[,] and its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). “We will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and [the] errors affect a party's substantial rights.” Id. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I. Evidence of Bailey's and Alexander's Arrest
[18] Barnes first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the officer's testimony about Bailey's and Alexander's arrests because it related to Barnes's third-party perpetrator defense that Bailey and Alexander committed the murder. Barnes contends that evidence is relevant, given that it decreases the likelihood of his own commission of the crime. See Ind. Evidence Rule 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”). We find no deprivation of a third-party perpetrator defense.
[19] First, the jury heard substantially similar evidence of the police investigation of Alexander through other testimony. For instance, an officer later testified that he was directed by homicide detectives to “transport [Barnes, Bailey, and Alexander] to Lake County [Jail] and PC [probable cause] them for the homicide.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 152. This testimony established that all three men—Barnes, Bailey, and Alexander—were arrested for Hayes's murder.
[20] Furthermore, Barnes was permitted to present evidence suggesting Alexander's potential involvement. Barnes elicited testimony about the specific pieces of clothing collected from Alexander at the jail that partly matched that of one of the shooters and evidence showing that Barnes, when arrested, was wearing different pants than the shooters. Barnes also introduced testimony that no DNA testing was done on any item of evidence, including the mask found in the passenger side of the vehicle. Most significantly, Barnes leveraged this information during closing arguments, specifically arguing that all three men were DNA swabbed but the State failed to test the recovered clothing and shoes for DNA.
[21] Because the jury received through other testimony the same information that Barnes contends the trial court improperly excluded, Barnes was not denied the opportunity to present his third-party perpetrator defense. Unlike the defendant in Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997)—a case upon which Barnes relies—Barnes has not shown that the initial exclusion of testimony, even if erroneous, prejudiced his substantial rights. See Sylvester v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ind. 1998) (ruling that “[w]here the wrongfully excluded testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence presented, its exclusion is harmless error”). Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the trial court's handling of the third-party perpetrator defense evidence.
II. Evidence Obtained Following Barnes's Arrest
[22] Barnes next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence seized following his arrest, particularly Barnes's memorial hoodie bearing Goines's image. Barnes contends that his arrest lacked probable cause, rendering the subsequent seizure of evidence unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[23] When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a search or seizure, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. 2020). But we review the trial court's factual findings for clear error without reweighing the evidence or judging witness credibility. Lundquist v. State, 179 N.E.3d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
A. Federal Constitutional Analysis
[24] The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ․” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This prohibition “applies not only to searches and seizures of property, but also to physical apprehension of persons, such as arrests.” Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 625 (Ind. 2017). “To preserve that right, a judicial officer may issue a warrant only ‘upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ ” Lundquist, 179 N.E.3d at 1054 (quoting the Fourth Amendment).
[25] In other words, police who arrest a person without a warrant must generally either see the person commit a crime or have probable cause to believe the person has committed a felony. Thomas, 81 N.E.3d at 625. Probable cause to arrest exists “when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances, which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.” Id. at 626. If an arrest is made without probable cause, evidence obtained as a result is generally inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 266 (Ind. 2013).
[26] Barnes argues that when he was arrested at the park, the officers lacked probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. He argues that he was initially approached because Bailey had a firearm in a city park that prohibited guns and police discovered Bailey possessed marijuana. Barnes claims that when he (Barnes) was detained, he was not wearing clothing matching either shooter's description. According to Barnes, at the time of his arrest, “no evidence linked him to the shooting.” Appellant's Br., p. 14.
[27] Barnes further argues that his alleged failure to identify himself properly to police did not justify his arrest because the officer could not remember the names that Barnes and Alexander provided. Barnes contends that the officer merely testified the names “came back not on file,” which, he argues, is insufficient to establish he committed false informing. Tr. Vol. III, p. 123.
[28] Contrary to Barnes's claim, his arrest was supported by probable cause consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements. At the time of the arrest, police had already established several key facts linking him to the murder. First, the surveillance video showed Barnes and Bailey shopping at the gas station shortly before the shooting and then minutes later depicts a masked shooter wearing what appears to be the same distinctive pants, shoes, and hoodie that Barnes had worn. The matching attire is evident in the following still images from that video:
[29] Second, Barnes was wearing a hoodie similar to that worn by one of the shooters. Barnes was found at the park with Bailey, his companion at the gas station, who was still armed in a place that prohibited firearms. The man accompanying them—Alexander—was wearing clothing similar to that of the hooded shooter: a graphic t-shirt (although in black, rather than white), light-colored jeans, and distinctive sneakers.
[30] Third, nearby was the Hyundai in which Barnes and Bailey were seen at the gas station and that had been tracked by license plate readers to the park after the murder. Finally, on the Hyundai's passenger seat, police observed a mask like that used in the shooting. These facts and circumstances would justify a reasonable officer in believing Barnes was involved in Hayes's murder.
[31] The trial court correctly concluded there was probable cause to arrest Barnes because the police “have Defendant that they've seen on video” and “there's enough there to hold them” while the investigation continued. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 21. Barnes's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
B. Indiana Constitutional Analysis
[32] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, but Indiana courts interpret this provision independently. Under Indiana law, the reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on a balancing of: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
[33] Barnes argues that his arrest was unreasonable under this analysis. Claiming he was not wearing the same clothing as either shooter when arrested, Barnes contends that the degree of suspicion was minimal. He asserts that the degree of intrusion was significant, however, because he was arrested and jailed. Finally, Barnes argues that law enforcement had no urgent need to arrest him without further investigation.
[34] Applying the Litchfield factors, we reach different conclusions and find Barnes's arrest was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. First, the degree of suspicion was high. As previously discussed, police had video evidence of Barnes at the gas station shortly before the murder showing him wearing clothing similar to one of the shooters—most notably the black hoodie. They found him in the company of Alexander, whose clothing was somewhat similar to that of the other shooter depicted in the video. Barnes's companion at the gas station—Bailey—remained armed at the park. And all three men were found in the area of the Hyundai earlier seen at the gas station. As we already have determined under our federal analysis, police had probable cause to believe Barnes was involved in the homicide.
[35] As to the level of intrusion, we agree with Barnes that it was significant. See, e.g., Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 727 (Ind. 2010) (finding arrest and incarceration was intrusive). We have already determined that police had probable cause to arrest Barnes. As our Supreme Court has recognized when applying various parts of the Litchfield test, “[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion ․ [that is] lawful.” Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1200 (Ind. 2016) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (2018)).
[36] As to the final Litchfield factor, law enforcement had a substantial interest in promptly apprehending the murder suspects and securing evidence that might otherwise be destroyed. After balancing these three Litchfield factors, we conclude the totality of the circumstances indicates Barnes's arrest was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11. See Shotts, 925 N.E.2d at 727 (finding officers’ arrest and search of the defendant did not violate Article 1, Section 11 where officers had probable cause to believe he had committed crime in another state and was at large in Indiana).
C. Harmless Error Analysis
[37] Even if we were to find that Barnes's arrest violated either the state or federal constitution, any error in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of Barnes's arrest would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Such errors do not require reversal. Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 741 (Ind. 2019).
[38] The evidence Barnes challenges—primarily the memorial hoodie—was largely cumulative of other unchallenged evidence. The security video showed Barnes wearing the memorial hoodie before the shooting. Officers testified about observing Barnes wearing the hoodie under a Lakers jersey at the park. Even without the hoodie itself, the jury would have known about its existence and significance from the unchallenged video evidence and testimony.
[39] Additionally, substantial independent evidence supported Barnes's conviction: the surveillance video showing him at the gas station shortly before the shooting; his apparent observation of Hayes's arrival; his departure down the same alley the shooters later emerged from; the shooter wearing the same distinctive pants and shoes as Barnes had worn in the gas station; Barnes's association with Goines, who had been killed in the homicide victim's home; and perhaps most significantly, Barnes's jail phone call in which he stated, “[J]ust know I put the smile on [Goines's] face today.” Ex. 23(a).
[40] Given this evidence, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same verdict even without the evidence Barnes challenges. Accordingly, any error in admitting this evidence was harmless.
[41] Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Affirmed
Weissmann, Judge.
May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-2606
Decided: July 31, 2025
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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