IN RE: the Commitment of: B.C. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The trial court ordered a regular commitment for B.C. to the Logansport State Hospital. B.C. raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's conclusions that B.C. was dangerous and gravely disabled, and that a regular commitment at Logansport State Hospital was appropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] B.C. was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2017. In May 2024, B.C. was incarcerated at New Castle Correctional Facility (NCCF). While at NCCF, B.C. would go extended periods without eating or drinking. Once, in July 2024, B.C. became so dehydrated that he was sent to an outside hospital. NCCF staff subsequently moved B.C. to the mental health unit in August 2024. Thereafter, Psychiatrist Dr. William Mays took over B.C.’s care.

[3] Dr. Mays observed more symptoms of B.C.’s schizophrenia: B.C. experienced paranoia, had disorganized speech or periods of mutism, and suffered from disorientation. B.C.’s “prominent symptoms of disorientation” included not knowing who he was, that he was in prison, that he was about to be released, or what he would do upon release. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. NCCF Mental Health Lieutenant Kenneth Stephens repeatedly observed and received reports of B.C.’s aggressive behavior. B.C. would kick his cell door and threaten staff. He repeatedly threatened to assault staff, grab them through the cuff port, or throw items at them. At times, B.C.’s threatening behavior prevented staff from feeding B.C. through the cuff port. However, B.C. never assaulted any staff, in part because Lieutenant Stephens would not let B.C. out of his cell whenever he made verbal threats.

[4] Before moving to NCCF and while at a county jail, B.C. refused medication. After moving to NCCF, B.C. was prescribed Zyprexa to treat his symptoms. He responded well to treatment at first but later became noncompliant and his condition deteriorated. In November 2024, B.C.’s cell was searched and “a bunch” of Zyprexa pills were discovered. Id. at 9. Dr. Mays switched B.C.’s prescription to Haldol Decanoate, a long-acting injectable antipsychotic medication. B.C. received his first injection on December 9.

[5] Dr. Mays saw B.C. three times in December, including on December 31. He observed B.C. was still “significantly impaired” and showing symptoms of disorientation, confusion, and paranoia. Id. at 12. B.C.’s release date was scheduled for January 9, 2025, and Dr. Mays believed additional time was needed to “adjust [B.C.’s] medication ․ get him stabilized ․ and then release him.” Id. at 9. NCCF filed a petition for regular commitment on December 27. The trial court held a hearing on the petition on January 8, 2025.

[6] Dr. Mays testified and recommended a regular commitment to a state psychiatric hospital as the least restrictive option for B.C.’s care. Dr. Mays believed B.C. posed a danger to himself because B.C. would refuse to eat or drink, in one instance resulting in B.C.’s hospitalization. Dr. Mays believed B.C. posed a danger to others because he frequently threatened to assault staff. He concluded B.C. was gravely disabled because “prominent symptoms of disorientation” made B.C. unable to provide housing, food, or clothes for himself. Id. at 6.

[7] B.C. testified and, at the time, understood who he was and that his release from incarceration was the following day. He anticipated moving in with his father, despite not discussing this plan with his father, and believed he could find a job as a metal former. B.C. claimed he never threatened anyone and said his aggressive behavior was in response to NCCF denying him the opportunity to phone his family and plan for his release. The trial court asked B.C. if he agreed with his diagnosis—B.C. believed the diagnosis was incorrect. He also told the trial court he would be willing to take some medication if ordered to do so, but also claimed he had a “religious exemption” to certain medications, including Zyprexa. Id. at 22.

[8] The trial court found B.C. was gravely disabled and dangerous to himself and others. The court granted NCCF's petition and ordered B.C. committed to Logansport State Hospital for a period “expected to exceed ninety days.”¹ App. Vol. II p. 27. Logansport staff was ordered to submit a periodic report one year from January 21, 2025, the date of B.C.’s admission, after which the trial court would reevaluate its commitment order. B.C. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] “Civil commitment proceedings have two purposes: ‘to protect the public and to ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake.’ ” J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1264 (Ind. 2025) (quoting T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015)). “The liberty interest at stake in a civil commitment proceeding goes beyond a loss of one's physical freedom, and given the serious stigma and adverse social consequences that accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an involuntary civil commitment is subject to due process requirements.” T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)). “To satisfy the requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown by clear and convincing evidence[.]” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Appellate courts will affirm a civil commitment if, considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find [the necessary elements] proven by clear and convincing evidence.” J.W. v. Cmty. Fairbanks Behav. Health, 260 N.E.3d 946, 951 (Ind. 2025) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

[10] To obtain an involuntary commitment, NCCF was required to prove (1) B.C. was mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) commitment of B.C. was appropriate. Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e) (2007). NCCF sought a regular commitment, which a trial court may order for individuals “whose commitment is reasonably expected to require custody, care, or treatment in a facility for more than ninety (90) days.” Ind. Code § 12-26-7-1 (1992). B.C. does not contest that he is mentally ill but argues insufficient evidence was presented that (1) he was either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) his commitment to Logansport State Hospital was appropriate.

I. Dangerous or Gravely Disabled

[11] Indiana Code section 12-26-2-5(e)(1) is written in the disjunctive, thus, NCCF was only required to prove that B.C. was either dangerous or gravely disabled. In re Commitment of C.M., 191 N.E.3d 278, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Here, however, NCCF presented sufficient evidence that B.C. was dangerous and gravely disabled.

[12] First, dangerous is defined as “a condition in which an individual as a result of mental illness, presents a substantial risk that the individual will harm the individual or others.” Ind. Code § 12-7-2-53(a) (2023). In determining whether an individual is dangerous, “[a] trial court ․ is not required to wait until a physical act is visited upon an individual before determining that an individual poses a substantial risk of harm to others.” M.Z. v. Clarian Health Partners, 829 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[13] While B.C. did not assault anyone, he repeatedly threatened to assault staff, grab them through the cuff port, or throw items at them. B.C.’s threats led Lieutenant Stephens to not allow B.C. out of his cell whenever B.C. made verbal threats. And B.C. posed a danger to himself because he would forego eating and drinking for extended periods, once becoming so dehydrated that he required hospitalization. Moreover, although B.C. had recently started Haldol Decanoate, Dr. Mays feared B.C. may become noncompliant upon release and rapidly deteriorate, exacerbating B.C.’s aggressiveness and his habit of foregoing food and drink. See J.F., 256 N.E.3d at 1271 (finding the respondent's prior conduct and condition probative evidence as to how the respondent's condition would progress if she was not committed). NCCF presented sufficient evidence that B.C. was dangerous to himself and others.

[14] Still, B.C. argues NCCF failed to present evidence showing the “immediacy” of his dangerousness, relying on the fact that he started a new antipsychotic medication one month before the hearing. Appellant's Br. p. 9. In doing so, B.C. invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273.

[15] Second, gravely disabled is defined as:

a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual:

(1) is unable to provide for that individual's food, clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or

(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of that individual's judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual's inability to function independently.

Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96 (1992).

[16] B.C. argues that his refusal to medicate and denial of his diagnosis “standing alone” are insufficient to prove he is gravely disabled. Appellant's Br. p. 8. B.C.’s argument misrepresents the evidence presented—Dr. Mays testified that B.C.’s symptoms of disorientation worsened because of B.C.’s noncompliance and opined that B.C. would rapidly decompensate upon release. He also believed B.C. was unable to provide for his necessities—food, clothing, or housing—because B.C.’s “prominent disorientation” would cause him to not know his name, that he was incarcerated, or that his release was upcoming. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. And B.C. previously forewent food and water intake for so long that he required hospitalization for dehydration. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that B.C. was gravely disabled. Finally, B.C. claims he could have relied on his father to provide necessities. We again decline B.C.’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273.

II. Appropriateness of commitment

[17] A court may order that a person needing commitment should be placed “in an appropriate facility ․ [or] an outpatient therapy program[.]” Ind. Code § 12-26-7-5(a) (2018). “The determination of whether an involuntary commitment is appropriate is fact-sensitive.” R.P. v. Optional Behav. MHS, 26 N.E.3d 1032, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[18] B.C. argues his commitment at Logansport State Hospital is inappropriate because he was medicated, planned to stay with his father upon release, and intended to find work as a metal former. However, at the time of the hearing, B.C. had only received one injection of a new injectable antipsychotic medication. Dr. Mays believed additional time was needed to adjust B.C.’s medication, allowing B.C. to stabilize before his release. As a result, Dr. Mays recommended commitment to a state psychiatric hospital as the least restrictive option for B.C.’s treatment and feared B.C. would rapidly decompensate if he was released and became noncompliant. Additionally, B.C. had not yet spoken with his father about his plan to reside at his father's home. Moreover, B.C.’s argument again invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273.

[19] B.C.’s commitment was appropriate when B.C. lacked insight into his illness and his likely noncompliance with medication would exacerbate symptoms that endangered himself and others. See R.P., 26 N.E.3d at 1037 (holding commitment was appropriate where respondent lacked insight into his schizophrenia and the medical provider recommended commitment to improve his condition and minimize risk of harm to the respondent); see also In re Commitment of Heald, 785 N.E.2d 605, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding inpatient commitment was appropriate after “no evidence was presented that someone would monitor Heald's medication, delusions, mental illness, and care for and support her[ ]”).

[20] The trial court did not err in concluding B.C. was dangerous and gravely disabled and B.C.’s regular commitment to Logansport State Hospital is appropriate. We affirm.

affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   On appeal, B.C. claims the trial court committed him to Logansport State Hospital for “a period not expected to exceed 90 days[,]” and he has since completed his commitment. Appellant's Br. pp. 5, 7. However, the trial court ordered a regular commitment for B.C. expected to exceed ninety days, and Logansport State Hospital staff indicated B.C.’s release date was “undetermined” in a treatment plan submitted to the trial court. App. Vol. II p. 32. Thus, we address B.C.’s appeal on the merits.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.