DAVIDSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] William C. Davidson appeals following the trial court's denial of his petition requesting an evaluation and hearing on whether he should be released from his lifetime sex offender registration requirement. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Davidson was born in 1954. He molested his ten-year-old granddaughter in October 2001 by performing oral sex on her. He molested her again in December 2001 by having sexual intercourse with her. The State subsequently charged Davidson with two counts of Class A felony child molesting ¹ and two counts of Class B felony incest.² On May 16, 2002, Davidson and the State entered into a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided:

1. Defendant shall plead guilty to Count I Child Molest (A Felony).

2. Defendant shall pay a fine to be determined by the Court.

3. Defendant shall pay costs to be determined by the Court.

4. Defendant shall be incarcerated for twenty (20) years, no (0) years time suspended to probation, in Count I.

5. Defendant shall receive credit for any days served.

6. State moves to dismiss the remaining counts.

7. Defendant agrees to pay for any counseling received by the victim to date along with any counseling needed within the next 5 years.

8. Defendant agrees upon his release from incarceration to register as a sex offender with the appropriate state/county agency.

(App. Vol. 2 at 30.) The trial court accepted Davidson's plea agreement and sentenced him accordingly.

[3] Davidson was released from incarceration in 2012 and began registering as a sex offender upon his release. On August 2, 2024, Davidson filed a “Verified Petition to Appoint Psychologists or Psychiatrists to Determine Whether William Davidson is Likely to Commit Another Sex Offense[.]” (Id. at 93) (emphasis removed). In the petition, Davidson alleged that at the time he was sentenced, he was “a sex ‘offender’ and required to register with local law enforcement agencies and to disclose detailed personal information for ten years after release.” (Id. at 98.) He noted the General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 in 2007 to provide that an individual convicted of Class A felony child molesting is a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) by operation of law. Davidson alleged that his “classification as an SVP under the 2007 Amendment had the effect of converting his ten-year registration requirement into a lifetime-registration requirement.” (App. Vol. 2 at 98.) He asked the trial court, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(g), to appoint two psychologists or psychiatrists to evaluate him and hold an evidentiary hearing regarding whether he should no longer be considered a SVP. Davidson asserted that “[w]hen an offender presents a meritorious petition to be removed from the sex offender registry, [the trial court] should appoint two psychologists or psychiatrists to evaluate the offender to determine whether he is ‘likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense.’ ” (Id. at 99) (emphasis removed) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.5(a)).

[4] The State filed an objection to Davidson's petition and asked the trial court to dismiss Davidson's petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The State attached to its response copies of the charging information, the probable cause affidavit, and Davidson's plea agreement. The trial court dismissed Davidson's petition on August 26, 2024.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Davidson appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition. When the trial court rules on a motion to dismiss based on a paper record, we apply a de novo standard of review. IncreMedical, LLC v. Kennedy, 212 N.E.3d 220, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[6] Davidson argues the 2007 Amendment of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 “had the effect of extending his ten-year registration requirement to a presumptive lifetime registration requirement.” (Appellant's Br. at 10.) Thus, he continues, if the trial court removes his designation as a SVP, then he has fulfilled his sex offender registration obligation because he has registered for more than ten years. Therefore, Davidson's petition asks the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding whether he should no longer be considered a SVP.

[7] However, the law in effect at the time Davidson committed his offense imposed a lifetime registration requirement on him. See Smith v. State, 194 N.E.3d 118, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“To determine a sex offender's registration obligation, we start by looking to the law in place at the time of the offense.”). At the time of Davidson's offense, child molesting was one of the “sex and violent offenses” requiring registration. Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(a)(3) (2001). Indiana Code section 5-2-12-13(c) (2001) (enacted by P.L. 238-2001 eff. July 1, 2001) provided:

A sex and violent offender who is convicted of at least one (1) sex and violent offense that the sex and violent offender committed:

(1) when the person was at least eighteen (18) years of age; and

(2) against a victim who was less than twelve (12) years of age at the time of the crime;

is required to register for life.

Davidson was born in 1954 and was above the age of 18 when he molested his granddaughter in October and December of 2001. His granddaughter was only ten years old at that time. Therefore, he has a lifetime registration requirement. Because the ultimate relief Davidson seeks, removal from the sex offender registry, is not available to him, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of his petition. See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding offender required to register for life because statute in effect at time of his offense imposed a lifetime registration obligation).

Conclusion

[8] The law in effect at the time Davidson molested his ten-year-old granddaughter imposed a lifetime registration obligation on Davidson. Because the trial court had no authority to modify that obligation, it properly dismissed Davidson's petition. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (1998).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-3 (1994).

May, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.