HEYMAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Adam Heyman was convicted of Level 4 felony arson after setting his apartment on fire. On appeal, Heyman contends that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied his self-representation request, which was made on the morning his trial was scheduled to begin. Given that Heyman's self-representation request was untimely, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 22, 2023, Heyman was evicted, by court order, from his apartment at 9486 Old Oak Drive in Fishers.¹ After deciding that he would not contest the eviction, Heyman, who had smoked methamphetamine and “was high[,]” “started packing [his] stuff to move out.” Tr. Vol. III p. 124. At some point, Heyman used a torch lighter to ignite multiple fires in his apartment. After starting the fires, Heyman ran out of his apartment wearing only shorts and carrying the torch lighter and his methamphetamine pipe.

[3] Firefighters arrived at Heyman's apartment at approximately 8:15 p.m. After putting out the fire, the firefighters noticed “multiple fire origins, like multiple areas that had been on fire, separate from the actual main fire, which was in the closet area.” Tr. Vol. II p. 188. The firefighters found the fire to be suspicious based on multiple origin points and the fact that the smoke detectors had been removed. Heyman was detained a short time later after entering a nearby business wearing only shorts, acting erratically, and leaving the torch lighter on the counter.

[4] On November 6, 2023, the State charged Heyman with Level 4 felony arson and Level 6 felony criminal mischief. On the morning of trial, Heyman indicated that he wished to proceed pro se. Following a lengthy colloquy during which Heyman asserted that he had not been able to contact his counsel the week before trial to develop a defense strategy and the trial court alerted Heyman to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the trial court denied Heyman's request. During trial, the trial court allowed Heyman to proceed with a hybrid-like representation, by which defense counsel would question the witnesses as directed by Heyman. When defense counsel expressed disagreement with Heyman's desired line of questioning, the trial court instructed defense counsel to honor Heyman's directives.

[5] Heyman testified at trial that he had used a torch lighter to set his wall, couch, closet, and bed on fire. After the jury found Heyman guilty as charged, the trial court vacated the criminal-mischief conviction and sentenced him to a ten-year term, with eight years executed and two years suspended.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Heyman contends that he was improperly denied the right to represent himself under the United States and Indiana Constitutions.

Faretta v. California, [422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975)], held that the right of self-representation is implicit in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, § 13, of the Indiana Constitution also guarantees this right. A request to proceed pro se is a waiver of the right to counsel, and consequently, there are several requirements to invoking the right of self-representation successfully. A defendant's “request must be clear and unequivocal, and it must be [made] within a reasonable time prior to the first day of trial.” Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 64, 383 N.E.2d 309, 315 (1978); accord Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind. 1999). In addition, a defendant's choice to proceed pro se must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003); accord Sherwood, 717 N.E.2d at 134–35.

Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274, 279 (Ind. 2004). Furthermore,

[t]he trial court is uniquely situated to assess whether a defendant has waived the right to counsel. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). And when that court “has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information,” and then “reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendant's understanding of his rights and voluntariness,” an appellate court, after a careful review of the record, “will most likely uphold” the trial court's “decision to honor or deny the defendant's request to represent himself.” Id. (citation omitted).

Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 254–55 (Ind. 2021).

[7] While deeply rooted in our legal culture as a “fundamental” right, “the right to self-representation is not absolute.” Id. at 256. With regard to the timeliness of a self-representation request, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “the right of self-representation must be asserted within a reasonable time prior to the day on which the trial begins. Morning of trial requests are thus per se untimely.” Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 62, 383 N.E.2d 309, 314 (1978) (emphases added). In reaching this holding, the Court explained that

[n]one of the interests involved here, the right of self-representation, the right to counsel, or the interest in preserving an orderly criminal process, are furthered by the allowance of a last minute request such as was made in the present case. On the other hand, experience has shown that day of trial assertions of the self-representation right are likely to lead to a rushed procedure, increasing the chances that the case should be reversed because some vital interest of the defendant was not adequately protected.

Id., 383 N.E.2d at 314.

[W]e feel that it is unreasonable to expect that such a waiver can be established in a last minute, morning of trial assertion of the self-representation right․ We thus think that the defendant's right to counsel will be best respected if we require a pre-trial assertion of the self-representation right, so that it can be the subject of a pre-trial hearing and inquiry.

Id. at 63, 383 N.E.2d at 315. Requiring a waiver of the right to counsel be made prior to the first day of trial also facilitates the orderly administration of the courts because

[d]ay of trial assertions of the self-representation right, whether before or after empaneling of the jury, disrupt the time schedules of judges, counsel, and potential jurors, all who have been assembled for the occasion, and who can be assembled only at the expense of extra time and money. The counsel waiver inquiry on the day of trial may also disrupt the time schedules of other matters on the court's schedule, which have been planned around the present trial.

Id. at 63, 383 N.E.2d at 315. Having held that any self-representation request must be made prior to the first day of a scheduled trial, the Indiana Supreme Court further held that “[a]ny self-representation request made the day of trial or later may be summarily denied, for self-representation after this point is completely a matter of the trial court's discretion.” Id. at 64, 383 N.E.2d at 315.

[8] It is undisputed that Heyman made his self-representation request on the morning that his trial was scheduled to begin. In arguing that his rights were violated by the denial of his request, Heyman acknowledges that his “morning of trial request might be per se untimely,” but argues that the presumption of untimeliness “needs to be rebuttable in these circumstances.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. Heyman, however, does not develop this argument further or cite to any binding authority supporting it.²

[9] The record reveals that the trial court conducted a lengthy colloquy during which it informed Heyman of the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation. Heyman indicated that he understood the dangers but wished to proceed pro se. The trial court, in denying Heyman's request, indicated that based on the circumstances, it “would [be] a mistake to allow [Heyman] to represent [himself] in this matter.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65. The circumstances noted by the trial court included that Heyman's self-representation request was “late[,]” calling its untimeliness “problematic.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65. While the trial court considered a number of circumstances in denying Heyman's request, it clearly partially based its decision on the untimely nature of Heyman's request. Given the clear precedent of the Indiana Supreme Court that a self-representation request “must be asserted ․ prior to the day on which the trial begins” and that “[m]orning of trial requests are thus per se untimely[,]” Russell, 270 Ind. at 62, 383 N.E.2d at 314 (emphases added), we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion or violated Heyman's constitutional rights by denying his self-representation request.

[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The eviction order gave Heyman until noon on June 23, 2023, to vacate the premises.

2.   In both his opening and reply briefs, Heyman cites to the dissenting opinion in Wright in support of his argument. However, even if we assume that the dissenting opinion supports Heyman's argument, it is not binding precedent. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 129 Ind. App. 271, 275, 153 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958) (providing that because a dissenting opinion is not a majority view, it is not binding precedent).

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.