IN RE: R.A. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.A. (“Father”) and Sav.F. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's adjudication of their son, R.A. (“Child”) as a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Parents argue that: (1) the CHINS adjudication is clearly erroneous because the evidence does not support a finding that Parents caused Child's injuries; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Parents to engage in certain services and requirements listed in the dispositional order. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Parents raise several issues, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court clearly erred by adjudicating Child to be a CHINS.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Parents to engage in certain services and requirements listed in the dispositional order.

Facts

[3] Child, born in April 2024, is the biological child of Parents. Mother also has two young daughters, Ser.S. and Sal.S. (“Daughters”), from a previous relationship. Father and Mother took turns caring for Child at night. On Mother's nights, Mother would sleep in the bedroom with Child in a bassinet next to the bed. On Father's nights, Father would normally sleep in the living room with Child next to him in Child's bouncer, but Child occasionally slept on the couch with Father.

[4] On September 5, 2024, Child fell asleep between Father's legs on the couch. Father did not want to move Child because Child had been crying more often than normal that week. At approximately eight or nine in the morning, Mother was awoken by Child “crying very loud and out of the ordinary.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. She went into the living room and saw Father trying to give Child his pacifier, but Child continued to cry. Child started to “seem[ ] like he was fainting,” so Mother placed a cold towel on his neck. Id. at 27. Child, however, became “pale” and “started to stop breathing.” Id. Parents contacted 911, and Child was taken to the hospital. Child was diagnosed with subdural hemorrhages, which indicate “bleeding between the skull and the brain.” Id. at 36.

[5] The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child and Daughters from the home. On September 9, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS ¹ based upon Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (neglect); Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2(a) (serious endangerment); and Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2(b) (victim of offense). DCS also alleged that the rebuttable presumption that a child is a CHINS found in Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4 and Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4.5 applied. DCS alleged that Child's injuries, “without a viable explanation, [were] characteristic of abusive head trauma.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 25.

[6] On September 24, 2024, a pediatric child abuse fellow, Dr. Leah Garvin, evaluated Child. Dr. Garvin noted that Child was “macrocephalic,” meaning his head was large, and Child had “some low tone,” which together were “consistent either with head injury or just development.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. Dr. Garvin reviewed Child's hospital records and diagnosed Child with bleeding on and between both hemispheres of the brain, bleeding in the lumbar spine, and retinal hemorrhages behind the eyes that were “too numerous to count.” Id. at 37. These injuries were specific to “inflicted injury”; Dr. Garvin opined that Child's injuries were the result of “nonaccidental trauma,” specifically, rapid acceleration and deceleration forces. Id. at 38. Dr. Garvin had only seen such injuries caused by accident in “head crush injuries,” such as “falls from over [a] 10 meter height” or “motor vehicle collisions.” Id. at 42. Dr. Garvin believed Child's injuries occurred “within minutes to hours prior to the onset of symptoms.” Id. at 46.

[7] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on November 7, 2024, where Parents, Dr. Garvin, and family case manager (“FCM”) Regina Bishop testified. FCM Bishop recommended that Parent's engage in services because they “admitted to not practicing safe sleep” by allowing Child to sleep with them. Id. at 55. Concerned that Father had lost his job, FCM Bishop also recommended fatherhood engagement classes to help Father find employment.

[8] Parents claimed that Child had a large head since birth and had been crying more often since staying with Mother's father and stepmother several days prior to Child's hospitalization. Mother's stepmother “scrubbed all of the cradle cap” off Child's head without Mother's permission, and Parents believed this could have injured Child's head. Id. at 21. Parents also claimed hospital staff advised them that, although abstaining from sleeping with Child was “preferred,” Parents could still sleep with Child, especially if that was the only way to get Child to fall asleep. Id. at 73. Father testified that he was fired from his employment at Culver's due to the investigation into Child's injuries but that he was now working full-time at Steak ‘n Shake. Mother testified that she had a job interview scheduled for the day after the fact-finding hearing.

[9] Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. The trial court found:

1. [Child] is a Child in Need of Services pursuant to I.C. 31-34-1-1 and I.C. 31-34-1-2[.]

2. [Child's] physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. [Child] suffered an unexplained head injury that is indicative of trauma while in the custody of [Father] and [Mother]. Both parents have admitted to practicing co-sleeping in an unsafe manner.

3. [Child's] physical or mental health has been seriously endangered due to an injury by the act or omission of his parent, guardian, or custodian. DCS has shown under I.C. 31-34-12-4 that a rebuttable presumption has been met by showing that [Child] was injured while in the custody of his parent and that the injury is one that would not ordinarily be sustained except for the act or omission of a parent, guardian or custodian and that there is a reasonable probability that the injury was not accidental.

4. [Child] needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that is not being received and is not likely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. [Mother] and [Father] are in need of parenting classes to address safe sleeping practices and additional parenting education to address caring for young children.

5. The coercive intervention of the Court is necessary to ensure the safety and wellbeing of [Child].

* * * * *

Father's App. Vol. II p. 109.

[10] The trial court scheduled a dispositional hearing for December 6, 2024, where the trial court ordered that Child be returned to Parents. The trial court ordered Parents to, among other things, participate in DCS services, including therapy, case work, and programming; maintain employment and suitable housing; and create a protection plan to prevent abuse to Child. Although DCS presented no evidence regarding illegal substance use by Parents, the trial court also ordered Parents to not use or deal in illegal substances. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS. CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “ ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. R.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child. Servs., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020). Here, the trial court entered, sua sponte, findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting the CHINS petition. “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “ ‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We will reverse a CHINS adjudication only if it is clearly erroneous. R.L., 144 N.E.3d at 686.

[12] “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child” although “the acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[13] DCS must prove three elements for a trial court to adjudicate a child as a CHINS: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) one of eleven different statutory circumstances exist that would make the child a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he or she is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. Id. at 475.

[14] The trial court here found Child to be a CHINS under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 ² and -2 ³ and the Presumption Statute, Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4. The Presumption Statute provides:

A rebuttable presumption is raised that the child is a child in need of services because of an act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian if the state introduces competent evidence of probative value that:

(1) the child has been injured;

(2) at the time the child was injured, the parent, guardian, or custodian:

(A) had the care, custody, or control of the child; or

(B) had legal responsibility for the care, custody, or control of the child;

(3) the injury would not ordinarily be sustained except for the act or omission of a parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(4) there is a reasonable probability that the injury was not accidental.

[15] As this Court has explained:

The purpose of the Presumption Statute is clear. In cases where a child has injuries that suggest neglect or abuse, it shifts the burden to the party most likely to have knowledge of the cause of the injuries—the parent, guardian, or custodian—to produce evidence rebutting the presumption that the child is a CHINS.

Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. J.D., 77 N.E.3d 801, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “DCS need only produce some relevant and admissible evidence tending to establish the elements of the Presumption Statute in order to shift the burden of production to the parents or custodians.” Id. at 809.

A. The trial court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child to be a CHINS.

[16] We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child to be a CHINS under the Presumption Statute and we, therefore, need not address whether the CHINS adjudication was proper under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 and -2.

[17] DCS established a rebuttable presumption that Child was a CHINS based on the following: Child was sleeping between Father's legs on the couch—which DCS argued was an unsafe sleeping practice—before Child's injuries occurred. Child awoke crying, in pain, and struggling to breathe and was diagnosed with numerous hemorrhages throughout his brain, lumbar spine, and retinas. These injuries were specific to “inflicted injury” and “nonaccidental trauma” involving rapid acceleration and deceleration forces. Tr. Vol. II p. 38. According to Dr. Garvin, Child's injuries would have occurred minutes or hours before Child began experiencing symptoms. Under the Presumption Statute, this evidence was sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption that Child was a CHINS and to shift the burden to Parents to rebut the presumption.

[18] Parents argue that they did not cause Child's injuries. Parents claim that Child could have been injured while in the care of Mother's father and stepmother when Mother's stepmother scrubbed off Child's cradle cap. But this occurred several days before Child experienced the symptoms that led to his hospitalization, and Dr. Garvin testified that Child's injuries occurred minutes or hours before Child's symptoms began. We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that Parents did not rebut the presumption that Child was a CHINS.

[19] Parents also argue that the coercive intervention of the court is unnecessary. See Ind. Code §§ 31-34-1-1(2) and -2(b)(3) (requiring that the child need “care, treatment, or rehabilitation” that the child is “not receiving” and “is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court”). Under the Presumption Statute, however, “the rebuttable presumption that a child is a CHINS applies to all the statutory CHINS elements in chapter 1, including the ‘coercive intervention’ element.” In re K.Y., 145 N.E.3d 854, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. J.D., 77 N.E.3d 801, 809 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied), trans. denied. Because DCS established that Child was a CHINS under the Presumption Statute, DCS was not required to separately establish that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary.

[20] Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child to be a CHINS. See In re C.K., 70 N.E.3d 359, 372-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming CHINS adjudication under the Presumption Statute based on subdural hematomas and retinal hemorrhaging that child appeared to have suffered while in mother's care), trans. denied.

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Parents to engage in the services and requirements listed in the dispositional order.

[21] Parents next argue that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Parents to engage in the services and requirements listed in the dispositional order. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Following the CHINS adjudication, the trial court conducts a dispositional hearing to consider the alternatives for the child's care, treatment, placement, or rehabilitation; the participation of the parent, guardian or custodian; and the financial responsibility for the services provided. Ind. Code § 31-34-19-1. Following the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court issues a dispositional order that sets forth the plan of care, treatment, or rehabilitation necessary to address the child's needs. Indiana Code section 31-34-19-10 provides,

(a) The juvenile court shall accompany the court's dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning the following:

(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement.

(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the child.

(3) Efforts made, if the child is a child in need of services, to:

(A) prevent the child's removal from; or

(B) reunite the child with;

the child's parent, guardian, or custodian in accordance with federal law.

(4) Family services that were offered and provided to:

(A) a child in need of services; or

(B) the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; in accordance with federal law.

(5) The court's reasons for the disposition.

(b) The juvenile court may incorporate a finding or conclusion from a predispositional report as a written finding or conclusion upon the record in the court's dispositional decree.[4]

“Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate, the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstance[ ] that was revealed by the evidence.” A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257-58 (Ind. 2012).

[22] Father challenges the dispositional order's requirements that he maintain employment and suitable housing, “provide food,” “ensure that no one abuses” Child, and “avoid controlled substances and avoid dealing drugs[.]” Father's Br. p. 15.

[23] Because Father was the only income earner prior to the fact-finding hearing, and he lost his job at Culver's during the investigation into Child's injuries, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring that Father maintain employment and suitable housing and provide food for Child. As for the requirement related to abuse, the dispositional order requires Father to “[a]ssist in the formulation and implementation of a protection plan which protects the child from abuse or neglect from any person.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 17. This requirement is not an abuse of discretion given Dr. Garvin's opinion that Child's injuries were consistent with “inflicted injury.” Tr. Vol. II p. 38. Lastly, the dispositional order requires that Father not “possess” or “use, consume, manufacture, trade, distribute or sell any illegal controlled substances.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 17. The inclusion of this requirement was not an abuse of discretion because it does no more than require Father to follow the law by avoiding involvement with illegal substances.⁵

[24] Parents also challenge the requirement that they engage in DCS services, including “home-based therapy, home-based casework, and parenting classes.”⁶ Mother's Br. p. 14. FCM Bishop explained during the fact-finding hearing that DCS recommended Parents engage in services because they did not practice safe sleeping strategies with Child. Child's symptoms arose after Parents allowed Child to sleep between Father's legs on the couch, and Parents did not indicate that they planned to change their sleeping practices with Child. In light of the connection between Parents’ sleeping practices and Child's injuries, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Parents to engage in services, including those related to parenting skills such as co-sleeping with Child.

Conclusion

[25] The trial court's CHINS adjudication is not clearly erroneous, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Parents to engage in the services and requirements in the dispositional order.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS also alleged that Daughters were CHINS. During the fact-finding hearing, the trial court ordered the CHINS petitions regarding Daughters to be dismissed.

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 provides:A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:(A) the child is not receiving; and(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

3.   Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2 provides, in relevant part:(a) A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:(1) the child's physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:(A) the child is not receiving; and(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.(b) A child is a child in need of services if, before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:(1) the child is a victim of:(A) an offense under IC 35-42-1-2.5 [assisting suicide];(B) an offense under IC 35-42-2-1 [battery];(C) an offense under IC 35-42-2-1.3 [provocation of battery];(D) an offense under IC 35-42-2-1.5 [aggravated battery];(E) an offense under IC 35-42-2-9 [strangulation];(F) an offense under IC 35-42-2-10 [female genital mutilation]; or(G) an offense under IC 35-46-1-4 [neglect of a dependent];(2) the offense described in subdivision (1) was committed by the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child; and(3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:(A) the child is not receiving; and(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.* * * * *

4.   We note that Indiana Code Section 31-34-19-10 has since been amended to add subsection (a)(6), which reads, “Whether the child is a dual status child under IC 31-41.” This amendment does not affect our decision.

5.   Indeed, another requirement in the dispositional order is that Father “[o]bey the law,” Father's App. Vol. II p. 17, and Father does not challenge this requirement.

6.   Mother does not specifically challenge any other requirement under the dispositional order, and any such argument is therefore waived. See Ind. R. App. P. 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that an appellant's arguments “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”).

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.