IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.A.S. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.S. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights to his son, J.A.S. (“Son”). On appeal, Father claims that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons for Son's placement outside Father's home would not be remedied. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Father presents one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons for Son's placement outside Father's home would not be remedied.

Facts

[3] Son was born in September 2020 to M.K.F. (“Mother”) and Father. In March 2023, Mother and Father were the subject of an informal adjustment action with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) involving Son. As part of this informal adjustment, Father was required to complete drug treatment through Centerstone and complete home-based case work. Father, however, failed to complete either of these requirements and, during the informal adjustment, DCS had difficulty locating Father, who did not maintain a consistent address or telephone number.

[4] On June 7, 2023, Mother was arrested for neglect of a dependent after she left Son unattended in her car while she went shopping inside a mall. DCS was unable to locate Father at that time. On June 8, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that Son was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) based on Mother's history of neglect and abuse, Mother's mental illness, a history of domestic violence between Mother and Father, the existence of a protection order that prevented Father from having contact with Mother or Son, and Father's inability to provide for Son.

[5] DCS located Father on June 27, 2023, at which time Father was incarcerated. Due to Father's incarceration, lack of stable housing, and the protection order, DCS could not place Son in Father's care. Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Renee Phillips asked Father to take a drug screen to demonstrate his sobriety. Father refused. Father remained in contact with FCM Phillips for only a short time after he was released from incarceration, after which point he “disappeared[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 50.

[6] On June 28, 2023, Mother admitted that Son was a CHINS based on her untreated mental illness, the need for parenting education, the protection order, and domestic violence between Mother and Father. An initial hearing for Father was set for August 14, 2023, but Father failed to appear at the hearing. On August 18, 2023, the trial court found Son to be a CHINS based on Mother's admissions. Father appeared for an initial hearing held on September 6, 2023, and, on October 6, 2023, Father admitted that Son was a CHINS based on Father's need for assistance in finding appropriate housing, reliable transportation, and sufficient income. Father also admitted that he would benefit from parenting education and domestic violence services.

[7] A dispositional hearing was held on October 29, 2023, at which Father failed to appear. After the hearing, the trial court entered a dispositional order that required Father to, among other things: (1) maintain contact with the FCM, (2) maintain appropriate housing, (3) find a stable and legal source of income, (4) complete a substance abuse assessment and participate in all recommended substance abuse services, (5) abstain from the use of illegal drugs; (6) submit to random drug screening, (7) attend all visitations with Son, and (8) participate in case-management services. Father appeared for a December 4, 2023 review hearing but not the review hearing held on June 4, 2024.

[8] On June 6, 2024, Carol Childress, an intake therapist at Centerstone, completed a substance abuse assessment of Father. During the assessment, Father disclosed that he had “multi-substance dependence.” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. Father reported that his drug of choice was cocaine, which he had been using since he was eighteen years old. He claimed to have been clean from cocaine for the past three months, but he still experienced “cravings.” Id. To counter these cravings, Father used methamphetamine, which he had used only six days before the assessment. Father also reported recent use of marijuana, which he had used since he was twelve years old. Childress recommended Father participate in addiction treatment at Centerstone. DCS referred Father to such addiction treatment services, but he failed to complete them. Childress also tested Father for drug use, and he tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, and THC—the active compound in marijuana.

[9] Throughout the CHINS case, Father repeatedly failed to submit drug screens; other times, he would agree to submit to a screen but then failed to appear for the screening. When Father did submit to drug screening, he told FCM Phillips that he would not test positive, but of the five drug screens Father submitted, all five tested positive for drug use, including methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, and THC.¹ Father later admitted that he was addicted, and his addiction was so severe as to cause malnourishment that damaged his cardiovascular system. Father stated that he had been through drug rehabilitation several times in the past, but it was “not for [him].” Id. at 76.

[10] DCS also referred Father to individual therapy. Such therapy required Father to first attend three sessions with a skills or recovery coach. Because Father never engaged in these services, he never participated in individual therapy. DCS also referred Father to domestic violence services. Father, however, never contacted the service provider and did not complete such services. Father claimed that he was confused about the need for such services because he believed that the incident that resulted in the protection order occurred before Son's birth.² The incident, however, occurred approximately one year after Son's birth.

[11] Between the filing of the CHINS petition in June 2023 and December 2024, Father lived in at least five locations. Father told DCS that he was paying rent in some locations but, at other times, said he was living with friends or sleeping “couch to couch.” Id. at 50-51. Father later claimed that he had lived with his mother for the past six years, but he had previously told FCM Phillips that he had nothing to do with his mother. He testified that he worked at a fast-food restaurant and seasonally for a tree service and earned approximately $60,000 in cash that year but also that he had little money.

[12] Father's visitation with Son was arranged through a service provider. Initially, Father attended five or six visits, but then he stopped attending and did not see Son from July through September of 2023 or July through December of 2024. In 2024, Father visited Son “maybe” ten times. Id. at 58. Father explained that he stopped attending visitations because he went “off the grid” to get his “head clear.” Id. at 77; Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. Father stated that he was “[p]robably” using drugs during the periods in which he failed to visit Son. Tr. Vol. II p. 88.

[13] On September 10, 2024, DCS filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to Son.³ ,  ⁴ At the evidentiary hearing on December 3, 2024, FCM Phillips testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Son's best interest. Court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Mackenzie Dunckel testified that Father had been absent from Son's life throughout most of the CHINS case and also believed that termination of Father's parental rights was in Son's best interest. CASA Dunckel also testified that Son was loved by and bonded with his current pre-adoptive foster parents. Father testified that he had completed an inpatient recovery program, but he did not present any evidence to corroborate his claim. Father admitted that he relapsed after “rehab,” id. at 86, but he also claimed to have been sober for three months prior to the hearing. Father also denied any domestic violence between him and Mother. Father left the courtroom during a recess after his testimony, and his attorney was unable to locate him.

[14] On February 26, 2025, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon in which it terminated Father's parental rights to Son. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[15] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of their child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). When determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights, we recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[16] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).⁵ Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including “[t]hat there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)).

[17] If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c).⁶ Here, the trial court entered such findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

II. The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the reason for Son's placement outside Father's home would not be remedied.

[18] On appeal, Father challenges only the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).⁷ “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In the first step of this analysis, it is not just the reasons for the initial removal of the child that may be considered, but also the reasons that resulted in the continued placement outside the home. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)), trans. denied.

[19] In analyzing the second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[20] Here, the reasons for Son's placement outside of Father's home were that DCS was unable to locate Father, Father had a history of drug abuse and domestic violence, and a protection order was in place that prohibited Father from having contact with Son.

[21] During the CHINS case, Father stopped visiting Son for long periods of time during which he was using illicit drugs; his substance abuse evaluation revealed that he was addicted to multiple substances; he never engaged in the drug treatment services he was referred to; and he missed numerous drug screenings and tested positive for drugs when he did submit to screens. A child's exposure to illegal drug use poses an actual and appreciable danger to the child. In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing White v. State, 547 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind. 1989)). Given Father's continued use of illicit drugs and his failure to successfully complete the services offered to address his addiction,⁸ the trial court could reasonably conclude that there was a reasonable probability that Father's drug addiction and drug use would not be remedied.

[22] Father also claims that he was not referred to any domestic violence services and that he had not engaged in any domestic violence. Father, however, admitted in the CHINS proceedings that he “would benefit from domestic violence services,” Ex. Vol. p. 23, which he would not need if he had not engaged in any domestic violence. Father was referred to domestic violence services through the PEACE program, but he never contacted this program. Moreover, Father was the subject of a protection order that prevented him from having contact with Mother and Son, and this order was based on Father having committed family or domestic violence against Mother.

[23] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons for Son's placement outside of Father's home would not be remedied. Father's arguments to the contrary are merely a request that we credit his testimony and reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons for Son's placement outside of Father's care would not be remedied. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On September 6, 2023, Father tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, and THC; on June 6, 2024, Father twice tested positive for the same substances; on March 4, 2024, Father tested positive only for THC; and on October 17, 2024, Father again tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, and THC.

2.   According to Father, the incident that led to the issuance of the protection order occurred when he had been drinking alcohol with a friend, and Mother threw something at Father. The object broke a window in Father's car, which prompted Father to break all of the windows in his car.

3.   On September 25, 2024, the trial court issued an order for Father to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the court's orders in the CHINS case. An initial hearing on the contempt matter was held on October 1, 2024, at which Father again failed to appear. The trial court continued the hearing, and no further action had been taken on the contempt issue at the time of the evidentiary hearing in the termination case.

4.   Mother was dismissed from the termination case due to lack of proper service, but her parental rights to Son were eventually terminated in Cause No. 89D03-2411-JT-60, and an appeal has been filed in that case under Case No. 25A-JT-1477.

5.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in December 2024, under the new version of the statute.

6.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

7.   Father makes no argument that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a satisfactory plan for Son's care and treatment or that the termination of the parent-child relationship was in Son's best interest.

8.   Father testified that he completed an inpatient drug treatment program, but the trial court was not required to credit this testimony; nor was the trial court required to credit Father's testimony that he was addressing his addiction by participating in the sport of boxing. And Father's claim to have been clean for three months prior to the evidentiary hearing is laudable if true. But given Father's history of relapse, the trial court was not required to conclude that Father's substance abuse issues had been successfully treated.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.