CASTLEMAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Anthony Joel Castleman appeals from the trial court's sentencing order, which was imposed after his conviction of murder and an habitual offender status determination. Concluding that there is no error to correct, we affirm.

Issues

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found as an aggravating circumstance that his sperm was found inside the vaginal cavity of his grandmother's body.

II. Whether the imposition of the maximum sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender when Castleman's sperm was found inside his grandmother's vaginal cavity, he stabbed her thirty-six times, and he then dumped her body behind a shed and he had prior criminal history.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Castleman was unemployed and lived with his grandmother Bernice Eubank. In addition to housing, Eubank provided him with money and food.

[3] On November 10, 2023, Castleman and Eubank visited Eubank's daughter and Castleman's mother, Tiffanee Cole. While they visited, Cole learned that Eubank and Castleman planned to travel to Fort Wayne the next day so Eubank could purchase a truck for him. Cole did not hear from her mother the next day.

[4] On November 12, Cole learned that her mother's car had been abandoned in front of David Watson's house. Watson was Castleman's cousin. Cole tried to call her mother many times but could not reach her. Next, she drove to her mother's home at around 10:00 a.m. and observed that her car was not there. When she went into her mother's home via an unlocked door, everything was “a big old mess,” and the living room carpet had been removed. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 156. She continued to call her mother's phone number but could not reach her.

[5] Cole left and then contacted her aunts who drove around town looking for Eubank. Eventually the aunts gathered at Eubank's house. By that time, the door to her house was locked. When they moved to the back of the house, they saw a shirt, a movie, a music album, and a family picture on the ground. The family picture had blood on it. They discovered Eubank's purse dumped on the ground, along with her bank card, Medicare card, and medications.

[6] Eubank's sisters then walked to a shed on the property. There they found a pile of debris and a carpet covered in blood. In the pile of debris was a broken urn that contained the ashes of Eubank's recently deceased son. There also was a shoe box with blood in it. They did not move any of the items or disturb the carpet because they realized it could be a crime scene. Eubank's sisters called Cole, who returned to her mother's house and called the police.

[7] Officers who arrived at the scene discovered Eubank's body underneath the pile of debris behind the shed. She was naked from the waist down and had been stabbed thirty-six times. Of those thirty-six stab wounds, thirteen were to her head and neck, and nineteen were to her torso. Her airway, lung, aorta, liver, bowel, stomach, pancreas, abdominal wall, and jugular vein had been pierced. Her eyeball had hemorrhaged, and a vertebrae had fractured. The inside of her home smelled like bleach, the carpet was missing, and there was a blood stain on the subfloor in front of the fireplace.

[8] During the course of their investigation, police officers learned that on the day Castleman and Eubank had planned to travel to Fort Wayne, Castleman traveled to Michigan and spent Eubank's money on marijuana. He then arrived at Watson's home on November 11, 2023, driving Eubank's SUV. Watson said that Castleman asked for some bleach, and threw away a cell phone he brought with him. The cell phone belonged to Eubank.

[9] Castleman also traveled with Watson to Ohio, where they returned some belongings to their cousin, Michael Chick. Castleman did not return home with Watson. During his conversation with Chick, he asked what Chick would do if he had hurt somebody he cared about, and what he would do if he were in trouble. Chick responded that he would flee if he had done something bad to somebody. Castleman asked Chick to purchase a bus ticket for him, and Chick bought him a ticket to Kentucky.

[10] Police serving a warrant for Castleman's arrest found him in Georgia. While in jail, Castleman asked another inmate if that inmate's gang-member nephew could kill Castleman's cousin. The State charged Castleman with Eubank's murder and alleged that he was an habitual offender.

[11] A DNA analyst testified at Castleman's trial. The analyst tested swabs from Eubank's internal and external genitals, lower back, vaginal scar tissue, and buttocks. There was “very strong support” for the inclusion of Castleman's sperm DNA on all of the swabs. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 14-15, 17-18, 20-22. The analyst explained that in areas where one would expect seminal material to be found, a “differential extraction” of the DNA is performed to create a sperm fraction and a non-sperm fraction of the DNA. Id. at 46. Sperm cells are “very durable” and require a “specific chemical to break up the sperm cell” when looking for DNA. Id. at 15. On the sperm fraction, there is a “quantitation step” where a calculation is performed that indicates the possible presence of sperm cells. Id. These calculations are a “presumptive test” for the presence of sperm cells, and confirmation of the presence of seminal material can only be done with visual observation of the cells by looking at them under a microscope. Id. at 47.

[12] A jury found Castleman guilty of Eubank's murder and also found that he was an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Castleman to the maximum sentence of sixty-five years for Eubank's murder enhanced by twenty years for being an habitual offender.

[13] The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) that the harm to Eubank was greater than necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense; (2) that Castleman has both a criminal and juvenile history; (3) that Eubank was at least sixty-five years old; (4) that Castleman recently violated the terms of his probation and parole; (5) that Castleman's sperm was found inside Eubank's vaginal cavity; (6) that Castleman discarded Eubank's body under a pile of garbage; (7) that he stole Eubank's money and car to purchase marijuana in Michigan after killing her; and (8) that he fled. The court said,

You slaughtered your own grandmother ․ You slashed the face of your grandmother who provided for you. Defensive slash wounds were seen on her hands ․ [Y]our conduct is completely and utterly void of concern or regard for a fellow human being, let alone a person you claim to love.

Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 155-56. The court further noted,

And what an immensely personal and horrific way to murder anyone, to be close enough to cut someone 36 times and to witness the pain and horror that you put that person through.

Id. at 156. The trial court found that “[t]his case is the worst of the worst.” Id. at 157.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion—Aggravating Circumstance

[14] Castleman argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding as an aggravating circumstance that his sperm was found inside his grandmother's vaginal cavity.

[15] “A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) fails ‘to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]’ (2) enters ‘a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,’ (3) enters a sentencing statement that ‘omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,’ or (4) considers reasons that ‘are improper as a matter of law.’ ” Gellenback v. State, 918 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Ind. Ct App. 2009) (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). “If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing ‘if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.’ ” Id. (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). “[T]he relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 712.

[16] Castleman argues that the court's finding that the presence of his sperm inside Eubank's vaginal cavity as an “exceedingly aggravating” circumstance was improper because it was not supported by the evidence. Appellant's Br. p. 8; Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 155-56 (court's finding). He claims that because the DNA analyst's conclusions were based on testing that “was presumptive in nature, and that no confirmatory testing had been done to determine whether in fact the cells in the ‘sperm fraction’ of the samples were actual sperm cells[,]” “they could have been” Castleman's sperm cells, “or they may not have been.” Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[17] The testimony revealed that for sperm fraction of the internal genital, external genital, bilateral thigh, buttocks, vaginal scar tissue, vaginal cervical, and speculum swabs, the “DNA profile is at least one trillion times more likely if it originated from Bernice Eubank and Anthony Castleman, than if it originated from Bernice Eubank and an unknown, unrelated individual.” Tr. Vol. V, pp. 15-16 (vaginal cervical), 17-18 (internal genital), 20 (external genital), 22 (vaginal scar tissue), 22 (speculum), 23 (bilateral inner thigh), 24 (buttocks). The statistical analysis provided very strong support for the proposition that Anthony Castleman was included.

[18] When considering this specific factor, the trial court said,

[Y]ou either inserted your sperm into her vaginal cavity while she was still alive, while she was still able to know what you were doing to her, or after brutally murdering your grandmother you inserted your sperm into her vaginal cavity of her lifeless body, as if slicing her body 36 times was not enough. Either way, your conduct is completely and utterly void of concern or regard for a fellow human being, let alone a person you claim to love. The Court finds these facts exceedingly aggravating.

Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 155-56. The evidence supports the fact that at a minimum Castleman's DNA was found in his grandmother's vaginal area, a place where it ought not have been found. And the presumptive sperm fraction DNA evidence, indicating that the sperm fraction was at least one trillion times more likely to have originated from Castleman, was not rebutted. Thus, the presumption of the presence of sperm stands. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[19] Nevertheless, the other unchallenged aggravating factors support Castleman's sentence, which we discuss in more detail below. Thus, even if the court had abused its discretion, which we conclude it did not, the existence of these other unchallenged aggravating factors makes us “confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not found the improper aggravator.” Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Again, we find no abuse of discretion in the first instance in the trial court's finding of this aggravating circumstance.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[20] The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[21] We begin our analysis of the nature of the offense by looking to the advisory sentence selected by the legislature as the appropriate sentence for the committed crime. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 563-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The sentencing range for murder is between forty-five and sixty-five years with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2015). The sentencing range for the habitual offender enhancement in this situation is between eight and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2023). The court sentenced Castleman to the maximum sentence for murder, sixty five years, and the maximum sentence for his habitual offender enhancement, twenty years, for an aggregate sentence of eighty-five years.

[22] “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant's participation therein.” Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d 531, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Without repeating the facts set out in great detail above, and acknowledging Castleman's concession that “the nature of the offense was disturbing[,]” we turn to Castleman's argument concerning his character. Appellant's Br. p. 13.

[23] “In evaluating a defendant's character, we engage in a broad consideration of his or her qualities.” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “A defendant's life and conduct are illustrative of character.” Id. “When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Castleman had three prior felony convictions, ten prior misdemeanor convictions, and was the subject of at least four juvenile delinquency proceedings. “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Castleman's criminal history is not minor and reflects poorly on his character.

[24] Yet, Castleman offers that “[m]ental illness has played a significant role in [his] life and probably in the commission of this offense.” Appellant's Br. p. 13 (emphasis added). He asserts that his mother believed that he had a mental illness, but he had not submitted to an evaluation to be diagnosed. Id.

[25] There are a few points we would like to make here. There are several considerations that bear on the weight, if any, that should be given to mental illness in sentencing. These factors include: (1) the extent of the defendant's inability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime. Biehl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. In the present case, Castleman argues on appeal that his mental illness probably had a significant role in the commission of this offense. But he does not connect his mental illness with the commission of his crime.

[26] Second, Castleman's mother's belief that he had a mental illness, does not equate to a diagnosis that he suffers from mental illness. His mother conceded that he had not submitted to an evaluation to be diagnosed. In that case, Castleman has mental health issues he has failed to address. Indeed, Castleman's sentencing memorandum reflects that he personally did not assert that he had any mental health issues or mental illness. Appellant's App. Conf. Vol. 3, p. 216. And in that same memorandum, Castleman's mother is credited with knowledge that he refused to acknowledge any mental disease or defect. Id.

[27] In any event, Castleman's unrecognized, undiagnosed, and untreated mental health issues do not constitute “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” as to paint his character in a positive light. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Castleman has not met his burden of persuading us that his sentence is in need of revision in light of the nature of the offense or his character.

Conclusion

[28] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[29] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.