C.F., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.F. appeals his delinquency adjudications for Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm ¹ and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana.² C.F. challenges the admission of evidence from a traffic stop, claiming the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.³ We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Not long after midnight on February 11, 2024, Officer Caleb Bray (“Officer Bray”) of the Lafayette Police Department (“LPD”) was in his marked patrol car in the parking lot of a Village Pantry when he observed a black sedan traveling eastbound toward the intersection of 18th Street and Brady Lane. There was a red light, and the sedan stopped in the lane to proceed eastbound, which was in the direction Officer Bray was parked. The sedan then activated its turn signal, crossed a solid white line, and merged into a turn lane to turn northbound at the light. After changing lanes, the sedan was positioned over the front white line at the intersection. The sedan then turned northbound onto 18th Street. Officer Bray waited until traffic cleared, then turned onto 18th Street to begin following the sedan. After Officer Bray turned onto 18th Street, he momentarily lost sight of the sedan. He then turned onto nearby Eastway Street. At the intersection of Eastway Street and Mojave Drive—which was in a residential area—Officer Bray spotted the sedan traveling away from him on Mojave Drive. Officer Bray followed the sedan, which turned onto Manitou Drive and pulled over in front of a house. Officer Bray passed the sedan and ran its license plate to determine whether the vehicle belonged to someone in the neighborhood, “trying to come up ․ with an explanation as to why [the vehicle] was pulling to the side of the road right there.” Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 14. At that point, Officer Bray was unable to see into the sedan, such that he was unable to discern the number of occupants in the vehicle or personally observe any occupant. He suspected the driver “chang[ed] its direction of travel” upon “seeing a [marked] police car” at the stoplight, and “pulled to the curb ․ in front of a house” to “evade being pulled over by a police officer,” which Officer Bray had witnessed “several times” in his police career. Id. Officer Bray discovered the vehicle was not registered to an address in the neighborhood.

[3] As Officer Bray began to go around a curve on Manitou Drive, he turned off the lights in his patrol vehicle and watched the sedan through his rearview mirror. The sedan executed a three-point turn in the road and began driving back in the direction it came from, turning south onto Mojave Drive. Officer Bray turned around and followed the sedan for a short time. The sedan turned onto Crowfoot Drive and pulled over in front of a home on Chickasaw Lane. Officer Bray then initiated a traffic stop. At that point, Officer Bray remained unable to observe the sedan's occupants. Because of the unusual driving behavior he observed, Officer Bray called for an additional officer to provide backup before he exited his patrol vehicle to approach the driver of the sedan.

[4] Officer Bray approached the sedan, which had two occupants. C.F., a black teenager, was the driver. Officer Bray recalled initiating a conversation with C.F. by telling him “the vehicle did not check to this neighborhood[.]” Supp. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Officer Bray asked “where he was headed” and why he was driving the way he was driving. C.F. said he was meeting a friend and “was confused and lost in the neighborhood,” which is why he pulled over in front of a different house. Id. at 17. C.F., who did not have a driver's license with him, provided his name and information. LPD Officer Cody Fultz (“Officer Fultz”) arrived around the time Officer Bray was walking back to his patrol vehicle to run C.F.’s information. Officer Fultz spoke with Officer Bray, approached the sedan, and recognized C.F. from coaching track at a local high school. While standing at the driver's window, Officer Fultz detected what he recognized from his training and experience to be the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the sedan. Officer Fultz informed Officer Bray of his observation. At that point, C.F. and his passenger were removed from the sedan. They stood with Officer Fultz while Officer Bray searched the sedan. Behind the flap to the sedan's gas compartment, Officer Bray found a plastic bag containing four to five grams of marijuana. Officer Bray's search of the trunk revealed a firearm covered by a black cloth. The firearm was next to a backpack, inside of which was a basketball player card that bore C.F.’s photograph and name.

[5] On February 20, 2024, the State obtained permission to file a delinquency petition alleging C.F. committed Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. C.F. moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop. The juvenile court held a hearing, where C.F. argued that “what are you doing in this neighborhood” was “not a valid reason to stop a motor vehicle.” Id. at 44. C.F. disputed that “anything described [in the testimony] constitute[ed] an ordinance violation or an infraction,” pointing out that “tickets were never written[.]” Id. at 45. C.F. also referred to “the length of time between seeing an[y] infraction and when [C.F.] was finally stopped.” Id. The State argued C.F.’s presence in the neighborhood was not the basis for the stop. The State referred to Officer Bray's “testimony ․ that there was a traffic infraction observed at that [stoplight] intersection,” where C.F. “[c]ross[ed] over that white line.” Id. at 48. The State argued C.F. violated Indiana Code section 9-21-8-21, which governs turning at intersections, and Officer Bray “did not need to write an infraction ticket” and “had reasonable suspicion to stop th[e] [sedan] when he saw it cross that white line.” Id. The State also argued that C.F. violated Indiana Code section 9-21-8-22 when he a made a three-point turn too close to a curve on Manitou Drive. The juvenile court took the matter under advisement and denied the motion to suppress on May 23, 2024. In its order, the court concluded “the traffic stop/search was supported by reasonable suspicion and with probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances,” referring to evidence that C.F. committed at least one infraction in front of Officer Bray. App. Vol. 2. p. 149.

[6] The matter progressed to a fact-finding hearing in June 2024, where C.F. objected to evidence obtained from the traffic stop and renewed arguments from the hearing on the motion to suppress. The court overruled the objection and ultimately determined C.F. committed both alleged delinquent acts. Following a dispositional hearing on July 22, 2024, the juvenile court placed C.F. on supervised probation and ordered him to complete the Handgun Intervention Program and the Teen Intervene Program. At a subsequent review hearing, there was evidence C.F. completed the Handgun Intervention Program. The juvenile court then eliminated the requirement to complete the Teen Intervene Program and successfully released C.F. from probation. C.F. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, C.F. argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop. However, because C.F. appeals following a completed fact-finding hearing, the issue is properly framed as whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence. J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. We do not reweigh evidence and generally view conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the ruling. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). “But when a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is based ‘on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.’ ” Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017)). Along these lines, “determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are reviewed de novo.” J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 228. Moreover, where—as here—there was foundational evidence presented on a motion to suppress, in evaluating the admissibility of evidence, it is proper to consider not only (1) evidence from a fact-finding hearing, but also (2) “evidence from the motion to suppress hearing” when it “is not in direct conflict with the trial testimony.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 426–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[8] The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “To encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment, [any] evidence seized in violation [thereof] must be excluded at trial unless an exception to this ‘exclusionary rule’ applies.” Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. 2010) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136–38 (2009)). A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ind. 2019). For a traffic stop to be reasonable, the stop must be supported by at least reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014). A police officer has reasonable suspicion when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer, together with reasonable inferences arising from those facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. K.W. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 505, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The reasonable suspicion inquiry is objective rather than subjective, ultimately turning on whether facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the seizure was appropriate. Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1259.

[9] In this case, C.F. does not dispute that Officer Bray saw him commit a traffic infraction. It is well-established that a traffic stop is constitutional when law enforcement has observed a violation of Indiana's traffic laws. E.g., State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006). Indeed, the officer need only “be able to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for believing a traffic violation occurred.” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1259. Here, the evidence indicated—and C.F. does not dispute—that Officer Bray saw C.F. drive across a solid white line when merging into the turn lane. This conduct was contrary to Indiana Code section 9-21-8-21(b), which requires drivers to maneuver their vehicles at intersections “as directed and required by the markers, buttons, or signs” placed “within or adjacent to [the] intersections.” Based on Officer Bray's observation of a traffic violation—and regardless of other observations in the short period between that violation and the ensuing stop—a person of reasonable caution would be warranted in believing that a traffic violation had occurred. Therefore, Officer Bray's observations provided sufficient justification under the Fourth Amendment to conduct the traffic stop.

[10] C.F.’s appellate challenge centers on Officer Bray's statement that the vehicle “did not check to this neighborhood,” Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 25, which C.F. contends indicates the stop was merely pretextual and based on improper motives. Specifically, C.F.—a black teenager—argues that he “was stopped for being in the wrong neighborhood” and cites several cases for the proposition that “the color of one's skin, a neighborhood, time of night[,] and turning away to avoid the police are not sufficient grounds for a stop.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. C.F. claims that Officer Bray's statement “demonstrated the illegal basis for the stop by claiming [C.F.] did not fit in[ ]to the neighborhood, not a word about driving conduct.” Id. Notably, however, Officer Bray testified that, before conducting the traffic stop, he was unable to see into the sedan and, therefore, unable to identify the number of occupants in the sedan or any occupant's race or sex. Furthermore, Officer Bray explained that his decisions to run the license plate and mention the neighborhood to C.F. were aimed to understand why C.F. might have parked in front of a house—conduct Officer Bray recognized as used to evade officers. See Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 14, 24–25, 31–32. Officer Bray testified he regularly asks drivers where they are going to provide directions or to learn more about the driver's behavior. Id. at 31–32. Moreover, we previously noted the Fourth Amendment is not offended by routine inquiries about “who was in the vehicle and the purpose of their travel[.]” Kenny v. State, 210 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[11] More fundamentally, an officer's subjective motivations play no role in the applicable Fourth Amendment analysis when there is objective justification for the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). Indeed, “for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Kenny, 210 N.E.3d at 328–29. Instead, reasonableness turns on whether there were objective justifications for the traffic stop. Id. Here, the unchallenged objective justification was that Officer Bray observed a traffic violation before following the vehicle, conducting further investigation, and ultimately deciding to initiate a traffic stop. Further, to the extent C.F. focuses on the fact that “[n]o tickets for [C.F.’s] driving behavior were written”—which he claims indicates “[C.F.] was not stopped for driving behavior”—C.F. cites no authority for the proposition that the constitutionality of a traffic stop turns on whether an officer issues a ticket. Appellant's Br. p. 9. Regardless, law enforcement might reasonably decline to issue a traffic ticket where, as here, a traffic stop ultimately escalated into a more serious investigation of contraband. Cf. Kenny, 210 N.E.3d at 329 (involving an officer's decision to prioritize a vehicle search once it was justified, rather than focus on traffic infractions).

[12] Because the stop was justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court did not err in admitting evidence from the stop.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5.

2.   I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).

3.   C.F. also claims the stop violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, but he has waived any argument thereunder by failing to separately analyze this issue. See Banks v. State, 231 N.E.3d 853, 860 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. We therefore limit our review to the Fourth Amendment challenge.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.