MITCHELL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Sterling J. Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals his sentence of two years and 183 days for Level 6 felony domestic battery.¹ Mitchell argues that his sentence exceeds, by half a day, the statutory maximum of two and one-half years established by Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b). Agreeing with Mitchell, we remand to the trial court for entry of a sentence within the statutory limit for a Level 6 felony.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 15, 2023, the State charged Mitchell with Level 6 felony domestic battery. A jury trial was held on December 19, 2024. At trial, the jury heard evidence that Mitchell argued with his girlfriend in their bedroom on June 9, 2023, while their minor child was at home. Mitchell became angry and struck his girlfriend in the head three or four times, inflicting pain and a large lump.

[3] The jury found Mitchell guilty of the Level 6 felony. A sentencing hearing was held in January 2025, where the trial court sentenced Mitchell to the Indiana Department of Correction “for a period of two (2) years [and] one hundred and eighty-three (183) days[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 208. Mitchell now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] “Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and as long as a sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. However, when a sentence exceeds statutory limits, the sentence is contrary to law, and we generally remand the case for resentencing. See, e.g., Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144–45 (Ind. 2022) (remanding for resentencing when the aggregate sentence exceeded the statutory maximum). On appeal, questions of law—such as the proper interpretation of a statute—are subject to de novo review. Temme v. State, 169 N.E.3d 857, 859 (Ind. 2021).

[5] Here, Mitchell was convicted of a Level 6 felony. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) governs the sentencing range for Level 6 felonies, specifying that a defendant “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1/2) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” The question presented is whether Mitchell's sentence of two years and 183 days exceeds the statutory maximum of two and one-half years by half a day because, based on a 365-day calendar, one-half of 365 is 182.5, not 183.

[6] “When construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain the legislature's intent.” Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind. 2016). So long as the statute is “clear and unambiguous,” we do not engage in judicial construction and instead find the legislature's intent in the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the words used in the statute. Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1139. However, “when a statue permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider that statute ambiguous.” Id. “[W]hen a statute is ambiguous, we resort to the rules of statutory construction to determine its meaning.” Id. In criminal cases, the rules of statutory construction “include[ ] the rule of lenity—a rule that requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State while resolving any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” Id. “[E]ven under this rule, we avoid construing a statute so narrowly ‘as to exclude cases they fairly cover.’ ” Id. (quoting Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009)). Moreover, we presume the legislature intended for statutory language to be applied in a logical manner that is consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Id.

[7] Here, the statute is unambiguous, giving trial courts discretion to impose a Level 6 felony sentence that is between six months and two and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Based on a standard 365-day year, a sentence of two and one-half years is equivalent to two years and 182.5 days. In this case, whether by convenience or preference, the trial court converted the statutory expression of two and one-half years into a combination of years and days and, in doing so, appears to have “rounded up,” resulting in a sentence of two years and 183 days that clearly exceeds the statutory maximum for a Level 6 felony.

[8] The State defends the sentence by referring to language in our Rules of Trial Procedure. But those rules generally govern only “procedure and practice in [Indiana] courts.” Ind. Trial Rule 1. The maximum sentence authorized by statute is not a matter of court procedure or practice, but instead a question of substantive criminal law. Thus, we are not persuaded those rules apply here. The State also questions an interpretation that allows for a half-day sentence, arguing our legislature did not clearly authorize fractional-day sentences. Yet, the very use of fractional language in the statute suggests an intent to permit precise fractional calculation of a sentence. Put differently, had our legislature intended for the maximum sentence to be two years and 183 days, it could have provided for that sentence directly instead of using the fractional two and one-half years. Cf. Dobeski v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1257, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (interpreting a statute referring to a period of seventy-two hours, noting that “when the legislature intends for a time frame to be calculated as a period of hours rather than full calendar days, it will make that intention clear”).

[9] Moreover, the State advances several public policy arguments, claiming fractional-day sentences are administratively burdensome and there is a “historic custom ․ to sentence defendants to whole numbers of days,” noting it was “unable to find any Indiana appellate decision in which a defendant's sentence has been described as including a partial day.” Appellee's Br. p. 6–7. We note, however, that a trial court may avoid a fractional-day sentence—and comply with the statute—by simply rounding down from 182.5 rather than rounding up to the next integer. More fundamentally, the State's public policy arguments do not override the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.

[10] In the end, a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum must be corrected. See Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1144–45. We therefore remand with instructions to the trial court to impose a sentence not exceeding two and one-half years. See id. (remanding for resentencing when a sentence exceeded the statutory limit).

[11] Remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2).

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.