W.J. (Father) and J.A. (Mother), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] W.J. (Father) and J.A. (Mother) appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to K.E.J. and K.C.J. (collectively, Children). Father challenges the trial court's conclusions that the conditions that led to Children's removal would not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to Children's well-being. Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) challenge the court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests. Because the uncontested findings clearly and convincingly support the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of K.E.J. and K.C.J. When K.E.J. was born in August 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) investigated a report alleging that K.E.J.’s umbilical cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. After submitting to a drug screen that returned positive, Mother admitted she used methamphetamine and THC while pregnant with K.E.J. and disclosed that Father also used THC. Family Case Manager (FCM) Danielle Cupp believed there were domestic violence issues between Parents because she and hospital personnel overheard multiple verbal arguments. DCS also discovered Mother was unemployed and did not have stable housing.

[3] DCS immediately removed K.E.J. from Parents’ care and filed a petition alleging him to be a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). In November 2021, Parents admitted the allegations in the CHINS petition including those regarding their unstable housing, Mother's substance use, and Father's “anger issues.” Ex. Vol. XII p. 173; see id. at 62-63. The trial court adjudicated K.E.J. a CHINS and entered a dispositional order on November 17. Parents were ordered to: complete a clinical interview and assessment, a substance use disorder assessment, and a medication evaluation; submit to random drug screens; and participate in home-based case management, medication management, and visitations. Father was also ordered to address his anger management issues.

[4] In July 2022, K.C.J. was born drug-exposed to THC. DCS initially did not remove K.C.J. from Parents’ care. In August, DCS filed a petition alleging K.C.J. was a CHINS and attempted to provide Family Preservation services to ensure K.C.J.’s safety in Parents’ care: Parents refused the preservation services.¹ K.C.J. was removed from Parents’ care in late August but was returned on September 6, 2022, because Parents began cooperating with Family Preservation services.

[5] The trial court adjudicated K.C.J. a CHINS and entered a dispositional order in November. Parents were ordered to substantially the same services as in K.E.J.’s CHINS case. Supra ¶4. Plus, Mother was ordered to attend a sober support group and recovery coach services, and Father was ordered to attend recovery coach services and domestic violence batterer's services.

[6] On November 29, 2022, the court again ordered K.C.J. to be removed from Parents’ care because Parents’ participation in services had declined and “Father ha[d] become aggressive with service providers.” Ex. Vol. XIII p. 116. Moreover, DCS and service providers observed increased aggression between Parents: Father had been arrested for intimidation on November 27 after he threatened Mother. Yet, “Mother indicate[d] her intention to allow Father to return to the home and to maintain the relationship with Father when [a ten-day No Contact Order] expire[d].” Id. K.C.J. was placed in the same foster home as his brother, K.E.J., who had never returned to Parents’ care.

[7] Throughout Children's CHINS cases, Parents were inconsistent and non-compliant with services. Following completion of their substance use assessments in October 2021, Parents were recommended to participate in intensive outpatient treatment (IOP). Both restarted IOP multiple times after being discharged due to long-term noncompliance. When Parents ultimately completed IOP in March 2024—the same month that DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate their parental rights—Parents’ substance abuse was still a concern. Parents’ submission to random drug screens was inconsistent for the life of the CHINS cases, and when they did screen, Parents consistently tested positive for THC—even after they completed IOP.

[8] Mother also completed her clinical interview in October 2021 and was recommended to attend individual therapy. From September 2022 through June 2024, Mother's therapy goals included addressing her substance abuse, past trauma, and coping skills. While she was “successfully discharged” from therapy in June 2024, Mother “did not meet the goals” therein. Tr. Vol. II p. 170. Father's trajectory was similar: he completed a clinical interview in June 2022 and was recommended for individual therapy. However, Father missed seven out of eighteen appointments and was discharged due to noncompliance.

[9] Parents’ pattern of noncompliance continued in home-based case management. Mother was unsuccessfully discharged because she “frequently” cancelled appointments and the only goal she accomplished was going to food pantries with her home-based case manager. Id. at 73. She did not meet her housing or employment goals, quitting one job after only “a couple of days.” Id. at 68.

[10] Father, on the other hand, refused to participate in home-based case management without explanation. And although he completed an abuse and awareness accountability program (AAA Program), Father had not made progress controlling his anger in less-controlled, non-classroom settings. The AAA Program facilitator observed Father's “power dynamic” during child and family team meetings (CFTM), stating “he would get frustrated, he would get angry, he would cuss[.]” Id. at 95. Father was also fired from one job for “threatening a co-worker.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 34.

[11] In addition, visits with Children never progressed to fully unsupervised because of Parents’ inconsistent attendance. Between November 2021 and August 2024, Parents missed or cancelled at least thirty-five visits. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 179-81. FCM Laura Somerville, who took over the management of the CHINS cases in April 2024, indicated that Parents were missing or cancelling visits “[a]t least once every other week.” Id. at 137.

[12] Father also demonstrated alarming behaviors toward Mother and service providers during one partially supervised visit. When the service provider arrived at Father's home for the supervised portion of the visit, Parents were arguing, and Father was “very abrasive about” trying to get Mother out of the home, telling her to “get the F out of my house[.]” Id. at 109. Because Children were crying, the visit supervisor attempted to end the visit, but Father initially would not allow Children to leave. When the supervisor was finally able to leave with Children, Father told her she “was going to pay for this later[.]” Id. at 110.

[13] DCS petitioned to involuntarily terminate Parents’ parental rights, and the trial court held a termination hearing on August 22 and August 30, 2024. At the time of the hearing, Parents remained homeless and unemployed. Children had been in the same foster home since their respective removals from Parents’ care: K.E.J. since his birth and K.C.J. since he was four months old. DCS's plan for Children's care was adoption by their foster parents.

[14] FCM Somerville testified that termination was in Children's best interests. Court-appointed special advocate (CASA) Sara Huber had been Children's CASA since the beginning of their cases. She testified that she had concerns about Parents’ housing instability, joblessness, inability to provide for Children, and ongoing substance use. Parents’ volatility and anger also concerned her. When asked if she had a recommendation as to “what's in the children's best interest[,]” CASA Huber responded affirmatively and recommended termination of Parents’ parental rights and adoption by the foster parents. Id. at 226.

[15] On November 26, 2024, the trial court issued findings of fact, including: Parents continued to be homeless affecting their ability to progress in visitations; Parents had inconsistent employment affecting their ability to provide for Children; Parents continuously used THC throughout the life of the case and were inconsistent with substance-related services; domestic violence was a recurring concern; Parents were inconsistent with attending visits; and Parents were unable or unwilling to provide for Children without DCS assistance. Concluding DCS proved the statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationships.

[16] Mother and Father separately appealed the termination of their parental rights. We granted a motion to consolidate appeals. This decision follows.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[17] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g. denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[18] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Any unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[19] In relevant part, DCS was required to allege and prove, by clear and convincing evidence:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

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(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019).² If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

II. Termination of Parents’ parental rights was not clearly erroneous.

A. Remedying Conditions

[20] Parents do not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept them as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 609 n.2. Rather, Father contends the uncontested findings do not clearly support the trial court's conclusions that: 1) the conditions resulting in removal would not be remedied and 2) the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to Children's well-being. Mother does not join in this argument. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-4-2(b)(2)(B) was written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one of the three requirements of that subsection has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The remedying conditions issue, therefore, is dispositive.

[21] In reviewing a trial court's conclusion that conditions will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis: first, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [Children's] placement” and second, “we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (citations and quotation marks omitted). As recently stated in In re A.L.:

It is well-established that “[a] trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In judging fitness, a trial court may properly consider, among other things, a parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment. The trial court may also consider a parent's failure to respond to services. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.”

223 N.E.3d 1126, 1138-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original), trans. denied.

[22] First, K.E.J. was removed in August 2021 because he was born drug-exposed to methamphetamine and THC, Parents lacked employment and stable housing for K.E.J., and there were concerns about domestic violence. In August and November 2022, K.C.J. was removed from Parents’ care because he was born drug-exposed to THC, Parents remained non-compliant with services and drug screens, and Parents continued to test positive for THC when they completed drug screens.

[23] In determining whether the conditions that led to Children's removal would be remedied, the trial court found:

38) Both parents continue to be homeless which has affected their ability to progress in visitation. Mother indicated they are staying in a hotel room that her father assists with costs of said room.

39) To date, both Mother and Father have had inconsistent employment which has affected their ability to provide for the needs of their children and secure a suitable and safe home.

40) Mother and Father have continuously used THC throughout the long life of these cases and have been inconsistent with providing drug screens and participating in substance abuse treatment.

41) Mother and [F]ather both continue to screen positive for illegal substance use, namely THC, but miss substantial number of screens.

42) Domestic Violence, although never directly at issue in this case, has been a recuring [sic] concern throughout the life of the case including case managers Sommerville and Cupp both observing concerning verbal arguments in the courthouse during these proceedings.

43) Although Father has completed Abuse Awareness and Accountability classes, a program designed to address need for power and control, setting priorities, and accepting responsibility, the Father continues to display behaviors when he is upset like yelling during Child and Family Team Meetings, inappropriate outburst during court hearings, blaming others, bickering with [J.A.] and addressing conflict in front of the children during visits which is not consistent with the goals of the AAA program.

44) Mother and Father have been inconsistent with attending visits at least leading up to the evidentiary hearing in this matter and have at no point in time progressed to overnight or unsupervised visits.

45) CASA testified that the parents do not have a parent-child relationship but more like that of an aunt or uncle or that of a teacher.

46) The parents are unable and/or unwilling to provide for their own needs without DCS assistance even though the children have been out of their care and custody for approximately 3 years.

47) The parents are homeless and have been unable to obtain or maintain housing, employment, a license, or sobriety.

Father's App. Vol. II pp. 35-36. The court concluded thereon that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Children's removal from Parents’ care would not be remedied.

[24] Father argues that a parent's parental rights may not be terminated “based upon facts and circumstances which are not attributable to the parent.”³ Father's Br. p. 12. He contends that “[f]lawless participation [in services] is not required” and a trial court “should judge a parent's fitness ․ as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration changed circumstances.” Id. at 13. In support of his argument, Father asserts that he made progress including completing the AAA program, several therapy sessions, and IOP.

[25] However, Father's argument ignores the court's findings about his failure to benefit from services, including that Father failed to demonstrate new behaviors learned in the AAA program and continued to test positive for THC. His argument also ignores that some of the court's findings are, indeed, attributable to his actions, including his failure to obtain housing or employment and his inconsistent participation in visits as of the time of the termination hearing. Children cannot simply remain in long-term foster care languishing, waiting for Parents to engage in and benefit from court-ordered services such that they can properly care for Children. See Baker v. Marion Cnty. OFC, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 n.4 (Ind. 2004) (limitations on trial court's ability to approve long-term foster care are designed to ensure a child does not “languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency”) (quoting In re Priser, No. 19861, 2004 WL 541124 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 2004)). The trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions which led to Children's removal would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[26] Parents also challenge the trial court's conclusion that terminating their parental rights was in Children's best interests. In determining best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations omitted). We have previously held that “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[27] Here, FCM Somerville and CASA Huber testified that termination is in Children's best interests. And, as explained above, Parents have not shown that the reasons for Children's removal will be remedied. Parents have been inconsistent with services throughout the CHINS cases and have not demonstrated an ability to appropriately provide for Children's needs. CASA Huber added that “the demonstrated change that [she] was hoping to see [from Parents] has not occurred.” Tr. Vol. II p. 231.

[28] This evidence is sufficient on its own to support the trial court's best-interests conclusion. But permanency is also a central consideration in determining Children's best interests. K.E.J. has been removed from Parents’ care since his birth, and K.C.J. has been removed from Parents’ care since he was approximately four months old. As the trial court found, “[Children] need stability in their lives” and Parents remain unable or unwilling “to provide for their own needs without DCS assistance even though [Children] have been out of their care and custody for approximately [three] years.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 36. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Children's best interests. We affirm.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   FCM Cupp testified that Family Preservation services are “[s]ervices to try [to] keep the child in the home and [for] the safety of the child.” Tr. Vol. II p. 123.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was substantially amended effective March 11, 2024. In its petition, filed on March 11, 2024, DCS cites to the 2019 version of the statute. The court's findings in its termination order reflect the same. We do the same.

3.   However, Father does not directly argue that his rights were terminated based solely on facts attributable to Mother.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.