GREGORY v. GREGORY (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tasiana Gregory (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court's interlocutory order in her ongoing dispute with Brent Gregory (“Father”) over custody of their child L.G. Father contends that we do not have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. Because we agree with Father, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother, a citizen of Belarus, and Father met in 2015, moved to Belarus, had child L.G., and married. Gregory v. Gregory, 2024 WL 469517 at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“Gregory I”). In March of 2022, during a period of civil unrest, Father left Belarus with L.G. and returned to the United States, eventually settling in Tippecanoe County. Id. In April of 2023, Father petitioned the trial court to establish paternity, custody, parenting time, and child support. Id. at *2. The next month, Mother petitioned for the enforcement of a foreign child-custody order, and, after several hearings, the trial court concluded that the Belarusian Court had jurisdiction to enter an initial child-custody order. Id. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court's registration of the Belarusian custody order was clearly erroneous. Id. On February 7, 2024, we affirmed the trial court's order to assume temporary emergency jurisdiction in Gregory I. Id. at *3. Meanwhile, while the appeal in Gregory I was pending, the trial court began attempts to conduct a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) conference with the Leninsky District Court of Grodno, Belarus (“the Belarus Court”), which attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.

[3] On July 10, 2024, Mother moved to terminate emergency jurisdiction. On July 22, 2024, Father objected to Mother's motion and moved for relief from judgment. On July 24, 2024, Mother requested that the trial court accept written answers from a foreign court or request written questions. On July 26, 2024, Father objected and moved to strike Mother's ex parte correspondence with the Belarus Court.

[4] In September of 2024, the trial court conducted hearings on all pending matters and, on November 26, 2024, issued an order, in which it denied Mother's request to accept written answers from the Belarus Court or request written questions. The trial court also, however, granted Father's motion for relief from judgment and denied Mother's motion to terminate emergency jurisdiction on the basis that the Belarus Court had refused to exercise jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the UCCJEA. The trial court ruled that Father would continue to have temporary emergency custody of L.G. in the United States until an evidentiary hearing could be conducted on all pending matters. On December 17, 2024, Mother moved to correct error, which motion the trial court denied on January 6, 2025.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Initially, we note that Mother appears pro se. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

[6] Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Father's motion for relief from judgment and in denying her motion to terminate emergency jurisdiction. Father contends that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because Mother is attempting to prosecute a discretionary interlocutory appeal without having obtained the required trial-court certification and requests that we dismiss it. Mother responds in her reply brief that her interlocutory appeal is of right and, even if not of right, a properly-certified discretionary appeal. We agree with Father.

[7] Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 14 governs interlocutory appeals and provides, in part, as follows:

A. Interlocutory Appeals of Right. Appeals from the following interlocutory orders are taken as a matter of right by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the notation of the interlocutory order in the Chronological Case Summary:

(1) For the payment of money;

(2) To compel the execution of any document;

(3) To compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things in action;

(4) For the sale or delivery of the possession of real property;

(5) Granting or refusing to grant, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a preliminary injunction;

(6) Appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or revoking or refusing to revoke the appointment of a receiver;

(7) For a writ of habeas corpus not otherwise authorized to be taken directly to the Supreme Court;

(8) Transferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75; and

(9) Issued by an Administrative Agency that by statute is expressly required to be appealed as a mandatory interlocutory appeal.

The Notice of Appeal shall be in the form prescribed by Rule 9, and served in accordance with Rule 9(F)(10).

B. Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals. An appeal may be taken from other interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal.

(1) Certification by the Trial Court. The trial court, in its discretion, upon motion by a party, may certify an interlocutory order to allow an immediate appeal.

(a) Time for Filing Motion. A motion requesting certification of an interlocutory order must be filed in the trial court within thirty (30) days after the date the interlocutory order is noted in the Chronological Case Summary unless the trial court, for good cause, permits a belated motion. If the trial court grants a belated motion and certifies the appeal, the court shall make a finding that the certification is based on a showing of good cause, and shall set forth the basis for that finding.

(b) Content of the Motion in the Trial Court. A motion to the trial court shall contain the following:

(i) An identification of the interlocutory order sought to be certified;

(ii) A concise statement of the issues to be addressed in the interlocutory appeal; and

(iii) The reasons why an interlocutory appeal should be permitted.

(c) Grounds for Granting Interlocutory Appeal. Grounds for granting an interlocutory appeal include:

(i) The appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage or injury if the order is erroneous and the determination of the error is withheld until after judgment.

(ii) The order involves a substantial question of law, the early determination of which will promote a more orderly disposition of the case.

(iii) The remedy by appeal is otherwise inadequate.

[․]

(2) Acceptance of the Interlocutory Appeal by the Court of Appeals. If the trial court certifies an order for interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its discretion, upon motion by a party, may accept jurisdiction of the appeal.

[8] As for Mother's claim that she is pursuing an interlocutory appeal of right, she does not identify which of the nine categories her appeal falls into, and it is abundantly clear that the trial court's order does not qualify for any of them. As for Mother's claim that her appeal is a discretionary interlocutory appeal which has received the proper certification, Mother contends that she “requested and certified the Order on Appeal with the tr[ai]l court[,]” Mother's Reply Br. p. 4, and has filed with us an “Official Certified Copy” of the trial court's order. All this “certifies,” however, is that the order was issued, not that it was certified as being eligible for immediate appeal. There is no indication in the record that any motion for certification for interlocutory appeal was ever filed in the trial court, much less that any such motion was ever granted. Moreover, even if the trial court had certified its interlocutory order for immediate appeal, Mother has never moved that we accept jurisdiction, which we may do only “upon motion by a party[.]” App. R. 14(B)(2). Because we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, we dismiss.

[9] The appeal is dismissed.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.