HAWKINS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Terrill Hawkins appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he operated a vehicle. But Hawkins ignores the testimony of an eyewitness who saw him driving and Hawkins's own admission to police that he had “just left [a] friend's house and was driving away” when police arrived. Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. We affirm.

Facts

[2] Hayley Amatuzzo was at her Noblesville home around 10:00 p.m. one summer evening when she heard “a huge bang and a rumbling of [her] home.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 16. Looking out her window, she saw that a large passenger van had crashed into a tree in her front yard, about three yards from the window.

[3] Amatuzzo then saw a man she later identified as Hawkins step out of a black Jeep parked about 20 yards away in front of her next-door neighbor's house. Amatuzzo could not ascertain whether Hawkins had exited the driver or passenger side of the Jeep. Hawkins was yelling, “Open the door. Get out of the car. Get out of the car.” Id. at 17. Amatuzzo then saw Hawkins reenter the black Jeep and drive away. Meanwhile, the van driver left the van and walked away. Amatuzzo then observed Hawkins return in the Jeep, park, and exit the vehicle.

[4] Police were called, and Sergeant Wilkes Brisson-Monteith arrived at the scene approximately five to ten minutes after the crash occurred. Upon his arrival, Sergeant Brisson-Monteith observed Hawkins's black Jeep parked near Amatuzzo's home. The Jeep was running and unoccupied. It was parked pointing southbound on a one-way northbound street next to a one-way street sign. As Sergeant Brisson-Monteith shined his flashlight into the unoccupied Jeep, Hawkins approached him on foot and stated that the Jeep was his. When asked if he or his Jeep had been involved in an accident, Hawkins said “No.” Id. at 25. Hawkins told the officer that he had been visiting a friend's house and was driving away when he stopped, parked, and walked back to the crash scene to check on his friend. Hawkins claimed he was preparing to leave as the officers arrived.

[5] Hawkins then failed three field sobriety tests at the scene, although a portable breath test showed no indication of alcohol present. Officer Krystal Watters, a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), administered further testing that Hawkins also failed. Hawkins agreed to submit to a blood test, which was positive for Delta 9 THC, Delta 9 Carboxy THC (a metabolite of Delta 9 THC), and Phencyclidine (commonly known as PCP).

[6] The State ultimately charged Hawkins with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, and operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood, a Class C misdemeanor. During his bench trial, Hawkins sought judgment on the evidence on the Class A misdemeanor operating charge. The trial court granted that motion after finding that the State had not proven Hawkins was involved in the van crash. But the trial court found Hawkins guilty of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood. For that crime, the trial court sentenced Hawkins to 60 days in the Hamilton County Jail, all suspended, with credit for 4 days (2 actual days served), and one year of probation. Hawkins appeals his conviction.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Hawkins raises a single issue on appeal: whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a vehicle. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We will affirm if the evidence and reasonable inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value “such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[8] To convict Hawkins, the State was required to prove that Hawkins operated a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in his blood. See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(c). To “operate” means “to navigate or otherwise be in actual physical control of a vehicle․” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-117.5. And the operator of a motor vehicle is “a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.” Winters v. State, 132 N.E.3d 46, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[9] Hawkins contends that because no officer observed him driving, the evidence was insufficient to prove his operation of the vehicle. But he ignores that the State presented other direct eyewitness testimony that Hawkins operated the Jeep. Amatuzzo testified that, after Hawkins yelled at the van's driver, she saw Hawkins enter the Jeep and drive away. When asked during cross-examination if she saw Hawkins driving, Amatuzzo confirmed, “I saw him drive further down the road.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 19. To clarify, the trial court asked, “So did you see the Defendant drive,” and she responded, “I did. I saw him drive away” in a black Jeep. Id. This evidence alone was sufficient to prove Hawkins operated a vehicle. Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“[A] conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.”).

[10] Even so, that was not the only evidence that Hawkins operated a vehicle. Hawkins admitted to Sergeant Brisson-Monteith that he had been driving. As Sergeant Brisson-Monteith recalled while testifying, Hawkins told the officer that he had “just left his friend's house and was driving away” when “he had stopped, parked ․ and then walked back to check if his friend was okay.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 25. This admission, combined with the officer's observation of Hawkins's Jeep running and parked the wrong way on a one-way street, provides substantial evidence of Hawkins's operation of the Jeep. Hawkins does not dispute that the other elements of the offense were proven.

[11] As the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt Hawkins's operation of a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in his blood, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

afirmed

Weissmann, Judge.

[12] Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.