ZUK v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Alfred Zuk molested his daughter B.Z. on multiple occasions throughout her childhood. B.Z. later disclosed the abuse, and Zuk was charged with and convicted of child molestation and sexual misconduct with a minor. Zuk now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] B.Z.’s parents were in a 20-year relationship and had four children in common, including B.Z, and three older children belonging to B.Z.’s mother. B.Z. and Zuk were very close, and B.Z. was a self-described “daddy's girl.” Tr. Vol. III at 171. B.Z. was not close to her mother and, at one point, described her as a manipulator and a narcissist. From the time B.Z. was 11 to 14 years old, the family lived in a house in Marion County. Although B.Z. had her own room, she often slept in her brothers’ room, which had “two sets of bunk beds.” Id. at 201. The bunk beds could be separated into singles, and B.Z. slept on a single bed. Zuk occasionally slept in the single bed with B.Z.

[4] When B.Z. was 11, her school presented on sex education. That night, B.Z. asked Zuk “what it meant -- what the body parts were, and he showed [her].” Tr. Vol. III at 173. Zuk “explain[ed] that the clitoris was the fun area and then he just played with it. He rubbed it ․ with [his hand].” Id. at 174. Then he explained the “vagina hole” was “where the penis goes, and then he stuck his fingers in there ․ [j]ust going in and out.” Id. Zuk continued for five to ten minutes, stopping “because the boys woke up.” Id. at 176. The following night, Zuk used his hand to rub B.Z.’s clitoris and go “in and out” of her vagina. Id. at 178.

[5] When B.Z. was 14 or 15, she and one of her brothers took turns helping Zuk make deliveries in a box truck. When it was B.Z.’s turn, she went to the back of the truck while her brother sat in the cab. When B.Z. was in the back of the truck, Zuk told her to take her pants off, pushed her down over a car part, and “stuck his penis inside [her].” Tr. Vol. III at 181. Zuk continued to “go in and out” until he ejaculated on the floor. Id. at 182.

[6] B.Z. wrote about these experiences in a journal that she left in the house when her family moved. From the evidence, it appears the journal may have been found, and it prompted a 2021 investigation by the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”); however, the child molest allegations were unsubstantiated after B.Z. denied writing the journal or being touched inappropriately. At the time of trial, the journal could not be located.

[7] In January 2023, B.Z.’s mother learned Zuk would be receiving an inheritance from his brother for an unknown amount. That June, when B.Z. was 15, she disclosed the above-described events to her mother while talking about “want[ing] to get pedophiles off the street.” Tr. Vol. III at 205. On June 11, B.Z.’s mother contacted law enforcement, and on June 22, B.Z. spoke with forensic child interviewer Jill Carr. Sometime after reporting the abuse, B.Z.’s mother sent one email to Detective Nicholsen, who was assigned to investigate the allegations, to ask about receiving Zuk's inheritance.

[8] The State charged Zuk with two counts of child molesting as Level 1 felonies,¹ and one count of sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony ² . A jury found Zuk guilty as charged. Thereafter, Zuk was sentenced to 34 years of incarceration and 4 years of home detention. Zuk now appeals.³

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Zuk's Convictions

[9] Zuk argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his three convictions. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025).

[10] Zuk does not argue that the State failed to prove any specific element of the charged offenses. Rather, Zuk challenges all three convictions together, claiming B.Z.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. “A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072–73 (Ind. 1991)). However, under the incredible dubiosity rule, “a court will impinge upon the jury's responsibility to judge witness credibility” where there is (1) a sole testifying witness; (2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and (3) “a complete lack of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994)). Our Supreme Court has explained that “while incredible dubiosity provides a standard that is not impossible to meet, it is a difficult standard to meet, and one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence. The testimony must be so convoluted and/or contrary to human experience that no reasonable person could believe it.” Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted) (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)).

[11] Both Zuk and the State concede the first Moore factor is met, so we address the remaining two factors. Zuk argues B.Z.’s testimony was coerced because she lived with her mother who “likely had some influence over her” and “starts things” and was seeking to “seize [ ] Zuk's inheritance.” Appellant's Br. at 16. Zuk contends that B.Z.’s mother “timed her entreaty to Det. Nic[h]olsen to coincide with B.Z.’s disclosure.” Id. While Zuk may believe that B.Z. had a motive to fabricate, we are unconvinced her testimony was coerced—especially given the lack of any evidence suggesting B.Z. was aware of the inheritance or that her mother pressured her to accuse Zuk of child molest.

[12] Zuk also points to several aspects of B.Z.’s testimony that he identifies as “improbable” such as her sleeping in a single bed with Zuk “while her mother slept in a different room” and her brothers “never said anything.” Appellant's Br. at 16. Zuk also seems to argue that it is improbable that one of his sons would wait in the cab of a truck while Zuk was molesting B.Z. in the back and did not notice any evidence of the sexual encounter afterward. However, Zuk fails to address in what way these pieces of testimony are inherently contradictory, equivocal, or coerced. Nor, do we find the allegations to be so outside normal behavior that the allegations could not be reasonably believed.

[13] Zuk next claims “B.Z.’s r [sic] testimony was contradictory and dubious” because she previously denied sexual abuse occurred to DCS after DCS asked her about the statements in her journal that “was never produced.” Appellant's Br. at 17. Zuk points to no inconsistent statements made by B.Z. during trial. Instead, he relies on her prior statements, but those are irrelevant for the incredible dubiosity rule. See Smith v. State, 163 N.E.3d 925, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 498 (Ind. 2001)) (“witness testimony that contradicts [a] witness's earlier statements does not make such testimony ‘incredibly dubious’ ”). Even if B.Z.’s prior statements were relevant to an incredible dubiosity analysis, B.Z. testified that she lied to DCS in 2021 because she was ashamed someone had read her journal, and because Zuk had told her that “if [she] wanted a dad that [she] would keep it quiet.” Tr. Vol. III at 185. When asked why her trial testimony should be believed after admitting she lied to DCS in the past, B.Z. stated, “[Y]ou [don't] have to, and it would be understandable if you [don't], but it'd be very much appreciated if you did.” Tr. Vol. III at 194. Here, the jury knew about B.Z.’s earlier denial to DCS, as well as the reasons for her denial, and was able to judge the credibility of her trial testimony. A reasonable jury could believe her explanations regarding the inconsistency between her prior statement and trial testimony. See Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 759.

[14] Lastly, Zuk argues “[n]o circumstantial evidence, nor corroborating evidence supported [ ] Zuk's guilt” because (1) there were no witnesses to the criminal acts, (2) the journal was never found, and (3) B.Z. delayed reporting. Appellant's Br. at 17. The State argues that there was circumstantial evidence. The State suggests that B.Z.’s mother corroborated B.Z.’s testimony that Zuk did sleep in a room with B.Z., and that Zuk did sometimes have B.Z. and another child help with work. Whether this corroborating testimony amounts to circumstantial evidence is irrelevant. To succeed on an incredible dubiosity attack, the proponent must fulfill all three factors, and here, Zuk has not shown B.Z.’s testimony to be ambiguous, inconsistent, convoluted, and/or contrary to human experience. See Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 758 (failure to establish any one of the three factors “precludes the application of the incredible dubiosity rule”). Nevertheless, as Zuk points out, there was a 2021 DCS investigation where the case worker asked B.Z. about sexual abuse. This supports B.Z.’s testimony that she wrote about the sexual abuse in her journal and that DCS asked her about it. The jury confronted the issue of B.Z. admitting that she previously lied to DCS about the sexual abuse and they determined her in-trial testimony was believable. This weighing of contradictory facts is exactly what jurors are supposed to do and are most capable of doing. B.Z.’s testimony was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. See Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 135. We conclude that B.Z.’s testimony was not incredibly dubious, and the State provided sufficient evidence at trial to support Zuk's convictions. We therefore affirm Zuk's convictions.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (effective July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2025).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a) (effective July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2025).

3.   Zuk fails to support with citations to the record numerous statements of fact in his Statement of Facts, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a). Zuk also fails to support with citations to authority numerous statements of law in his Argument, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.