KEEN v. ADAMS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Corinne Keen (“Mother”), pro se, appeals the trial court's order granting the Petition for Grandparent Visitation filed by George Adams and Jennifer Adams (collectively “Paternal Grandparents”)¹ regarding her minor child A.A. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Devan Adams (“Father”) are the parents of L.A, born in August 2006, and Child, born in June 2018. Father was arrested on June 29, 2021, and charged with child molesting as a level 4 felony and multiple counts of child exploitation as level 5 felonies. L.A. was the alleged victim of those crimes. On July 1, 2021, the court issued a no contact order against Father to protect L.A. Mother filed for dissolution of marriage on July 2, 2021, and, on September 23, 2021, the court issued a decree dissolving the marriage between Mother and Father. Mother was granted sole legal and primary physical custody of L.A. and Child. Father was granted supervised visitation with Child and no visitation with L.A.

[3] On May 9, 2022, Mother filed a petition for a protective order against Father, which was granted by the court on May 27, 2022. On October 7, 2022, Father was arrested and charged with public voyeurism as a level 6 felony and distribution of an intimate image as a class A misdemeanor. Following Father's arrest, Mother filed a petition for protective order against Father for the benefit of L.A. and Child. On October 19, 2022, the court issued a permanent order of protection prohibiting him from having any contact with L.A. and providing that his contact with Child, “shall ONLY be in a therapeutic supervised parenting time and [Father] SHALL NOT be permitted to be alone with [Child] during said session.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 80. During this time period, Paternal Grandparents had monthly visits, including some overnights, with L.A. and Child and maintained a “solid relationship” with the girls. Transcript Volume II at 7.

[4] In June 2023, Father entered into a plea agreement with the State regarding his pending charges under multiple cause numbers. On July 7, 2023, the court sentenced him to a nine and one-half-year sentence. Father was also ordered to register as a sex offender.

[5] In July 2023, Mother married Christopher Keen (“Stepfather”). On July 31, 2023, Mother, Stepfather, and Paternal Grandparents had a meeting to discuss “expectations with visitations” and “requirements” for Paternal Grandparents to have visitations with L.A. and Child to ensure their safety from Father. Id. at 27. Mother was concerned that Paternal Grandparents maintained contact with Father. Mother gave Paternal Grandparents her new address but insisted that it “could not be under any circumstances shared with [Father].” Id.

[6] In October 2023, Mother and Stepfather met with an attorney to begin the stepparent adoption process. Both L.A. and Child stayed with Paternal Grandparents at their home over Christmas Break in December 2023 and January 2024. Stepfather filed a petition for stepparent adoption on January 9, 2024. Mother invited Paternal Grandparents to a church event for Child, which Paternal Grandparents attended in February 2024.

[7] After learning from Father that the petition for adoption had been filed and that they would need “to file to have grandparents[’] rights established or [they] would lose all [rights],” Paternal Grandparents filed a Verified Petition for Grandparent Visitation on February 22, 2024. Id. at 38. Mother received a copy of the petition and noted that her home address was not protected and had been provided to Father. Mother sent Paternal Grandparents a message “stating that because they had shared [her] address for this court case, at that time until the court case is finished grandparent visitation would need to stop.” Id. at 29.² Mother moved to a new residence in the spring of 2024 and both L.A. and Child moved to new schools. L.A. turned eighteen years old in August 2024.

[8] On November 6, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing. In support of their Petition for Grandparent Visitation, Parental Grandparents called Mother to testify, as well as each paternal grandparent. On January 29, 2025, the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order granting Paternal Grandparents’ petition for visitation as to Child.³ Specifically, the court determined that Grandparents are entitled to visit with Child “at a minimum” of “[o]ne weekend every other month, beginning February 8, 2025[.]” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 19. On February 6, 2025, Mother filed a Motion for Stay with the trial court, which the court denied. Along with her notice of appeal, on February 10, 2025, Mother filed a Motion for Stay with this Court, which we also denied.

Discussion

[9] Mother raises numerous overlapping issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court clearly erred in granting Paternal Grandparents visitation with Child. The Indiana Supreme Court has observed that a child's relationship with her grandparents is important and can deserve protection under the Grandparent Visitation Act. In re Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d 583, 584 (Ind. 2013). As is applicable here, the Act provides that “[a] child's grandparent may seek visitation rights if ․ the marriage of the child's parents has been dissolved in Indiana[.]” Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1(2). The Act gives a trial court authority to grant grandparents visitation if doing so is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-17-5-2. The trial court's decision regarding the child's best interests is left to the court's discretion and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Swartz v. Swartz, 720 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, our review is conducted with a “preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters” and we are “confident in the ability of our courts to determine when grandparent visitation would substantially infringe upon the custodial parent's constitutional right to guide the upbringing of their child.” In re Visitation of L-A.D.W., 38 N.E.3d 993, 997-998 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted).

[10] Because grandparent-visitation orders necessarily impinge, to some degree, on a parents’ constitutionally protected rights, an order granting such visitation must address four well-settled factors for balancing parents’ rights and the child's best interests, and must limit the visitation award to an amount that does not substantially infringe on parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their child. M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 584. Indeed, although the amount of visitation is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, the “Grandparent Visitation Act contemplates only occasional, temporary visitation that does not substantially infringe on a parent's fundamental right to control the upbringing, education, and religious training of their children.” Id. at 586 (citation omitted).

[11] In its required findings and conclusions, the trial court must address what are referred to as the McCune factors: “(1) the presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child's best interests; (2) the special weight that must be given to a fit parent's decision to deny or limit visitation; (3) whether the grandparent has established that visitation is in the child's best interests; and (4) whether the parent has denied visitation or has simply limited visitation.” K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind. 2009) (citing McCune v. Frey, 783 N.E.2d 752, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). When reviewing these findings, we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. K.L. v. E.H., 6 N.E.3d 1021, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We set aside the court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. In turn, a judgment is clearly erroneous when the findings fail to support the judgment or when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.

[12] We begin by noting that Mother dedicates a considerable portion of her pro se briefs to arguing that several of the trial court's findings of fact are “not supported by” the evidence and claiming that they are based on “mischaracterized testimony, or outright fabrications.” Appellant's Brief at 13-20; Appellant's Reply Brief at 7-14. We decline to separately address each of the challenged findings as many of them are superfluous. Moreover, our review of Mother's arguments reveals that her complaints revolve around the lack of “verbatim” testimony or “quantitative evidence” supporting the findings, as well as what we view to be alleged minor and/or irrelevant “factual inaccuracies” within some of the findings. Id.⁴ Mother cites no authority, as there is none, that provides the trial court's findings must be supported by verbatim testimony or quantitative evidence, or that minor inaccuracies render findings of fact clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we concentrate on the trial court's findings and conclusions that directly, or by implication, address the required McCune factors.

[13] Regarding the first McCune factor, the trial court specifically acknowledged “the presumption that a fit parent's decision about visitation is in the child's best interests and the special weight given to a fit parent's decision to deny visits.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 18. As to the second factor, the court specifically found that “Mother is a fit parent and her decision to cease all visits with [Paternal Grandparents] is given special weight and presumed to be in [Child's] best interests[.]” Id. Thus, the trial court properly acknowledged its obligation to presume that Mother acted in Child's bests interests in deciding to cease all visitation with Paternal Grandparents.

[14] We disagree with Mother's suggestion that the court, although finding that she is a fit parent, “failed to apply the proper presumption in her favor and improperly shifted the burden of proof to her.” Appellant's Brief at 11. Rather, in determining that Paternal Grandparents had overcome the presumption that Mother's absolute denial of visitation was in Child's best interests, the trial court carefully considered and assessed Mother's testimony explaining her decision to terminate visitation, but the court did not find much of her testimony credible. This included testimony that she had safety concerns for Child and that visits with Paternal Grandparents had caused an increase in Child's anxiety. Regarding safety, the court found that in her testimony, Mother “could not articulate any real danger, particularly in light of Father's incarceration” and she “gave no reasonable explanation for fear of any actual danger facing [herself or Child], whether at their home or Grandparents’ home.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16.⁵ The court further found that there was “no evidence before the Court to explain the source of Child's anxiety” and the court found no “reasonable connection between Child's reported anxiety and visits with Grandparents.” Id.⁶ It is well established that the trial court is not required to accept a parent's reasons for denying or restricting visitation with grandparents as necessarily true. Hicks v. Larson, 884 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Moreover, the “special weight requirement does not require a trial court to take at face value any explanation given by a parent.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather, “[i]t is the trial court's prerogative to listen to the evidence and determine, in light of that evidence, whether a parent's alleged justification for denying or restricting visitation with grandparents holds water.” Id.

[15] For their part, Paternal Grandparents presented evidence that Mother's “absolute denial of visits” coincided with the petition for stepparent adoption and Paternal Grandparents’ inadvertent disclosure of Mother's address to Father. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 18. The court found that the evidence indicated that Mother's decision to deny visits entirely “stems from her anger at Father,” Paternal Grandparents’ “refusal to cut Father entirely out of their lives,” and “their inadvertent disclosure of Mother's address in the filing of their petition herein.” Id. There was certainly ample evidence submitted by Paternal Grandparents to support these findings.

[16] As for the third factor, regarding Child's best interests, the court found that Child had a good and consistent relationship with Paternal Grandparents during Mother and Father's marriage that continued until early 2024. Paternal Grandparents presented evidence that even after Mother and Father's marriage was dissolved, Child would spend time with Paternal Grandparents at their home, including some overnights, “at least once a month for a weekend.” Transcript Volume II at 41. Similarly, Mother testified that prior to her cutting off visitation in January 2024, Child was at Paternal Grandparents’ house “[a]bout monthly” and “occasionally” overnights. Id. at 6. Our thorough review of the record indicates that Mother's newfound concerns with visitation had very little to do with Paternal Grandparents and more to do with the hostility she feels towards Father, who Paternal Grandparents readily admit should not have any contact with Child.

[17] As found by the trial court, the fourth factor, whether the parent has denied visitation or has simply limited visitation, weighs in Paternal Grandparents’ favor. Mother has suddenly denied visitation entirely, and her testimony made clear that she has no intention of granting visitation in the future absent a court order. Where a parent has denied all visitation, the grandparent is “pursuing the right to have a relationship with the child.” Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, “the case for judicial intervention” is strengthened. M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 587.

[18] Finally, we disagree with Mother's characterization of the court's order as “awarding excessive visitation.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 26. We cannot say that the occasional, temporary visitation ordered here of one weekend every other month substantially infringes on Mother's fundamental right to control the upbringing, education, and religious training of Child. In sum, we find no clear error in the trial court's order granting the Petition for Grandparent Visitation.

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It appears that although an attorney has entered an appearance with this Court on Paternal Grandparents’ behalf, the Appellees’ Brief was prepared and submitted pro se prior to the appearance being filed.

2.   Mother testified that she is in the “Indiana Attorney General Confidentiality Address Program.” Transcript Volume II at 7. The record indicates that this program “allows victims of many offenses, specifically domestic violence, sexual assault ․ and/or invasion of privacy, to maintain a confidential address through the Office of the Indiana Attorney General.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 22.

3.   The court noted that L.A. had “reached the age of majority and is no longer a child” and that “Child is the only remaining child at issue herein.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 13-14.

4.   For example, Mother challenges the trial court's statement in Finding No. 12 that Paternal Grandparents had overnight visits with A.A. on a “fairly regular basis approximately one weekend every other month or so,” arguing that “no documentation, schedules, or other quantitative evidence was ever presented to support this finding.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 7. Mother also challenges the trial court's statement in Finding No. 14 in which it characterizes Paternal Grandparents’ interaction with A.A. and L.A. as “generally good” because “this phrasing is not found verbatim in any testimony.” Id. at 9.

5.   Indeed, Mother initially testified that the primary reason she discontinued all visitation was because she did “not trust [Paternal Grandparents] to not continue to be in contact with their son” and that their having “any contact” with Father puts Mother “at risk.” Transcript Volume II at 12. Mother acknowledged that Father's earliest release date was March 2029, and when pressed by Grandparents’ counsel for further explanation of her safety concerns, Mother admitted that even if Paternal Grandparents “had no contact with [Father]” she would still “fight tooth and nail” for them to have no visitation rights with Child. Id. at 13.

6.   Mother testified that Child “had anxiety” after her visits with Paternal Grandparents, that those “problems arose at the beginning of January,” and that she decided in February 2024 that it was in Child's “best interests not to” visit Paternal Grandparents anymore. Transcript Volume II at 26. Mother later clarified that the anxiety was due to “being separated from Mother,” and had nothing to do with Paternal Grandparents. Id. at 33. When asked if she would be amenable to Parental Grandparents and Child attending counseling to help with the anxiety, Mother dodged the question and reiterated her disdain regarding Paternal Grandparents’ failure to “keep [her] address protected.” Id.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.