In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: F.M.C. and D.M.C. (Minor Children) and T.C. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.C. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to F.M.C. and D.M.C. (Children).¹ Mother argues that termination “is not supported by law” and is therefore erroneous. Appellant's Brief at 6.

[2] We affirm

Facts & Procedural History

[3] F.M.C. was born on July 25, 2009, and D.M.C. was born on March 10, 2011. In March 2021, Mother and Children moved from Texas to Fort Wayne because Mother took a job with General Motors. On May 14, 2021, police responded to a report of a “disturbance” involving Mother at a hotel. Exhibits Vol. I at 59. It was then reported to the Department of Child Services (DCS) that Mother and Children were living at the hotel, that Mother was verbally abusing Children, and that she had told them she did not want them. Five days later DCS received a second report that Mother and Children were living out of a car and that Mother left the Children unsupervised during her work shifts. Children were not attending school and exhibited behavioral issues such as aggression and isolation. Due to the emergency nature of the situation, DCS immediately removed Children from Mother's care.

[4] On May 20, 2021, DCS filed a child in need of services (CHINS) petition, alleging Children were victims of neglect and serious endangerment by Mother. The court held an initial hearing on May 21, 2021. Mother and DCS participated in a dependency mediation on June 10, 2021, at which Mother admitted that she was living out of her car and unable to provide housing for Children. Mother did not object to Children being adjudicated CHINS. On June 14, Children were adjudicated CHINS and the court entered a dispositional order. Mother was ordered to remain accountable to her caseworker; refrain from criminal activity; maintain clean, safe, and appropriate housing; provide Children with clean, appropriate clothing when requested; fully cooperate with the rules of Children's placement and treatment; participate in a psychological assessment; participate in services and keep all appointments; and participate in visits with Children.

[5] A review hearing was held on November 8, 2021, at which the court found Mother had refused DCS access to her home, had not provided pay stubs as evidence of employment, had failed to attend her psychological evaluation, and had not complied with DCS services or visitation. With regard to visitation, DCS had arranged for Mother to visit the Children once per week, but due to her “difficulty managing both children at the same time,” DCS adjusted visitation to be with each child individually. Transcript Vol. 2 at 28. Mother's visits were inconsistent, and she would often cancel visits with F.M.C. but not with D.M.C., which made F.M.C. “extremely upset.” Id. at 29. After December 2021, Mother stopped visiting Children altogether.

[6] A permanency hearing was held on April 25, 2022. The court found that Mother had failed to satisfactorily participate in services required by the dispositional order and that Mother's visits with Children had been “inconsistent” and her interactions with them had been “inappropriate.” Exhibits Vol. 1 at 95. The court therefore suspended Mother's visitation and ordered her to attend five therapy sessions related to appropriate interactions with Children. The court also changed the permanency plan to a concurrent plan of a change of custody of Children to their maternal great-grandparents, who lived in Texas, and termination of Mother's parental rights. The court ordered DCS to identify and secure service as to each of Children's fathers.²

[7] A second permanency hearing was held in August 2022. The court found that Mother had not participated in services, had not demonstrated an ability to benefit from services, and that Mother had stated she did not want to comply with visitations. The court also modified the permanency plan to “termination of parental rights with adoption” after it was determined that maternal great-grandparents would not be able to adopt Children. Id. at 104. DCS informed the court that it would not seek termination until after a suitable, pre-adoptive home for Children was found.³

[8] Throughout the proceedings, DCS provided Mother with referrals for a number of services, including therapy and home-based case work to help with housing and life skills. Mother, however, failed to contact or consistently follow up with service providers. For instance, DCS made three referrals for Mother to obtain a psychiatric evaluation at the Bowen Center, but all three referrals expired before Mother responded to the attempts to contact her. Mother attended one therapy session after her initial diagnostic session in 2021 but failed to return for additional sessions. Mother refused to provide her family case manager with her address and did not contact the family case manager for the entirety of 2022. Mother contacted her family case manager in April 2023 and indicated a desire to reengage in services.

[9] Mother never obtained stable housing, but rather, “bounced around” between hotels and motels. Transcript Vol. 2 at 156. At one point, Mother secured an apartment on her own but was unable to maintain it in a livable condition and was ultimately evicted in June 2024. Case workers who visited Mother at the apartment reported that it had “a lot of clutter” and “heavy smells of chemicals,” thereby rendering it an unsuitable place for Children to live. Id. at 68, 110. After her eviction, Mother again lived in her car for a time and then moved to a motel. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was still living in a motel.

[10] Mother began attending therapy sessions at the end of 2023. Her therapist set goals of improving her anxiety, problem solving, relationships, and parenting skills. By the time of the termination hearing, Mother had completed nineteen therapy sessions. However, Mother's therapist did not believe Mother had made any progress in improving parenting skills, problem solving, or relationships. Any time the therapist wanted to discuss parenting, Mother became “frustrated” and “defensive” and changed the topic. Id. at 109. According to her therapist, Mother had not demonstrated the skills necessary to properly care for Children emotionally.

[11] Children remained with their initial foster placement for about two years. In July 2023, Children's bevhavioral issues were causing damage to their foster home, so DCS, at the foster parents’ request, moved Children to a new foster family in Michigan City. In their new placement, Children's behavioral problems lessened and their grades in school improved. F.M.C. had struggled with tantrums but in the six months leading up to the termination hearing, he had not had a tantrum. F.M.C. was on track to graduate and D.M.C.’s teachers reported that his behavior had improved, and he was making better decisions. The foster family in Michigan City wishes to adopt Children.

[12] On May 1, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. The court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition on October 22, 24, and 29, 2024. At the hearing, a family case manager and a court appointed special advocate (CASA) both testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Children.

[13] On January 27, 2025, the court entered a twenty-nine-page order terminating Mother's parental rights. The court made detailed findings of fact, including that Mother did not regularly participate in services, that her parenting skills had not improved, that she had not visited with Children since late 2021, and that she had not obtained safe, stable, and appropriate housing throughout the entirety of the CHINS proceedings. The court concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that there a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal of Children from Mother's care would not be remedied and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Children. Mother now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[14] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). “A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). We recognize that “parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. If “parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities[,]” termination of parental rights is appropriate. Id. The termination of a parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[15] Mindful of the trial court's “unique position to assess the evidence,” Indiana appellate courts rely on a “deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We neither reweigh evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses. See K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment, and we accord deference to the trial court's “opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand.” Id. In addition, we note that unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[16] In Indiana, before a parent's rights can be involuntarily terminated, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship and prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests; and that at least one of the elements listed in I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d) is established. Those elements include, in relevant part:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

[17] If the trial court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, it “shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS has the burden to prove the required elements “by clear and convincing evidence.” C.A. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing I.C. § 31-37-14-2). “[C]lear and convincing evidence requires the existence of a fact to ‘be highly probable.’ ” Id. (quoting In re D.W., 969 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

[18] Mother does not raise any specific challenge to any of the court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. Mother has therefore waived any arguments relating to these unchallenged findings. S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 614 n.2 (explaining that this court will accept unchallenged trial court findings as true). Inasmuch as Mother has not challenged the trial court's conclusions, she has conceded that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence the allegations in the petition to terminate her parental rights. See id.

[19] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Children. As we noted above, parental interests are not absolute and “must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in child's removal will not be remedied, courts must consider a parent's habitual patterns of conduct. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231-32.

[20] Here, the trial court detailed the circumstances that gave rise to the removal of Children from Mother's care and considered Mother's actions over the next three years. The evidence supports the court's findings that throughout the entire pendency of the CHINS action, Mother failed to consistently engage in court-ordered services, never obtained safe, stable, and suitable housing, and had not visited with Children in nearly two and a half years. The evidence also supports the court's findings that Children's behaviors were improving, they were attending school, and, overall, they were doing well in their current preadoptive foster home. These findings support its conclusion that Mother is unlikely to remedy the conditions that led to removal and that termination was in Children's best interests.

[21] We reject Mother's argument that the trial court's order terminating her parental rights was premature given her recent request to reengage in services. Mother has had more than three years to get herself in a position to have Children returned to her care. As of the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not visited with Children in more than three years and had made no strides toward obtaining a safe, suitable place to live. Mother's total lack of engagement in services for more than a year and her history of non-compliance is more telling than her recent stated desire to reengage in services. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (holding that a trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination). Children need not languish in the system so Mother can have yet another chance. Matter of C.M., 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that a trial court “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship”).

[22] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   F.L., father of F.M.C., does not participate in this appeal. J.J., father of D.M.C., is deceased.

2.   The CHINS matter was extended due to DCS's difficulty in identifying and locating the fathers of each child.

3.   Children were in foster care, but DCS noted that the foster parent was “struggling” to manage Children's behaviors. Id. at 105.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.