Steven Liskey and Natalie Chabot Liskey, Appellants-Defendants v. Jacqueline M. Staatz, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jacqueline Staatz owns real estate across the street from LaPorte County's Hudson Lake. Although her property is physically landlocked, Jacqueline has historically had lake access because her deed includes a walkway easement over a 10-foot-wide strip of land that runs from the street to the lake (the Strip). Steven and Natalie Liskey purportedly own half the Strip by virtue of County Ordinance No. 2019-12, which vacated an alleged “public way” over the Strip. This lawsuit arose when the Liskeys began interfering with Jacqueline's easement by, among other things, removing from the Strip a staircase that enabled pedestrian access to the lake.

[2] Jacqueline sued the Liskeys for both a declaratory judgment as to the validity of her easement and an injunction requiring that the Liskeys replace the Strip's staircase and otherwise restore her lake access. The Liskeys assumed that, by vacating the alleged public way over the Strip, Ordinance No. 2019-12 had inherently extinguished Jacqueline's easement. They also assumed that, for the easement to be enforceable, the Ordinance must be invalid. Therefore, when Jacqueline moved for summary judgment, the Liskeys focused their opposing arguments on the validity of the Ordinance and, alternatively, the ramifications of the trial court finding it invalid. The Liskeys, however, cited no authority and made no argument to support their underlying assumptions.

[3] The trial court entered summary judgment in Jacqueline's favor without addressing the validity of Ordinance No. 2019-12. Instead, the court assumed the Ordinance was valid and expressly concluded that it did not affect Jacqueline's walkway easement over the Strip. On appeal, the Liskeys again focus their arguments on the validity of the Ordinance and the ramifications of the trial court finding it invalid. But they again cite no authority and make no argument to support their underlying assumptions. Because the Liskeys do not bridge these critical legal gaps, they have failed in their appellate burden of proving Jacqueline was not entitled to summary judgment. We affirm.

Facts

[4] In 1980, William and Vula Miller acquired real estate that would become the three parcels labeled below as the Dittrich Property, the Liskey Property, and the Staatz Property. The Millers also acquired the Strip, the 10-foot-wide strip of land between the Dittrich Property and the Liskey Property, labeled below as the Walkway Easement.

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Appellants’ Br., p. 7; Appellee's Br., p. 6.

[5] In 1981, the Millers conveyed the landlocked Staatz Property to Mary and James Staatz. Because the property did not have physical access to the lake, the Millers also granted Mary and James “a walkway easement through, over and across” the Strip. App. Vol. II, p. 104. Mary and James's warranty deed for the Staatz Property expressly included the walkway easement and was recorded as Document No. 86-05488. Since then, the easement has been continuously transferred with the Staatz Property through successive, recorded deeds.

[6] Jacqueline acquired the Staatz Property in 2017, and her warranty deed was promptly recorded as Document No. 2017R-09316. As with the deeds of the Staatz Property's prior owners, Jacqueline's deed expressly included the walkway easement over the Strip. The Strip had no recorded owner at that time, but a prior owner had installed a staircase at one end to allow pedestrian access to the lake.

[7] When Jacqueline acquired the Staatz Property, the Liskey Property was owned by Gregory and Patricia Gilmore. In April 2017, the Gilmores filed a quiet title action to establish ownership of the Strip. Two months later, after no interested parties appeared in the action, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the Gilmores. The written judgment expressly stated that the Strip remained subject to the Staatz Property's walkway easement. That judgment, however, was never recorded.

[8] In November 2017, the Liskeys purchased the Liskey Property from the Gilmores. Their signed purchase agreement noted: “[Two] properties have an easement to [the Liskey Property] – [the Staatz Property] and [the property immediately south of it].” App. Vol. II, p. 139. The agreement also noted: “[The Staatz Property] has sold and has access to the water.” Id. But the Liskeys’ warranty deed only conveyed the Liskey Property to the Liskeys. It did not convey the Strip—the land actually encumbered by the Staatz Property's walkway easement.

[9] When the Liskeys acquired the Liskey Property, the Dittrich Property was owned by Dennis and Cynthia Dittrich. In 2019, the Liskeys obtained a boundary survey of the Liskey Property and surrounding real estate. According to the Liskeys, this survey identified the Strip as a “ ‘Walkway Easement’ per the ‘Miller's Lake Park Unrecorded Subdivision.’ ”¹ Appellants’ Br., p. 10. The Liskeys interpreted this to mean the Strip was a dedicated alley and, thus, a “public way” that could be vacated by the LaPorte County Plan Commission.² They therefore petitioned the Commission to vacate the alleged public way. In theory, this would establish that the Strip's adjacent landowners—the Liskeys and the Dittrichs—each owned one five-foot half of the ten-foot-wide Strip.

[10] The Commission ultimately granted the Liskeys’ petition, finding all interested parties had received proper notice of the public meetings thereon. The result was Ordinance No. 2019-12, entitled “An Ordinance to Vacate an Unimproved Public Way Adjacent to [the Liskey Property], Which Public Way Is a Platted but Unimproved 10’ Alleyway Along the Northern Side of [the Liskey Property].” App. Vol. III, p. 27 (all caps omitted). The operative language of this Ordinance, however, only vacated the alleged public way over half the Strip—the five feet adjacent to the Liskey Property. The Commission took no action as to the half of the Strip adjacent to the Dittrich Property.

[11] In 2020, the Dittrichs petitioned the Commission to vacate the alleged public way over the remaining half of the Strip. But at a public meeting on their petition, the Commission determined that no public way existed because the plat on which the alley allegedly was plotted had never been recorded. The Commission therefore concluded that it lacked any jurisdiction over the Strip, prompting the Dittrichs to withdraw their petition. Meanwhile, Patricia Gilmore and Jacqueline both appeared at the meeting and requested that the Commission rescind Ordinance No. 2019-12. The Commission advised that it had no authority to do so because the Liskeys’ petition was no longer before it.

[12] With Ordinance No. 2019-12 still in effect, the Liskeys considered themselves owners of half the Strip. They soon removed the Strip's staircase and installed landscaping that prevented pedestrian access to the lake. They also generally refused to honor the Staatz Property's walkway easement. Therefore, in 2022, Jacqueline sued the Liskeys, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the easement and an injunction requiring the Liskeys to replace the Strip's staircase and otherwise restore her lake access.

[13] Jacqueline eventually moved for summary judgment, which the Liskeys opposed. The Liskeys assumed that, by vacating the alleged public way over the Strip, Ordinance No. 2019-12 had inherently extinguished the Staatz Property's walkway easement. But the Liskeys cited no authority and made no argument to support that legal proposition. Instead, they focused on the validity of the Ordinance, arguing that Jacqueline had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for challenging it. The Liskeys ultimately concluded: “Because [Jacqueline] failed to challenge the vacation Ordinance, her alleged walkway easement is not valid and enforceable.” App. Vol. III, pp. 10-11.

[14] The Liskeys also assumed that, for the Staatz Property's walkway easement to be enforceable, Ordinance No. 2019-12 must be invalid. But the Liskeys cited no authority and made no argument to support that legal proposition either. Instead, they argued that an invalid Ordinance means the Gilmores own the Strip by virtue of their quiet title judgment. If the Gilmores own the Strip, the Liskeys reasoned, only the Gilmores could be ordered to replace its staircase and otherwise restore Jacqueline's lake access. Thus, the Liskeys concluded: “If [the trial court] determines that the ․ vacation Ordinance did not terminate [Jacqueline's] easement claims, then the Gilmores must be joined in this action.” Id. at 11-12.

[15] Jacqueline, in turn, claimed that Ordinance No. 2019-12 is ultra vires and void because the Strip was never a public way over which the Commission had jurisdiction. The trial court, however, granted Jacquline's motion for summary judgment without addressing the Ordinance's validity. Assuming the Ordinance was valid, the court expressly concluded:

[T]he vacation of the public right of way did not affect Staatz's easement. Ind. Code § 36-7-3-12 creates a procedure for a legislative body, in this case the Plan Commission, to vacate a public way. Ind. Code § 36-7-1-17 defines public way, “ ‘Public way’ includes highway, street, avenue, boulevard, road, lane, or alley.” The Liskeys used this procedure to obtain Ordinance 2019-12, which, as titled, vacates a public way. A private easement is not a “public way” and so this proceeding did not affect the private easement that is claimed by Staatz.

App. Vol. II, p. 20 (emphasis added). The Liskeys appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[16] “When reviewing a summary judgment ruling, we use the same standard as the trial court.” State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Although our review is de novo, “a trial court's judgment comes to this court clothed with a presumption of validity, and the appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court erred.” Schwartz v. Heeter, 994 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. 2013) (internal quotations omitted).

[17] The Liskeys fail to meet their burden on appeal. In arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate, the Liskeys claim Ordinance 2019-12 was valid and that Jacqueline failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for challenging it. But the Liskeys again cite no authority and make no argument to support the assumption underlying these claims—that a valid Ordinance inherently extinguished the Staatz Property's walkway easement over the Strip.

[18] Alternatively, the Liskeys claim that Jacqueline's summary judgment is void because an invalid Ordinance means the Gilmores own the Strip, making them indispensable yet un-joined parties to the lawsuit. But the Liskeys cite no authority and make no argument to support the assumption underlying this claim either—that Ordinance 2019-12 must be invalid for the Staatz Property's walkway easement to be enforceable.

[19] The Liskeys omissions stand in stark contrast to the trial court's summary judgment order. The trial court expressly concluded that Ordinance No. 2019-12 “did not affect” the Staatz Property's walkway easement over the Strip. App. Vol. II, p. 20. And in doing so, the court reasoned that the Ordinance vacated an alleged public way, which by statutory definition, did not include a private easement. Thus, the court assumed the Ordinance's validity and still found that the Staatz Property's walkway easement was enforceable.

[20] Special findings and conclusions “are not required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal.” Fields v. Gaw, 213 N.E.3d 1028, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). But “a trial court's judgment comes to this court clothed with a presumption of validity,” Schwartz, 994 N.E.2d at 1105, and “[w]e will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on [their] behalf. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023).

[21] Because the Liskeys do not establish the critical legal propositions upon which their appellate arguments are based, they have failed to carry their burden of proving Jacqueline was not entitled to summary judgment. We therefore affirm.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   The boundary survey is included in the record. It identifies the Strip as a “Walkway Easement” and lists an “Unrecorded ‘Miller's Plat of Lake Park’ ” as one of the sources consulted in the survey's preparation. App. Vol. III, p. 24 (all caps omitted). The survey's text is difficult to read, but it does not appear to attribute the “Walkway Easement” to any particular source. The Miller's Plat of Lake Park is not included in the record.

2.   Indiana Code § 36-7-3-12 authorizes certain government bodies to vacate public ways, which Indiana Code § 36-7-1-17 defines as including a “highway, street, avenue, boulevard, road, lane, or alley.”

3.   To be clear, the validity of Ordinance 2019-12 and the ownership of the Strip are not before us on appeal. We make no ruling on those issues.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges May and Scheele concur. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.