C.G., Appellant-Respondent v. D.T., Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.G., pro se, appeals the trial court's order for protection entered in favor of D.T., raising the following two restated issues: (1) Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order, and (2) Did the trial court deny C.G. a hearing? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] C.G. and D.T. began dating in 2015. The couple broke up in 2022, although they maintained a non-romantic relationship for some time. At some point, C.G. contracted a human papillomavirus (“HPV”) infection, which caused her to develop cervical cancer. C.G. believed she contracted HPV from D.T.

[3] In early June 2024, D.T. stopped responding when C.G. tried to contact him. Over the next few months, C.G. continued reaching out to D.T. by leaving him voicemails, sending him letters in the mail, emailing him at work, and leaving notes on his car parked outside his house. In the messages, she alleged he caused the cancer, asked for his help, and requested he reimburse her for medical expenses upwards of $100,000. She also indicated she planned to hire an attorney to sue him and put him on a “sexual predator list,” which D.T. feared would affect his job as the dean of students at an elementary school. Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. D.T. also worried about C.G. telling people he had a sexually transmitted infection. D.T. did not respond to C.G.’s attempts to contact him. Although D.T. eventually blocked C.G.’s phone number, he began receiving calls from a different number. One time, C.G. called the workplace of D.T.’s family member trying to reach him. On another occasion, C.G. approached D.T. unannounced at a restaurant while he was having breakfast with his coworkers. D.T. asked her to leave, which she did after D.T. said he would call the police. Twice D.T. made police reports after C.G. left notes on his car.

[4] On August 6, 2024, D.T. moved for a protection order alleging he was a victim of domestic or family violence, stalking, and repeated acts of harassment. In his verified petition, D.T. listed thirty incidents of alleged harassment.¹ The trial court entered an ex parte protection order pending a hearing within thirty days, after which C.G. ceased contacting D.T.

[5] The trial court held a hearing on September 4. C.G. and D.T. both appeared pro se. D.T. testified and introduced into evidence the letters C.G. mailed and left on his car. The trial court permitted C.G. to cross-examine D.T. C.G. also testified. In response to the trial court's questions, she acknowledged she contacted D.T. on the thirty occasions listed in the petition and sent the messages after D.T. stopped responding to her. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 28–30.

[6] The trial court found C.G. engaged in stalking and repeated acts of harassment. As such, the trial court enjoined C.G. from threatening to commit or committing acts of stalking or harassment against D.T. and from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with” him for two years. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 7. The trial court also ordered C.G. to stay away from D.T.’s residence and place of employment. C.G. moved the trial court to reconsider the order which the court denied.

Standard of Review

[7] We first acknowledge C.G. proceeds pro se. It is well-established that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[8] We also note D.T. has not filed an appellate brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). If an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm.

[9] Although C.G. requests de novo review of the trial court's protection order and urges us to reach our “own independent conclusion” on the facts, that is not our role. Appellant's Br. at 12. Our two-tiered standard of reviewing a protection order is well established: first we consider whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and if so, we determine whether those findings support the judgment. S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023). “In making these determinations, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. We adopt this approach because “our trial courts are far better than appellate courts ‘at weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility.’ ” Id. at 498 (quoting Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017)). “And this is particularly true in protective order cases, where our trial judges see and hear the parties interact as they relay details about intensely personal, traumatic events.” Id.

Sufficient evidence supports the protection order.

[10] The trial court found C.G. committed stalking or repeated acts of harassment to justify issuing a protection order. A person who is or has been a victim of domestic or family violence—which includes stalking, whether or not committed by a family or household member—may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed stalking. I.C. § 34-26-5- 2(a)(2) (2021); I.C. § 34-6-2-34.5 (definition of “domestic or family violence”).² Stalking means “a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened,” but does not include statutorily or constitutionally protected activity. I.C. § 35-45-10-1 (1993).

[11] Similarly, a person who is or has been subjected to harassment may petition for a protection order against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against him. I.C. § 34-26-5-2(b). In this context, “harassment” means “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5(a) (2019).³ Impermissible contact includes following or pursuing the victim and communicating with the victim. I.C. § 35-45-10-3 (2022).⁴

[12] A petitioner must establish domestic or family violence (here, stalking) or harassment occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. See I.C. § 34-26-5-9(h); see also S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498 (“[O]ur trial courts need only determine whether the petitioner has made the requisite showings by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Trial courts must consider the evidence and determine whether the respondent's actions—viewed objectively at the time the petitioner seeks relief—provide grounds for relief. See S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499.

[13] A trial court's finding that stalking or harassment has occurred is sufficient to establish the respondent represents a credible threat to the petitioner's safety. See I.C. § 34-26-5-9(h). Upon a showing of stalking or harassment by a preponderance of the evidence, “the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of ․ the threat of violence.” Id. Among other relief, a trial court may enjoin a respondent from threatening to commit or committing an act of stalking against a petitioner or “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with a petitioner.” I.C. § 34-26-5-9(c)(1), (c)(2), (d). A trial court may also order a respondent to stay away from the petitioner's residence, school, or place of employment. Id.

[14] The evidence favorable to the judgment is as follows: D.T. and C.G. were in a seven-year relationship and broke up in 2022. D.T. cut off contact with C.G. in June 2024. At the time, C.G. was “saying that she wanted [him] to hurt or feel ․ pain” and “saying stuff about [his] job” and “putting [him] on some ․ sex offender” registry. Tr. Vol. 2 at 10, 11. C.G. then attempted to contact him around thirty times between June and August by phone, email, and letter. When she called and left messages, “[t]here was anger.” Id. at 11. D.T. did not respond. D.T. also made police reports when C.G. left letters on his car in front of his residence. In one letter, C.G. wrote, “If you don't talk to me, then you are going to be blindsided.” Ex. Vol. 3 at 6. When C.G. interrupted D.T. while he was eating out at a restaurant with his coworkers, he believed she had been following him. She left after he threatened to call the police. The next day, C.G. sent an email saying, “gloves off,” which D.T. believed meant she was “moving forward with coming after” him and hiring an attorney to put him on a “sexual predator list.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 19.

[15] D.T. feared C.G.’s actions would affect his livelihood as an elementary educator. In his verified petition, D.T. explained C.G. “continues to threaten me and [say] I have [a sexually transmitted infection.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26. He sought the protection order because “I start back at work Monday 8/5/24 and I do not have time to be worried [about] my job, my home, [and her] spreading rumors to ruin my reputation[.]” Id. at 27. At the hearing, he pointed to her acts of “coming to [his] place of residence leaving stuff on [his] car” and approaching him at the restaurant as evidence of stalking. Tr. Vol. 2 at 21. He testified, “I just want this stuff to stop” and “I want her to just leave me alone.” Id. at 22, 34.

[16] By sending D.T. repeated messages over three months, leaving notes on his car at his home, contacting his family member, telling others he had a sexually transmitted infection, and confronting him in public while he was with coworkers, C.G. engaged in repeated and continuing communication that would cause a reasonable person to feel threatened or suffer emotional distress and caused D.T. to feel threatened and emotional distress. The evidence therefore supports the trial court's finding C.G. engaged in stalking and repeated acts of harassment as to D.T. and in turn supports the issuance of a protection order.

[17] On appeal, C.G. argues the evidence was insufficient because she testified D.T. never explicitly told her not to contact him, she was unaware D.T. intended to cut off contact, and she was merely trying to reach him because she was worried about him. See Appellant's Br. at 7. But the trial court did not credit her testimony. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 30 (trial court observing, “based on everything I'm looking at, he has made it pretty clear that he doesn't want to have any contact with you at all”). Moreover, at the hearing, C.G. acknowledged that D.T. “cut [her] off” in early June. See id. at 29 (C.G. stating she received text messages from D.T. “as late as June 8th and 9th ․ the day before he cut me off”). And the letters C.G. sent D.T. show she was aware he was deliberately avoiding contact with her. See Ex. Vol. 3 at 4 (C.G. writing on June 23, “It's now been two weeks and not so much as a text to see how I am doing. Nothing.”); id. at 6 (C.G. writing on August 1, “you have decided to completely cut me out of your life”). C.G. essentially requests we reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility on this point, which we cannot do. S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497.

[18] C.G. also argues D.T. did not testify he felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened or suffered emotional distress and therefore failed to establish stalking or harassment to justify a protection order. She likens her case to L.O. v. D.O., 124 N.E.3d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In that case, the parties were involved in a contentious divorce, and wife alleged in her protection order petition that husband “threatened” her about the children and money issues. Id. at 1238. At the hearing, wife testified: “My only issue was he just kept texting me and texting me and wouldn't leave me alone when I asked him not to. And then his family members started calling me ․ and telling me that he was planning on taking the kids and running off with them[.]” Id. On appeal, this Court first observed that “[a]rgumentative or annoying behavior ․ does not rise to the level of threatening behavior.” Id. at 1240. Then, after reviewing the messages, the Court determined both parties had initiated messages about the children and money. Yet nothing in the messages suggested wife felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened, or suffered emotional distress. And although wife testified at the hearing, she did not testify to the effect of husband's contacts on her. In light of the “sparse record” in the case, the Court held there was insufficient probative evidence to support the issuance of a protection order. Id. at 1241; see also Maurer v. Cobb-Mauer, 994 N.E.2d 753, 758–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding there was insufficient evidence to support issuing a protection order in part because the petitioner did not testify about the effect the contacts had on her).

[19] Unlike these cases, D.T. filed a detailed, verified petition setting forth C.G.’s repeated attempts to contact him over three months and summarizing the contents of her communications. He made two police reports about the contact. At the hearing, D.T. testified directly about many of the incidents in the petition and spoke at length about C.G.’s behavior and the messages’ content. D.T. also introduced six of the letters and emails he received. He described feeling worried about his job at an elementary school due to her threats to pursue legal action to put him on a sex offender registry and distressed by her telling people he had a sexually transmitted infection. The trial court was able to assess D.T.’s demeanor as he testified about these incidents. Given the great deference we give to the trial court's role in assessing witness credibility, particularly in protection order cases, see S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498, the documentary evidence, testimony, and reasonable inferences therefrom in this case are sufficient to establish D.T. felt threatened or suffered emotional distress from C.G.’s repeated, unwanted contacts.

[20] Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's protection order.

The trial court did not deny C.G. a hearing.

[21] C.G. also argues the trial court denied her an opportunity to present testimony, evidence, and argument on her behalf and therefore denied her a hearing.

[22] If it appears from a petition for an order for protection the domestic or family violence has occurred, a trial court may immediately issue an ex parte protection order without notice or hearing. I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(1). After a trial court enters an ex parte protection order under circumstances like those presented here, a court shall set a hearing on the petition within thirty days of the petition being filed. See I.C. § 34-26-5-10(c) (2023).

[23] The legislature did not define “hearing” in the protection order statutes, but this Court has determined a hearing in this context means one in which the petitioner may “present testimony, call witnesses on his or her behalf, and cross-examine any witnesses.” Essany v. Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding the trial court erred when it did not permit the petitioner to testify or cross-examine the respondent before dismissing the petition). Subsequent cases have expanded Essany to include the presentation of evidence. See N.E. v. L.W., 130 N.E. 3d 102, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding a protection order hearing “did not meet the minimum requirements of Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9 and that the trial court erred when it did not allow [petitioner] to testify, present evidence, and call witnesses before denying her petition”).

[24] At the hearing, D.T. testified, and the trial court asked him questions about his petition. He then offered the six letters and emails from C.G., and the trial court asked if C.G. had any objections. She did not, and the trial court admitted the documents. The trial court also offered C.G. the opportunity to cross-examine D.T. She asked him questions about certain factual allegations he made with which she disagreed, including that (1) she sent a Facebook “friend request” to D.T.’s coworker, (2) she called him from a different phone number, and (3) he cut off contact because she threatened his job. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 25–26.

[25] When it was C.G.’s turn to testify, the trial court first asked her, “[A]re you denying that you contacted him [in] all of these 30 incidents that he's mentioned in his petition?” and C.G. responded, “No, I'm not denying it.” Id. at 28. The trial court then asked C.G. “what [she had] to say about the situation.” Id. C.G. requested to read a four-page statement she prepared on the advice of Northwest Indiana Volunteer Lawyers, but the trial court asked her to instead summarize the contents in the interest of time. C.G. then testified D.T. never told her not to contact him, she reached out several times because she was concerned about him, and D.T. “promised he wouldn't walk away” and would help pay her medical bills. Id. at 32. C.G. offered to introduce text messages showing D.T. told her he was “not leaving” her and “if he doesn't immediately respond to [her], it's because he just needs time to process things.” Id. at 29. The trial court asked if D.T. sent the messages “before he filed this proceeding and ․ indicated to you that he didn't want you to contact him[,]” to which C.G. responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” Id. at 30. The trial court did not accept or read the messages.

[26] On appeal, C.G. argues the trial court committed reversible error when it did not admit the text messages she offered to contradict D.T.’s verified petition and sworn testimony. She alleges he perjured himself and the text messages prove it.⁵ But C.G. acknowledged at the hearing D.T. sent those messages before D.T. ceased contact with her, greatly limiting their relevancy on the question of whether C.G. thereafter engaged in repeated or continuing harassment or impermissible contact to justify a protection order. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Evid. R. 402. It was within the trial court's discretion to refuse to admit the text messages because they did not make a consequential fact more or less probable. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Earl, 33 N.E.3d 337, 340 (Ind. 2019) (“We trust issues of admissibility to the sound discretion of our trial judges, and we review their evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.”).

[27] The record also shows C.G. either testified or cross-examined D.T. about the subject matter in the text messages she sought to offer. As such, it is unclear how the text messages would change the outcome of this case. This is especially true considering C.G.’s admission that she attempted to contact D.T. thirty times in three months, even though he was not responding. See A.P. v. A.S., No. 20A-PO-1486, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2021) (mem.) (holding the trial court's refusal to admit respondents’ sixty-one exhibits of text and Facebook messages offered to contradict the petitioner's testimony about the messages’ content was not an error because respondents “have not placed anything before the court that would have changed the result” particularly considering their admissions they sent the messages and had no reason to be doing so). Even on appeal, C.G. acknowledges, “While [she] does not agree with every incident [D.T.] reported in his petition, she does agree that she did repeatedly try to contact him[.]” Appellant's Br. at 7. And although she claims that is because she was unaware D.T. cut contact with her, it was within the trial court's discretion to weigh the evidence and witness credibility on that point. S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497. The trial court did not deny C.G. a hearing.

Conclusion

[28] There was sufficient evidence to support the protection order, and the trial court did not deny C.G. a hearing.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   C.G. argues D.T.’s petition was insufficient for failing to attach affidavits by one or more persons who have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the petition. D.T. petitioned for relief using the form prepared by the Office of Judicial Administration in accordance with the protection order statute. See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-3(a) (2018). The statute requires petitions to be verified or under oath under Indiana Trial Rule 11. See I.C. § 34-26-5-3(e). According to the form instructions, affidavits are only required if the petition is “made solely on the basis of Petitioner's information and belief”—that is, matters outside the petitioner's personal knowledge. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 31. D.T.’s verified petition was based on matters within his personal knowledge, making a supporting affidavit unnecessary.C.G. also alleges D.T. perjured himself when he checked the box on the form which states, “I am or have been a victim of domestic or family violence.” See id. at 12. But as discussed below, the statutory definition of “domestic or family violence” includes “stalking.” I.C. § 34-6-2-34.5 (2019).

2.   In addition to stalking, the statutory definition of “domestic or family violence” includes the following acts committed by a family or household member: (1) attempting to, threatening to, or causing physical harm to another family or household member; (2) placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm; (3) causing a family or household member to involuntarily engage in sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress; and (4) abusing, torturing, mutilating, or killing an animal to threaten, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or household member. See I.C. § 34-6-2-34.5. As there was no evidence C.G. committed such acts, we consider only whether C.G. presented sufficient evidence of stalking or harassment. See L.O. v. D.O., 124 N.E.3d 1237, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

3.   Like stalking, harassment does not include “statutorily or constitutionally protected activity, such as lawful picketing pursuant to labor disputes or lawful employer-related activities pursuant to labor disputes.” I.C. § 34-6-2-51.5(b).

4.   Although the civil code does not define “impermissible contact,” this Court has applied to civil protection cases the term's definition from the criminal statutes. See, e.g., J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); Fox v. Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

5.   C.G. does not identify most of D.T.’s allegedly false statements in the argument section of her brief but identifies some in her statement of facts. There, C.G. alleges D.T. “accused [C.G.] of guilt tripping and trying to get money out of him because he decided to cut contact with her.” Appellant's Br. at 6. She states the text messages show D.T. offered to help with her medical bills. C.G. also points to D.T.’s testimony that C.G. had only recently threatened a lawsuit that would affect his job, causing him to seek the protection order. C.G. contends the text messages show she and D.T. had repeatedly discussed a lawsuit, but “she could never actually go through with it because it could cost him his job and she would never do anything to [D.T.] to cause him to lose his job.” Id. Other allegedly false statements she identifies and sought to refute with text messages are: (1) D.T. explicitly told C.G. not to contact him anymore, (2) C.G. called D.T.’s mother's office, and in fact, it was his stepmother's office; (3) C.G. called D.T. from an unknown/different phone number; and (4) C.G. sent a Facebook “friend request” to D.T.’s coworker. See id. at 7–8.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.