Brenda A. Granados Barcenas, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Brenda A. Granados Barcenas appeals her conviction for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. Barcenas raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the results of the blood test that was administered as the result of a search warrant. Barcenas argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Shortly before 7:00 a.m. on March 23, 2024, Barcenas rear-ended a vehicle in her lane of traffic, which was stopped at a stoplight. The driver of that vehicle called 9-1-1. Prior to Barcenas rear-ending his vehicle, the driver had observed Barcenas driving erratically and well below the speed limit.

[4] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Bradley Harris responded to the accident report. As the officer approached Barcenas's vehicle, Barcenas exited the vehicle. The officer observed that Barcenas was leaning backwards, and he feared she was going to fall into the adjacent lane of traffic. Barcenas seemed confused and reported to the officer that she had driven off the road and had struck a tree. However, she could not remember where that incident had occurred. Officer Harris observed fresh mud “all over” Barcenas's vehicle. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 31-32. Barcenas also admitted to consuming beer two or three hours earlier. After the officer interviewed another witness to the accident who also reported Barcenas's erratic driving behavior, he directed his attention back to Barcenas. He noted that her eyes were red and she had urinated on herself. The officer also smelled the odor of alcohol on Barcenas's breath “as she spoke.” Id. at 32.

[5] Officer Harris believed that Barcenas might be intoxicated, and therefore, he administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to her.¹ During the test, the officer asked Barcenas to follow the tip of his pen with her eyes only as he moved it in front of her head. Id. at 42. Because Barcenas exhibited signs of intoxication during the test, Officer Harris asked Barcenas to submit to a chemical test. Barcenas refused. Therefore, Officer Harris sought and obtained a warrant requiring Barcenas to submit to a blood draw. He transported Barcenas to Eskenazi Hospital where a nurse performed a blood draw at approximately 9:00 a.m. The results established a blood alcohol level of 0.130.

[6] The State charged Barcenas with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of at least .08 or more. Barcenas's bench trial commenced on January 21, 2025. Barcenas objected to the admission of the blood test results. She argued that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court overruled her objection. At the close of evidence, the court entered a judgment of conviction on the Class A misdemeanor charge and sentenced Barcenas to 300 days with 298 days suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Barcenas claims that the warrant authorizing the blood test was not supported by probable cause, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the results of that test into evidence.

The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Guilmette [v. State], 14 N.E.3d [38,] 40 [(Ind. 2014)]. Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and ordinarily reversed when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997). However, when a challenge to such a ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo. Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017).

[8] The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The text of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. “ ‘Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the most essential constitutional rights under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995)). Therefore, evidence seized in violation of these constitutional rights may not be admitted at trial. Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 313-14 (Ind. 2018); Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[9] The General Assembly has codified these principles in Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2 (2014), as follows in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in section 8 of this chapter, and subject to the requirements of section 11 of this chapter, if applicable, no warrant for search or arrest shall be issued until there is filed with the judge an affidavit:

(1) particularly describing:

(A) the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for; or

(B) particularly describing the person to be arrested;

(2) alleging substantially the offense in relation thereto and that the affiant believes and has good cause to believe that:

(A) the things sought are concealed there; or

(B) the person to be arrested committed the offense; and

(3) setting forth the facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge or based on hearsay, constituting the probable cause.

[10] “The determination of probable cause is based on the facts of each case and requires the issuing magistrate to ‘make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” Darring v. State, 101 N.E.3d 263, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Keeylen v. State, 14 N.E.3d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on reh'g, 21 N.E.3d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)); see also Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that probable cause is a fluid concept incapable of precise definition and is to be decided based on the facts of each case), trans. denied. “ ‘Probable cause is only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not a certainty that a crime was committed.’ ” Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 871 (quoting Suarez v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 581 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 2009)).

[11] “The act of drawing a person's blood by the State, or at the direction of the State, in furtherance of a police investigation is a type of search that is subject to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment and [A]rticle [1], [S]ection 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” L.W. v. State, 199 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Barcenas argues that the magistrate lacked a substantial basis to conclude evidence of intoxication would be found in her blood sample.² See, e.g., Combs v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1252, 1255-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[12] Specifically, Barcenas claims that there was no probable cause for the warrant because Officer Harris only performed one of three field sobriety tests and did not complete the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. But Barcenas ignores the other facts which led Officer Harris to conclude that she was intoxicated.

[13] Before he administered the test, Officer Harris observed that Barcenas struggled with her balance, was confused, and admitted to driving her car off the road and hitting a tree. Barcenas's vehicle had a significant amount of fresh mud on it. The other driver involved in the accident and another motorist told the officer that Barcenas's driving was erratic, including that she crossed the centerline more than once and drove in the oncoming lane of traffic. Barcenas's eyes were red, she admitted to drinking beer, and she had urinated on herself. And while the officer did not initially smell the odor of alcohol on Barcenas's breath, likely due to the windy conditions that morning, he “smelled a very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage from her breath as she spoke” after the officer turned Barcenas so the wind was at her back. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 32. Officer Harris then administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and Barcenas exhibited signs of intoxication during that test. Id. at 33-34.

[14] The totality of these facts established a fair probability that Barcenas was under the influence of alcohol such that there was “an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of” her faculties. See Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86(1) (2013) (defining intoxication under the influence of alcohol); see also Awbrey v. State, 191 N.E.3D 925, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Because a substantial basis existed to conclude that evidence of intoxication would be found in Barcenas's blood sample, the warrant authorizing the blood test was supported by probable cause.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The officer did not conduct any additional fields tests because Barcenas “was cold. We were standing in the middle of a three-lane road. It was dark. There was ․ ambient light in the area, but it wasn't a lot.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 34.

2.   Barcenas did not include the probable cause affidavit in the record on appeal.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges Foley and Scheele concur. Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.