WILKERSON v. FAIRVIEW PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Laura Wilkerson appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Fairview Presbyterian Church (“Fairview”) on Wilkerson's complaint for breach of contract, racial discrimination, false light, negligent reporting, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Wilkerson raises five issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment for Fairview.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[3] In January 2022, Wilkerson, who is Caucasian, was pregnant with her biracial twins, L.W. and N.W. She wanted her children to attend Fairview's daycare program after their birth due to its proximity to her home. On January 31, she applied for their enrollment, and a few days later Fairview informed Wilkerson that her children had been accepted and would be able to begin attending in September.

[4] L.W. and N.W. began attending Fairview on September 1, when they were eight months old. N.W. has a birthmark on his back that is commonly known as a Mongolian birthmark. Such marks are more common on individuals of Asian or African ancestry than of European ancestry. Wilkerson described N.W.’s birthmark as a “[m]ixture of green, brown, [and] blue,” and N.W.’s grandmother acknowledged that the mark “could be confused for a bruise.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 58, 124.

[5] On Monday, September 19, N.W.’s teacher, Laurie Highsmith, noticed his birthmark for the first time. She was concerned because the mark “looked like a large bruise,” and so she took N.W. to the program director, Tracy Samples. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 28. Samples agreed with Highsmith that the appearance of the birthmark was “concerning.” Id. Samples contacted Child Protective Services (“CPS”) to report a possible case of abuse. A CPS investigator met with Wilkerson later that same day, recognized the birthmark as not being a bruise, and closed the case.

[6] After Wilkerson picked her children up from Fairview at the end of the day on September 19, Wilkerson ceased communications with Fairview. On September 20, Samples emailed Wilkerson and explained that their report to CPS “was based on legal protocol” that Fairview was “obligated to follow ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 91. Wilkerson did not respond and did not take the children back to Fairview. Therefore, on Friday, September 23, Samples emailed Wilkerson as follows:

Laura,

We haven't heard from you this week. We just wanted you to be aware that tuition invoices for October will go out on Monday. In order to not be charged for child care that may no longer be needed, please let us know if you plan on [your children] returning Monday or if you wish to withdraw from the program. If we have not heard from you by Monday of next week, we will assume you are withdrawing and will fill their spots with families on the waitlist.

We hope to hear from you and see them on Monday.

Id. at 92. Wilkerson did not respond to that email or otherwise contact Fairview about maintaining her children's enrollment in the daycare program. Accordingly, and despite typically requiring two weeks’ notice from parents to unenroll a child, Fairview considered the children unenrolled and did not charge Wilkerson the more than $1,700 in October tuition that had been scheduled.

[7] Thereafter, Wilkerson filed her complaint against Fairview. In her complaint, Wilkerson alleged as follows: that Fairview breached its contract to provide daycare services when it unenrolled the children without providing her with a refund of the unused September days or two weeks’ notice of the children's unenrollment; racial discrimination for reporting the suspected abuse to CPS “upon determining that the children” were biracial and using the reporting process “as a tool to expel” the children; false light for reporting the birthmark to CPS as possible abuse; negligent reporting for reporting the suspected abuse; and negligent infliction of emotional distress for reporting the suspected abuse. Id. at 16. Fairview moved for summary judgment as to all of Wilkerson's claims and designated evidence in support of its motion. After Wilkerson failed to file a timely response, the trial court granted Fairview's motion and entered judgment for Fairview on all claims.

[8] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[9] Wilkerson appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Fairview. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ․ the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to “demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (omission and some alterations original to Hughley).

The trial court properly entered summary judgment for Fairview on all claims.

[10] We first consider Wilkerson's claim for breach of contract against Fairview. To negate this claim, Fairview designated evidence that showed there was no contractual term breached by Fairview. See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 231 (Ind. 2021). In particular, Fairview designated the parents’ handbook that all parents of children in the daycare program received upon enrollment. That handbook expressly states that monthly tuition “is due” regardless of actual attendance. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 86. The handbook further expressly states that parents must give two weeks’ notice to discontinue a child's enrollment, but there is no corollary duty from Fairview to parents. Id. Accordingly, Fairview's designated evidence demonstrated that there was no contractual term breached by Fairview, and the trial court properly entered summary judgment for Fairview on Wilkerson's breach-of-contract claim.

[11] We next consider Wilkerson's claim of racial discrimination in violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. That statute generally prohibits race-based discrimination in the making or enforcing of a contract. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see also Sanghvi v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 258 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2001). To prevail under § 1981, the plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for cause” of her injury. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 333 (2020).

[12] We agree with Fairview that its designated evidence negated the required but-for causation. Fairview's designated evidence shows that the children were unenrolled from the daycare program due to Wilkerson's refusal to communicate with Fairview for an entire week following the CPS report. And Wilkerson's attempts on appeal to portray the designated evidence as demonstrative of a hidden, racially motivated strategy to get Wilkerson to remove her own children from the daycare program is not persuasive. We affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Fairview on this claim.

[13] We next turn to Wilkerson's claims of false light, negligent reporting, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Each of those three tort claims was premised on Fairview's report of possible abuse to CPS. We hold that the resolution of those claims turns on Indiana Code section 31-33-5-1, which imposes a duty on certain individuals to report possible child abuse or neglect, and Indiana Code sections 31-33-6-1 and -2, which establish immunity from criminal and civil claims for individuals who comply with that duty unless the individual has acted with “gross negligence” or “willful or wanton misconduct.” See also Newman v. Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 875 N.E.2d 729, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that the tort of false light requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter”), trans. denied.

[14] Fairview's designated evidence established that it acted in accordance with its duty under the law and that it did not act with gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct when Fairview reported the possible bruising to CPS. In particular, Fairview's designated evidence demonstrated that N.W.’s birthmark had a similar appearance to a bruise and could reasonably have been mistaken for bruising, a fact acknowledged by his own grandmother. The designated evidence further demonstrated that both N.W.’s teacher and Fairview's program director independently concluded that the birthmark was “concerning” and that Samples erred on the side of caution when she contacted CPS. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 28. Accordingly, Fairview's designated evidence established that it was entitled to statutory immunity from Wilkerson's civil tort claims arising out of Fairview's reporting of the possible abuse to CPS.²

Conclusion

[15] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Fairview.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   We also acknowledge Fairview's argument on appeal that the designated evidence negates the requisite physical impact or direct observation required for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Ruch ex rel. K.G. v. Smith, 178 N.E.3d 300, 305-06 (Ind. 2021). Further, Wilkerson argues for the first time on appeal that her emotional-injury claim is not for negligent infliction of emotional distress but for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A party may not raise a new issue for the first time on appeal, and we do not consider Wilkerson's purported claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.