BLOSS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In March of 2023, authorities received a report that Charles Bloss, whose driving privileges had been suspended for life, was driving and selling methamphetamine to employees of General RV in Elkhart County. A police officer stopped Bloss, and a search of his vehicle uncovered illegal drugs and paraphernalia. The State charged Bloss with Level 5 felony methamphetamine possession, Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle with a license suspended for life, Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession, and Class C misdemeanor paraphernalia possession. After a bench trial, the trial court found Bloss guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years of incarceration, with two years suspended to probation. Bloss contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for operating a vehicle with license suspended for life and that the trial court abused its discretion admitting the test results for the drugs found in his vehicle. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2013, after Bloss had pled guilty to operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator, his driver's license was suspended for life. On March 24, 2022, a manager from General RV called the police to report that Bloss was selling methamphetamine to General RV's employees. According to the manager, Bloss had just picked up one of the employees from the dealership in a silver SUV. Elkhart County Sheriff's Detective Kwau Kuntu learned of the report and, after receiving the dispatch for General RV, searched for Bloss in the BMV database. In the database, Detective Kuntu saw a photograph of Bloss and “learned his status was habitual traffic offender for life.” Tr. Vol. II p. 20. Bristol Police Sergeant Dustin Lundgren also received the report regarding Bloss, was able to view his photographs in his department's and the BMV's systems, and learned that Bloss's driving privileges had been suspended. Sergeant Lundgren encountered Bloss driving a silver SUV, recognized him from his photographs, stopped him, and arrested him “for habitual traffic violator.” Tr. Vol. II p. 44.

[3] Bloss's vehicle smelled like raw and burnt marijuana. Inside, the police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Sergeant Lundgren collected the contraband according to department policy, putting the drugs in packages, which he sealed, initialed, and marked with his unit number “to secure them so that way they are not tampered with.” Tr. Vol. II p. 64. The packages collected from Bloss's vehicle were secured at the Bristol Police Department until they were transported to the Indiana State Police (“ISP”) laboratory, where they were assigned a case number and item numbers, labeled, and stored in an evidence vault until they were ready to be analyzed. The laboratory manager inspected the sealed packages and put her initials on the other side of each seal. Eventually, forensic scientist Andrew England unsealed the packages, weighed and tested their contents, resealed the packages, and initialed the seals. England observed no indications that the samples had been contaminated and determined that they contained marijuana and methamphetamine.

[4] On March 28, 2022, the State charged Bloss with Level 5 felony methamphetamine possession, Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle with a license suspended for life, Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession, and Class C misdemeanor paraphernalia possession. At Bloss's bench trial, Sergeant Lundgren testified that when he had seen Bloss driving the SUV, his appearance had matched his BMV photograph. Sergeant Lundgren identified Bloss's certified BMV record, which was admitted as State's Exhibit 2, and identified Bloss as the person he had pulled over. The State additionally presented a certified court order showing that Bloss's driving privileges had been suspended for life beginning on August 26, 2013, as State's Exhibit 3. Sergeant Lundgren also identified the packages of drugs that he had collected from Bloss's SUV. The packages were marked State's Exhibits 24-A, 24-B, 24-C, and 25, and Bloss did not object to their admission. Before England testified about the results of his analysis of State's Exhibits 24-A, 24-B, 24-C, and 25, however, Bloss objected on the basis of an alleged lack of foundation for the chain of custody of the physical evidence. The trial court overruled Bloss's objections, admitting England's test report as State's Exhibit 26 and allowing him to testify regarding its contents.

[5] On October 28, 2024, the trial court found Bloss guilty as charged. On December 19, 2024, the trial court sentenced Bloss to an aggregate term of five years of incarceration, with two years suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] Bloss contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 5 felony operating a vehicle when a license has been suspended for life. Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well-settled:

[W]e examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient so long as an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In order to sustain the challenged conviction, the State was required to establish that Bloss had “operate[d] a motor vehicle after [his] driving privileges [had been] forfeited for life under section 16 of this chapter[.]” Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17(a)(1).

[7] Bloss contends only that the State failed to establish that he was the person named in State's Exhibits 2 and 3, which were copies of the BMV record for “Charles Alan Bloss” and sentencing order for “Charles Bloss” following a conviction for operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator, respectively. Bloss's argument, at the very least, fails to account for the in-court identification by Sergeant Lundgren, who testified that the Charles Bloss in the courtroom was the same Charles Bloss whose picture he had seen in the BMV database associated with “Charles Alan Bloss[’s]” driving record. This testimony is sufficient to establish that Bloss is the same Charles Bloss mentioned in State's Exhibits 2 and 3. Bloss's argument amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Lock, 971 N.E.2d at 74.

II. Admissibility of Evidence

[8] Bloss challenges the admission of England's testimony and State's Exhibit 26, which contains the results of his analysis of State's Exhibits 24-A, 24-B, 24-C, and 25. Decisions concerning admission of evidence at trial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Higgason v. State, 210 N.E.3d 868, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Those decisions are only reversed when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “Conflicting evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” O'Keefe v. State, 139 N.E.3d 263, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “We may affirm a trial court's judgment on any theory supported by the evidence[.]” State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1186 (Ind. 2014).

[9] Specifically, Bloss contends that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the physical exhibits in question. Generally, “an exhibit is admissible if the evidence regarding its chain of custody strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times.” Culver v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ind. 2000). Although “the State must give reasonable assurances that the property passed through various hands in an undisturbed condition[,]” it “need not establish a perfect chain of custody whereby any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility.” Id. Law enforcement officers are presumed to “exercise due care” when they handle evidence. Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. 2002). To successfully challenge the State's chain of custody, the defendant “must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been tampered with.” Id.

[10] We conclude that the State carried its burden in this case, as the evidence regarding the chain of custody strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times. Sergeant Lundgren testified that he had collected the drugs according to departmental policy, placing the evidence in packages, which he had sealed, initialed, and marked with his unit number to prevent tampering. The packages had been securely stored at the Bristol Police Department before being shipped to the ISP laboratory.

[11] The record also indicates that, upon arrival at the ISP laboratory, the items had been assigned a case number and item numbers, labeled, and stored in an evidence vault until analyzed. According to England, the seals had been inspected and found to be intact, and the laboratory manager had initialed them as well. Finally, England testified that he had unsealed the items, weighed and tested the material for the presence of illegal drugs, resealed the packages, and initialed them. The record accounts for the whereabouts of the evidence up until it was tested, which is, in light of Bloss's suggestion that it may have been compromised prior to testing, as far as the record needs to go. See, e.g., Culver, 727 N.E.2d at 1067. In the end, Bloss's argument, as with his first, amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[12] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

affirmed

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.