PATTON v. STURGEON (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Steven Patton sued a timber buyer who harvested timber from his neighbor's property, alleging that the timber buyer trespassed onto this land and cut some of his trees. After the timber buyer moved for summary judgment, Patton moved to amend the complaint to add his neighbor as a defendant and additional counts. The trial court denied Patton's motion to amend and entered summary judgment for the timber buyer. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2018, Richard L. Amador-May and Patton owned neighboring properties in Owen County. That October, Amador-May and Clint Sturgeon, a licensed timber buyer, entered into a Timber Sale Contract for Sturgeon to harvest the timber from 325 acres of Amador-May's property. According to affidavits from Sturgeon and Amador-May, Sturgeon marked the boundary lines of the 325 acres. “There was a fence line along part of the property and [Sturgeon] placed stakes and purple pennants along the fence line and boundary line [he] had staked.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. When Sturgeon marked the boundary lines, he noticed tree stands, which belonged to Patton, on Amador-May's side. Amador-May contacted Patton and asked him to remove the tree stands. Patton didn't remove them, so Amador-May did and placed them on Patton's property.

[3] In late October or early November, Patton went to the property and saw the boundary line marked “by an old fence line, rebars and purple flags that had been placed on the line” by Sturgeon. Id. at 24. Amador-May told Patton that Sturgeon would be harvesting the timber up to the boundary line, and Patton “raised no objection” other than requesting that Sturgeon not do so during deer season. Id. Amador-May told Sturgeon that “Patton had come to the property, [seen] the purple pennants along the boundary line[,] and indicated that he agreed with that line.” Id. at 27. Sturgeon then harvested the timber up to the marked boundary line, finishing in early January 2019.

[4] Over five years later, in June 2024, Patton filed a two-count complaint against Sturgeon for trespass and conversion. Patton alleged that “[u]pon consulting a survey demarking [sic] the boundary between his own property and the neighboring property, Patton discovered that Sturgeon had harvested timber from Patton's property without obtaining Patton's authorization or offering compensation for the timber.” Id. at 11.¹ Sturgeon filed an answer asserting the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, and statute of limitations.

[5] In September, Sturgeon moved for summary judgment and designated affidavits from himself and Amador-May. Sturgeon argued that he and Amador-May “reasonably relied” on Patton's “agreement” as to the location of the marked boundary line and therefore Patton was “precluded from asserting anything to the contrary” under the doctrine of estoppel. Id. at 20, 22. Sturgeon also argued that even “if the Court were to find a trespass, the damages claimed would be barred” by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for conversion, Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4. Id. at 23.

[6] In November, Patton filed a summary-judgment response, including an affidavit from himself, as well as a motion to amend the complaint to add Amador-May as a defendant and two additional counts for “intentional conversion” and fraud. See id. at 45-53. In his affidavit, Patton acknowledged that he spoke with Amador-May about removing the tree stands, that he didn't do so, and that Amador-May moved them to his property. He further alleged:

In October/November 2018 Mr. Amador-May notified me that the logger placed ribbons by the tree stand and indicated the logger utilized GPS to mark the property lines. I was never presented with a contract, survey, any information to contact the logger[,] or even the logger's name. I never physically walked the property lines with Mr. Amador-May or the logger and never approved or denied that the property lines were accurate.

Id. at 54. The trial court denied Patton's motion to amend the complaint, reasoning that “allowing amendment of the Complaint at this stage in the proceeding” would not be “in the interest of justice.” Id. at 58. In a separate order, the court granted summary judgment to Sturgeon:

1. [Sturgeon's] affidavits establish that [he], a licensed timber buyer, marked the boundary between the properties belonging to Richard L. Amador-May and Steven Patton following the Timber Sale Cont[r]act of October 21, 2018. Steven Patton was notified by Mr. Amador-May that the boundary line had been marked and that all timber up to that line would be cut. Mr. Patton acknowledges that notification in his affidavit.

2. Mr. Patton did not object and took no action to contest the boundary line until June 10, 2024, although his affidavit confirms his knowledge that Mr. Amador-May removed a tree stand claiming that it was on Mr. Amador-May's property.

3. Mr. Sturgeon reasonably relied on Steven Patton's failure to object or contest the boundary line and Mr. Patton's causes of action accrued in 2018.

4. There are no genuine issues as to any material fact in this cause and the Defendant, Clint Sturgeon, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id. at 8.

[7] Patton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Patton contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend the complaint and in granting summary judgment to Sturgeon. Sturgeon didn't file an appellee's brief, so Patton need only make a prima facie showing of error. See Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006).

[9] We first note that Patton's brief does not contain a single citation to the record on appeal, in violation of our appellate rules. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) (“The facts shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix”); App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that appellant's argument must be supported by citations to “the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”). Despite this failure to adhere to our appellate rules, we address the merits of Patton's appeal.

I. The trial court did not commit prima facie error in denying the motion to amend

[10] Patton first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend the complaint. Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) provides that when a responsive pleading has already been filed, “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires.” Amendments to pleadings are to be liberally allowed, but the trial court retains broad discretion to grant or deny them. Rusnak v. Brent Wagner Architects, 55 N.E.3d 834, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[11] Patton claims that the trial court should have allowed him to amend his complaint because the amendments were based on the “deception” that Sturgeon and Amador-May “admitted” to in their September 2024 summary-judgment affidavits. Appellant's Br. p. 7. Specifically, he claims that Sturgeon “admitted that he made no effort to match the line he demarcated in the woods to the legal boundary line between the properties” and that Amador-May “acknowledged withholding from [Patton] that the boundary marked by [Sturgeon] was an arbitrary line, made with no attempt at indicating a legal boundary line.” Id. at 5. But neither Sturgeon nor Amador-May made such acknowledgments of deception in their affidavits. Instead, as detailed above, Sturgeon explained that he marked the boundary lines of the 325 acres. He said “[t]here was a fence line along part of the property” and he “placed stakes and purple pennants along the fence line and boundary line [he] had staked.” And Amador-May explained that Sturgeon made a boundary line “marked by an old fence line, rebars and purple flags.” Because their affidavits do not establish any “deception,” Patton hasn't shown that the trial court committed prima facie error in denying his motion to amend.

II. The trial court did not commit prima facie error in granting summary judgment to Sturgeon

[12] Patton next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Sturgeon. We review a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). That is, “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[13] Patton claims that the trial court “incorrectly applied estoppel in finding [that Sturgeon] ‘reasonably relied [on Patton's] failure to object or contest the boundary line.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 8. “In a general sense, estoppel forces a party to follow through on what it says or otherwise represents it will do.” NIPSCO Indus. Grp. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 125 N.E.3d 617, 625 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. More specifically, it “is a concept by which one's own acts or conduct prevents the claiming of a right to the detriment of another party who was entitled to and did rely on the conduct.” Id. “While estoppel comes in many different forms, all its forms are based on the same underlying principle: one who by deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position, attitude, or course of conduct that causes injury to such other.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[14] Patton claims that Sturgeon, a licensed timber buyer, was not entitled to rely on the fact that he “raised no objection” to the marked boundary line because

[Sturgeon] does not and cannot know if [Patton] “raised no objection” because [Patton] knew affirmatively the location of the property line and agreed that [Sturgeon] demarcated the line accurately, or if [Patton] merely relied upon the expertise of [Sturgeon] believing [Sturgeon] had utilized some reliable method for discovering the property line.

Appellant's Br. pp. 8-9.² But Patton was the property owner and knew that Amador-May was having the timber on his property harvested. If Patton didn't agree with or had doubts about the marked boundary line, he should have said so or at least told Amador-May that he needed to investigate the matter before Sturgeon started harvesting the timber. Patton apparently “obtained a survey” of his property in the spring of 2024, see supra note 1, but he doesn't say why he couldn't have done so in 2018. Sturgeon, having used a fence line and GPS to mark the boundary line with stakes and purple pennants, was entitled to rely on the fact that Patton had no objection to that marked line. Patton has failed to establish that the trial court committed prima facie error in granting summary judgment to Sturgeon.³

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his brief, Patton claims, without any citation to the record on appeal, that “[i]n the Spring of 2024 [he] obtained a survey which seemed to indicate that a portion of the land upon which [Sturgeon] had cut timber was actually on [Patton's] property.” Appellant's Br. p. 5.

2.   Patton also claims that Sturgeon didn't rely on his statement; rather, Sturgeon relied on Amador-May's statement as to what Patton told him. But Amador-May's affidavit alleges that he and Patton had a discussion and that Patton had “no objection” to the marked boundary line, and Sturgeon's affidavit states that Amador-May told him what Patton had said, i.e., that Patton agreed with the boundary line.

3.   Patton also makes an argument about the statute of limitations. But because we find that the trial court properly entered summary judgment based on estoppel, we need not address this argument.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.