CONLEY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Mark Conley appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony intimidation,¹ arguing the State presented insufficient evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 23, 2024, 9-1-1 received a call about a man lying unconscious outside of a trailer home in Pulaski County. Deputy Matthew Scott was one of the first officers to arrive on scene, and as he assisted EMTs with the unconscious man, he heard a man and woman arguing inside the trailer. The woman appeared at the trailer door and identified herself as Amanda Hedden and the man inside as Conley. Conley did not appear; instead, he went to the back to lay down.

[3] Dispatch later informed Deputy Scott that Conley had two arrest warrants. Deputy Scott, along with Deputy Cody Foust, arrested Conley and escorted him out of the trailer and into the secure area (“cage”) in Deputy Foust's truck. Before placing him in the cage, Deputy Scott asked Conley if he had any weapons, to which Conley responded he had a gun to “blow your head off.” Ex. Vol. 4 at 4 (Deputy Scott's body camera footage). A pat-down search revealed no gun.

[4] A transport van was called to take Conley to the county jail. While waiting for the van to arrive, Conley continuously ranted while kicking and headbutting the cage. During his rant, he addressed Deputy Foust, saying things like: “[I'm] gonna f*** you up,” “I'm gonna beat you, Cody,” and “I promise you I'll drown you.” Id. at 5 (Deputy Foust's body camera footage).

[5] By the time the transport van arrived, four officers were on scene to transfer Conley “due to [his] unruly ․ and aggressive behavior.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 121. Deputy Scott readied his taser in case Conley decided to fight. See Ex. Vol. 4 at 4 (Deputy Scott's body camera footage). Conley did not fight but officers had to force him into the transport van.

[6] Deputy Foust spoke with Conley again after Conley was transported to the jail. Conley told Deputy Foust and surrounding officers he would “take on every one of you” and specifically told Deputy Foust, “I promise on my dead mother's grave, I'll kill you.” Id. at 6 (Officer Parrish's body camera footage).

[7] Conley was charged with Level 6 felony intimidation. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29.² At the jury trial, Deputy Foust testified Conley was “pretty steady hostile toward everyone and everything” and “if I was with him, by myself, I would be afraid that he was going to attack me or harm me.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 147, 152.

[8] The other responding officers also testified about Conley's behavior toward Deputy Foust. Deputy Scott said Conley was “yelling through the cage, specifically at my partner, Deputy Cody Foust, saying that he, essentially wanted to fight us.” Id. at 118. Correctional Officer Daniel Ross confirmed Conley was acting in a hostile manner toward Deputy Foust when the transport van arrived and that more officers were on scene than normal because of Conley's behavior.

[9] The jury found Conley guilty of intimidation, and the trial court sentenced him to two years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

There was sufficient evidence Conley communicated a threat to sustain his intimidation conviction.

[10] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[11] To convict Conley of intimidation as charged, the State was required to prove Conley communicated a threat to commit a forcible felony with the intent that Deputy Foust be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4) & (b)(1)(A). Conley argues there was insufficient evidence to support his intimidation conviction “because the State did not present evidence that his statements were ‘true threats’ or that Deputy Foust was placed in fear.” Appellant's Br. at 6. We look at two things to determine if a communication is a threat. “A threat is punishable if the speaker ‘intend[s] his communications to put his targets in fear for their safety, and ․ the communications were likely to actually cause such fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the target’ ” McBride v. State, 128 N.E.3d 531, 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 964 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied).

[12] We first look at whether Conley intended his communications to put Deputy Foust in fear for his safety. Intent is a mental function; absent an admission, intent is determined from the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences of it. Matter of K.Y., 175 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Put differently, a mens rea determination is almost inevitably a matter of circumstantial proof. Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 964 (quotation omitted). “Because of the inferential nature of circumstantial evidence, that mens rea question will often depend on whether a reasonable person would recognize the statements’ threatening potential.” Id. at 965.

[13] While Deputy Scott and Deputy Foust escorted Conley into the cage, Deputy Scott asked Conley if he had a weapon, to which Conley replied he did, “to blow your head off.” Ex. Vol. 4 at 4 (Deputy Scott's body camera footage). After Deputy Scott and Deputy Foust determined Conley did not have a gun and placed him in the cage, Conley began yelling incessantly. He addressed specific comments to Deputy Foust, saying multiple times he was going to fight, drown, and, later, kill him. As Conley yelled, he kicked the cage and rammed his head against it. Conley's conduct towards Deputy Foust led to additional officers being on the scene, anticipating Conley would fight when moved to the transport van. Based on Conley's conduct and the officers’ reactions to it, there is sufficient evidence Conley intended Deputy Foust be placed in fear for his safety.

[14] Next, we look at whether Conley's “communications were likely to actually cause such fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the target.” Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 964. Conley contends there was no evidence Deputy Foust feared him based on Deputy Foust's calm demeanor at the scene. Reviewing Deputy Foust's demeanor is a request to reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015).

[15] Conley also argues a reasonable person in a similar situation would not be fearful because he was restrained during his encounters with Deputy Foust. But the capacity to carry out one's intent does not determine whether a communication is a threat. See Holloway v. State, 51 N.E.3d 376, 378–79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming intimidation conviction where defendant threatened to fight an officer while handcuffed). Moreover, the fact Conley was handcuffed while being transferred to the transport van did not alleviate officers’ concerns he would try to fight. In fact, additional officers were called to the scene because of his behavior. The circumstances present sufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded a reasonable person in a similar situation to Deputy Foust would feel fear.

Conclusion

[16] Sufficient evidence supported Conley's intimidation conviction.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4) & (b)(1)(A) (2022).

2.   Although Conley was initially charged with intimidation against “Pulaski County Deputies on scene,” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29, the information was amended before trial and the jury was specifically instructed to find whether Conley committed intimidation against Deputy Foust. See id. at 60, 88; Tr. Vol. 2 at 231.In addition to intimidation, the State charged Conley with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony battery against a public official, and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. The jury found Conley not guilty of those charges.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.