SEXTON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Cheyenne Sexton pled guilty to Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent, after her three-month-old daughter, L.S., died while in her care. The trial court sentenced Sexton, in accordance with the terms of her plea agreement, to twenty-seven years of incarceration. Sexton contends on appeal that her twenty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense and her character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September 2021, Sexton lived in New Castle with her mother, Fallan Markwell, and her children ten-year-old A.S., four-year-old Z.O., and three-month-old L.S. Around 11:35 a.m. on September 4, 2021, police were dispatched to Sexton's residence after receiving a report that L.S. had died. After confirming L.S.’s death, police searched Sexton's home, finding “no apparent signs of any type of oddity, foul play, or even blood/froth from” L.S. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. Police also interviewed Sexton and Markwell.

[3] Sexton told police that she and L.S. had gone to bed around midnight, with Sexton putting L.S. into her bassinet that was located near Sexton's bed. Z.O. had slept in Sexton's bed with Sexton. Sexton claimed that, at some point during the night, L.S. had woken up crying. L.S. had gone back to sleep after Sexton had checked on her. Sexton claimed that when she had woken up between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., L.S. was lying on her stomach in the bassinet. Sexton had rushed to Markwell's bedroom after noticing that L.S. would not wake up and had purple lips. Sexton called 911 at Markwell's instruction.

[4] An autopsy was performed on L.S. on September 5, 2021. The examiner did not see anything of significance on L.S.’s body during the external portion of the examination but, upon opening L.S.’s scalp and skull, “there [were] obvious signs of blood near the back side of the head, under the scalp.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. In addition, there were two visible fractures on L.S.’s skull and “an obvious brain bleed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. L.S. was determined to have suffered “a subarachnoid hemorrhage to the bilateral parietal cerebral lobes (focal), right occipital and right temporal skull fractures with multiple diastatic fractures, and hemorrhage to the right temporalis muscle, right occipital scalp, sclera of the left eye, and periosteum/galeal region of the scalp.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. L.S.’s cause of death was determined to be “blunt force trauma to the head.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. The pathologist who completed the autopsy opined that the type of injuries that L.S. had suffered generally would have produced instantaneous, noticeable symptoms, including things such as a weak cry, altered breathing, trouble tracking with her eyes, no appetite, some posturing, and shaking or seizures. The pathologist further opined that L.S. would have survived “[m]inutes at most” after having suffered her injuries. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30.

[5] After receiving the autopsy results, the police re-interviewed Sexton and Markwell. Sexton indicated that on September 3, 2021, Markwell had watched L.S. until Sexton had returned home from work at approximately 4:00 p.m., after which time Sexton had cared for L.S. Sexton had not observed anything out of the ordinary with L.S. and L.S. had been alert and had acted normally. She had “had trouble getting L.S. to sleep” but L.S. had otherwise “been good.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. Z.O. had not been alone in the bedroom with L.S. and had gone with Sexton when she had left the bedroom to “do some laundry and dishes” before going to bed. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27.

[6] Sexton “could not think of anything that had happened that could have contributed to L.S.’s death.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. She “did not think anyone else had been around L.S.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. Sexton indicated that “there was a time when L.S. was hit with a cell phone in the head by Z.O., but that had been approximately a few weeks prior to” L.S.’s death. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). The interviewing officer expressed doubt that such an incident could “have caused a traumatic injury like this.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. Sexton reiterated that she did not know what had happened and indicated that she had expected the autopsy to show that L.S. had suffocated.

[7] Markwell indicated that A.S. and Z.O. sometimes had to be reminded that L.S. was a baby because they would play rough around her. Markwell, however, did not believe that either A.S. or Z.O. would have ever intentionally hurt L.S. Markwell indicated that L.S. had been “perfectly normal and happy as ever” while she had been watching L.S. and that L.S. had eaten “better than she had ever eaten for” her and had “slept really good.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. Markwell had last seen L.S. at approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 3, 2021.

[8] Sexton was interviewed for a third time on September 26, 2021. Sexton “continually stated through the interview that she had no explanation for the injuries to L.S. that caused her death.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30. Sexton reaffirmed that she had been L.S.’s sole caregiver from the time that she had arrived home from work on September 3, 2021, until she had discovered L.S. unresponsive the next day. Sexton indicated that L.S. had been “fine when she drank her bottle, went to sleep on [Sexton's] bed, and was then placed in her bassinet for the night.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30. Sexton further indicated that L.S. had been “fine when she woke briefly at what she guessed to be the very early morning hours (possibly in the 4:00 am. time frame), was awake briefly then went back to sleep after [Sexton had] checked on L.S. and patted L.S.[’s] bottom a few times.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31.

[9] The State charged Sexton with one count of Level 1 felony aggravated battery and three counts of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. On February 5, 2025, Sexton pled guilty to one count of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The parties also agreed that sentencing was to be left to the trial court's discretion, but that Sexton's sentence was to be capped at twenty-seven years.

[10] During the guilty plea hearing, Sexton admitted that she had “knowingly place[d L.S.] in a situation that endangered [L.S.’s] life or health to wit: by failing to supervise and or protect [L.S.] which resulted in the death of” L.S. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. The trial court accepted Sexton's guilty plea and, after considering the parties’ arguments, sentenced Sexton to twenty-seven years of incarceration. In doing so, the trial court acknowledged that Sexton had not pled guilty to causing L.S.’s injuries, but rather to “the neglect resulting in death due to placing a child and danger and failing to care for that child.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Sexton contends that her twenty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[12] “[A] person who commits a Level 1 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. We have said that an appellate court is “unlikely to consider an advisory sentence inappropriate[,]” Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, and that a “defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. It stands to reason that the same is even more true for a sentence below the advisory term.

[13] While the sentence imposed by the trial court was the maximum allowed pursuant to the terms of Sexton's plea agreement, the twenty-seven-year sentence was less than the advisory sentence for a Level 1 felony. Sexton, therefore, bears a “particularly heavy burden in persuading us” that her sentence is inappropriate. Id. Furthermore, we have previously noted that “a defendant's conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness and appellate relief should be granted only in the most rare, exceptional cases.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

[14] This case involves the tragic death of a three-month-old, helpless, and defenseless child. Three-month-old L.S. suffered blunt force trauma that likely caused her death within minutes. L.S. had not displayed any obvious signs of injury or trauma prior to her death and the cause of the trauma remains unexplained. While we may never know exactly what happened to L.S., what we do know is that Sexton had been solely responsible for L.S.’s care and safety at the time of L.S.’s death. Sexton admitted to as much, despite her repeated claim that she had no idea what had happened or who had harmed L.S.

[15] Sexton argues that “there were several characteristics of the nature of the offense that make [her twenty-seven-year] sentence inappropriate[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. She asserts that there was no evidence of intentional harm, it was possible that the cause of L.S.’s injuries was accidental, lengthy sentences for neglect usually involve repeated acts of neglect or where the neglect involved was extreme or reckless, and “[a]ny neglect on [her] part was a momentary lapse[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15 (underlining omitted). Sexton claims that “[t]hese circumstances reveal that the nature of the offense lacked the severity, malice, or pattern of neglect typically associated with a lengthy sentence such as the one imposed in this case.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. As the State points out, we have previously rejected similar arguments relating the nature of the offense in cases where a child has died as a result of neglect. See Skeens v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1248, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (rejecting the claim that the defendant's thirty-five-year sentence for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent was inappropriate because the child's death had been the result of a tragic accident and not the product of planning or criminal intent, finding that the argument disregarded the obvious fact that the Indiana General Assembly has determined that neglect resulting in death merits serious penal consequences); trans. denied; Robinson v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1038, 1043–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting defendant's argument that her advisory sentence was inappropriate because she had not intentionally killed her child but rather “just let it die”).

[16] Sexton argues that L.S.’s death may have been accidental, but there was no evidence of such in the record. Furthermore, while the record also does not demonstrate that Sexton had a documented history of neglecting her children, the neglect in this case was egregious as it resulted in the tragic death of a young child. Again, at some point, seemingly during the night while L.S. slept in a bassinet near Sexton's bed, L.S. suffered blunt force trauma to her head, causing her death. While admitting that she had neglected L.S., Sexton maintained that she had no explanation for what may have happened or who may have caused L.S.’s injuries.

[17] As for her character, Sexton asserts that “[a]ny neglect on [her] part was an aberration and certainly not reflective of her character.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. While Sexton had only a minimal criminal history, “[e]ven a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character for the purposes of sentencing.” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). It also reflects poorly on Sexton's character that she had violated her position of trust with L.S. by subjecting her to neglect. See Harris v. State, 163 N.E.3d 938, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (providing that the violation of a position of trust reflects very poorly on one's character, noting that there is no one that an eighteen-month-old child should be able to depend on and trust more than its mother), trans. denied. Further, while numerous family members and neighbors spoke and wrote letters in support of Sexton, Bradley Orr, the father of Z.O. and L.S., wrote that he “truly believe[d] this was a cruel act of pure evil.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 125. Sexton has failed to carry her heavy burden of convincing us that her twenty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate.

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.