BOGGS v. STUCKEY (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kristine Stuckey filed a complaint against her sister, Vicki Boggs, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. After Stuckey filed a motion for summary judgment and Boggs failed to file a timely response, the trial court granted Stuckey's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Boggs argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment regarding both the breach-of-contract claim and the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Issues

[2] Boggs raises two issues, which we revise and restate as:

 I. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Stuckey on her breach-of-contract claim.

II. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Stuckey on her unjust enrichment claim.

Facts

[3] In April 2024, Stuckey filed a verified complaint ¹ against Boggs and alleged the following:

6. [Stuckey] found an abandoned residence in Indiana owned by an individual in Texas which Texas owner was willing to sell for payment of the back taxes.

7. The parties made arrangements for [Stuckey] to provide the opportunity for [Boggs] to purchase the property and [Stuckey] assisted in the renovation of said property.

8. The parties agreed that [Stuckey] would be paid Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) for finding the property.

9. [Boggs] has only paid Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) toward said Twenty Thousand Dollar ($20,000.00) Agreement.

10. [Stuckey] performed additional services on said residence including arranging for sub-contractors, meeting personnel at the residence, painting the inside of the residence, and otherwise.

11. Reasonable reimbursement for said services would be the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12.²

[4] On September 5, 2024, Stuckey filed a motion for summary judgment. Stuckey argued that Boggs breached an oral contract by only paying $5,000 rather than $20,000 for the finder's fee. Stuckey also argued that she was entitled to payment for “valuable services and materials” under an unjust enrichment theory. Id. at 20. In support of Stuckey's motion for summary judgment, she designated only her verified complaint.

[5] On October 9, 2024, Boggs filed her response in opposition to Stuckey's motion for summary judgment. In support of her response, Boggs designated her affidavit. On October 14, 2024, however, Stuckey filed a motion to strike Boggs’ affidavit and argued, in part, that Boggs did not file the affidavit within thirty days as required by Trial Rule 56(C). The trial court granted the motion to strike because “the affidavit was filed more than 30 days after the service of [Stuckey's] Motion for Summary Judgment.” Id. at 5.

[6] On November 22, 2024, the trial court granted summary judgment to Stuckey as follows:

[Stuckey] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The court struck [Boggs]’s response as untimely and NOW FINDS:

1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case and venue are proper since Madison County is where the land is located, and the complaint includes a claim relating to such land.

2. The undisputed evidence is [Stuckey] is owed $15,000.00 per an agreement she had with [Boggs] and an additional $10,000.00 for services provided to [Boggs] at the property at issue.

3. There is no genuine issue of material fact and as a matter of law [Stuckey] is entitled to a judgment against [Boggs] in the sum of $25,000.00, costs of this action and statutory interest until paid.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Stuckey] recover from [Boggs] $25,000.00, costs of this action and statutory interest until paid.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 9.

[7] Boggs then filed a motion to correct error and argued that: (1) the trial court is not required to grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment; and (2) no evidence was “offered by Affidavit or testimony to support the specific amount granted by the Court.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 8. Boggs requested that the trial court set aside the summary judgment order or set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on damages. Stuckey responded that Boggs was incorrect because Stuckey had designated the verified complaint.³ The trial court denied Boggs’ motion to correct error, and Boggs now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Boggs challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Stuckey. “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, and Trial Rule 56(C) supplies the framework.” Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 684 (Ind. 2024). “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if the evidence it designates in support of its motion ‘shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 684-85 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). The purpose of summary judgment is to withdraw issues from the jury only when there are no factual issues for the jury to decide. Id. at 685. “Summary judgment is available when the nonmovant cannot prove its claim based on the undisputed evidence[.]” Id.

[9] The summary judgment movant has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom ․ in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. “We limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018).

[10] Here, Boggs failed to make a timely response to Stuckey's motion for summary judgment, and the trial court struck Bogg's designated evidence.⁴ We note that “a trial court is not required to grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment.” Murphy v. Curtis, 930 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “[S]ummary judgment is awarded on the merits of the motion, not on technicalities.” Id. In fact, Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) provides: “Summary judgment shall not be granted as of course because the opposing party fails to offer opposing affidavits or evidence, but the court shall make its determination from the evidentiary matter designated to the court.”

If a party is not required to respond to a motion for summary judgment at all, and if a party who fails to timely respond to a motion for summary judgment may still have summary judgment entered in his favor, we are unwilling to say that a party who fails to timely respond to a motion for summary judgment has, for purposes of appeal, waived any argument regarding the propriety of summary judgment. While a party who does not respond to a motion for summary judgment may be limited to the facts established by the movant's submissions, such failure to respond does not preclude argument of the relevant law on appeal.

Murphy, 930 N.E.2d at 1234. Accordingly, Boggs’ failure to file a timely response to Stuckey's motion for summary judgment does not entitle Stuckey to summary judgment. Rather, Stuckey was still required to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The judgment for Stuckey was made up of two parts: (1) $15,000 for the remaining finder's fee; and (2) $10,000 for unjust enrichment due to Stuckey's renovation of the property. We will address each separately.

A. Portion of the Finder's Fee

[11] Boggs argues that the award of $15,000 for a portion of the finder's fee was not supported by the evidence. Boggs’ sole argument regarding this part of the judgment is that the “amounts alleged in [Stuckey's] Complaint are conclusory in nature” and “no independent evidence” was designated “to show that the parties agreed on a Twenty Thousand Dollar ($20,000.00) figure to [Stuckey] for finding the property.”⁵ Appellant's Br. p. 7.

[12] Regarding this claim, the only designated evidence follows:

6. [Stuckey] found an abandoned residence in Indiana owned by an individual in Texas which Texas owner was willing to sell for payment of the back taxes.

7. The parties made arrangements for [Stuckey] to provide the opportunity for [Boggs] to purchase the property ․

8. The parties agreed that [Stuckey] would be paid Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) for finding the property.

9. [Boggs] has only paid Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) toward said Twenty Thousand Dollar ($20,000.00) Agreement.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12.⁶

[13] The elements of a contract are “offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.” Derr Enters., LLC v. Union City Ind. Props., LLC, 253 N.E.3d 1129, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “ ‘The essential elements of a breach of contract action are the existence of a contract, the defendant's breach thereof, and damages.’ ” Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 231 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Fowler v. Campbell, 612 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). “To be valid and enforceable, a contract must be reasonably definite and certain.” Zukerman v. Montgomery, 945 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). A contract must be “reasonabl[y] certain[ ] in the terms and conditions of the promises made, including by whom and to whom[.]” Id. “Enforcement of [an agreement] which is incomplete or ambiguous creates the substantial danger that the court will enforce something neither party intended.” Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 1996).

[14] Here, Stuckey's bare bones complaint designated as evidence in support of summary judgment was insufficient to establish that no genuine issues of material fact existed or that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although Stuckey contends that the agreement was an oral contract, the designated evidence does not specify whether the agreement was oral or written. The designated evidence does not even detail the terms of the agreement, when the agreement took place, when the partial performance took place, or where the performance occurred. Importantly, the statute of limitations differs for oral contracts and written contracts. See Ind. Code §§ 34-11-2-7 (six-year statute of limitation for an oral contract); 34-11-2-11 (ten-year statute of limitation for a written contract). Given that the designated evidence does not include any dates or whether the alleged contract was oral or written, we cannot even determine whether the action was filed within the statute of limitation. The designated evidence simply does not show that the alleged agreement was a contract that was reasonably definite, certain, or unambiguous. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Stuckey on this claim.

B. Unjust Enrichment

[15] Boggs also argues that the award of $10,000 for unjust enrichment was not supported by the evidence. According to Boggs, Stuckey “did not present any evidence about the services she performed or the value of those services, or whether the amount she alleges in the complaint is reasonable for the services that were performed, if any.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. The only designated evidence regarding this claim follows:

7. The parties made arrangements for [Stuckey] to provide the opportunity for [Boggs] to purchase the property and [Stuckey] assisted in the renovation of said property.

* * * * *

10. [Stuckey] performed additional services on said residence including arranging for sub-contractors, meeting personnel at the residence, painting the inside of the residence, and otherwise.

11. Reasonable reimbursement for said services would be the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00).

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12.

[16] “[U]njust enrichment requires a party who has been unjustly enriched at another's expense to make restitution to the aggrieved party.” Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 296 (Ind. 2012) (citing Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991)). To recover under an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must generally show that: (1) she rendered a benefit to the defendant at the defendant's express or implied request; (2) the plaintiff expected payment from the defendant; and (3) allowing the defendant to retain the benefit without restitution would be unjust. Id. (citing Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 408). “Put another way, ‘a plaintiff must establish that a measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such circumstances that the defendant's retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust. One who labors without an expectation of payment cannot recover in [unjust enrichment].’ ” Woodruff v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 408).

[17] Stuckey's designated evidence was simply that she performed services at the property. Stuckey, however, designated no evidence that she performed the services at Boggs’ express or implied request. Stuckey also designated no evidence that she conferred a measurable benefit on Stuckey under such circumstances that Stuckey's retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust. Essential elements of an unjust enrichment claim are absent from the designated evidence. Accordingly, Stuckey's designated evidence failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Stuckey on this claim.

Conclusion

[18] The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Stuckey regarding the $15,000 for the remainder of the finder's fee. The trial court also erred by granting summary judgment regarding the $10,000 for the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[19] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Stuckey affirmed the following: “I Affirm Under The Penalties Of Perjury The Foregoing Representations Are True To The Best of My Knowledge, Information, And Belief.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13; see Ind. Trial Rule 11(B).

2.   Boggs filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(7) and argued that the property in question was purchased by Mariposa Properties, LLC, and that Mariposa Properties was a party necessary for adjudication. The trial court denied Boggs’ motion to dismiss. Boggs does not appeal that determination.

3.   Boggs makes no argument on appeal that the verified complaint was insufficient for summary judgment purposes.

4.   Boggs makes no argument that this order granting the motion to strike was improper.

5.   Boggs makes no argument that the alleged agreement was required to be in writing.

6.   This designated evidence is from the verified complaint. We note that neither party designated Boggs’ answer. Even if the answer had been designated, it was not verified and, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(E), “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.