HALL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Nicholas Hall appeals the trial court's order that he serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) as a sanction for his probation violations. Hall argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering this sanction. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Hall raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Hall to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC for violating the conditions of his probation.

Facts

[3] On September 25, 2018, the State charged Hall with five counts: Count I, criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony; Count II, auto theft, a Level 6 felony; Count III, strangulation, a Level 6 felony; Count IV, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count V, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. The charges stemmed from allegations that Hall battered his girlfriend and forced her into a vehicle. Hall pleaded guilty to criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Hall to six years in the DOC, with three years executed and three years suspended to probation. The conditions of Hall's probation required, among other things, that he “report to the Probation Department as directed” and “notify [his] Probation Officer of any change of address, telephone number, or employment status within twenty-four (24) hours.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 91.

[4] Hall was released from the DOC on December 21, 2020, and began his probationary sentence. Four petitions to revoke probation followed. On April 12, 2022, the State filed the first petition to revoke Hall's probation, which alleged that Hall: (1) failed to report to probation, (2) was charged with resisting arrest, and (3) missed four drug screens. Hall admitted to the violations, and the trial court ordered Hall to serve eighty-three days of his previously suspended sentence, which Hall had already served while awaiting disposition. The trial court, thus, ordered Hall to “return to probation to complete mental health and substance abuse treatment programs as recommended” and to reside at Wabash Recovery, an addiction rehabilitation center. Id. at 110.

[5] On April 24, 2023, the State filed the second petition to revoke Hall's probation, which alleged that Hall: (1) twice tested positive for methamphetamine at Wabash Recovery; and then (2) “left Wabash Recovery and never returned.” Id. at 117. Hall admitted to the violations, and the trial court ordered Hall to serve 183 days of his previously suspended sentence.

[6] On January 31, 2024, the State filed the third petition to revoke Hall's probation, which alleged that Hall: (1) failed to report to probation, (2) failed to report for drug testing, and (3) tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. On April 29, 2024, Hall filed a “notice of mental disease or defect” and a motion for a psychiatric evaluation to determine his “competence to stand trial.” Id. at 138, 140. The trial court thereafter held a competency hearing and appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate Hall.

[7] Dr. Rebecca Mueller's “[d]iagnostic impression” was: “Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder,” post-traumatic stress disorder, “Amphetamine-type use disorder,” “Cannabis use disorder,” and “Opioid use disorder.” Id. at 148. Dr. Mueller, however, opined that Hall was competent to stand trial. Dr. Joanna Will “suspect[ed] Hall experiences borderline personality traits, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression” but also opined that Hall was competent to stand trial. Id. at 152.

[8] Following the competency evaluations, on October 2, 2024, Hall admitted to the violations alleged in the third petition to revoke probation, and the trial court ordered him to serve 321 days of his previously suspended sentence.

[9] On January 3, 2025, the State filed the fourth petition to revoke probation. The petition first alleged that, on December 2, 2024, Hall reported that he was residing at the Lighthouse Recovery Center, which was located in a different county than his probation was based, and he failed to provide documentation to verify his residency with the probation department. The petition further alleged that, on December 17, 2024, Hall reported that he “had traveling to do and was going to be leaving” the Lighthouse Recovery Center. Id. at 159. Hall's probation officer instructed him to report to probation or provide documentation regarding his living situation, but Hall did neither. Then, on December 20, 2024, Hall sent his probation officer a message stating:

I'm being admitted to a mental health hospital so I'm not going to have a phone or any way to respond to anything else at this time. If you violate me I'll see you when you get out of Federal Prison. You['re] guilty of more tha[n] 7 accounts [sic] of [perjury] on 3/13/2024 so I've already had [the] CIA file charges in Washington on my behalf. Nice know[ing] you.

Id. The probation officer inquired regarding which mental health hospital Hall had been admitted to but received no response, and Hall's “whereabouts [were] unknown.” Id. Lastly, the petition alleged that Hall failed to report for two drug screens in November and December 2024.

[10] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the fourth petition to revoke probation on February 20, 2025. Hall's probation officer testified regarding Hall's violations. Hall testified that he stayed at the Lighthouse Recovery Center for approximately thirty days and then stayed at the Lafayette Transitional Housing Center for approximately one week. After this, Hall went to the emergency room for one night on December 31, 2024, and then stayed at Sycamore Springs, a mental health and addiction treatment center in Lafayette. Hall admitted that he did not advise his probation officer regarding where he was seeking treatment after staying at the Lighthouse Recovery Center; that he had not reported in-person to his probation officer since November 14, 2024, or by phone since December 2024; and that he did not call in for drug screening on the dates he failed to screen. Hall explained that he stated his probation officer would go to federal prison because Hall “was in a state where [he] wasn't thinking clearly,” but Hall claimed that his condition had since improved. Tr. Vol. II p. 19.

[11] The trial court determined that Hall violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer and failing to submit to drug screens and noted that four petitions to revoke probation had been filed. The trial court terminated Hall's probation unsuccessfully and ordered Hall to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence—508 days minus credit for 38 days—in the DOC. Hall now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Hall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC as a sanction for his probation violations. We disagree.

[13] We review a trial court's sanction for probation violations under the abuse of discretion standard. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id.

[14] When a probation violation is alleged, the trial court engages in two functions. Id. “First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Id. “Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) governs such sanctions and provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the [probationary] period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[15] “ ‘Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.’ ” Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Nonetheless, “the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation, which will require a determination of whether the defendant committed a new criminal offense.” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618.

[16] Hall failed to report to probation and keep his probation officer apprised of his location, which were conditions of his probation. Hall also threatened that his probation officer would go to federal prison if she filed a violation report against him. Hall's probation officer then lost contact with Hall, whose whereabouts were unknown. See Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming trial court's imposition of probationer's two-year suspended sentence based, in part, on probationer's failure to report to probation).

[17] Hall also failed to participate in required drug screening. And significantly, this was Hall's fourth petition to revoke probation. The previous petitions involved similar violations related to failing to report and missing drug screens. See Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (considering probationer's repeated probation violations in affirming order imposing two years of previously suspended sentence).

[18] Hall argues that he “was clearly not thinking correctly” and “was seeking his own treatment to address his mental health issues.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We commend Hall for voluntarily seeking treatment but doing so does not negate Hall's responsibilities to report to his probation officer and submit to drug screening.

[19] He further argues that his failure to report to probation was a “technical” violation that does not warrant the imposition of his suspended sentence. Id. at 12. Hall relies on Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), which we find distinguishable. In Brown, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the probationer's probation after he missed “an undetermined number of appointments with his probation officer”; however, Brown's violations did not warrant imposition of his entire suspended sentence, which totaled more than sixteen years. Id. at 1183.

[20] Here, Hall did not merely fail to report to his probation officer as in Brown. Hall also failed to drug screen, and this was his fourth set of probation violations in this case. Moreover, the imposed sanction here is considerably less than that ordered in Brown. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Hall to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC.

Conclusion

[21] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Hall to serve his previously suspended sentence in the DOC. Accordingly, we affirm.

[22] Affirmed.

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.