Tamika Manson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tamika Manson appeals her conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, arguing the evidence is insufficient to support it. Concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The evidence most favorable to the conviction is as follows. On December 18, 2023, Speedway Police Department Officer Scott Highland was dispatched to a GetGo gas station on Crawfordsville Road because Manson was causing a disturbance. Officer Highland filled out a “Trespass Notice,” which contained Manson's name, address, date of birth, and social-security number and was signed by a store employee. See Ex. 1. The notice provided that Manson was banned from the property and would be arrested if she returned. When Officer Highland tried to hand a copy of the notice to Manson, “[s]he walked away and refused to take” it. Tr. Vol. II p. 96. Officer Highland “yelled” at Manson “across the parking lot as she was walking away” that “she would be arrested if she came back[.]” Id. at 96-97.

[3] The next day, December 19, Officer Highland was again dispatched to the GetGo station after Manson returned and caused another disturbance. Upon arrival, Officer Highland “immediately noticed” Manson from the day before and arrested her. Id. at 94.

[4] The State charged Manson with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. Following a bench trial, the trial court found her guilty.

[5] Manson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Manson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We consider only the evidence supporting the conviction and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[7] To convict Manson of criminal trespass as charged here, the State had to prove that she, not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly entered the real property of GetGo after having being denied entry by GetGo or its agent. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13; Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1) (2023). Manson first argues that the State failed to prove that she was on GetGo's property on December 19. Specifically, she claims that Officer Highland “did not testify that he saw [her] on any Get[G]o property when he responded” to the call that day and that she could have been on “the public sidewalk” or “an adjacent property.” Appellant's Br. pp. 7-8. However, Officer Highland testified that he was dispatched to GetGo on December 19 because Manson “was causing a disturbance inside the store” and that when he arrived, he “immediately” noticed her. Tr. Vol. II p. 94 (emphasis added). The trial court could reasonably infer from this testimony that Manson was on GetGo's property on December 19. Cf. Powell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding evidence insufficient to support criminal-trespass conviction under different subsection of the statute because the State failed to prove that the defendant was on the bar's property when an officer asked him to leave).

[8] Next, Manson argues that the State failed to prove that she “knew she had been trespassed” from the property. Appellant's Br. p. 10. Officer Highland testified that on December 18, he filled out the Trespass Notice, which contained Manson's personal identifiers, but that Manson “refused to take a copy” and “walked away.” Officer Highland then yelled across the parking lot that Manson would be arrested if she returned. The trial court could reasonably infer from this evidence that Manson knew she had been ordered not to return to the property. Manson claims that she didn't hear Officer Highland, but this is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we don't do. See Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1066.

[9] Finally, Manson argues that the State failed to prove that Officer Highland “was acting as the agent of Get[G]o when he shouted at [her] that she had been trespassed.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. But as the State points out, Officer Highland was not the one who requested the trespass. Instead, it was the store employee, as the agent of GetGo, who requested the trespass and signed the notice. See Tr.

Vol. II p. 98; Ex. 1; see also I.C. § 35-31.5-2-12(a) (defining “agent” in part as an “adult employee”). The evidence is sufficient to support Manson's conviction.

[10] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Felix concur. Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.