LLC v. Shonda Hiller, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Shonda Hiller took her child to Triple Crown Valparaiso Baseball and Softball Training Center (“Triple Crown”) for a private batting lesson. During her child's lesson, an instructor retrieved Hiller from the waiting room and directed her to kneel on the floor in the training area so she could watch her child's lesson. Directly behind where Hiller was told to kneel stood a netted training screen with an aluminum frame. Shortly after Hiller knelt in front of the training screen, a different child at Triple Crown knocked over the screen onto Hiller, causing her to hit her head on the floor. Hiller sued Triple Crown for negligence. Triple Crown filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it did not owe Hiller a duty of reasonable care. The trial court denied Triple Crown's motion. Triple Crown now appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred in denying Triple Crown's motion for summary judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 1, 2015, Hiller took her daughter, Brooke, to Triple Crown in Valparaiso, Indiana, for a private batting lesson. This was Hiller and Brooke's first time at Triple Crown. Initially, Hiller stayed in a separate waiting room while Brooke went into the training area of the facility. During Brooke's lesson, Zach Janssen, Brooke's batting instructor, came into the waiting room and asked Hiller to follow him so she could watch Brooke's lesson. Janssen took Hiller into the training area and directed her to kneel in front of the training screen.

[4] That same day, Barbara Cole was at Triple Crown in the training area with her eight-year-old daughter Hannah while she waited for her other child to finish a lesson. While Hiller was watching Brooke's lesson, Hannah somehow knocked over the training screen behind Hiller. The parties do not dispute that Hannah tipped over the training screen, but no one witnessed the exact circumstances. The screen fell on top of Hiller, causing her head to hit the ground.

[5] On September 22, 2017, Hiller filed a lawsuit against Triple Crown alleging negligence. On April 29, 2024, Triple Crown filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not owe Hiller a duty of care. After a hearing, the trial court denied Triple Crown's motion for summary judgment. On November 8, 2024, we accepted jurisdiction for Triple Crown's interlocutory appeal of that denial, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Triple Crown's Motion for Summary Judgment

[6] Triple Crown claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. We review the denial of a summary judgment motion de novo. Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 684 (Ind. 2024). “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if the evidence it designates in support of its motion ‘shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 684–85 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, we “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences for the nonmovant.” Id. at 685 (citing Cosme v. Clark, 232 N.E.3d 1141, 1150 (Ind. 2024)).

[7] The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wireman v. LaPorte Hosp. Co., 205 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Serbon v. City of E. Chicago, 194 N.E.3d 84, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), reh'g denied (Apr. 5, 2023), trans. denied, 211 N.E.3d 1007 (Ind. 2023). The movant “can make this showing when undisputed evidence affirmatively negates a required element” of the nonmovant's claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022) (citing Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187–88 (Ind. 2016)). Only if the movant meets this prima facie burden does the burden then shift to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Wireman, 205 N.E.3d at 1045 (citing Serbon, 194 N.E.3d at 91).

[8] Triple Crown filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Hiller's negligence claim. To recover on a negligence claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty through conduct that fell below the appropriate level of care; and (3) the defendant's breach caused injury to the plaintiff. Cave Quarries, 240 N.E.3d at 685 (citing Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016)). Triple Crown argues only that it did not owe a duty to Hiller. Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care “is a question of law for the court to decide.” Pennington v. Memorial Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 223 N.E.3d 1086, 1096 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386–87). Additionally, we have recently noted that “the law of duty as it has evolved in Indiana reveals that it can be quite nuanced when we are applying our well-settled standard of review on summary judgment.” Simon Property Group, L.P. v. Stewart, -- N.E.3d --, 2025 WL 1618501 at *10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[9] Both parties agree that Hiller was an invitee of Triple Crown. “It is well settled in Indiana that a landowner has a duty to an invitee to ‘exercise reasonable care for the invitee's protection while the invitee is on the premises.’ ” Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097 (quoting Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016)). A landowner can owe an invitee a duty based on either conditions of the land or activities on the land; foreseeability is an element of both types of duty. See id. at 1097–98; Simon Property, 2025 WL 1618501 at *10. Our Supreme Court has recently described the “critical difference ․ between the foreseeability tests for conditions and activities”:

The Restatement test that we use for conditions looks at whether the danger posed by the specific condition involved was foreseeable. Whereas, the Rogers/Goodwin test that we use for activities looks at whether it was foreseeable that a general class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged might suffer the general type of harm involved. This distinction makes sense in that a landowner can know the precise physical condition of their premises, but only generally foresee what conduct or behavior will occur.

Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097–98. Triple Crown argues only that we should apply the foreseeability test for activities on the land. We cannot agree.

[10] “To distinguish between condition claims and activity claims, we focus on the substance of the claims as reflected in the complaint, summary-judgment briefs, and designated evidence.” Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1098. In Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend¸ Pennington sued the owner of a fitness center for negligence for injuries sustained while swimming in the fitness center's pool. Id. at 1092. While swimming backstroke, Pennington struck her head on a winged wall of the swimming pool, id., so the question arose: Was the fitness center's alleged duty to protect based on the condition of the premises by having a winged wall in the pool or the activity of swimming backstroke? See id. at 1098. Pennington's complaint alleged that the fitness center did not “remedy dangerous conditions” and mentioned “safety features such as floating lines and adequate padding,” while her summary judgment brief argued in part that the fitness center “owed a duty of care to protect a member of its fitness club from an injury resulting from an exposed wall during normal use of its lap pool.” Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he unreasonable danger” in Pennington's negligence claim was “swimming backstroke next to the unpadded wing-wall,” stating, “It was the placement and condition of this wing-wall that formed the basis for alleging a duty to protect.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the Pennington Court applied the Restatement test used for conditions of the land. Id.

[11] Here, Hiller's complaint alleged that Triple Crown failed to exercise reasonable care by:

(a) Directing Shonda to the location on the premises where she was injured;

(b) Failing to adequately supervise other invitees on the Triple Crown premises;

(c) Failing to secure athletic equipment on the Triple Crown premises; and

(d) Failing to enforce its own rules, policies and procedures for others on its premises.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 8–9. In her summary judgment brief, Hiller argued that Janssen, and in turn Triple Crown, “owed her a duty of care to place her in a reasonably safe location,” but instead placed her in front of a training screen that is “known to tip over when force is applied to it.” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 120. The alleged danger was Hiller being directed to kneel in front of a screen that could tip over, so the proximity to and condition of the screen were the basis for Triple Crown's alleged duty to protect her. Therefore, we conclude Hiller's allegation is that the condition of Triple Crown's premises formed the basis of its alleged duty to protect her, so the Restatement test of foreseeability applies. See Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1098.

[12] Under the Restatement test:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Thus, “[t]he duty to exercise reasonable care extends to ‘an unreasonable risk of harm’ that the defendant ‘should realize’ exists and ‘should expect’ invitees to overlook or fail to ‘protect themselves against.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343). When conducting this foreseeability analysis, we “focus[ ] specifically on ‘the condition’ that allegedly resulted in injury.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343).

[13] The condition of the land that allegedly resulted in Hiller's injury was the training screen that was prone to tipping over. Thus, to prevail on her negligence claim, Hiller needs to demonstrate that Triple Crown had actual or constructive knowledge of this dangerous condition. See Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. 2021) (citing Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 1991)). Under our summary judgment standard, the burden was on Triple Crown as the movant to show the undisputed facts negate the duty element of Hiller's negligence claim. See McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 377 (citing Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187–88). Triple Crown does not claim that it did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the screen could tip over; instead, it argues that the screen was only known to fall over when it was hit by a ball and that it had not previously been knocked over by a child. Thus, Triple Crown admits it had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition—that the screen could fall over—when Janssen directed Hiller to kneel in front of it, and Triple Crown failed to negate the duty element of Hiller's claim. We conclude that Triple Crown owed Hiller a duty of care and the trial court did not err in denying Triple Crown's motion for summary judgment.

[14] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.