Mariusz Kurylo, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Mariusz Kurylo, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment and the granting of the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Wireless Propco, LLC (“Wireless Propco”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Unfortunately, the parties’ briefs—both of which violate multiple rules of appellate procedure ¹ —fail to paint a coherent picture of the facts relevant to our review. Apparently, the instant dispute revolves around which party is entitled to receive proceeds from a Net Profits Agreement (“the Agreement”) executed in 2011 between the owners of a commercial building in Anderson and the owner of a wireless communications easement relating to cellular equipment on the roof of the building. Under the Agreement, the owners of the building were entitled to a specified share of revenue that the easement owner earned from renting portions of the easement.

[3] Kurylo acquired the building in 2021. In February 2023, he financed its sale to another entity and apparently took steps to preserve the rights that he had purportedly acquired to the revenue under the Agreement. Also in February 2023, another entity purportedly assigned those rights to Wireless Propco. In September 2024, Kurylo, pro se, filed a quiet title complaint against Wireless Propco, which filed an answer to the complaint. Kurylo filed a motion for summary judgment, and Wireless Propco filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In January 2025, after a hearing, the trial court denied Kurylo's motion and granted Wireless Propco's cross-motion. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Kurylo is proceeding pro se on appeal. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted). “The purpose of our appellate rules, Ind. Appellate Rule 46 in particular, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “We will not become an advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.” Id. (quoting Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied).

[5] “The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which can be determined as a matter of law.” Lamb v. Mid Ind. Serv. Co., 19 N.E.3d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Our standard of review is well settled. “We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.” Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weaver, 120 N.E.3d 280, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Considering only those facts that the parties designated to the trial court, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In answering these questions, the reviewing court construes all factual inferences in the non-moving party's favor and resolves all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and once the movant satisfies the burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Est. of Ecker v. Est. of Samson, 59 N.E.3d 282, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation modified).² We are “not bound by the trial court's findings and conclusions and will affirm if the trial court's entry of summary judgment can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record.” Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025).

[6] “Our standard of review is not altered by the fact that the parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. Instead, we consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Est. of Ecker, 59 N.E.3d at 284 (citation omitted). “A trial court's grant of summary judgment on appeal to this Court is ‘clothed with a presumption of validity,’ and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ind. 2009)).

[7] Kurylo has failed to carry his burden here. Initially, we observe that Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) states that at the time of filing a summary judgment motion, “a party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the rule “requires sufficient specificity to identify the relevant portions of a document” on which the moving party relies and that

[d]esignation may be placed in a motion for summary judgment, a memorandum supporting or opposing the motion, a separate filing identifying itself as the designation of evidence, or an appendix to the motion or memorandum. The only requirement as to placement is that the designation clearly identify listed materials as designated evidence in support of or opposition to the motion for summary judgment. If the designation is not in the motion itself, it must be in a paper filed with the motion, and the motion should recite where the designation of evidence is to be found in the accompanying papers.

Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind. 2008). Kurylo's appendix contains no designation of evidence in any form. “We cannot consider evidence not designated to the trial court in reviewing its summary judgment ruling.” Scribner v. Gibbs, 953 N.E.2d 475, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[8] Moreover, as stated in footnote 1 above, Kurylo failed to include copies of his complaint and Wireless Propco's answer in his appendix and thus has deprived us of crucial factual and legal context for our review. Kurylo asks us to take judicial notice pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201 that the entity that purportedly assigned him the revenue rights under the Agreement was duly registered with the Indiana Secretary of State's Office in February 2023, whereas the entity that purportedly assigned those rights to Wireless Propco was not. Assuming, purely for argument's sake, that taking judicial notice of such matters is proper and that Kurylo's assertion is correct, we observe that he cites no pertinent authority for his implicit assertion that an assignment from a non-registered entity is invalid as a matter of law. The same is true for his implicit assertion that the assignment to Wireless Propco is invalid because it was not recorded.³

[9] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) provides that the argument section of an appellant's brief “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]” “It is well settled that we will not consider an appellant's assertion on appeal when he has failed to present cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record as required by the rules.” Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “If we were to address such arguments, we would be forced to abdicate our role as an impartial tribunal and would instead become an advocate for one of the parties. This, clearly, we cannot do.” Id.⁴

[10] Simply put, “[a] brief should not only present the issues to be decided on appeal, but it should be of material assistance to the court in deciding those issues.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Kurylo's disjointed statement of facts and failure to present cogent argument supported by authority compel us to conclude that he has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that the trial court's summary judgment ruling was erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   First and foremost, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) provides that a party's statement of facts “shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in accordance with Rule 22(C).” Far too many of the parties’ “facts” are not supported by page references to the record or appendix, and both parties mention documents that are not in the appendix. Appellate Rule 50(A) provides that an appellant's appendix “shall contain ․ pleadings and other documents from the Clerk's Record in chronological order that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal.” Kurylo's appendix does not contain his complaint, Wireless Propco's answer, or the parties’ designation of evidence (if any) on summary judgment. Wireless Propco could have filed its own appendix and included the missing documents, but it opted not to do so. Instead, it asks us to take judicial notice of certain documents, which we decline to do. Of lesser importance, we note that both sides violated Appellate Rule 46(A)(2), which provides that a party's table of authorities “shall list” the authorities cited in the brief “alphabetically or numerically, as applicable.” Additional rule violations are discussed below.

2.   In his standard of review, Kurylo asserts that “[f]acts alleged in the complaint should be accepted as true, by the court[,]” and that “[a]ll well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint, shall be taken as admitted by the court.” Appellant's Br. at 18-19. These principles apply when reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, not a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. In any event, as previously mentioned, Kurylo failed to include his complaint in his appendix, so we are unable to determine what facts he pleaded.

3.   There is no indication that the Agreement itself was recorded, although it is mentioned in the 2011 easement agreement, which was recorded. Wireless Propco correctly observes that the Agreement gave the easement owner the “unrestricted right” to assign its interest in the Agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36. In support of his argument that his assignment should take priority over Wireless Propco's assignment, Kurylo cites a memorandum decision from 2018, which he may not do. Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D)(2). He also relies on three title commitments that appear in his appendix but are not specifically mentioned in his summary judgment brief.

4.   The trial court based its ruling on res judicata grounds. Kurylo cites some basic res judicata principles, but his argument on the issue suffers from the same lack of cogency as his other arguments.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.