WHITE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Susan White appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation and the imposition of her previously suspended sentence. White argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a laboratory drug test report; by finding that she violated her probation; and by ordering White to serve her previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). We, however, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[2] White raises four issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

 I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a laboratory drug test report.

 II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking White's probation.

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing White's previously suspended sentence as a result of her probation violation.

Facts

[3] In June 2020, the State charged White with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, and dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 1 felony. White pleaded guilty to dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, and the State dismissed the Level 1 felony charge. In April 2024, the trial court sentenced White to six years in the DOC, all suspended to probation. The trial court placed White “on a zero (0) tolerance policy with Probation.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. The trial court ordered the following condition of probation, among others:

You shall not possess or consume any alcoholic beverage, narcotic, synthetic marijuana, or controlled substance unless prescribed by a physician or dentist. You shall undergo a laboratory chemical test (as defined in IC 14-15-8-1) or a series of chemical tests as specified by the court to detect and confirm the presence of alcohol, synthetic marijuana or a controlled substance (as defined in IC 35-48-1-9) at the request of any probation officer, anyone acting upon the request of the Probation Department, or upon order of the Court. You must provide a valid urine sample for testing upon request. The provided sample must not be diluted nor adulterated which may be confirmed by the Probation Department. A drug or alcohol test result returned from the lab as diluted will be considered a positive test.

Id. at 40.

[4] On August 29, 2024, the probation department filed a petition to revoke White's probation and alleged:

That [White] has violated the terms of the probation established herein in that:

Ms. White tested positive for benzodiazepine on 08/19/2024 in the office during a random drug screen. [White] denied use and does not have a valid prescription for any benzodiazepines. I asked Ms. White if she had taken any benzodiazepines and she responded, “No, but I wish I had.” The sample was sent to the lab for confirmation. Results were received from the lab on 08/27/2024 confirming a positive result for benzodiazepines and the sample was dilute[d].

Id. at 41.

[5] An evidentiary hearing on the petition to revoke White's probation was held on January 3, 2025. Probation Officer Holly Mitchell testified that she routinely administers at least ten drug tests each week; she administered a drug screen to White on August 19, 2024; White tested positive for benzodiazepines; and White did not have a prescription for benzodiazepines. White did not object to Probation Officer Mitchell's testimony.

[6] According to Probation Officer Mitchell, because White denied usage of benzodiazepines, Probation Officer Mitchell sent White's drug screen to Redwood Toxicology Laboratory for confirmation. The State sought to admit the one-page laboratory report (“Lab Report”) as Exhibit 1, and White objected to the admission of the Lab Report based upon hearsay and lack of proper authentication. The trial court admitted the Lab Report over White's objection. The Lab Report showed that White's sample was diluted ¹ based upon a low creatinine level and that White tested positive for benzodiazepines. On cross-examination, White questioned Probation Officer Mitchell about other causes of low creatinine, and Probation Officer Mitchell agreed that she was not a physician, did not work in a lab, and was unsure of other causes of low creatinine.

[7] Fifty-nine-year-old White testified that she has serious health issues, including diabetes, which led to an amputation of her toe; peripheral vascular disease; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; asthma; restless leg syndrome; hypertension; anxiety; and kidney issues. White cares for her husband, who has been placed in a nursing home due to his poor health. Although White denied taking benzodiazepines before the drug test at issue, she testified that she later obtained a prescription for Xanax ² from her doctor. White questioned the result of the drug test and argued that the drug test should have been positive for her pain pills instead of benzodiazepines. Mary Keown, White's aunt, also testified as to White's extensive health issues.

[8] The trial court concluded that White violated the terms of her probation and ordered that White serve her six-year previously suspended sentence in the DOC. The trial court noted that, in an earlier hearing, White had “effectively passed out in court.” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. When the trial court ordered her to immediately submit to a drug test, White denied taking any drugs and claimed that she was unable to submit a sample. At the jail, White tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, morphine, and benzodiazepines, and thirty-eight unprescribed Xanax pills were found in her purse. Given White's history, the trial court found not credible White's denials that she took benzodiazepines.

[9] The trial court also noted the “very favorable” plea agreement that White was given and the trial court's advisement at White's sentencing of the “zero tolerance policy” given the favorable plea agreement. Id. at 39. Finally, the trial court stated that it had accepted the plea agreement so that White could get treatment for her “severe substance abuse problem,” and given White's continued substance abuse, continuation of probation was not appropriate. Id. at 41. White now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review for Probation Revocation

[10] We review a trial court's determination regarding probation violations for an abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id.

[11] “ ‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’ ” Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we do not reweigh the evidence or credibility. Murdock, 10 N.E.3d at 1267. We will affirm if “there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation.” Id.

[12] “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.” Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. “The requirement that a probationer obey federal, state, and local laws is automatically a condition of probation by operation of law.” Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(b).

II. Admission of Drug Test Results

[13] We first address White's challenge to the admission of the Lab Report at her probation revocation hearing. “A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence at a probation revocation hearing, and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion.” Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “As a general matter, the Indiana Rules of Evidence do not apply to probation revocation proceedings.” Id. at 287 (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2)). “This flexibility is ‘necessary to permit the court to exercise its inherent power to enforce obedience to its lawful orders.’ ” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind. 1999)). Our Supreme Court has held that hearsay evidence is admissible in a probation revocation hearing if it is “substantially trustworthy.” Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ind. 2012) (citing Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ind. 2007)).

[14] White argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting “an unauthenticated laboratory report indicating a positive result for benzodiazepines.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. According to White, the State was required to present laboratory personnel or a qualified expert to authenticate the Lab Report in order to explain the testing methods, validate the accuracy of the results, and interpret the test results.

[15] We first note that White did not object to the probation officer's testimony regarding the initial positive drug test result. The “[a]dmission of hearsay evidence is not grounds for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted.” VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 267 (Ind. 2013). The Lab Report showing that White tested positive for benzodiazepines is merely cumulative of the probation officer's testimony that White's initial drug test was positive for benzodiazepines. Accordingly, any error in the admission of the Lab Report was harmless.

[16] Moreover, even if the alleged error was not harmless, we do not find White's arguments persuasive. In support of her argument, White relies upon Wann v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). White argues that, in Wann, this Court “reversed [the] probation revocation precisely because drug tests results were admitted without foundational testimony from laboratory personnel capable of authenticating and explaining the report.” Appellant's Br. p. 14 (emphasis added). Contrary to White's argument, in Wann, this Court affirmed the revocation of probation. In Wann, the probation officer testified as to the probationer's positive drug test, and a toxicology report was admitted. On appeal, the probationer argued that the report was not substantially trustworthy because an affidavit from the testing toxicologist was required. Relying upon our Supreme Court's opinion in Reyes, we “discern[ed]” no requirement that such an affidavit was required. Wann, 997 N.E.2d at 1106. Ultimately, however, we resolved the issue on other grounds. We concluded that the probationer's due process rights were not violated by the admission of the report because he had earlier specifically agreed to waive any objection to the admissibility of drug test results in revocation hearings.³

[17] Next, White relies upon Donald v. State, 930 N.E.2d 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), and argues that the Court in Donald “reversed a probation revocation where an unauthenticated laboratory report constituted the sole evidence against the probationer.” Appellant's Br. pp. 14-15. This Court, in fact, reversed the probation revocation in Donald because the probationer had “a due process right to a competency evaluation prior to his probation revocation hearing if it was warranted.” Donald, 930 N.E.2d at 80. The appeal had absolutely nothing to do with an unauthenticated laboratory report.

[18] Finally, White relies upon Whatley v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)⁴ , and argues that the Court in Whatley “reversed a probation revocation due to admission of hearsay evidence without sufficient guarantees of reliability ․” Appellant's Br. p. 15 (emphasis added). Again, contrary to White's argument, this Court, in fact, affirmed the probation revocation in Whatley. We held that the trial court properly took judicial notice of a probable cause affidavit from another case and that the probable cause affidavit had “substantial indicia of reliability.” Whatley, 847 N.E.2d at 1010.

[19] We do not find White's misrepresentations of these opinions to be persuasive. In fact, in Bass v. State, 974 N.E.2d 482, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), we held that “[t]he absence of an affidavit from a toxicologist or laboratory employee does not render drug test results inadmissible in probation revocation proceedings where there is otherwise a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness.” We noted that the probation officer in that case testified that:

She was familiar with and described the urinalysis collection and chain of custody procedures; she testified that the laboratory which had generated Bass's urinalysis report was the laboratory used to generate twenty to sixty reports per week for Vigo County Community Corrections. The reports identify the collecting and processing individuals, and contain detailed information about the testing time. Each report is accompanied by a document signed by Bass and by the collecting officer, acknowledging that the sample was sealed and secured in Bass's presence.

Bass, 974 N.E.2d at 487-88. We, thus, concluded that the trial court did not violate the probationer's due process rights when it admitted the State's exhibits.

[20] Similarly, here, the probation officer testified that she routinely administers drug tests, and she administered a routine drug test on White that was positive for benzodiazepines. Because White challenged the results of the drug test, the probation officer sent the sample to the laboratory for a confirmatory test. The Lab Report also showed that White's sample was positive for benzodiazepines and that the sample was diluted. Although the State did not submit an affidavit to accompany the Lab Report or an expert's testimony, we conclude, as we did in Bass, that the Lab Report was substantially trustworthy.

[21] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Lab Report. Moreover, the Lab Report was cumulative of the probation officer's testimony, to which White did not object. Accordingly, any error in the admission of the Lab Report was harmless.

III. Revocation of White's Probation

[22] Next, White argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding she violated her probation. According to White, the Lab Report was unreliable, the Lab Report conflicted with White's “substantial compliance with all probation conditions,” and the Lab Report failed to contain a positive result for White's prescribed pain medication.⁵ Appellant's Br. p. 13.

[23] In support of her argument, White relies upon Jenkins v. State, 956 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. According to White, this Court in Jenkins “reversed a probation revocation where the state relied solely on an unexplained positive drug test.” Appellant's Br. p. 12 (emphasis added). In Jenkins, however, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the probationer violated his probation. Moreover, the probationer in Jenkins “admitted that he had failed to timely report for probation and failed to pay court costs and probation fees.” Jenkins, 956 N.E.2d at 148. The alleged probation violation in Jenkins had absolutely nothing to do with a positive drug test.

[24] White also relies upon Bass, 974 N.E.2d 482, for the proposition that this court “reversed a probation revocation that was based exclusively on an unauthenticated drug screen, lacking testimony from a qualified expert to verify the test's reliability.” Appellant's Br. p. 12 (emphasis added). As noted, supra, this Court affirmed the trial court's revocation of probation in Bass, and this Court held the admission of the drug test results did not violate the probationer's due process rights. White also contends that Wann, 997 N.E.2d 1103, “reversed [the] probation revocation ․ holding that the absence of foundational expert testimony renders drug tests insufficiently reliable.” Appellant's Br. p. 13 (emphasis added). As noted, supra, this Court affirmed the trial court's revocation of probation in Wann.⁶

[25] We do not find White's argument, which includes misrepresentations of Jenkins, Bass, or Wann, to be persuasive. We have already concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Lab Report. Moreover, White did not object to the probation officer's testimony that White tested positive for benzodiazepines in the initial drug test. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence of probative value that White violated the terms of her probation by consuming benzodiazepines without a prescription. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that White violated her probation.

IV. Imposition of White's Suspended Sentence

[26] Next, White challenges the sanction imposed by the trial court as a result of her probation violation. We review a trial court's sanction for probation violations under the abuse of discretion standard. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id.

[27] When a probation violation is alleged, the trial court engages in two functions. Id. “First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Id. “Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) governs such sanctions and provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the [probationary] period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[28] “While it is correct that probation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition, the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation, which will require a determination of whether the defendant committed a new criminal offense.” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618. “[T]he defendant must be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence showing the violation does not warrant revocation.” Holsapple v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1035, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). “However, in determining the appropriate sentence upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”⁷ Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582 (citing Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

[29] White argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing her entire previously suspended sentence as a sanction for her probation violation. White argues that she has severe chronic health conditions, which are exacerbated by incarceration; she has family responsibilities as the caregiver for her husband; and the trial court abused its discretion by enforcing a zero-tolerance policy without exercising its discretion.

[30] We begin by discussing the implications of strict compliance in probation revocations. Our Supreme Court has held:

In one sense all probation requires “strict compliance.” That is to say probation is a matter of grace. And once the trial court extends this grace and sets its terms and conditions, the probationer is expected to comply with them strictly. If the probationer fails to do so, then a violation has occurred. But even in the face of a probation violation the trial court may nonetheless exercise its discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation.

In any event the very notion that violation of a probationary term will result in revocation no matter the reason is constitutionally suspect․

We acknowledge that telling a defendant that he is on “strict compliance” is a dramatic way of putting him on notice that he is on a short leash and has been given one final chance to “get his act together.” Nonetheless due process requires that a defendant be given the opportunity to explain why even this final chance is deserving of further consideration․

Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

[31] We addressed a similar issue in Holsapple, 148 N.E.3d at 1037, where the defendant pleaded guilty and agreed to the following:

If [defendant] graduates from Drug Court, then her sentence shall be stayed permanently.

If [defendant] is terminated from Drug Court, then the stay on her sentence shall be lifted, and her sentence, sixteen (16) years to be executed at Indiana Department of Correction, shall be imposed.

The trial court sentenced the defendant in accordance with the plea agreement, but the defendant later violated the terms of her problem-solving court. In sanctioning the defendant for her probation violation, the trial court concluded that it had “no discretion whatsoever” based upon the plea agreement and ordered the defendant to serve her sixteen-year sentence at the DOC. Id. at 1038.

[32] We held that:

[C]ontrary to the trial court's belief that it was required to impose the agreed-upon sanction of full execution of the stayed sentence, a plea agreement cannot bind the trial court's hands as to an appropriate sanction. Rather, as in any probation revocation proceeding, the trial court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Id. at 1042. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's order that the defendant “serve the entire sixteen-year-sentence because it [was] based on the predetermined sanction ․” Id.

[33] Here, unlike in Holsapple, there is no indication that the trial court believed it was required to impose the entire six-year suspended sentence as a result of White's probation violation. The trial court here discussed extensively its reasoning for imposing the entire six-year suspended sentence. First, the trial court noted White's history of drug abuse. In an earlier hearing, White had “effectively passed out in court;” claimed to be unable to submit a drug test; and then tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, morphine, and benzodiazepines, and thirty-eight unprescribed Xanax pills were found in her purse. Tr. Vol. II p. 40. The trial court also noted that White had been given a “very favorable” plea agreement. Id. at 39. Finally, the trial court stated that it accepted the plea agreement so that White could get treatment for her “severe substance abuse problem,” and given White's continued substance abuse, probation was no longer appropriate. Id. at 41. Accordingly, this is not a case where the trial court believed it was required to impose a certain sanction based upon a strict compliance provision of a plea agreement; rather, the trial court imposed the entire six-year suspended sentence as an exercise of its discretion.

[34] White was given an opportunity to explain why the trial court should not impose the previously suspended sentence, and we are not unsympathetic to White's serious health concerns and to her status as her husband's caregiver. White, however, has a significant drug addiction and pleaded guilty to dealing in methamphetamine. As part of a plea agreement, all of White's sentence was suspended to probation. Despite the very favorable plea agreement and sentence, White reoffended within months by testing positive for benzodiazepines. Under these circumstances, the trial court was within its discretion to order White to serve her six-year previously suspended sentence in the DOC.

Conclusion

[35] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Lab Report, by finding that White violated her probation, or by ordering White to serve her previously suspended sentence in the DOC. Accordingly, we affirm.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Probation Officer Mitchell testified a diluted sample could mean that the probationer was “drinking a whole bunch of water intentionally, trying to pass a drug screen.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8.

2.   Xanax is a benzodiazepine. See Gillespie v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

3.   The State argues that White “explicitly agreed to submit to the use of such test results when she agreed to the terms and conditions of her probation.” Appellee's Br. p. 12 (citing Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 31-40). Some probationers do agree to waive any objection to the admissibility of such drug test results. See, e.g., Wann, 997 N.E.2d at 1106 (noting that the probationer agreed: “You shall submit to alcohol and drug tests when requested by the Probation Department or any Law Enforcement Officer. You shall waive any objection to the admissibility of the results of the test as they are received by the Court into evidence at any Revocation Hearing.”). We find no such provision in the orders here, and the State does not direct us to any such provision. Accordingly, we do not find the State's argument persuasive.

4.   Whatley also held that “[t]he trial court only needs to find that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant violated a criminal law.” 847 N.E.2d at 1010 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court, however, held in Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. 2013), that the preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable in probation revocation proceedings.

5.   The Lab Report indicates that White's sample was only tested for the presence of benzodiazepines.

6.   White also relies upon Baxter v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, for the proposition that this Court “reversed due to lack of authentication and foundational testimony.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. This Court did reverse a probation revocation in Baxter, but the issue concerned a law enforcement incident report, not a drug test report.

7.   Relying upon Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), and Donald, 930 N.E.2d 76, White argues that “Indiana courts have repeatedly held that trial courts must explicitly weigh mitigating factors before revoking probation, particularly when a probationer presents evidence of significant hardship or medical difficulties.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. In Patterson, a panel of this Court held that “a probationer's mental state must be considered in the dispositional determination of a probation revocation proceeding.” 659 N.E.2d at 222-23. In Donald, this Court held that the probationer had “a due process right to a competency evaluation prior to his probation revocation hearing if it was warranted.” 930 N.E.2d at 80. These cases did not hold that trial courts must explicitly weigh all mitigating factors, as White contends. White also relies upon Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1, which applies to initial sentencings, not sanctions in probation revocation hearings.

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.