Joe P. Hambel, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Joe P. Hambel was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of criminal trespass, for which he received an aggregate sentence of 121 years in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Hambel later sought post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing relating to Hambel's traumatic brain injury (TBI). On summary disposition, which was at Hambel's request, the PCR court denied Hambel's claims. On appeal, Hambel claims that the undisputed evidence establishes that his trial counsel was ineffective.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In August 2016, Hambel was angry about the drug problem in Washington County and particularly focused on a home on Small Street (the Small Street Residence) owned by his maternal uncle, Tony Shelton. At the time, three of Shelton's children – Logan (an adult with autism), Seth (a fifteen-year-old boy), and Valerie (an adult with three teenage children) – were also living in the Small Street Residence. This side of the family had a long history of substance abuse, and on August 5, Shelton and one of Valerie's teenagers had overdosed while using drugs together. As a result, they were hospitalized, and Shelton was arrested on August 18 and held in jail.

[4] Hambel and his mother, Carol Slack, blamed Valerie for the overdose situation at the Small Street Residence, as they believed she was a drug dealer. When Hambel and Slack initially discussed the matter, along with Hambel's pregnant fiancée Jessica Reisert, someone stated that Valerie should die for what she did to her own son and father. Although it is not clear who made this statement, the others expressed agreement with the sentiment.

[5] On the afternoon of Friday August 19, Hambel went to Slack's house so that he could speak with her alone. Thereafter, around 6:00 p.m., Hambel showed up at the home of Salem Police Department (SPD) Officer Ronald Mays. Hambel expressed concerns about drugs at the Small Street Residence and his nephew's overdose, and he specifically mentioned Valerie. Hambel asked about “how to become an informant and how he could help get the drugs out of Washington County.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 8 at 169. Officer Mays directed him to call the drug hotline or set up a meeting with SPD Officer Eric Mills, a drug interdiction officer. Officer Mays then returned to his deck to resume dinner with his family, and Hambel returned to his own apartment complex.

[6] Around 9:30 p.m., Hambel drove to the Small Street Residence with his seventeen-year-old neighbor, R.J. Sease, as a passenger. Hambel backed into a driveway across the street and then left Sease in the car as he walked around the Small Street Residence looking in windows. Hambel surveilled the area for about twenty minutes and saw Valerie, Seth, Logan, and a man he did not recognize sitting around the kitchen table.

[7] Hambel and Sease stopped at a Circle K gas station for cigarettes on the way home. Officer Mills happened to be there investigating a motor vehicle collision, so Hambel introduced himself and told Officer Mills that he wanted to help “clean up the drug problem in the town.” Id. at 186. Hambel identified Valerie as “one of the drug dealers that he was wanting to help with.” Id. Officer Mills took Hambel's number to call him at a later date.

[8] After leaving the gas station around 10:20 p.m., Hambel and Sease went back to Hambel's apartment. There, Hambel called Sease into a bedroom and showed him a .32 caliber handgun, which Hambel put into a holster on his own ankle. Though Hambel regularly carried a 9mm handgun, which was on his hip at the time, he had never carried the .32 caliber handgun, as he was holding it as collateral for a loan he had made to someone.

[9] Sease left to run an errand with his girlfriend, during which Hambel sent them text messages asking when Sease would be home. After Sease returned, he and Hambel left again shortly after midnight. Hambel drove a different car this time, one that Sease was interested in buying from him. After again stopping at the Circle K for cigarettes, Hambel returned to the Small Street Residence, getting there at 12:23 a.m.

[10] Hambel parked on the street near the Small Street Residence, with the car obscured by a large bush. He turned off the headlights but kept the car running as he walked up to the Small Street Residence. Sease stayed in the car. Once again, Hambel circled the house looking in the windows. Josh and Logan were in their respective bedrooms at the time. Josh was lying in his bed listening to music with headphones on, and Logan watched television until about 12:30 a.m., when he turned off the television to sleep. Valerie and her boyfriend, Joe Hobson, whom Hambel did not know, were sitting on a couch in the living room.

[11] At some point, Hambel entered the Small Street Residence through a side door, which was next to the couch where Valerie and Hobson were sitting. Using the .32 caliber handgun, Hambel shot Valerie in the forehead from a close enough range to leave gun powder stippling on her face. He then shot Hobson with the handgun's six remaining bullets, striking Hobson four times in the back and twice in the back of the arm. Valerie and Hobson died at the scene.

[12] Sease heard the gunshots and then saw Hambel running back to the car. As he entered, Hambel had the .32 caliber handgun in his hand and told Sease that “he had took [sic] care of one of Washington County's biggest drug problems.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 9 at 21. Hambel also told Sease that he “shot her in the head and then shot him.” Id. Hambel drove away at 12:41 a.m. As they pulled into their apartment complex about five minutes later, Hambel warned Sease, “if you tell anyone, I've got a bigger one I'm going to use on you.” Id. at 22.

[13] Based on information from Officer Mays, Indiana State Police Detective David Mitchell went to Hambel's apartment later that morning. Slack and Reisert were sitting outside. Detective Mitchell then spoke with Hambel, who agreed to come to the Washington County Sheriff's Department for an interview.

[14] In the first recorded interview, which began shortly after noon and lasted over two hours, Hambel stated that he had not been to the Small Street Residence for over a year and that he suspected Valerie's murderer was one of the many people she had “[s]nitched” on to get out of jail. Id. at 105. Hambel eventually acknowledged that he had driven by the Small Street Residence with Sease the previous night. He initially said that he never got out of the car but later admitted that he walked around the house and looked in all the accessible windows. Hambel claimed he never went inside the house and that he did not shoot anyone. Detective Mitchell asked, “Were you armed?” Id. at 165. Hambel responded, “My 9mm” and then stated, “It's the only, only firearm I have.” Id. Hambel offered to let Detective Mitchell test his 9mm handgun and agreed to a search of his apartment.

[15] Detective Mitchell took Hambel back to the apartment complex where they waited outside while another officer was attempting to secure a search warrant. While waiting, Hambel volunteered, “the 9mm is under the seat of [my] car.” Id. at 182. Reisert and Hambel communicated in the parking lot and then Hambel suddenly yelled to Detective Mitchell that “he had to take a s**t.” Id. at 183. Detective Mitchell accompanied Hambel into the apartment and searched the bathroom before allowing Hambel to use it. In doing so, Detective Mitchell found an ankle holster with a .32 caliber handgun, later determined by a firearms examiner to be the murder weapon, secreted above a high cabinet.

[16] Hambel and Detective Mitchell returned to the sheriff's department for a second interview during which Hambel eventually confessed to entering the Small Street Residence on his second visit. He said he walked around the exterior of the house a couple times and then let himself in through a side door. Hambel explained:

Figured I'd just scare the s**t out of them. Valerie started yelling at me. The guy came, the guy jumped up and ran towards me and I turned around to run. He grabbed the pistol from the back of my waist. I turned around to grab him by his wrist. We struggled for a moment. I got his arm down and he must have pulled the trigger and then I grabbed the barrel of the gun and snapped it backwards to get it out of his hand. He swung at me and missed. And I got the gun and he, he turned and ran towards the front door and said I've got something for you motherf**er. I didn't mean to kill them. I didn't want to. I just wanted to scare them. I never shot my cousin.

Id. at 229-30. Ultimately, the evidence, both forensic and testimony, did not support Hambel's account, nor did it support a different, lengthier version of events that he offered to Detective Mitchell during a third interview the next day.

[17] In November 2018, Hambel was tried by a jury and ultimately convicted of two counts of murder and one count of criminal trespass. In sentencing Hambel on December 1, 2018, the trial court found two mitigating circumstances and five aggravating. The mitigators were Hambel's PTSD diagnosis and the substantial law-abiding life he lived before the murders.¹ The aggravators included: lack of remorse; the murders were committed in the presence of a fifteen-year-old; the “execution style” killing of Valerie, his cousin, followed by six shots to the back of Hobson; Hambel's threat to harm Sease if he told anyone; and Hambel “scoped out the place” two times that night before entering the house. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 3 at 104; Appellant's Appendix Vol. 10 at 46. The trial court sentenced Hambel to consecutive sentences of sixty years for each murder and one year for criminal trespass.

[18] On direct appeal, Hambel challenged his sentence as inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. This court disagreed:

[T]he nature of the offenses supports the 121-year sentence in that Hambel: planned the murders; shot [Valerie] in the head from close range; shot Hobson six times; and threatened to kill Sease if he told anyone about the murders. As for his character, Hambel may have been motivated to commit these murders by his concern about the drug problem in Washington County and his interest in helping law enforcement. But when he became a vigilante and took the law into his own hands, he displayed a blatant disrespect for the law, which reflects poorly on his character. We cannot say that Hambel's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Hambel v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1142, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[19] Hambel later filed a pro-se PCR petition, which was amended in March 2024 by appointed counsel. The amended petition alleged that Hambel's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not fully investigating or presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing of his permanent TBI. On July 12, 2024, Hambel moved for summary disposition pursuant to Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g).²

[20] In support of his motion for summary disposition, Hambel designated evidence that he was electrocuted at work in September 2014. Along with suffering serious physical injuries, he was diagnosed with PTSD, requiring psychotropic medications and ongoing psychiatric treatment. Hambel met with his psychiatrist weekly through August 2016 to address PTSD, anxiety, depression, panic attacks, paranoia, and anger.³ In 2016, Hambel also attended an anxiety/PTSD/depression group focused on overcoming anger and explosiveness.

[21] Further, Hambel designated a January 2023 independent psychological evaluation, conducted by neuropsychologist Polly Westcott. Westcott diagnosed Hambel with permanent TBI from the electrocution (and a 2006 car accident). She opined that the TBI resulted in impairments in Hambel's attention, concentration, processing speed, reaction time, and short-term memory. In her designated affidavit, Westcott summarized her findings:

27. Cumulatively, Hambel's recall of events is significantly affected by his brain injury which specifically affects his ability to take in and remember information. And Hambel has difficulty with processing information especially while stressed.

28. When presented with a stressful environment, Hambel cannot rationalize, adequately process, and judge appropriate behavior.

29. When faced with circumstances that evoke his emotions, Hambel is less able to think clearly and assess the consequences of his actions.

30. When Hambel is faced with a perceived threat, the combination of his TBIs and [PTSD] make his diminished rationalization and appreciation of wrongfulness even more pronounced.

Id. at 135-36.

[22] Hambel also designated the affidavit of Mark Clark, his lead trial attorney. Clark acknowledged that in January 2017, based on preliminary information from a psychologist retained by the defense, he became aware that Hambel had likely suffered TBI from the electrocution. Clark did not investigate Hambel's TBI further and did not present any TBI evidence or arguments at the sentencing hearing, despite knowing that a defendant suffering from TBI is a statutory mitigating circumstance. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(13). Clark acknowledged these failings were not strategic.

[23] The PCR court held oral argument on October 10, 2024, at which the State agreed with Hambel that the case was ripe for summary disposition because the material facts were not in dispute. After the parties presented their respective arguments, the PCR court took the matter under advisement. Five days later, Hambel filed a second amended PCR petition, which did not raise new claims or factual allegations but only sought to “clarify his Strickland prejudice prong allegations[.]” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 223.

[24] On November 18, 2024, the PCR court entered its order on summary disposition and denied Hambel's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on lack of prejudice. Hambel now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review 4

[25] In a PCR proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Lewis v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1144, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Because the PCR court denied relief here, Hambel appeals from a negative judgment and has the burden of showing that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the PCR court. See Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “It is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as contrary to law.” Id.

Discussion & Decision

[26] Hambel alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing. To prevail, he must show both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282-83 (Ind. 2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). Thus, if we can resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on lack of prejudice, which is often the case, we need not address the adequacy of counsel's performance. See Wentz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 351, 360 (Ind. 2002). Such is the case here.

[27] “To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Conley, 183 N.E.3d at 283 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotations omitted).

[28] When considering whether a defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing, “courts must determine ‘what effect the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence would have had on the sentence.’ ” Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting McCarty v. State, 802 N.E.2d 959, 968-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. We have observed that this is a difficult task: “Given the subjectivity inherent in the sentencing process, a reviewing court is hard pressed to conclude there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it been presented with additional mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have brought to light.” McCarty, 802 N.E.2d at 968.

[29] In this case, at sentencing, the trial court understood that Hambel had been electrocuted during a workplace accident in September 2014 which, in addition to physical injuries, caused him to suffer PTSD, depression, and anxiety.⁵ The court also knew that Hambel had been attending weekly individual and group counseling from December 2014 until his arrest, remained under the care of a physician to treat these diagnoses, and had been prescribed Celexa and Seroquel.

[30] Citing I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(13), the trial court found Hambel's PTSD diagnosis to be a mitigating circumstance. This provision provides that a court “may consider ․ as mitigating” that the defendant “has posttraumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, or a postconcussive brain injury.” Id. Hambel now argues that if counsel had provided the trial court with a fuller picture – that he suffered from TBI in addition to PTSD – there is a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence. We cannot agree.

[31] The designated evidence establishes that as a result of the electrocution Hambel indeed suffered PTSD and TBI, but that evidence does not explain the relevant distinctions between the two diagnoses. For example, he had mood changes after the accident and began regularly carrying a handgun – was that due to his PTSD or his TBI? While the statute places the diagnoses together into one statutory mitigator, Hambel does not explain to us why they should be considered separately.

[32] Moreover, as we read it, the trial court's oral sentencing statement makes clear that it did not give the PTSD mitigator much weight; the court simply noted “statutorily I believe I have to find that you have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 11 at 46. This was juxtaposed to the five powerful aggravating circumstances that the trial court described at sentencing. Of particular note, the trial court observed: “Two times that evening, you went over there. Two times you had that opportunity to turn away. First time you turned away but then shortly thereafter you went back.” Id. After “scop[ing] out the place,” Hambel went in the house and shot his cousin execution-style in the head and then shot Hobson six times from behind. Id. And Hambel showed no remorse for these killings or for what he put Josh and Logan through.

[33] We are confident that the designated TBI evidence would not have changed the trial court's calculus. Hambel's actions were cold and calculated before, during, and after the murders. This is not a situation where he made a rash decision while responding under stress or without time to deliberate. Rather, on his second trip, armed with a handgun that he did not believe would be connected to him and with his car running but lights out, Hambel waited until Josh and Logan were tucked away in their rooms and then moved in to quickly take care of his target, whom he dubbed “one of Washington County's biggest drug problems.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 9 at 21.

[34] Under the circumstances, Hambel has failed to convince us that he suffered any prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to present the designated TBI evidence at sentencing. Accordingly, he cannot prevail on his petition for PCR.

[35] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Hambel was twenty-nine years old at the time of the murders. He had one brush with the law as a juvenile but none as an adult. The trial court did note, however, that Hambel had admitted abusing drugs in the past.

2.   This rule provides:The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the petition when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court may ask for oral argument on the legal issue raised. If an issue of material fact is raised, then the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as soon as reasonably possible.

3.   According to his father, Hambel's attitude changed after the electrocution, and he “became forceful, violent, possessive, began carrying a handgun everywhere, and acted like he was the protector of everyone.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 129 (Timothy Hambel's affidavit designated in support of PCR).

5.   This information was referenced three separate times in the presentence investigation report, and Hambel spoke openly about this accident and his resulting mental health issues during his recorded interviews with Detective Mitchell, which were entered into evidence at trial.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Brown and Tavitas concur. Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.