IN RE: A.H. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.S. (Mother) and B.J. (Father) appeal the trial court's order adjudicating their two children, A.J. and A.L.J., as Children in Need of Services (CHINS); Mother also appeals the adjudication of her third child, A.H., as a CHINS. Together, they raise the following restated issues:

I. Whether the order adjudicating A.H., A.J., and A.L.J. (collectively, Children) as CHINS is clearly erroneous;

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding the admission of one of Father's exhibits; and,

III. Whether the trial court fundamentally erred by not sua sponte appointing a genetics expert and continuing the factfinding hearing.

Finding the order adjudicating Children as CHINS is not clearly erroneous, the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the evidentiary matter, and no fundamental error occurred, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) have two children together: A.J., born in January 2023, and A.L.J., born in January 2024. Mother has a third child from a previous relationship, A.H., born in May 2017.¹ Parents never married and, at all relevant times, did not reside in the same household. Parents were the sole caregivers for Children: Mother was the primary caregiver, but Father also cared for Children as needed and on weekends.

[3] Other than being jaundiced, A.L.J. was born healthy, and there were no complications from her birth. Between January and February 2024, Mother took A.L.J. to the emergency room (ER) multiple times. An abdominal x-ray of A.L.J. taken at one ER visit returned normal, and the provider noted that “everything ․ falls within normal variation for newborn behavior.” Ex. Vol. I p. 126. However, Mother said she and Father “were told” by medical personnel there was “[t]rapped gas” in A.L.J.’s abdomen. Tr. Vol. II p. 203. Parents found a gastroenterologist who examined A.L.J. and recommended Parents use a specific formula for infants with acid reflux.

[4] In March, A.L.J. was diagnosed with colic and with gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), and Parents were instructed to “bicycle” A.L.J.’s legs to relieve her symptoms. Id. at 205. Normally, Father bicycled A.L.J.’s legs. Mother observed him doing so and did not have concerns about Father's method. On March 7, however, Children's pediatrician, Dr. Lara Weeks, examined A.L.J. and observed bruising she described as “two linear streaks on the left side of [A.L.J.’s] abdomen.” Id. at 17. Mother told Dr. Weeks the bruises were from Father bicycling A.L.J.’s legs too hard, which concerned Dr. Weeks because she would “never expect [a baby] to develop bruising” from bicycling the legs. Id. at 18. Dr. Weeks also examined then one-year-old A.J. and observed a bruise on his ear. Mother indicated A.J. fell often from learning to walk, but that explanation also concerned Dr. Weeks because she did not expect to see bruising on a soft surface like an earlobe from short-distance falls.

[5] On May 10, Dr. Weeks saw A.L.J. for a routine checkup. Mother reported A.L.J. seemed to have developed right leg pain that occurred with movement, starting about a week earlier. Dr. Weeks ordered an x-ray that revealed a “right ․ distal femur fracture.” Id. at 21. Because it was “very unusual” for a non-mobile child to have that injury, Dr. Weeks instructed Mother to take A.L.J. to the ER for further evaluation. Id. at 23. Dr. Weeks believed it was more probable than not the fracture was sustained due to the omission of a caregiver.

[6] At the ER, Physician's Assistant (PA) Daniel Damm ordered a full body x-ray of A.L.J. that revealed multiple fractures—a fracture to each femur, ten rib fractures, and a wrist fracture—all in various stages of healing. PA Damm applied a splint to A.L.J.’s right leg. The right femur fracture was acute, which “typically ․ would refer to [having occurred] within the last ․ week or two.” Id. at 125. PA Damm believed A.L.J.’s injuries were non-accidental because it is uncommon for a child A.L.J.’s age to be able to “generate enough force to break a bone” and rib fractures are “typically seen when a child of [A.L.J.’s] age is squeezed or shaken.” Id. at 124. Accordingly, he made a report about A.L.J. to the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS).

[7] DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Regan Yonker and a Lafayette Police Department detective investigated the report. Medical personnel told FCM Yonker that A.L.J.’s injuries were consistent with nonaccidental trauma. Parents gave no explanation for the injuries and maintained they were A.L.J.’s only caregivers. DCS immediately removed A.L.J. from Parents’ care.

[8] The next day, FCM Marissa Cook went to Mother's home to see A.H. and A.J., and they appeared “active, healthy, [and] free from visible marks or bruises.” Id. at 175. However, DCS removed them from Parents’ care on May 13, because no explanation was provided about A.L.J.’s injuries and DCS was “unable to ․ say that the other two children were safe.” Id. at 176.

[9] On May 14, DCS filed a petition alleging Children to be CHINS. That same day, the trial court held combined initial and detention hearings and authorized the continued removal of Children from Parents. A.H. and A.J. received skeletal exams and x-rays, which returned normal with no current or past injuries. A.H. was also forensically interviewed and did not report any inappropriate discipline by or concerns about Parents.

[10] DCS referred A.L.J. to the Riley Children's Hospital Child Protection Team for evaluation, and Dr. Leah Garvin, a board-certified pediatrician and child abuse pediatrics fellow, examined A.L.J. on May 29. Mother and A.L.J.’s paternal grandparents attended the appointment and expressed their concerns about A.L.J. possibly suffering from “a bone disorder such as osteogenesis imperfecta [(OI)].”² Ex. Vol. II p. 11. Dr. Garvin ordered x-ray imaging and blood work and reviewed A.L.J.’s medical history, including the x-rays from May 10.

[11] Following her review, Dr. Garvin confirmed A.L.J. had ten rib fractures, a fracture of each femur, and a right arm fracture. A.L.J.’s blood work revealed that she had “very slightly low” parathyroid hormone (PTH),³ but Dr. Garvin opined that alone did not explain the fractures. Tr. Vol. II p. 75. She also found “no signs of bone demineralization or abnormal bone appearance[.]” Id. Ultimately, Dr. Garvin concluded “nothing on [A.L.J.’s] lab[s] ․ explained” the fractures and determined A.L.J.’s “injuries [were] the results of inflicted injury or non-accidental trauma.” Id. at 74-75.

[12] In addition, Dr. Garvin determined that even if A.L.J. had OI, her injuries were inconsistent with how OI typically presents. OI would not initially cause bruising then multiple fractures. Normally, children present with OI right after birth—with broken bones from the trauma of birth—or later in childhood once they are mobile. Dr. Garvin explained most children with OI present “very rarely [with] more than three fractures” and “[n]ormal care [of an infant with OI] should not cause multiple fractures[.]” Id. at 76, 78.

[13] Based on her findings, Dr. Garvin recommended ongoing DCS-directed safety planning for A.L.J. because “a child living in a home where suspected or confirmed maltreatment is occurring is at risk for ongoing and escalating injury.” Ex. Vol. II p. 16. She also opined there is an increased risk that other children living in the home “are victims of the violence and physical abuse themselves.” Tr. Vol. II. p. 80.

[14] Sometime in June, Parents changed A.L.J. to pediatrician Dr. Kaitlin Thomas, who ordered additional blood tests to evaluate A.L.J. for OI. The results showed A.L.J. had a “variant of uncertain significance” in one gene, which “could be ․ benign” or “if pathogenic, [A.L.J.] could be a carrier of the disorder[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 32. Importantly, Dr. Thomas concluded these results “are not a diagnosis” and referred A.L.J. for further testing by a genetic provider at Peyton Manning Children's Hospital. Id. at 29. However, the genetic provider “declined” to do further testing. Tr. Vol. II p. 219.

[15] Before the factfinding hearing, DCS made preliminary service referrals for Parents and Children, including home-based case management and supervised visitations occurring at Parents’ homes or in the community. Based on her observations during visits, case manager and visitation supervisor, Alison Cortes-Rojas, had concerns about Parents’ education on food safety, including ensuring food was sized so that one-year-old A.J. would not choke. Ms. Cortes-Rojas also had concerns about Mother's “[i]nappropriate expectations” of seven-year-old A.H., such as Mother getting upset when A.H.’s clothes got stained during the day. Id. at 143. When Ms. Cortes-Rojas attempted to talk to Mother about these concerns, Mother would “shut down” and “wasn't open to the conversation.” Id. at 145. A.H.’s school attendance was also concerning: she had over sixty absences and twenty tardies the previous school year. One morning while this CHINS case was pending, Mother planned to keep A.H. home from school because A.H. fell and busted her lip. Ultimately, DCS had to transport A.H. to school.

[16] The trial court held a three-day factfinding hearing on July 10, August 8, and September 5, 2024. On the second day of factfinding, when Father moved to admit a medical record (marked as Exhibit B), the court was first notified that A.L.J.’s placement providers, paternal grandparents, had taken A.L.J. to the ER on July 24 for a potential new injury. DCS objected to the admission of Exhibit B because it was neither certified nor authenticated, which CASA joined. The court briefly went off the record and held a sidebar with the parties’ counsel. Dr. Garvin, who was on the stand, left the courtroom. After going back on the record, the court declined to admit Exhibit B for purposes of the factfinding hearing.

[17] However, because the court was just informed about a potential new injury to A.L.J. occurring during the pendency of the CHINS case, the court paused the factfinding hearing and initiated a placement review hearing to determine whether Children were safe in the paternal grandparents’ care. Parties did not object to the court considering Exhibit B for purposes of a placement review only. At the court's request, Dr. Garvin re-entered the courtroom and assisted the court in interpreting the medical record. She opined that the “periosteal reaction” noted in Exhibit B could be from a healing fracture or new growth; so, the result of whether A.L.J. had a new injury was “indeterminate[.]” Id. at 114. The court then “resume[d] Fact Finding evidence for purposes of the Fact Finding[.]” Id. at 116.

[18] On October 25, the trial court adjudicated A.L.J. a CHINS based on her injuries resulting from nonaccidental trauma. A.H. and A.J. were also adjudicated CHINS based on the increased risk of injury to them from being in a home where another child was injured by nonaccidental trauma and concerns for parenting skills and A.H.’s education.

[19] The trial court issued its dispositional order on October 28. In pertinent part, the court ordered Parents to complete a parenting assessment, participate in home-based case management, participate in individual counseling, and participate in supervised visitation with Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. The CHINS adjudications of Children were not clearly erroneous.

[20] Mother and Father allege the evidence does not support the conclusion that Children are CHINS. Specifically, Mother argues that Children were not seriously impaired or endangered and that coercive intervention is not necessary. Father contends the court's conclusion was erroneous because: the court “misappli[ed] ․ a higher evidentiary standard or burden for a ‘diagnosis’ of [OI] ․ which operated ․ to improperly shift the evidentiary burden” from DCS to Parents; the evidence did not support that coercive intervention is required; and the court “improperly weigh[ed] genetic evidence that could account for A.L.J.’s injuries” Father's Br. p. 5. Parents do not challenge the court's findings of fact.

A. Standard of Review

[21] In reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, “we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility” but consider only the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). Where, as here, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we consider “first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 578 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We reverse only if the CHINS determination was clearly erroneous, which occurs if “the record facts do not support the findings” or the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[22] The trial court found Children to be CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. In pertinent part, DCS was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: Children's physical or mental conditions were seriously impaired or endangered by Parents’ inability, refusal, or neglect; their needs were unmet; and their needs were unlikely to be met without coercive intervention of the court. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g. denied; Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 (2019); Ind. Code. § 31-34-12-3 (1997). A.L.J. was also adjudicated a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-2(a), which required DCS to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that A.L.J. was seriously endangered due to injury by Parents’ acts or omissions and had needs that were unlikely to be met without the court's coercive intervention. See I.C. § 31-34-12-3.

B. Evidentiary Burden

[23] Father argues that the trial court erroneously required Parents to prove A.L.J. had diagnosis of OI; that a “ ‘diagnosis’ is a very high evidentiary burden to meet[;]” and that such a requirement imputed a higher evidentiary standard of proof of either clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt on Parents. Father's Br. p. 23. He also maintains the court “improperly shifted the evidentiary burden for a diagnosis” from DCS to Parents. Id. But the construction of Father's issue misconstrues the evidentiary burden and rebuttable presumption applicable to A.L.J.’s CHINS adjudication.⁴

[24] As to A.L.J., DCS invoked Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4 (Presumption Statute), which provides:

Sec. 4. A rebuttable presumption is raised that the child is a child in need of services because of an act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian if the state introduces competent evidence of probative value that:

(1) the child has been injured;

(2) at the time the child was injured, the parent, guardian, or custodian:

(A) had the care, custody, or control of the child; or

(B) had legal responsibility for the care, custody, or control of the child;

(3) the injury would not ordinarily be sustained except for the act or omission of a parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(4) there is a reasonable probability that the injury was not accidental.

“Once this showing is made, the rebuttable presumption that a child is a CHINS applies to all the statutory CHINS elements in chapter 1, including the coercive intervention element.” Matter of K.Y., 145 N.E.3d 854, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted), trans. denied. “DCS need only produce some relevant and admissible evidence tending to establish the elements of the Presumption Statute in order to shift the burden of production to the parents or custodians.” Ind. Dept. of Child Servs. v. J.D., 77 N.E.3d 801, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans denied.

[25] Here, DCS produced sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the Presumption Statute and shift the burden of production to Parents: A.L.J. suffered numerous fractures in various stages of healing; Parents—by their own testimony—had exclusive custody and control of A.L.J.; Dr. Weeks opined the injuries were very unusual for a nonmobile child; Dr. Garvin indicated the injuries were not consistent with OI nor with normal care of a child who was diagnosed with OI—which A.L.J. was not; and multiple physicians, including Dr. Garvin, concluded the injuries were likely the result of inflicted injury or non-accidental trauma.

[26] As to Parents’ burden to rebut the presumption—the court never placed a burden on Parents to prove A.L.J. had a diagnosis of OI. Rather, as the State explains, “if Parents believed that the diagnosis would explain Child's injuries, it was their evidentiary burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Child having OI rebutted the presumption.” Appellee's Br. p. 27. Parents claimed, both at trial and on appeal, that A.L.J. has or could have a disorder, OI, that caused the injuries. But the trial court—who is “in the best position to evaluate the evidence”—did not determine that Parents’ testimony or evidence about a possible genetic defect was credible enough to rebut the presumption. See Matter of K.Y., 145 N.E.3d at 863. Instead, based on other sufficient evidence in the record, the court found “[t]he extent of injuries suffered by [A.L.J.] would not be seen ․ even if the child did have [OI]” and “[A.L.J.’s] injuries [were] the result of nonaccidental trauma.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 51. It was reasonable for the court to conclude that Parents failed to rebut the presumption, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Matter of K.Y., 145 N.E.3d at 859, 863.

C. Seriously Endangered

[27] Mother asserts the court erred in concluding Children were seriously endangered simply because “[t]here was no evidence in the record that would support [that] finding[.]” Mother's Br. p. 14. Mother's argument is not developed beyond this statement. The record, however, contains ample evidence to support the conclusion that A.L.J. was seriously endangered: A.L.J. sustained fractures to her arm, both femurs, and multiple ribs; Parents did not provide a plausible explanation for A.L.J.’s injuries; Parents adamantly asserted they were the only caregivers for A.L.J.; and Dr. Garvin concluded the injuries resulted from non-accidental trauma. Dr. Garvin's conclusion that A.H. and A.J. were at risk of violence and physical abuse because they live in a home where suspected or confirmed maltreatment occurred to A.L.J. was sufficient to show they were also seriously endangered by being in that environment. See K.B. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[T]he CHINS statute does not require the juvenile court and DCS to wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene; rather, a child may be determined to be a CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition is endangered.”).

D. Coercive Intervention

[28] Parents challenge the court's conclusion that coercive intervention is necessary. Trial courts consider the family's condition both when the case was filed and at the time of factfinding to determine if coercion is necessary. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580. “Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already corrected them.” Id. at 581. Although Parents did not rebut the presumption as to A.L.J., which applies to the coercive intervention element, we address coercion as to the adjudication of all three children. See Matter of K.Y. at 861 (presumption applies to the coercive intervention element).

[29] In support of her argument, Mother emphasizes that “[P]arents were in the process of getting a medical evaluation to show that the most likely cause of the injuries could have been a genetic mutation.” Mother's Br. p. 14. Similarly, Father claims Parents were “consistently seeking medical treatment ․ to explain A.L.J.’s injuries” and “once a genetic predisposition towards brittle bones was discovered,” coercion was unnecessary. Father's Br. p. 19. Parents’ arguments are invitations to reweigh evidence and judge the credibility of Parents’ testimony, which we will not do.⁵ In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78.

[30] The unchallenged findings and evidence most favorable to the judgment show: A.L.J. sustained multiple injuries from non-accidental trauma while Parents were her sole caregivers; Parents never acknowledge the cause of the injuries and continuously assert that A.L.J. has OI—but the record clearly indicates she does not have this diagnosis; and the risk of injury to A.H. and A.J. is increased because of the injuries to A.L.J., another child in their home. Moreover, Parents “[hadn't] been really compliant with home-based case management” and showed concerning expectations during supervised visits. Tr. Vol. II. p. 143. This evidence supports the court's conclusion that coercive intervention is necessary “to ensure appropriate services are accepted and implemented to prevent additional harm to any of the children.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 51.

E. Weight Given to Genetic Evidence

[31] Father maintains the court “failed to adequately consider, and properly weigh, the genetic explanation for A.L.J.’s osseous injuries.” Father's Br. p. 22. He also asserts the court erroneously adjudicated A.L.J.’s siblings as CHINS for the same reason—that the court failed to give proper weight to the genetic evidence. Father's argument is a direct request for this court to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78.

II. The court did not abuse its discretion by not admitting Exhibit B.

[32] Mother alleges the trial court erred by not admitting Exhibit B during factfinding but then considering Exhibit B “as part of a placement hearing[.]”⁶ Mother's Br. p. 13. DCS objected to Exhibit B's admission because it lacked foundation through certification or witness testimony; the court sustained DCS's objection and did not admit Exhibit B. Mother notes a court may exclude relevant evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 403 but concludes her substantial rights were affected.⁷

[33] “The admission of evidence is a matter entrusted to the trial court's sound discretion.” In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. We reverse only if the court abused its discretion, which occurs if the court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. “[E]rrors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the fact finder to determine whether the admission of evidence affected a party's substantial rights. Id.

[34] Here, the record marked as Exhibit B was offered to show “an additional fracture” in A.L.J. from an emergency visit that took place during A.L.J.’s placement with relatives. Tr. Vol. II. p. 106. However, after the court paused the factfinding hearing to discuss Exhibit B in the context of a placement review hearing, Dr. Garvin testified that Exhibit B referenced a “periosteal reaction” that could be from either new growth or a healing fracture, meaning the results were “indeterminate[.]”⁸ Tr. Vol. II p. 114.

[35] The probable impact of Exhibit B—a record failing to definitively show whether A.L.J. suffered a new fracture after removal from Parents—upon the fact finder would have been minor. Other cumulative evidence showed A.L.J. did not have a diagnosed bone disorder and Parents did not have an alternate explanation for A.L.J.’s injuries. Therefore, the court's refusal to admit Exhibit B did not affect Mother's substantial rights; any error was harmless. See also Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023) (the probable impact test controls a determination of harmless error; “the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding[.]”), reh'g denied, cert. denied.

III. The court did not fundamentally err by not sua sponte appointing a genetics expert and continuing the factfinding.

[36] Relying on Indiana Evidence Rule 614(a), under which a court “may not call a witness except in extraordinary circumstances or as provided for court-appointed experts,” Father contends the trial court's failure to appoint a genetics expert and continue the factfinding on its own motion was fundamental error.⁹ He alleges the “court relied on testimony from medical experts, who were not experts in [OI], to improperly weight [sic] the genetic explanation for A.L.J.’s condition[.]” Father's Br. p. 25. We disagree.

[37] The extremely narrow doctrine of fundamental error is only available “when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Matter of E.T., 152 N.E.3d 634, 639-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted), trans. denied. To reverse, “the error [must have been] so egregious and abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should not have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve the error for appeal.” Id. at 640 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

[38] “The appointment of experts is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1383 (Ind. 1996), reh'g. denied, cert. denied. Whether to appoint an expert must be made “in the context of the case” and “only a clear abuse of ․ discretion will move as a denial of due process.” Schultz v. State, 497 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ind. 1986) (quoting Himes v. State, 403 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Ind. 1980)).

[39] Here, Father did not request that the court appoint an expert at the court's expense, and the court did not identify such extraordinary circumstances to call an expert witness on its own motion. See Ind. Evidence Rule 614(a). The court heard expert testimony from three medical doctors who all opined that A.L.J.’s injuries were likely caused by nonaccidental trauma. And Dr. Garvin, a child abuse pediatrics fellow, testified that even if A.L.J. did have a bone disorder, her opinion would have been the same—that A.L.J.’s injuries were intentionally inflicted. The trial court was within its discretion to rely upon the expert testimony already before it and not appoint another expert. Father provides no authority to the contrary, and we find none.

[40] Additionally, “[a]t all times the trial court must maintain an impartial manner and refrain from acting as an advocate for either party. A violation of due process occurs where a trial judge combines the roles of judge and advocate.” Chappey v. Storey, 204 N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotes omitted), trans. denied. Contrary to Father's argument, the court was not required to, and indeed should not have, become an advocate for Father by appointing an expert or continuing the factfinding on its own motion. No fundamental error occurred.¹⁰

[41] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.H.’s father is deceased.

2.   Dr. Garvin testified “osteogenesis imperfecta, often called OI ․ is an inherited disorder ․ which can often lead to [varying] degrees of bone fragility.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76.

3.   Dr. Weeks testified parathyroid hormone is “a hormone that's important for ․ calcium and vitamin D ․ metabolism. [I]f someone's calcium level were to be low, the parathyroid gland would produce more hormone and that would lead to a resorption of calcium from the bones and increase ․ intake of calcium from the gut and also ․ increased resorption of calcium by the kidneys” Tr. Vol. II p. 37.

4.   Father's issue statement alleges generally that the court's “CHINS adjudications” were clearly erroneous because of his perceived evidentiary burden issue. Father's Br. p. 23. But Father's argument on this issue only discusses A.L.J.’s adjudication based on her injuries. Accordingly, we address this argument as it applies to A.L.J.’s injury-based adjudication only.

5.   Despite conceding that the facts in In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1283, are distinguishable, Father relies on the S.D. court's reasoning. He asserts that A.L.J. does have a “serious genetic/medical condition that cannot be corrected, even with coercive intervention of the court,” so the CHINS adjudication is erroneous. Father's Br. p. 17. Here too, Father's argument invites this court to reweigh the evidence and find that A.L.J. does have a genetic cause for her injuries; again, we decline this invitation.

6.   In her brief, Mother references “Father's Exhibit D” but describes the circumstances of the court's denial as to Exhibit B. Mother's Br. p. 13. And Father's Exhibit D was admitted. It appears that Mother's reference to Father's Exhibit D is a scrivener's error. We therefore consider the court's denial as to Exhibit B.

7.   Under Indiana Evidence Rule 403, a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

8.   Mother mentions sans argument that the court considered Exhibit B for a “placement hearing that popped up” during factfinding. Mother's Br. p. 13. No error occurred. The record clearly indicates the court paused the factfinding hearing and removed witnesses from the room to initiate a placement hearing. The court explained to Parents and their counsels that it could not consider Exhibit B for the factfinding but “would like to be able to [consider it] as to the safety, and well-being, and the placement of the children[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 111. Parents confirmed they had no objection. Moreover, a pre-adjudication placement hearing, unlike a factfinding hearing, is “a preliminary juvenile matter to which the rules of evidence do not apply.” L.H. v. State, 878 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(2)); see also N.L. v. State, 989 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ind. 2013). Therefore, the trial court was permitted to consider the uncertified medical record for purposes of the placement hearing.

9.   Father characterizes his issue as the court failing to “stay[ ]” the factfinding. Father's Br. p. 5. But, as the State notes, stays are used to pause proceedings to enforce a judgment. See Ind. Trial Rule 62. In context, it appears Father is arguing that the court should have recessed or continued the factfinding on its own motion.

10.   Father concludes his fundamental error argument by asserting, without analysis, “[t]his fundamental error amounts to a due process violation.” Father's Br. p. 26. Due process requires the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner, and turns on the balancing of three factors: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012). Because the State and a parent both have substantial interests in CHINS proceedings, the analysis turns on risk of error. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). We agree with the State that the risk of error was low here, where Father was represented by counsel, had the opportunity to cross examine the State's experts, and had the opportunity to present his own experts or ask for a continuance. No due process violation occurred.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges May and Weissmann concur. May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.